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PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

EXECUTIVE SESSION HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
The Hughes-Rebozo Investigation, and Related Matters
WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 8, MARCH 16, 20, AND 21, 1974

Book 21



Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
Concord, New Hampshire 03301

ON DEPOSIT

MAR 6 - 1975

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(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)



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[Executive session hearings released to the public after the filing
of the final report of the Senate Select Committee.]

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**PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
THE HUGHES-REBOZO INVESTIGATION, AND
RELATED MATTERS**

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1974

**U. S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
*Washington, D.C.***

[The following testimony of Mr. Ehrlichman on the Hughes-Rebozo Investigation and Related Matters is a continuation of the executive session hearing of February 8, 1974, appearing in books 16 and 18.]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Ehrlichman, I would like to ask a couple of questions. Just before the period October 1971, when Newsday did a series on Mr. Rebozo, do you recall asking Mr. Fielding if he would come down to Key Biscayne and talk with Mr. Rebozo?

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN J. WILSON, COUNSEL**

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could you give us the background to how that request occurred?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. That occurred as a result of the President's request to me, that I talk with Mr. Rebozo about a conversation that Rebozo had had with the President in which he had—Rebozo had indicated that he was probably going to file a libel action, and the President was concerned about it for his friend, and didn't want to see him going off half cocked and just asked, as an accommodation, to sit down with him, and so, on the occasion of a trip when we were already there. I went around to his office and sat, and talked with him about it for awhile. There were questions there that I couldn't answer. I mean, there were technical questions that came up, and some of them involved improprieties on the part of Government officials, specifically, as I recall National Park Service, something to do with the Everglades National Park and so on, and Rebozo felt that he had been libeled. I was concerned from two standpoints, one, whether the charges were true or not from the standpoint of the internal operations of the Government. The other was where Rebozo might be getting himself into a situation—where he was

going to get himself into a law suit that would be of disadvantage to us both, to him and the President. So on my return, I asked Fielding to go down and find out as much as he could about those transactions and he talked to Rebozo, he talked to him about the law suit. He talked to—I think people in the Government down there.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. OK. Do you recall—I am not sure I understand the reference to the nature of the improprieties on the part of Government employees?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, the Newsday service, I recall, had various allegations that implied undue influence on Rebozo's part, or undue solicitation, or on the part of Government people because of his friendship with the President, and things of that kind.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. This is in the sale of the property?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. I am a little vague on this, but as I recall it had to do with title insurance, and where business had been done with this title insurance, and the National Park Service and the national parkland down there and also something to do with a park on an island down there in which he did, or did not have interest or some such thing. Well, he felt that that was libelous, that he had not influenced anybody with the commission of a crime, that he was going to sue. I was concerned for him and I was also concerned with the fact of whether there was in fact, improprieties, but it was not anything that I had anything to do with, in terms of my official responsibilities. Fielding did so, he was dispatched.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is my understanding that Mr. Fielding requested on the occasion of his meeting with Mr. Rebozo, certain documents relating to, among other things, I think Fisher Island, the stock transactions on Fisher Island.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Requested of him?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Of Mr. Rebozo, and Mr. Rebozo forwarded them to you with a cover letter, do you recall that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, but it could have been.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is my understanding the cover letter made reference to a conversation that the President had had with you regarding the fact that the documents should not go to anyone other than yourself, and should either be destroyed or returned to Mr. Rebozo when their use was included. Do you recall that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall any discussion with the President on the subject of Fisher Island?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Oh sure, we had a number of conversations about Fisher Island, but I don't recall that about the documents.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall a discussion with the President on the subject of how the redemption price for his stock was agreed upon at \$2?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. That was pretty much left to Rebozo and a lawyer named Wakefield to work out within the corporation, but beyond that I don't recall any specifics.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But, at the time of the Newsday article, you don't recall any?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, the Newsday article had in it—yes, I do recall something. Now, let's see who told me this. I guess Rebozo told

me. The Newsday article had something in it about a disgruntled stockholder who claimed they had been blackjacked into giving more money than the thing was worth. And Rebozo explained that the guy was a Democratic hack, who was down there and obviously making a false statement for political purposes and that he was of bad repute in the community, and so he filled me in and attempted to impeach this guy on the basis of his past conduct and so on.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But there was—was there any discussion as to how the price was arrived at—the \$2 was arrived at per share?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I think—I don't know who told me this or how I knew it, but it seems to me that they had a shareholders' meeting, or a meeting of the board, I forget which, and they determined it on the basis of market. I am the wrong one to ask how they did it. There were conversations though in response to the charges that this fellow had made.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But, at the time of the Newsday article this was not a matter of great concern to you?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall discussions of a corporation known as Condev, C-o-n-d-e-v, which Mr. William Rebozo, Mr. Charles Gregory, Rebozo's nephew was involved in?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Or that Senator Smathers was involved in—that Condev provided the money for an operation to buy Fisher's Island; purchased the operation for \$300,000; and, given the opportunity to—that money was the money which, in turn, the President was able to redeem his shares with?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, I don't think I have heard that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Let me leave that area. The second area of concern we had was—

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Oh, wait a minute now. I want to be as complete as I can. It seems to me that somebody told me that there was an offer and that that offer had made the market, in effect, which determined the price that would be paid. Now, whether that is the offer or not, I don't know, but I think I was told that at the time of the redemption the offer was still pending, and that they had considered that offer as sound basis for the determination of the market price.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, you don't remember the discussions. Was the offer or at least the deposit—the offer to buy providing the capital allowing the President to redeem his shares. You don't recall discussions on that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, did there come a time when Secretary Shultz informed you that the Internal Revenue Service was about to conduct an investigation of Mr. Rebozo—at least a preliminary tax audit of Mr. Rebozo's finances?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I am not sure it came from Shultz, I think it came from Barth in the office of the counsel there.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Would it have been approximately February 1973?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It could have been, sounds reasonable.

Mr. PLOTKIN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall if you related this information you had received from Mr. Barth to anyone else?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, he asked me to call Rebozo or—or I say asked—it came out of the conversation that I should. He asked me how to go about it. I guess is the way. It was a sensitive thing from their standpoint, because of Rebozo's closeness to the President. And I said, "Well, I will be glad to call him and arrange it."

Mr. ARMSTRONG. To facilitate the initial contact?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. They didn't want an audit, they wanted an interview, as I recall.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did Mr. Barth relate to you what the substance of the interview was to be?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It had to do with—it arose out of the Hughes Task Force in Nevada, and it had to do with whether or not Rebozo had received funds from the Hughes organization, or an offspring or entity or something. I have forgotten what it was, but they had had representations from Maheu or one of those people, that they had paid money to Rebozo and they wanted to track down and make sure that it wasn't taxable or, one or the other, that it was.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And did you contact Mr. Rebozo about that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And did you relate to him about what the interview would cover?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And is that the first occasion that you discussed the \$100,000 contribution?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I don't think even the number was used.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you tell him what the funds would be used for?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I told him what the agent would be interested in.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is that the first conversation you had with Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And was the President aware of this phone call and advice?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you ever inform the President that there was to be an IRS interview with Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I don't believe so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you ever find that anybody else independently informed the President?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, did Mr. Barth, or Secretary Shultz, or anyone else subsequently inform you of the progress made by the Internal Revenue Service on that issue?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Mr. Barth informed me later that the contact had been successfully made and that was all. In other words, that there had been no problem in arranging it. He thanked me for intervening or whatever.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And did he discuss what the substance of that interview was?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you ever come to understand what had transpired?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you have any source—independent source—of knowledge as to the nature of the transaction between Mr. Danner and Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. PLOTKIN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Let me point out—we got into the substance of what the investigation was going to be about.

Mr. WILSON. When you repeat the substance, you just——

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I apologize if it is in anyway repetitive.

Mr. WILSON. Excuse me for interrupting.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Prior to recent press accounts, did you have any knowledge of Mr. Rebozo receiving a \$6,000 payment from the Florida, Nixon for President committee in April 1969?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. When you say prior to recent press accounts. I don't think I even caught up with the press accounts. I never heard of this.

Mr. WILSON. It is new to me.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Were you aware of Mr. Rebozo contributing any money—Mr. Rebozo having given Mr. Kalmbach any money which in turn went to Mr. Ulasiewicz?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. At what time?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. This would have been in April or May 1969. I am sorry, I don't have the exact date in front of me.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Gee, I don't remember anything like that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, I guess it would have been a little later, maybe more like July, around the time Mr. Ulasiewicz started. I don't want to pin you down as to dates.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I just can't. It is a subject I just don't recall hearing anything about.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You mention that there was a meeting in August 1972 at Mr. Rebozo's bank where you met Mr. Rebozo—do you recall the purpose of that meeting in 1972, in August? Did you discuss with him any other libel actions that he was about to file?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well you have pinned that down to a date, and I am not—without looking at a log or something—I am not sure of the date. It is my recollection that the purpose of the meeting at his bank was to discuss this Newsday series and whether that was August 1972 or when it was. Anyway, it was while that series had just finished, it was right close after that. Was that August 1972?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. October 1971.

Mr. LACKRITZ. The series was in October 1971.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Oh, it would have been a short time after the series ended, I would think.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So the meeting in August 1972 at the bank would have been about this same libel concern?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, it wouldn't have been.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, if it wouldn't have been about that, do you recall what that might have been about?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. August 1972. That's convention time?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right. It would be after the convention.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. After the convention? It wouldn't be likely, because we took off after the convention. I don't think it would have happened. I very well might have gone over there during platform week, prior to convention. I may well have done—but it would have been—I can't imagine what it was about offhand. I was living over there on Key Biscayne at the time. I may just have dropped in to say hello, even if I did that. Because what I was doing, was commuting from Key Biscayne to Miami Beach for the platform.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. But in terms of discussion about the possible libel action, that would have just occurred right after the news article?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Right.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Second, when you informed Mr. Rebozo back—when you called him in relation to the request of Mr. Barth, what was Mr. Rebozo's response to you?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Very open, very willing. He said he'd be happy to do so—he said, "Should I have an attorney present?" and I said, "That's something I can't answer for you because I don't know any of the answers."

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did he discuss any of the substance of any of the information that was involved?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. I got the impression that he had an explanation that he wanted to get it on the record, so to speak.

Mr. LACKRITZ. There is one other question that came up as a result of notes. You said that Mr. Colson had a political interest in Mr. O'Brien that you were concerned about?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And you mentioned at one point that Mr. Colson came to you with some information about some information that O'Brien had about organized crime figures in Buffalo?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall what that was?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It was a tip that O'Brien had flown to Buffalo and met with representatives of the racetrack or betting syndicate or whatever. I can't be terribly specific about it. He had some names of people and so on that—and that he suspected from the fact of that meeting, that there would have been no legitimate purpose for the meeting and, undoubtedly, O'Brien must have been on the take from the gambling interests. Now, I don't know whether he ever pinned it down or whatever came of it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ever hear about this again or was this just an isolated instance from Mr. Colson?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Oh, I heard about it several times. He repeated his suspicions several times.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But he never pinned it down?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I have no knowledge.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you have any knowledge if any of these in-

stances were connected with any of the organized crime families? What do you use for colloquial terms?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I don't think so, not that I was aware of.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did the name Sam Giancana come into it at all, do you recall?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. It was a name that I never heard before.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did any other context of O'Brien with organized crime contacts come up on any other occasions with Colson?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, not that I recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How about by any other?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. As I say, that would have been the only reference of O'Brien contacts like that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Two short ones. At about the time that Secretary Shultz became the Secretary of the Treasury, do you recall a conversation with the Secretary regarding an ongoing tax investigation against Hughes Tool Co. which involved Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you recall what information you had available to you and from what source, about the nature of that investigation?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I had a sensitive case report from the IRS about that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At the conclusion of that investigation, did you have a conversation of that investigation, did you have a conversation with Secretary Shultz, Commissioner Walters and Mr. Barth; a conference call from the Secretary's office—

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Not a conference call. I talked to them all on the phone and the Commissioner was there in his office at the time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you recall for us the nature of that conversation?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes. He was reporting to me that the audit had been completed and that it had disclosed no improprieties or delinquencies and as far as they were concerned the matter was closed.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And what was your response to that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. OK. You know, there it is. My concern was throughout, that the IRS down in the woodwork was delaying the audit until after the election and that seemed to be the case, that there was a stall on because when the sensitive case report came in, I said, "Aha, when are you going to audit him?" Well, they had 75 well-selected reasons why they should not audit him and they weren't having any of the same reasons with regard to Republicans at that time and I thought there was a little unevenhandedness and, I am talking to the Secretary now, "George, your guys are being lopsided. Here is a probable cause for auditing O'Brien and it's apparently not going forward and we can read in the paper everyday about audits of Republicans. Now how come?" And he said, "Well, I will check in on it." He checked into it and he came back and said—he had a whole list of why he shouldn't be audited right now: "His son is sick, he's out of town. They can't find the books." And I said, "Are you satisfied with that?" And he said, "No." And I said,

"Well, neither am I." And I wanted them to turn up something and send him to jail before the election and unfortunately it didn't materialize.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. On the occasion when Commissioner Walters was through with the audit and there were no improprieties, do you recall discussing with Commissioner Walters that either they had been stalling the audit—

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You had a discussion with him too?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. You are darn right. It was my first crack at him. George wouldn't let me at him. George wanted to stand between him and his Commissioner and this was the first time it—I had a chance to tell the Commissioner what a crappy job he had done.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And did you suggest that they reopen the audit at that time?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. They told me it was closed; so there wasn't any.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you accept it as a fate of happening?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Other than the O'Brien one, was there any other information you had about the Hughes IRS investigation going on in Nevada at that time?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, it was a very long report and involved a lot of other people.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did it make any mention of Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And do you recall if you discussed that information with Mr. Rebozo at anytime prior to the time when Barth indicated they wanted to?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. You see, when it came over, it came over with a note from Barth saying that, "I need to talk to you about this." and so I immediately called him and he said at that time, "I need to have a green light on interviews with Rebozo and Don Nixon." And so I said, "You know, OK. I think from my standpoint it is indicated I will give you the green light if you are satisfied with that."

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And that was—go ahead. I'm sorry.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. And he said, "Well, this is a little touchy. I am a little concerned about how we make these arrangements because" he said, "I don't want to get crosswise with the White House" and that's what lead to my calling Rebozo.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And this was at the time that you received the first sensitive case report regarding Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I believe so, yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. As it turned out there was approximately a year from the time Mr. O'Brien was first investigated to when Mr. Rebozo was investigated. Do you recall what might have caused that delay at the time?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And what is your best recollection for the time period when you called Mr. Rebozo about the fact that the IRS would like to see him?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I don't have one. It would have been more or less contemporaneous with my receipt of that report.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And it certainly would have been prior to the election and prior to——

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Right. I would assume so. Now, the only thing that slows me down, is that I was getting continuous sensitive case reports about that Hughes investigation and it would have been contemporaneous with the receipt of the one that related to Rebozo, whenever that was.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. All right. But it would have been prior to the time when the O'Brien audit ended?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I don't know with relation to that, I can't fix that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You can't place that in time?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I can't fix that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That's all I have.

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the committee proceeded to the consideration of other matters.]

SATURDAY, MARCH 16, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room G-334, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Present: Terry Lenzner, assistant chief counsel; Marc Lackritz, assistant counsel; Emily Sheketoff, research assistant.

Mr. LACKRITZ. This is an executive session, which is the continuation of Mr. Jack Caulfield's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.

If there are no objections from counsel, we will continue the executive session this morning in the absence of a Senator.

Mr. SEARS. There are no objections.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, just for the record, again this morning, I would like to briefly go back over how you were hired by Mr. Ehrlichman in the White House in 1969, if you could, please.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN J. CAULFIELD, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN P.
SEARS, COUNSEL

Mr. CAULFIELD. You have that in the 26-page statement.

Mr. SEARS. Let's go off the record a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Back on the record.

I will repeat the question: You were hired, as I understand it, by Mr. Ehrlichman in the spring of 1969?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, shortly after you were hired, did there come a time when Mr. Ehrlichman called you in his office and requested you to place a national security wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. On whom was this national security wiretap to be placed, Mr. Caulfield?

Mr. CAULFIELD. On Mr. Joseph Kraft.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And did Mr. Ehrlichman give you any explanation why he wanted you to arrange for a wiretap, rather than going through the standard agency of the Federal Government?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He indicated this was the way it had to be done; he didn't go into any heavy specifics, but he indicated it was a national security matter of top priority.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did he explain to you why he couldn't go through the agency?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, he indicated—I had suggested to him this would properly belong in the purview of the Federal Bureau of

(9687)

Investigation, and he indicated that the FBI was a "sieve", and the matter would have to be handled in the manner he was suggesting—in the manner he was directing.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did he give you any indication of the source for the national concern?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have trouble recalling exactly what the specifics were; the only thing I recall is that he made a reference to Cambodia.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall what the reference to Cambodia was?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I do not; but I do specifically recall he mentioned the national security matter had to do with the Cambodian situation. He did not ever explain those specifics to me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. When was this meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The best I recall, it was in June of 1969.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And did you agree to follow Mr. Ehrlichman's direction and implement a national security wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I agreed to evaluate the directive—see if it could be done.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, sir. Could you explain what you did after you left Mr. Ehrlichman's office?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I contacted Mr. John Ragan subsequent to the meeting and advised him of the directive. And I requested that he and I confer with the view toward seeing that the wiretap would be implemented.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, who was Mr. John Ragan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Ragan was the chief of security at the Republican National Committee.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And had you known Mr. Ragan from before?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I had known him since 1968—the campaign.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ragan have the capability of implementing wiretaps?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, Mr. Ragan was a former employee of the FBI, and was knowledgeable in the area of wiretapping during his tenure at the FBI.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. Do you know how long he had been in the FBI?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I know he retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I have no idea how long a tenure that was.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ragan have any wiretapping capability that was used in the 1968 campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; Mr. Ragan's function in the 1968 campaign was the countermeasure security expert. In other words, his role would have been to insure the integrity of the communications system of the traveling campaign staff.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you mean by that explanation that he had a defensive sweeping capability?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is one way of putting it, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What was Mr. Ragan's reaction when you contacted him about this project for Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I am sure he would have preferred that it be handled through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I im-

pressed upon him, as it was impressed upon me, that it was a matter of high national security priority.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ehrlichman indicate to you that his instructions had come from the President?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not that I can specifically recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you assume that his instructions had come from the President?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is a tough question, and I can't say one way or the other.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, I take it you did not assume that Mr. Ehrlichman had authority to order national security wiretaps himself.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Say that again?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you assume that Mr. Ehrlichman did have the authority to order national security wiretaps?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, you are talking now about June of 1969, and frankly, I'm not so sure—I was not so sure at that time exactly how the Federal system worked in terms of implementing national security wiretaps. I know now. But at that time I would be hard put to make a determination on the spot as to whether or not Mr. Ehrlichman could, in his capacity as, I think, then counsel to the President, authorize a wiretap.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. So, at the time Mr. Ehrlichman requested you to implement this wiretap you did not have a clear understanding of the national security wiretap procedures.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So then you must have assumed that Mr. Ehrlichman, or somebody Mr. Ehrlichman had talked to, had authority to authorize national security wiretaps.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's an assumption, but I am not so sure that I made it on the spot when I was directed to institute the wiretap.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right.

Mr. SEARS. I think it is fair to say that he assumed there was authority residing somewhere, who authorized this.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did Mr. Ragan come down to Washington to meet with you subsequent to that——

Mr. CAULFIELD. Subsequent to the directive, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Had you ever used Mr. Ragan prior to this time to implement any wiretaps of any kind?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Never.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Have you used Mr. Ragan since that time to implement wiretaps of any kind?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Never.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, what did you and Ragan do when he came to Washington?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, we went out and took a look at the residence of Mr. Kraft with a view toward ascertaining whether or not such a wiretap could be instituted in a discreet manner.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And how did you try to ascertain that; did you physically observe the premises—walk around?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Physically observed the premises and respected the judgment of Mr. Ragan who had, as I indicated, previously been

engaged in that type of work while at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did you reach any conclusions as to how the wiretap could be implemented on Mr. Kraft's home?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I do recall going back and speaking with Mr. Ehrlichman and indicating that it was a very difficult type of wiretap to install because of the neighborhood in which Mr. Kraft's house was located in Georgetown.

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Would you read back the last response?

[Record read.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you say anything to Mr. Ehrlichman about the difficulty of implementing the tap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I did.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What was his reaction?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He said it would have to be done, in substance.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So, he directed you to go ahead and carry out the tap. Was there any discussion with Mr. Ragan about the need for getting the parent cable numbers of the telephone lines?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ragan request you to obtain that information for him?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't specifically recall whether he requested, or we both came to an agreement, a consensus agreement that that would be necessary for him to proceed, if he were to proceed. At that time there was no hard judgment made that we were going to go ahead and do it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. But after you spoke with Mr. Ehrlichman, I take it he directed you to go ahead and implement the project.

Mr. CAULFIELD. He indicated he wanted it done, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you then secure the information of the pairs and cable numbers for Mr. Ragan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, I was able to do that.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And how were you able to do that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I contacted a personal friend of mine; and I prefer not to mention his name.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, I think for the purposes of the record we would like to identify the individual. I believe that individual was in the Secret Service; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, that may well be, but at this hearing I prefer not to mention his name.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, let me put it this way: This record is at the present not for public release; the committee at some later time may wish to vote to release the testimony given here this morning. If in fact the committee decides to release the testimony you will have the opportunity of deleting information that you feel is not appropriate to be released to the public.

But at this time it is appropriate to have you state for the record the individual from whom you received——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I can't do that. I have had trouble with this par-

ticular area in other forums, and I steadfastly maintained that I don't think that's important because the individual who provided the information was totally unaware of the reasons for the wiretap.

It was done as a favor to me. It is a person of lifelong friendship and I will not have his name dragged into this. He was totally unaware of just what the specifics of this matter were.

Mr. SEARS. Can we go off the record?

Mr. LENZNER. Let me say one thing on the record before we do that. The significance as we see it is not whether he knew, or didn't know, what the purpose of that information was; but the question of why he would give you, as a member of another agency, that kind of information. That seems to me to be entirely appropriate for this committee to have some legislative review on.

Mr. SEARS. Now let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Back on the record.

The discussion off the record related to the need on Mr. Caulfield's and Mr. Sears' part to not disclose the name—how many agents are we talking about?

Mr. CAULFIELD. One agent.

Mr. LENZNER. One agent who furnished this information to Mr. Caulfield. As I understand it, if Senator Ervin is agreeable, the name of that individual will be forwarded to Senator Ervin in a letter from Mr. Sears and Mr. Caulfield, with Senator Ervin's discretion to use that information as he sees appropriate; and the letter will indicate that they prefer it not be disseminated widely, I assume.

Now, for the record, was the agent who furnished you that employed by the Secret Service?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Shall I indicate it at this time?

Mr. SEARS. Yes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. The answer is "Yes".

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right. Did you explain to this individual from the Secret Service that that was a matter of national security?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Let's go off the record here.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. The question was, did you explain to this individual that this was a matter of national security that you were requesting his assistance on?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you explain what specifically you were doing on behalf of Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I did not.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. And this individual obtained the pairs and cable numbers for you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How did he obtain them?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no idea how he did it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did he get them from a friend of his?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm not certain whether or not that happened.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Do you recall telling Mr. Lenzner and myself on September 11 that this individual got the pairs and cable numbers from another friend of his?

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. CAULFIELD. Give me the question, again.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I think the question was, did you recall telling Mr. Lenzner and myself on September 11, 1973, that a friend of this individual—a friend of this individual who is also in the Secret Service got the pairs and cable numbers and gave them to this friend, who gave them back to you; he got them from another friend also in the Secret Service.

Mr. SEARS. I think he recalls telling you that he thinks that's what happened, but of course he has no direct knowledge of how this individual went about performing this task.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Just to clarify that, you recall telling that to Mr. Lenzner and myself, but you are not now presently sure that is in fact how the information was obtained?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I have never been absolutely sure how the information was obtained. What I say—I believe that what I said on the 11th is the way it happened.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Was there any question raised by you or Mr. Ragan concerning proper credentials for the individual who would be installing the wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall who raised this question?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think it was Mr. Ragan.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what did you do in response to that concern?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I recall, he indicated that he would need credentials of some type if he were to perform the wiretapping. He indicated that if we could obtain telephone company credentials it would insure the discretion of the assignment. With that in mind, I arranged to have Mr. Ragan supplied with a telephone company card, installer credentials, as I recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Where did you get those credentials?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. John Davies of the White House staff was able to provide those credentials.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How did you decide to go to Mr. Davies? Were you instructed by anyone to see Mr. Davies?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I recall, I discussed it with Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Ehrlichman made arrangements for me to speak with Mr. Davies.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So, Mr. Ehrlichman was aware of the difficulty in securing proper credentials for the individual who would be installing the wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What was Mr. Davies' responsibility? What were his responsibilities in the White House?

Mr. CAULFIELD. At the time he was the tour director on the White House staff.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And was it normal procedure to obtain such credentials from Mr. Davies—did he do that on any other—

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, Mr. Davies had a background in telephone work, as I recall; I think he was formerly with A.T. & T.

Mr. LACKRITZ. On any other occasion, subsequent to this occasion, did you request identification credentials from Mr. Davies?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if Mr. Davies had any communication with Mr. Ehrlichman himself on this matter?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm not sure. It is possible, but I can't say for sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Did either of the individuals indicate to you they had been in touch with each other?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't know that for a fact. I could assume so, based on the fact that Davies agreed to provide that information because it was a national security matter; he stated that when he turned the card over to me, that he was, in fact, doing that because it was a national security matter. And I certainly concurred because that was my understanding of the whole affair, also.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell Davies that you were assigned the task by Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I must have.

Mr. LENZNER. So, the answer is "Yes"?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. I get the impression that you had the impression that Davies and Ehrlichman had been in touch with each other.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's my impression; yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Anything specific that you base that impression on?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No. I don't have any specifics; but reviewing it in my mind, that is my assumption.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any information that Davies previously furnished the same kind of help to Mr. Ehrlichman or others in the White House?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no information about that at all.

Mr. LENZNER. Except that Mr. Ehrlichman did suggest to you that Davies would get it for you; so at least he knew that Davies did have access to that kind of stuff.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, John Ehrlichman was as aware as I was that Mr. Davies had a high-level background in the American Telephone and Telegraph Co.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ehrlichman indicate to you how the individual who was going to install the wiretap should be paid?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no recollection how that was handled, if there was any payment at all on that whole matter.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you know if there was any payment at all?

Mr. CAULFIELD. My best recollection is that there wasn't.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did Mr. Davies get the identification card for you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Subsequently he did, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And then, did you turn it over to Mr. Ragan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes. I did.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And then, how did Mr. Ragan implement the wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Off the record a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. On the record. Would you read the last question.

[Question read.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, let me ask you this: During what period of time did these events occur—how long a period of time from when Mr. Ehrlichman requested you to implement the tap to the time of your obtaining the telephone installer's card for Mr. Ragan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I have no hard way of remembering the specific area of time. The best I can recall it was within the area of 2 to 3 weeks.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see, and did Mr. Ragan go ahead and implement the wiretap, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. CAULFIELD. At a subsequent time, after we initially discussed the directive Mr. Ragan came to me and indicated that he had gone ahead with an individual from New York, whom I do not know. He indicated that he had installed a device on a pole in the rear of Mr. Kraft's home in Georgetown.

Now, this was contrary to my involvement in this thing. In other words, what I am saying is, he went ahead and instituted—apparently instituted a wiretap without telling me he was going to go ahead and do it, along with an individual from New York.

He turned over to me a tape which he said—he indicated they had some success in connection with the wiretap.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Were you involved in the installation of this wiretap?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I was not.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. So, you were not present when the actual device was placed on the telephone wires?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't know for a fact that the device was placed on the telephone wire; I was not there; I was not present—if one was installed. OK?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Ragan came to me and said that they—I don't know the name of the other individual—had placed a device on a pole at the rear of Mr. Kraft's home; and presented me with a tape, saying they had some success with it.

Now, I have never listened to that tape; I have subsequently destroyed it. Again, I want to repeat that Mr. Ragan went ahead and did install this device, apparently, without checking with me, or going ahead and asking me about it before he did it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, were you ever asked by anyone to stop the wiretap, or take the wiretap off?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; John Ehrlichman came to me around the same time as Mr. Ragan apparently installed the device and indicated in connection with the directive to install the device that I was to desist from it.

I indicated to Mr. Ehrlichman that I hoped it hadn't gone too far, knowing that Mr. Ragan was exploring the possibility of installing a device—I'm trying to get the sequence in my mind. Subsequent to that I went to Mr. Ragan and told him to desist from any further activity in that area.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ehrlichman indicate to you why he wanted you to desist?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He indicated that it was going to be handled by the FBI.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Then, after Mr. Ehrlichman asked you to desist you went to Mr. Ragan and asked him——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I told him to forget the whole thing, that it was going to be handled by the FBI.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what was his reaction?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He said, "OK."

Mr. LACKRITZ. But prior to that time he had provided you with a tape recording from the listening device?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have trouble, deep trouble trying to recall the sequence of events. In fact, I have trouble recalling where he presented me with the tape. The best I can recall it was in a hotel here, the Congressional Hotel; exactly when that happened I have difficulty recalling.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But in other words, it was sometime around——

Mr. CAULFIELD. It was sometime around the time that Ehrlichman was saying to drop the matter, it was going to be handled by the FBI.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. As you recall Mr. Ragan met you at the Congressional Hotel and turned over a tape to you.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I believe it was at the Congressional Hotel. The best I can remember I was meeting Mr. Ragan at the Congressional Hotel, and I think at that time he presented me with the tape.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you explain to Mr. Ehrlichman, when Mr. Ehrlichman came to you and asked you to desist, that in fact the tap had already been implemented?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I never mentioned to Mr. Ehrlichman that the tap had been implemented.

Mr. LACKRITZ. When you received the tape from Mr. Ragan, did you turn that over to Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, he never saw the tape.

Mr. SEARS. Can we stop here just a moment so we are sure we got that straight on the record here?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Back on the record.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I want to repeat that Mr. Ehrlichman never saw that tape; I never listened to the tape. I indicated before that I destroyed the tape. I never listened to what was on it, if there was in fact anything on it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you have anyone transcribe the contents of the tape?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; I never listened to it and I never had anyone transcribe it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you know if anyone else listened to it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You didn't give it to your secretary to listen to, or give it to someone else in your office?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Nobody else.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did Mr. Ragan describe what was on the tape to you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, if you mean—I think, as I recall, he said there was some conversation on the tape, and it was not Mr. Kraft, as I recall. Now, that's all I recall about it.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying that when Ehrlichman told you the FBI was going to do it, you did not know at that time that Ragan had already recorded some information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Say that again.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying now when Ehrlichman told you the FBI was going to handle this thing, you were not aware at that time that Mr. Ragan had already gone ahead and put the tap on?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct, not absolutely aware. As I say, the time sequence of when this occurred was so close, I don't recall whether or not Ragan had come to me at this particular time, or immediately thereafter.

Mr. LENZNER. And how long after you got the tape did you destroy it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Within a month, or two.

Mr. LENZNER. And how did you destroy it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Put it in the burn bag in the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. And was there any reason why you didn't listen to it, or wanted to know what the information was that was on it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I had no reason to believe there was anything on it of any significance, according to the way Ragan described it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, it strikes me strange, as I understand the story, Ehrlichman came to you and told you there was some urgency about getting this done; didn't he say that at the beginning?

Mr. CAULFIELD. At the beginning, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And he didn't want the FBI to do it because they were a "sieve".

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And suddenly, you get the tap put on and get a tape, and you don't tell Ehrlichman what's on the tape, and you don't listen to the tape.

Mr. CAULFIELD. When you say "sudden"—I just explained here that the tap was put on by Mr. Ragan, and he did not even check with me before he went ahead and did it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, regardless whether he did, or didn't, when you learned he had a tape you didn't take that to Mr. Ehrlichman, nor did you——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I never told Mr. Ehrlichman we had a tape, never.

Mr. LENZNER. Why was that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. When he told me to desist, I was very happy that the whole matter was over. As I indicated initially, I felt this was a matter that should have been handled by the FBI, and so indicated to him in strong, no uncertain terms. It was presented to me as a high national security matter that had to be done in this way; this is the way he wanted to have it done.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he indicate to you under whose instructions he was——

Mr. CAULFIELD. He did not.

Mr. LENZNER. He did not indicate to you that he discussed this with the President?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. At any time?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not that I recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he indicate to you at any time why Mr. Kraft was going to be the target of this?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I indicated to Marc, I have difficulty remembering specifically what he said; but I do recall that it had to do with Cambodia.

Mr. LENZNER. Did it relate, to your recollection, to the trip that Mr. Kraft was taking, or was about to take?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No. I learned subsequently that Mr. Kraft was in France, but I had no way of knowing that at the time.

Mr. LENZNER. You learned it from the news media?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if Mr. Ragan ever put on any other taps?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have had no other business with wiretapping with Mr. Ragan. I don't know what he has done, other than this.

Mr. LENZNER. Did anybody else at the White House ever ask you to do something of similar nature at any other time?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, to the best of your recollection you paid Mr. Ragan no money at all for his efforts?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall paying Mr. Ragan any money in connection with this.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ragan pay you any money in connection with this?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Pay me any money?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Why would Ragan pay me any money?

Mr. LACKRITZ. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you furnish equipment to Mr. Ragan for this?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not other than the card we discussed.

Mr. SEARS. Can we break for a few minutes while I go over some things, to speed this up?

Mr. LENZNER. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SEARS. For the record, I think it would be a good idea, since we have gone through various chronological points here with the questions that have been asked, if Jack could just in a narrative, perhaps, state his recollection of the sequence of the events that transpired in regard to the Kraft wiretap.

Mr. LACKRITZ. That's fine.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, we started with June 1969 when Mr. Ehrlichman called me in and indicated he wanted to—in a high national security priority matter—he wanted to have a wiretap installed on the home telephone of Joseph Kraft.

I immediately indicated to him that I felt, since it was a national security matter, that it would properly be within the purview of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He indicated that the FBI was a sieve, and that he wanted the matter handled in this fashion; he also indicated at that time—and I don't recall the specifics the matter related to—the Cambodian situation, which at that time was of deep concern in the country.

I subsequently contacted Mr. Jack Ragan of the Republican National Committee and indicated to him that I had this directive from Mr. Ehrlichman, it was a high priority national security matter, and they wanted a wiretap installed at Mr. Kraft's residence. Mr. Ragan and I went out and took a look at Mr. Kraft's residence, and we both came to a consensus agreement that it was a very difficult matter to handle, Mr. Kraft lived in a very prestigious area of Georgetown. I went back and spoke to Mr. Ehrlichman and reported that back to him.

He indicated that it had to be done, and I was to attempt to proceed to have the wiretap installed. I so directed Mr. Ragan to attempt to see what he could do with respect to the wiretap. I learned subsequently that Mr. Ragan went out and, with an individual from New York whom I don't know, apparently installed some sort of a device on the rear pole of Mr. Kraft's residence. Just about that time Mr. Ehrlichman called me in and said I was to desist in the matter, they had decided—he didn't indicate who—that it had been decided that the FBI was going to take care of the matter.

I went back to Mr. Ragan and we met at the Congressional Hotel, and I told him that I had been directed that we should no longer be involved in the matter. He said he and another gentleman, whom he did not identify, had had some success with the wiretap, and presented me with a tape which allegedly contained some conversation.

He, as I recall, indicated that Mr. Kraft was not on the wiretap, his voice was not on the wiretap, there was some conversation. As I recall it might have been a maid.

I took the tape back to my office and ran out part of the reel, approximately 30, 40, 50 feet, and destroyed that. Kept the tape in my office for about a month or 2, and subsequently destroyed both the remainder of the reel and the reel itself; put it in the burn bag in the White House.

Mr. SEARS. That's about it.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I did not, at any time, ever indicate to Mr. Ehrlichman there had been a tape in connection with his directive.

Mr. LENZNER. When you say you ran it out, Mr. Caulfield, what does that mean when you say you "ran" the tape out?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I took the tape, unwound part of the tape, I estimate maybe 40, 50 feet, and destroyed that shortly after it was given to me; within a day or 2. I kept the reel and the tape in my office and within a month or 2 thereafter decided to put the reel and the remainder of the tape as well into the burn bag.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, why did you destroy that 40, or 50 feet of it initially?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, Mr. Ragan indicated to me that there was a short conversation on the tape that he had given to me; I never listened to it. I estimated, just a calculated guess as to how much it would be, a minute or two, and destroyed that part of it. And then, subsequently, I put the reel and the remainder of the tape also in the burn bag of the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you able to tell from looking at the tape, the face of the tape where it was recorded on, and where it wasn't recorded on?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not able to tell.

Mr. LENZNER. You were guessing?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I was guessing, based upon his statement to me that there was a short conversation on the reel.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you listen to the remaining portion of the reel to determine whether or not you had, in fact, destroyed the entire conversation?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I never at any time listened to the tape.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, have you been responsible for getting Mr. Ragan employed with the Republican National Committee, following the 1968 campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And what were Mr. Ragan's responsibilities with the Republican National Committee?

Mr. CAULFIELD. His function was to be the chief of security at the Republican National Committee offices in Washington.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How long did he remain in this position?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Up to sometime in early 1972.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, did you and Mr. Ragan and Mr. Ulasewicz meet secretly during the early part of the administration?

Mr. CAULFIELD. We met from time to time. Mr. Ragan and I had lunch frequently in Washington whenever, as part of his duties, he would come down from New York for a day or 2 each week. And on frequent occasions we would have luncheon together in Washington.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see.

Mr. CAULFIELD. And on an occasion or two Mr. Ulasewicz, Mr. Ragan and myself had lunch together.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I believe credit records of Mr. Ragan indicate a number of lunches in 1969-70; what were these lunches about?

Mr. CAULFIELD. They were just social lunches. Mr. Ragan was a friend of mine, and as I say, frequently when he was in town a day or 2 we would have luncheon during the period that you mentioned.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ragan have any plans, or any desire to use Mr. Ulasewicz in an investigative capacity, as you recall?

Mr. CAULFIELD. There were conversations on one, or two occasions about Mr. Ulasewicz possibly doing some security work in connection with Mr. Ragan; Mr. Ragan being in the security business, and Mr. Ulasewicz being a licensed private detective. I don't think anything of any substance evolved from these conversations.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right. Mr. Ragan's business was in the security business. Do you have any knowledge of other jobs that Mr. Ragan was asked to do for any other corporations, or any other individuals?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I know Mr. Ragan traveled extensively in connection with his work. His prime area of employment, if you put it that way, was countermeasure expert for a number of major corporations; and I know that he traveled extensively.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you know if Mr. Ragan was employed by A.T. & T.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I didn't know at the time, I found out subsequent to that. I know that he traveled overseas on numerous assignments. Mr. Ragan was very careful about this particular area, what he was doing overseas; and the only thing I recall, one time he went to Chile.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you have any idea when that was, when he traveled to Chile?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I haven't got any idea.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you have any knowledge of the purpose of his trip there?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, but I assumed it had to do with his counter-measures expertise.

Mr. LACKRITZ. When you say "countermeasure expertise," do you mean defensive sweeping capability?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did you ever purchase any equipment for Mr. Ragan, any electronic equipment for Mr. Ragan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, I take it when we talked to you on September 11, 1973, we were making an effort to determine the purposes of some checks that Mr. Ragan had written to you.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. It is our understanding, Mr. Caulfield, that you are still attempting to refresh your recollection as to the purpose of those checks.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. I take it, then, at the time when you are able to determine the purpose of those checks, we will get into that matter.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK, just for the record, I would like to note that there are, I believe, approximately eight checks totaling roughly \$800; does that give you any help in trying to refresh your recollection?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If I can recall specifically what areas they dealt with, I will come back and be happy to notify the committee.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Fine. Now, did you in the White House, in your responsibility, have any responsibilities for overseeing, keeping tabs on the activities of the President's brother, Mr. F. Donald Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I would like to explain my area of involvement with respect to Donald Nixon. Sometime in 1969, I believe it was October of 1969, it came to my attention that Mr. Donald Nixon had visited the Dominican Republic with three other gentlemen; they were the guests of the President of the Dominican Republic, Balaguer. There were newspaper accounts of that visit in a Dominican newspaper, which I forwarded to Mr. Ehrlichman for his information.

Approximately a year later, and I have difficulty remembering the date, Mr. Ehrlichman contacted me and indicated to me that he wanted me to monitor a project which involved the U.S. Secret Service, the idea being that a wiretap was being placed on the telephone of Mr. Donald Nixon by the Secret Service with the view of ascertaining whether or not persons of unsavory character might be attempting to embarrass the President through his brother Donald.

My direction from Mr. Ehrlichman was to monitor the results of the Secret Service wiretap and report back to him any information of substantive nature which might indicate that the President's brother was being embarrassed, or attempts were being made to use Mr. Donald Nixon to embarrass the the President of the United States.

I did in fact confer with the Secret Service on this matter, and they reported to me verbally the results of the wiretap that was installed out in Newport Beach, and I reported back the general substance of the results of the wiretap.

After approximately 3 weeks the Secret Service people indicated there was nothing of any substance coming across the wiretap, and made a suggestion to me, which I concurred with, that the wiretap should be terminated. I so advised Mr. Ehrlichman, and he agreed it should be terminated. As I recall, the time frame was approximately a 3-week period. That would make it sometime in 1970, and I, for the life of me, can't remember the dates.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now, going back to the first information from which you learned of Mr. Nixon's trip to the Dominican Republic, how did you come across this information initially?

Mr. CAULFIELD. From Mr. Juliano, James Juliano, who was a sugar lobbyist for the Dominican Republic, brought it to my attention. There had been an article in the Dominican newspapers mentioning that Donald Nixon had visited the Dominican Republic. I asked him if he could get me copies of the newspaper carrying that story, he did; and I transmitted them to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you know that Mr. Ehrlichman at that time had responsibilities for overseeing Mr. Donald Nixon's activities?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I knew that was the way to get it possibly to the attention of the President, and I gave it to Mr. Ehrlichman with that in mind.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, prior to that, did Mr. Ehrlichman ask you to keep track of any information that you could learn about—

Mr. CAULFIELD. Prior to that I had no involvement with the President's brother, or keeping track of the President's brother, anything of that nature. This was just a piece of intelligence information that I felt belonged with Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. Do you have any recollection of any of the individuals who accompanied Mr. Nixon on the trip to the Dominican Republic?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I recall, there were three people, I think one of them was Mr. Meier—

Mr. LACKRITZ. Is this John Meier?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I believe John Meier and another gentleman from the Democratic National Committee—formerly of the Democratic National Committee.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Napolitan?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, Joseph Napolitan; and there was another gentleman and I can't remember—

Mr. LENZNER. Tony Hatsis, does that ring a bell?

Mr. CAULFIELD. It rings a bell, I can't say for sure. I remember Mr. Meier and Mr. Napolitan.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you become aware at some time that Mr. Ehrlichman had responsibilities to supervise F. Donald Nixon's financial activities?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I had no knowledge of Mr. Ehrlichman's supervising his financial activities. I knew if there were to be any problems arising out of Mr. Donald Nixon's associates, Mr. Ehrlich-

man would have been the one to transmit it to; but I had no specific information about Mr. Ehrlichman being charged with supervision of his financial situation.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you get any reaction to the initial memo from Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Other than interest, no. I mean, I am trying to recall; I remember transmitting it as a memo, and I don't recall if I had a conversation. I probably called him up and indicated that I had this, and I would send it over.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he indicate that he had already received this information with regard to this trip, and discuss that information with you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know what stimulated Mr. Ehrlichman's desire to have this project begun on Mr. Nixon's phone?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, that has always been a mystery to me, exactly why at that particular time. I can't recall the date, the best I can do is put it a year after the transmittal of the newspaper accounts. But what precipitated it, I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Was the tap placed on his home phone in Newport Beach?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's what I was led to believe.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever see the log of the surveillance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't believe I have ever seen the logs. What was shown to me by the Secret Service was some photographs of Mr. Donald Nixon at an airport.

Mr. LENZNER. Orange County Airport?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That rings a bell. Getting on a plane, or meeting some people at a plane. I do recall it was out in California, I didn't recall it was Orange County. And there was a question as to who these people were in the photograph. There was Mr. Nixon and some other people, and I just don't recall who they were, very frankly.

Mr. SEARS. But you did not see the logs of the wiretaps.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I didn't see the logs of the wiretaps. The assignment indicated that I would report to Ehrlichman anything of substance that was to come over the wiretaps. I had conversations with members of the Secret Service, and they would indicate to me what the substance of those conversations was. As I previously indicated, there was nothing of any substance that would have justified a continuation of the wiretap.

Mr. LENZNER. Was physical surveillance conducted of Mr. Donald Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall that there was some physical surveillance by the Secret Service. What it entailed, and how it was done, I do not know. But, I do recall some physical surveillance in the vicinity of the residence.

Mr. SEARS. I think it is fair to say that Mr. Caulfield assumed there was because of the fact he saw pictures and you would have to have physical surveillance to be able to take pictures. I don't know that he knows of his own knowledge just what kind of surveillance was going on; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would say that is substantially correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you receive information with regard to meetings Mr. Donald Nixon was having that didn't come off the wire?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If I did, I don't remember at this time. I recall one picture at the airport in California, I believe, of Donald Nixon with two, or three, individuals in the vicinity of a plane; that is all I remember about it.

Mr. LENZNER. And was that picture taken by a Secret Service agent, do you know?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I assume it was.

Mr. LENZNER. And it appeared in nature to be a surveillance photograph?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Again, I would have to assume.

Mr. LENZNER. You were not advised, or were you advised; or don't you recall whether it was a surreptitious photograph?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Just how the hell—I don't recall just exactly how it was presented. I remember being shown the photograph that was in a file having to do with Donald Nixon; and I assume it would have been a surreptitious photograph.

Mr. LENZNER. And was any effort made to identify the other individuals?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, the Secret Service was attempting to identify them; and if they knew who they were and told me, I don't recall who the persons were at this time.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, were you asked to make any effort to help identify them?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I may have expressed an interest in who they were, yes.

Mr. SEARS. The question was, were you asked?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Was I asked to identify them by whom?

Mr. LENZNER. The Secret Service.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not asked to identify them by the Secret Service.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you make any effort to show that photograph to anybody else?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. To Mr. Ehrlichman—it was not transmitted to Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If it was, it wasn't by me.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you later learn that Mr. Johnny Meier and Tony Hatsis were among the individuals at the airport?

Mr. CAULFIELD. See, I got a problem in this context, I associate Johnny Meier with the newspaper articles. Tony Hatsis' name rings a bell, but I don't tie it in to the photograph. My recollection would be that they would have been tied in with the visit to the Dominican Republic. Now, whether they were the individuals in the photograph, I cannot say here today.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of Mr. Ehrlichman having an FBI check run on Mr. Hatsis?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; I do not.

Mr. LENZNER. Was Mr. F. Donald Nixon aware of the physical, or electronic surveillance, to your knowledge?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no way of knowing that. Mr. Ehrlichman

didn't go into the specifics of what he considered to be the overriding interest in Donald Nixon, and I didn't inquire because I did not feel that was my area. My function was to keep Mr. Ehrlichman apprised of anything that appeared to be of substantive nature with regard to unsavory people connected—that might be connected with Donald Nixon.

Mr. LENZNER. How could you have identified them as unsavory characters?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would have hoped the Secret Service might provide me with that information.

Mr. LENZNER. Did they ever give you names of individuals they checked out and found to be unsavory?

Mr. CAULFIELD. They gave me the name of an individual, and I testified I tried to recall the name.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember whether the files were maintained by the Secret Service, or the White House?

Mr. CAULFIELD. They were Secret Service files.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you report verbally, or in writing to Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Verbally.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you know whether a file was maintained in the White House on Donald Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no way of knowing that; I didn't maintain a file.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know whether Rose Mary Woods maintained a file, or had any responsibility for F. Donald Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No knowledge at all.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you, yourself, have a file on F. Donald Nixon in your office?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not a file as such; I might have had a memo or two that I could have sent to Mr. Ehrlichman. But as to a file, I wouldn't classify it as a file. Probably the memos you have there.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Who were the individuals in the Secret Service that you were dealing with on this question of the surveillance of Mr. Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Off the record a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. CAULFIELD. Again I have the same problems, not as great as we discussed earlier with the Joseph Kraft matter. Could we do this, could we handle the names of these individuals in the same manner?

Mr. LENZNER. I have no objection to that, we will pursue that same course of action.

Mr. CAULFIELD. You can appreciate my concern in those areas.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me ask you this: Were you aware, at the time it was happening, of the meeting at the airport between F. Donald Nixon and the other individuals?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; I was not.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you later learn that the people in the White House were aware of it, and made an effort to determine who was meeting with Mr. Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm just trying to think and recall—I would say no, for the simple reason that there were probably conversations

going on about this matter which I was not privy to. I want to repeat, my function was just to transmit whatever information was given to me by the Secret Service.

Now, I don't recall ever having any conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman as to who the people were. It is quite possible there was an ongoing effort to identify them, but I didn't have any specific connection with that.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know whether Mr. Rebozo was consulted with regard to Mr. Meier and his relationship with F. Donald Nixon?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, my position in the White House would not have gotten me into that area, and it would not have been brought to my attention.

Mr. LENZNER. When Mr. Ehrlichman discussed that with you, did he indicate that he had also discussed the surveillance of his brother with the President?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, he did not.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you the person, then, that requested the surveillance from the Secret Service?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I don't recall requesting—the reason I am hesitating, I am trying to recall whether or not John Ehrlichman indicated he wanted a surveillance conducted, and I can't recall.

Mr. SEARS. Would it be fair to say the extent of your knowledge is that you were told to speak with the members of the Secret Service and monitor what they were doing?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. SEARS. That is the framework you learned about it, carrying out the orders.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is what I recall.

Mr. LENZNER. And you have no information as to who requested the Secret Service to conduct the surveillance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No. And so you understand why I am replying this way. I am trying to reconstruct this whole area, which I, again, cannot put in a solid time frame. My impression was, when I came into the picture, that there were conversations between the Secret Service and Mr. Ehrlichman; and my role and function was to monitor what had been established, and I so did. Now, as to whether I became involved in the request of initiating the surveillance, I have no recollection of it at this time.

Mr. SEARS. You don't recall requesting the surveillance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I do not. My recollection is that it was already established, from conversations, and I was not a part of that; that is my impression. I picked it up and became the medium for the transmittal of whatever had been established.

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Back on the record. Let me ask you, did you ever at any time discuss physical or electronic surveillance of F. Donald Nixon with Pat Boggs?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have trouble recalling that. I tried to recall, as I indicated with my attorney here, whether Mr. Pat Boggs was ever at any meetings in my office in connection with the Donald Nixon

matter. I recall other gentlemen being there, and we have agreed that that would be handled through letters with Senator Ervin. As to whether or not Mr. Boggs was present at that meeting, I do not recall. So, my answer is that I just don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. That suggests that he was not chief liaison on that project.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you at any time discuss with Pat Boggs the physical, or electronic surveillance of anybody?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No. That's a broad question, are you looking for anything specific?

Mr. LENZNER. Well, it's a broad question.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. SEARS. Not to your recollection.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would like you to repeat the question.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you at any time discuss with Pat Boggs the physical and/or electronic surveillance of any specific individual? I'm not talking about general discussions on how to surveille people, but specific discussions of surveillance of specific individuals.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Now, the reason I am thinking about this, some of my functions at the White House had to do with law-enforcement nature. I got involved in many areas of law enforcement with the Secret Service, administratively, in connection with the executive protective service; and it is possible that on occasion I might have discussed an ongoing case of importance that the Secret Service might be working on. So, I qualify the answer that way. I had a lot of ongoing activities with Mr. Pat Boggs over the 3 years that I was at the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I am talking aside from legitimate investigative efforts. I am talking about surveillance of political figures; surveillance of F. Donald Nixon; surveillance of Joseph Kraft, surveillance of that nature.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I never discussed the surveillance of Joseph Kraft with anyone other than Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House. Mr. Boggs and I had quite a bit of contact on the demonstrations and the antiwar groups in the vicinity of the White House; but as far as political figures, the answer would be "no."

Mr. LENZNER. Well, in regard with the demonstrations, did you have discussions about physical or electronic surveillance with regard to people involved in demonstrations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, by that I mean I was the liaison at one time for the White House. At one time most of my time in the White House was in connection with antiwar activities. When you mention Secret Service, that would have to do with the security at the White House complex. I would be designated White House staff member to be present at the command post at the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. I understand that. My question was, did you ever discuss with Boggs the physical or electronic surveillance of, say, leaders of demonstrations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I have a few questions about the purpose of this project that the Secret Service was implementing. As I understand,

Mr. Caulfield, the Secret Service had placed this electronic surveillance on Mr. Nixon's home phone to determine if there were any individuals who might be in contact with Mr. Nixon, who might subsequently be an embarrassment to the President; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is the sum and substance, as I understood it, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And that was the primary substance of the surveillance, as you understood it.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes. Now, I want to qualify that this way: As I indicated earlier, I was not privy to any decisionmaking which would have precipitated this ongoing interest in Donald Nixon. I took particular note of the fact that there might have well been a number of things happening with respect to Donald Nixon that properly did not belong in my area, or that I should have knowledge of. I accepted that and performed my role as I was directed by Mr. Ehrlichman.

Now, it may well be that there were all kinds of things going on, and I have no knowledge of them.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Sure, but I am limiting my question now to your assignment. Your assignment was to insure there were no unsavory characters who attempted to use Mr. Nixon.

Mr. CAULFIELD. My function was to forward to Mr. Ehrlichman the results of this wiretap that was being conducted out there in California, see, if there was any information that would be indicating that persons of unsavory nature were involved with Donald Nixon; that was the substance of the assignment.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now, were you aware of any other wiretaps that were placed, of similar nature, during your tenure at the White House?

Mr. CAULFIELD. In the context with political figures?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Or relative to the President.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Were you aware of any other physical surveillance that was implemented on relatives of the President, or other individuals that were close to the President's family?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Were you aware of physical surveillance implemented by the Secret Service of an individual named Michael Gill?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I know the name Michael Gill, and I know he is a relative of Mrs. Eisenhower. I know of no surveillance, or any activity in connection with him.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Ehrlichman ever ask you to participate or oversee, or keep tabs on a project concerning Mr. Gill?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The only thing about Mr. Gill that I can recall, early after arriving at the White House there was information that he might have been associated with some people from Zambia. I recall either sending a memo to Mr. Ehrlichman, or speaking with him about the associations with Mr. Michael Gill. Mr. Michael Gill was considered to be a potential source of embarrassment to the White House.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Ehrlichman direct you to follow up on this memorandum that you sent to him, concerning Michael Gill?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall specifically. I do recall—associate the name Michael Gill with an association with some people from Zambia, and that is all I recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you direct Mr. Ulasewicz to conduct an investigation of Mr. Gill, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. CAULFIELD. To the best of my recollection, no; but I want to qualify it by saying that if Mr. Ehrlichman asked me to conduct an inquiry with respect to Michael Gill in Zambia, that it's quite possible, but I have no specific recollection.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, were there other efforts to investigate any of Mr. Donald Nixon's financial transactions, to your knowledge?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no specific recollection at the moment.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever request from the Security and Exchange Commission information with regard to companies that Mr. Nixon was dealing with?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no recollection of that at all.

Mr. LENZNER. Does the name Hallamore Homes mean anything to you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No other than what I read in the papers.

Mr. LENZNER. You never did any investigation of Hallamore Homes?

Mr. SEARS. Not that you recall.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall reading about Hallamore Homes in the paper, regarding Donald Nixon; but I have no specific recollection of conducting an investigation.

Mr. LENZNER. Or seeking any information for Mr. Ehrlichman, or others on Hallamore Homes?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I want to be very careful because when I saw that article in the paper about Hallamore Homes a bell rang; and if I did conduct an investigation it would have been a pro forma-type thing. I want to be careful if there is a memorandum laying around indicating that I had something to do with Hallamore Homes. It is possible, but I have no recollection about it at this time.

Mr. LENZNER. How about Separation and Recovery Systems, Inc.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. It means nothing to me at the moment.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, now we can turn to some of the substantive investigations you were asked to conduct during your period of employment at the White House.

Do you recall when you were first asked to investigate the background and/or activities of Mr. Larry O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I got a vague recollection of making some inquiries of people with respect to Larry O'Brien, but as to specifics—

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall who asked you to make the inquiries?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I don't recall who, but it's quite possible that Mr. O'Brien obviously, as a member of the opposition party—it's quite possible there was some intelligence information provided to members of the staff. I do recall specifically one instance when—I remember asking Mr. Ulasewicz to conduct an inquiry about him. I'm pretty sure it's probably on paper somewhere. I don't remember what the specifics were, I'll have to have my memory refreshed.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, at this time I would like to have marked for identification for purposes of today's executive session this 8½

by 14 folder, containing 31 tabbed files, each containing a series of documents. I would like to have this marked as exhibit 1.

[The documents referred to were marked Caulfield exhibit 1 for identification.*]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, before we get into the specific documents themselves, Mr. Caulfield, do you recall being asked to conduct an investigation of an organization called Public Affairs Analysts, with which Mr. O'Brien might have been associated?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That rings a bell. Again, I would have to see a memorandum to refresh my recollection.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me just ask you a general question. Do you recall whether Mr. Colson requested specific investigations of Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Of me, for me to become involved in it? The answer is no to that because I didn't deal with Mr. Colson except only in one area.

Mr. SEARS. If I might clarify this area. In the vast majority of cases, and it might even be in all, as far as Jack can't remember exactly all the so-called investigations that were done. He got his orders at first from Mr. Ehrlichman, and then at a later date from Mr. Dean. He would not know, however, the substance of what he was asked to do, whether it was suggested by other parties or not.

So, when questions are asked about Mr. Colson, or other people at the White House, in regard to their interest in any of these things, as I said, in the vast majority of cases, he did not know whether they provoked the investigation by calling Mr. Dean or Mr. Ehrlichman; or whether they were the ultimate recipients of whatever he would send back to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Mr. LENZNER. It is my recollection that on a prior occasion, Mr. Caulfield recalled that he heard from either Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Dean, that Mr. Colson was the one who wanted this investigation done.

Mr. CAULFIELD. In some instances, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. That's what I wanted to get on the record. I also think you said at some point that on occasion you learned from either Ehrlichman or Dean that Mr. Colson wanted some investigations.

Are you also aware of the fact that sensitive case reports from the Internal Revenue Service were being transmitted to employees at the White House?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, let me put it this way: I knew there was a sensitive case-reporting procedure between the White House and—I should correct that; between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. That was a procedure that was established in prior administrations and was continued during the current administration.

Now, I have no first-hand knowledge as to whether or not the procedure established between the IRS and the Secretary of the Treasury, in fact, went over to a similar reporting procedure to members of the White House Staff; I had nothing to do with that.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying you are not aware that sensitive case reports were transmitted on a fairly regular basis, or at least on occasion to the White House?

*See p. 9738.

Mr. CAULFIELD. As a formal——

Mr. LENZNER. I don't care whether it was formal, or informal, that information of the reports was transmitted.

Mr. CAULFIELD. What I am saying is that I had, specifically, nothing to do in that area. I know there was an individual at the Secretary of the Treasury's office who was responsible for receiving the sensitive case reports from the IRS and transferring them on a regular basis to the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Kennedy, Secretary Connally, and Secretary Shultz, I assume.

Whether that was also transmitted to high-ranking members of the White House staff, I can only make assumptions; but I have no first-hand knowledge.

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Back on the record.

Are you aware, Mr. Caulfield, that attempts were being made to make available to aides at the White House, information from sensitive case reports from IRS?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no personal knowledge, no specific knowledge of any such activity. I have knowledge of an established procedure whereby sensitive case reports are being made available from IRS to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Well, were you aware of a procedure by which information was obtained between the IRS and White House aide with regard to IRS materials and information contained in the materials; were you aware of instances where information was requested by the White House of the IRS?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I can respond this way: On one specific occasion I was directed to—let me retract that.

On a number of occasions I was directed to obtain information from IRS by Mr. John Dean. I'll respond to your question that way.

Mr. SEARS. On some occasions you were asked to act as a conduit for information requested from the IRS by the White House; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, not by the White House, by Mr. John Dean. I don't know where that was coming from, it could have been coming from a number of different sources. Mr. Dean on most occasions would not indicate for whom the information was being provided. So, I want to be very careful how I respond to the question.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying, also, that Mr. Ehrlichman never requested you to obtain information from IRS?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't have any recollection at this time that Mr. Ehrlichman asked me to get information from IRS.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you aware that Mr. Ehrlichman got information directly from Mr. Barth at IRS?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I was aware, as I indicated in other forums, that Mr. Barth and Mr. Ehrlichman conferred from time to time on matters within the purview of the Secretary of the Treasury and IRS. Now, what those specifics are would be anybody's guess. Mr. Barth would be the best one to respond to that.

Mr. LENZNER. How did you know they were conferring?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I was a friend of Mr. Barth's, and it came up in conversations. He was over in the White House on frequent occasions and would confer with Mr. Ehrlichman. That was Mr. Barth's business, and Mr. Ehrlichman's business; it wasn't my business.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever become aware that information was being conveyed from IRS to the White House with regard to tax orders of the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I never heard that before.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware that information was conveyed from IRS to the White House with regard to a tax audit of Lawrence O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I was not aware that there was a tax audit of Mr. O'Brien and information being conveyed to the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. You were never aware that a tax audit was being conducted of Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, not until it appeared in the paper. I think it did appear in the paper.

Mr. LENZNER. You mean in the news media?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware that a tax audit was being conducted on Mr. —

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall being asked by Mr. Peter Flanigan to get information from the Internal Revenue Service on any individual?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall Mr. Peter Flanigan requesting an investigation on certain people that would have been involved in business deals.

Mr. SEARS. Maybe the word "investigation" is a little too authoritative here. Do you recall Mr. Flanigan, and correct me if I am wrong, calling you and asking you if you could find out anything about some named individuals; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, that's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right now, do you recall getting information on these individuals from the Internal Revenue Service?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall conducting an investigation and providing Mr. Flanigan with the results of that investigation; some of it related to IRS information.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. How did you obtain the information from the Internal Revenue Service?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I received it from an individual who was then employed with IRS.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what was that individual's name?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That was Mr. Acree of the Internal Revenue Service.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And do you recall the nature of the information that was provided on these individuals?

Mr. CAULFIELD. In substance it would best be described as a background investigation.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, I would like to show you in exhibit 1 under

tab 1*, there is a series of memos under tab 1 concerning the organization Public Affairs Analysts.

The first one you are looking at is a memorandum from Mr. William Safire to Mr. Bob Haldeman, dated August 4, 1970; and then a followup memorandum for Mr. Dean from Mr. Haldeman concerning stated matter; and subsequently a memorandum which is not routed to anybody in particular, but is in the form, I believe, in which you generally made your reports to Mr. Dean.

I ask you now if you remember this memorandum entitled "Discreet"?

Mr. LENZNER. That is relative to the organization Public Affairs Analysts.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I ask you if you can identify that memorandum for the record. Do you remember having this memorandum typed by your secretary; or do you recall the contents of the memorandum?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, can I continue with this?

Mr. SEARS. Could we take just a second while he reads that?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right, sure, take your time.

Mr. CAULFIELD. It certainly looks like my report.

Mr. SEARS. I was asked to join this organization as a member of the board, and I refused, luckily.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, can you identify that document dated I believe, August 11, 1970?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Let me identify it this way: It would appear—the format is similar to the way I would have written a discreet political intelligence report. But I don't specifically recall the substance of the memo. The form and the outline appear to be similar to my style of writing a discreet political intelligence report.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see, and do you recall asking Mr. Ulasewicz to look into this particular organization?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I do not; but it is quite possible that if I did in fact, write the report, that he would have been asked to make the type of inquiry that the report outlines.

Mr. LENZNER. In addition, if you look at the paragraph, the fifth paragraph says, "Source advises that a discreet look at the interior office structure"; I take it that would have been something that Mr. Ulasewicz would have done at your direction.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, I see it. Yes, this is a form that would have been followed.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, the question is, Mr. Ulasewicz would have conducted that on-site surveillance—not surveillance, but observation; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, in the last paragraph on the last page you suggest that Dick Kleindienst would be the best person to determine this issue over F. Clifton White. Do you know if anything was pursued with Mr. Kleindienst in regard to that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no recollection of any further activities in the area of political affairs. The only way that I can respond, I don't know.

*See p. 9738.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, look at the first paragraph of the memo. Does that refresh your recollection that Mr. Haldeman at times made specific requests, and this was one of them, for investigator's discreet inquiries?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I have indicated before, I don't know, on the record or off the record; from time to time requests for information of a political intelligence nature would flow from many sources. In this instance, apparently, based upon the memorandum preceding this memo, it would appear that Mr. Haldeman made a request for information regarding the subject organization.

This is the way business was done at the White House on occasion.

Mr. LENZNER. Is it fair to say that it was known to a number of people that if a discreet inquiry investigation was to be made that you were the person that would carry that out?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think that is too broad a statement. There were a number of discreet inquiries being conducted in the White House over a 3-year period. I would respond if I was directed by my superiors to conduct an inquiry, attempt to obtain political information. One of my roles there, as everyone knows, was to attempt to develop and supply that information.

Now, I think it's fair to say that there must have been literally dozens of inquiries of that type. I was one person who was involved in the acquiring of that information upon direction.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know of any other individuals at the White House, conducting similar investigations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think it's fair to say that a number of people at the White House were actively engaged in acquiring information of political interest.

Mr. LENZNER. I don't mean regular run-of-the-mill newspapers, I mean getting people to go out and do surveillance and inquiries, getting background information; who would that have been?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, that could have been any number of people.

Mr. SEARS. Let me go off the record just a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. The question was, were you aware of any other individuals at the White House who employed people like Mr. Ulasewicz to conduct these kinds of investigations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have not been aware of any, but I want to say again, on the record, quite possibly there were others, but I'm not aware of them.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Can you recall if there was any response after you forwarded this memorandum back to Mr. Dean, I believe. Did you get any other inquiries about Public Affairs Analysts?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall any requests to take information from their tax returns?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no recollection and no knowledge of that at all.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Well, do you recall being asked by Mr.

Dean or anyone else, to inquire into the relationship that Mr. O'Brien had with the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You have no recollection of being asked to inquire into the relationship Mr. O'Brien might have had with Mr. Mahen, or other individuals with the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Let me correct that. In connection with Mr. O'Brien, there was an ongoing interest in Mr. O'Brien as indicated here earlier because of his position in the opposition party. Now, there may well be, and if there is a memorandum around, I'd like to see it.

Mr. SEARS. Can we go off the record just a second?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Back on the record.

In other words, you do recall that there was an inquiry concerning possible payments of money by the Hughes Tool Co. to Mr. Larry O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I don't know that. I would like to see the memorandum. I recall an inquiry regarding Mr. O'Brien and the Hughes Tool Co. If there is a memorandum, I'd like to refresh my recollection.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I show you tab 2* and would like you to refresh your recollection by reading through the documents in tab 2.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, looking at the January 22 document, can you identify that document with your initials and name?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is my document.

Mr. LENZNER. And you prepared it in response to a request from Mr. Dean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Haldeman sent Mr. Dean a request for this investigation, as reflected in these other memorandums?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would say yes, based on the memorandum as I view it now.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, you indicate there that "A reliable source postures the subject retainer in this manner——"

Mr. CAULFIELD. Which date are we at?

Mr. LENZNER. Still on January 22. I just want to go through, and I'll ask specifics on each one of them. Do you remember who your source was on that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, James Julianio.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you remember inquiring of anybody else—did you seek information on this retainer from anybody else at this time—January 22?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Julianio indicate that he had conducted his own investigation to obtain information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Julianio was a long-time friend of Mr. Desautels. I think that was his source of information.

*See p. 9747.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if Mr. Juliano went to Mr. Desautels to obtain further information on your behalf?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall whether he had that information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I recall, he had that information.

Mr. LENZNER. And he reported to you that during the Kennedy administration there was a continuous liaison between Maheu and O'Brien.

Mr. CAULFIELD. On January 22?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Ask the question again.

Mr. LENZNER. He indicated, according to this memorandum, that during the Kennedy administration there was continuous liaison between O'Brien and Maheu.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes. If Mr. Juliano is the source, that's where it would come from, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he give this to you orally, or in writing?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Orally.

Mr. LENZNER. And you made notes and——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I didn't make notes, that was over luncheon, as I recall.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you ask for him to seek other information. At the bottom of the page you indicate you asked for other information; was that of Mr. Juliano, on the bottom of this memorandum?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm sure I did.

Mr. SEARS. Is it fair to say that you said, "Well, if you can find out anything else about it", or something of that kind?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's the way I would have put it, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And then you have a memorandum on January 25, 1971, those are your initials on top of the page?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And you prepared that and transmitted it to Mr. Dean.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you know the source of information contained in that memorandum?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I recall my only source in connection with this matter was Mr. Juliano's knowledge of the area.

Mr. LENZNER. You make reference, in the second paragraph, to the fact that a firm associated with Mr. Desautels and Mr. O'Brien had handled the Hughes interest up until the Maheu controversy in Las Vegas. Did you do any independent investigation with regard to the Maheu-Hughes conflict, to your recollection?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. And in the following paragraph you say, paraphrasing, "Mr. Maheu's tentacle structure—each one which is fraught with potential for Jack Anderson type exposure." And then you give some examples. Can you explain what you meant by that? Take your time and read the following paragraphs.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, specifically what I meant by it was—I don't know, 1971, I don't know whether the Maheu-Hughes blow-

up had occurred by then, but there is apparently indication that the whole situation out there in Nevada was getting very sticky and very ugly. I was attempting to convey that in the third paragraph and the following three, that there was an inter-relationship, apparently, based upon Maheu's activities over the years with people of the Republican stripe, and it may well have come back and proved embarrassing to the people in the administration.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, if you began an investigation into O'Brien's getting money from Hughes, it might very likely turn up that Hughes was also involved, and Maheu was involved with Republicans in a comparable——

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's precisely what I meant.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, did you get any of this information reflected in the memorandum from Mr. James Golden?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't believe so, because as I said, Mr. Golden at that time was out there in Nevada—wait a minute, he had gone with Intertel at that time.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And wasn't Intertel providing security for the Hughes organization?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Intertel was deeply involved in the Maheu-Hughes battle, with Intertel being on the side of the Hughes interests.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Would Mr. Golden have been in a position to provide you with a lot of information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He would have been in a position to provide it, but at that particular time I was not that close to Jim Golden. He was talking to other people at the White House. I think he was talking to Bud Krogh.

My answer to that is "No," although on the surface it would appear—at least I have no specific recollection of discussing what intelligence Mr. Golden had with respect to Las Vegas.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know what Krogh's relationship with Golden was?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think there was an interest in Jim Golden solely because he had hooked onto the Hughes interest out there. These people might have been looking down the road when the administration finished there might have been some financial opportunities there.

Mr. LENZNER. You are talking about Mr. Krogh?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes. I know it was short-lived, rather moot now.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, do you recall that this relationship between Mr. Golden and Mr. Krogh began before the summer of 1971, or was it approximately the time——

Mr. CAULFIELD. Approximately the time, I think, when Mr. Golden wound up with the Hughes interest.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did individuals take advantage of Mr. Golden's hospitality with the Hughes interest to travel down to where the Hughes interests were?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I didn't.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, on the second page of your January 25 memo you talk about Maheu being a close associate of rogue FBI agent John Frank.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Just what was that all about, where did you get that information from?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would have gotten that from Jim Juliano.

Mr. LENZNER. What does that refer to?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, as I understand it, apparently Maheu and Frank were engaged in activities here in Washington back in the sixties when Maheu was beginning to make his mark. I believe Juliano mentioned that he and John Frank worked together. And, as everyone knows, John Frank is the No. 1 rogue FBI agent in the history of the organization.

Mr. LENZNER. Meaning what, what does that mean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Just as it says there, that it was generally believed, and this I learned——

Mr. SEARS. What does it mean to be a “rogue FBI agent”?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, for example Frank is believed to have been involved in the assassination of Generalissimo DeGalindey on behalf of Raphael Trujillo.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know who they were operating on behalf of at the time?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Who?

Mr. LENZNER. Maheu and Frank, whom they were operating on behalf of when this assassination was conducted?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Now, wait a minute, don't jump up ahead, Terry. I'm not even sure that Maheu and Frank were together in 1956. I am saying in the sixties I was led to believe—I don't know it for a fact—that Maheu and Frank were together, working together in Washington. John Frank, based upon the famous DeGalindey case in New York City was generally believed to have some part—that has never been proven—in the assassination of Raphael Trujillo—DeGalindey. I'm sorry. Trujillo was assassinated by the CIA, so they say.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, who was Frank working for at the time of this assassination?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Who was he working for?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. He was working for Raphael Trujillo.

Mr. LENZNER. And what were Frank and Maheu doing in Washington in 1960 together?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The best as I recall, they were involved in consulting, private detective work; that type of thing.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, in the last paragraph you indicate that you recommend an in-depth analysis of information available for White House perusal.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And you include CIA, FBI, and IRS. Were you aware of any effort to ask any of those agencies for information with regard to Mr. Maheu and/or Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. It never moved off that page, as far as I know.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, I take it when this task was first delegated to you it was in an effort to obtain derogatory information with

regard to O'Brien and his income from the Hughes organization; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. There was an attempt to develop information regarding O'Brien's involvement with the Hughes organization. Now, if in the course of that inquiry derogatory information arose, that would have been put on paper.

Mr. LENZNER. And what did you understand was the purpose of the information with regard to O'Brien and Maheu, this relationship; what was in back of it, what was behind it, what was the purpose of it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, the bottom line would have been——

Mr. SEARS. He is asking you what you knew about the purpose behind all this.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Obviously to develop political intelligence information on the subject that was of great interest to the people at the White House.

Mr. SEARS. That was your assumption.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. SEARS. Well, did anyone ever tell you what the exact purpose of that particular information was, the use it was to be put to?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Nobody ever discussed that with me.

Mr. LENZNER. So, basically all you knew was, there was an interest in determining the exact relationship between Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Maheu, per your memos.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And what you were concerned about in your last sentence of your January 25 memorandum that if things weren't done carefully something else might emerge that might damage Republicans.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That was my warning to the people that might be reading the memo, and to Dean.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, looking at the January 26, 1971 memorandum from Mr. Dean for Mr. Haldeman, it indicates some information obtained from Mr. Rebozo in the third paragraph. Were you aware of that inquiry to Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not. That is apparently something that Dean developed and I assume he discussed with Rebozo.

Mr. LENZNER. All I'm asking about, were you aware that Rebozo had information related to this inquiry, that is Maheu and O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Dean did not so confide in me.

Mr. LENZNER. And then, in the fourth paragraph, that incorporates the information you had provided him.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. On page 2 of Dean's memorandum, were you aware that Bob Bennett was also inquired of.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not that I can recall. I have seen the name Bennett in the papers so often that I want to be careful.

Mr. LENZNER. OK. Now, looking at the memorandum from Haldeman to Dean, January 28, 1971, it indicates some interest in having Colson leak information with regard to this inquiry.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you aware that was at least one of the efforts?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I was not.

Mr. LENZNER. And then, looking at February 1, 1971, the memorandum from yourself to Dean; are those your initials at the top of the page, and is that your memorandum?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And at the bottom of the page it indicates that Maheu had covert activities from his Washington association with the CIA. Do you remember where you got that information from?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall specifically, but I assume that it comes from Jim Juliano.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of learning that the Department of Justice, for the White House, had obtained information with regard to Mr. Maheu's CIA relationship?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you obtain any specific information with regard to exactly what Mr. Maheu did with the CIA?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever learn of any relationship Mr. Maheu had with an individual by the name of Johnny Rosselli?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Or that it was alleged that Mr. Maheu and Mr. Rosselli at one time allegedly discussed an effort to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I so read in the paper.

Mr. SEARS. You have no knowledge of it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. LENZNER. When you say read it in the paper, do you recall when you read it in the newspaper?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, July, August, September of last year.

Mr. SEARS. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall sometime in 1971 when you began your investigation—

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER [continuing]. Into Maheu's relationship to O'Brien—a Jack Anderson column?

Mr. CAULFIELD. About Rosselli, yes, that's what I recall.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you bring that article to the attention of anybody, that article that spoke about Rosselli and Maheu; is that what you are referring to here, his association with the CIA?

Mr. CAULFIELD. It's possible, Terry.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I'll get that article in a second for you, and see if that will refresh your recollection.

Do you know if there was any inquiry made of CIA with regard to this subject matter?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And again I take it, in the third paragraph, when you make reference to Donald Nixon's Dominican Republic visit, did you again remind Dean of the possibility of possible Republican problems?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. While Mr. Lackritz finds this article I want to say on the record these documents are from unsealed exhibits of the committee—I mean sealed exhibits, I'm sorry, of the committee; and consequently I am going to request that the transcript of this entire interview be sealed and furnished copies only to Senator Ervin.

I am also going to direct that staff present here today not reduce their notes to typewritten form, or distribute them to anybody except Mr. Thompson or Mr. Dash because these are sealed, and until the committee votes to unseal them, it would be unfair to have any of this material, or any of the answers that Mr. Caulfield has given to any of these questions furnished to the public.

Mr. SEARS. Thank you, Mr. Lenzner. We appreciate that. Of course you realize that comes as a great help to us. This has been a very trying situation for all of these defendants who have had to come before this body, and not only this body but the special prosecutor's office, and I assume other bodies of the Government. And we appreciate your care in safeguarding the rights of Mr. Caulfield and I am sure the other defendants.

Mr. LENZNER. And I would also say any other individuals who have been mentioned on the record in the interview, as I said I will direct, and I ask everybody from staff to recognize, on the record, that the information will not be transmitted in typed form or related to anybody except chief counsel and chief minority counsel.

Mr. SEARS. As I understand your statement, it covers not only the record, but summaries of conversations we were having.

Mr. LENZNER. What I am suggesting, there is a typed transcript, and there is no need to type up any information and circulate it. The transcript will be available from Senator Ervin upon request to his office, and let him decide in his discretion who should, or should not have access to the transcripts themselves.

I have no objection, obviously, to chief counsel or minority counsel, Mr. Thompson, being briefed orally because they obviously have the right to know the progress of the inquiry; but I would direct it be oral briefing, and that the notes taken not be typed into summaries, or any typewritten form at all.

Mr. SEARS. Thank you.

Mr. LENZNER. While we are waiting, looking at the last page of tab 2 I wonder, can you identify that document as a memorandum appearing to be in the same form as other memorandums prepared by you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you have any recollection now of the source you referred to in the first paragraph of that memorandum?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall, though, if I were to guess I would say Mr. Juliano, based upon the previous memorandums.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection. Do you know a Walter J. Badden?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, the best man at my wedding.

Mr. LENZNER. Was he employed at Hughes Aircraft Co.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever seek information from him with regard to this inquiry?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; he is the director of security for one of the Hughes Tool Co. organizations in California, and he had nothing to do with this area.

As I said, I want to repeat, he was the best man at my wedding and visited me from time to time in Washington. I never discussed this area with him.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you also know an individual named David Ludwig?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes; he is a subordinate of Mr. Badden, and Mr. Badden introduced me to him when we had lunch one time at the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. And he is also an employee of Hughes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. He is an employee of the same subsidiary corporation that Mr. Badden is.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you seek to obtain any information from him with regard to this inquiry?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of meeting with Mr. Ludwig on or about January 15, 1971, or about the same period of time you were conducting these inquiries?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I took Mr. Ludwig, upon request of Mr. Badden, to lunch at the White House on one occasion, and I wouldn't be able to recall the date. It could have been any time. It might have been in January of 1971; I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of the subject coming up, since you had somebody there from Hughes, and asking him whether he had any information with regard to Robert Maheu or Larry O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I have no recollection of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection inquiring from any employee of the Hughes Tool Co. or Intertel to obtain information with regard to Larry O'Brien, or Maheu's relationship with Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, at the bottom of the memorandum that you have identified as yours, it indicates that ominous relationships have been established between Maheu and well-known Mafia figures.

Mr. CAULFIELD. On the last memo?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, the first paragraph.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember the source of that information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. What sentence are we dealing with here? Are you talking about the last memorandum?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Paragraph No. 2.

Mr. LENZNER. Paragraph 1: "Ominous relationships have been established between Maheu and well-known Mafia figures."

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I indicated, my impression is that it would have come from Mr. Juliano, but I'm not sure—I'm not absolutely certain. I want to be careful. And the reason I say that is because of all the previous information that was supplied to me by Mr. Juliano. I want to be sure that we are talking about the same area.

I will have to leave it at that. My impression is that it was from Mr. Juliano, but I'm not absolutely certain.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware that Intertel was conducting an investigation into the possibility of Maheu's skimming Hughes' Las Vegas casino?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, you have to remember that at that time the Maheu-Intertel-Hughes controversy was a matter of public record in the media. In fact, there was a 60-minute CBS show dealing with the controversy at that time. There were reams and reams of information being written about the controversy, and it is quite possible some of my information could have come from there.

Mr. LENZNER. From Intertel?

Mr. CAULFIELD. From the media; I had nothing to do with Intertel.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you also aware that the Department of Justice was conducting a grand jury investigation into the skimming in Las Vegas and sought to have Maheu testify in that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever discuss this matter with any individuals in the Criminal Division of the Organized Crime Division of the Department of Justice?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you receive any information from that division?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Absolutely not.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, in the last paragraph of that same memorandum you said it was alleged that representatives of Maheu may have picked up hotel and bar tabs for the Presidential advance party. Now, would that information have come from somebody in the organization or, again, from Juliano?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think it came from the Secret Service, idle conversations I picked up from friends of mine who might have been on the White House——

Mr. LENZNER. Advance party?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not the advance——

Mr. SEARS. The White House detail.

Mr. CAULFIELD. The White House detail, I think, was kicking around a piece of information, you know, that was incorporated into this thing.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection who advised you of that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not specifically; it could have been three or four people in the area we discussed previously.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, we will have those names added, then.

Mr. CAULFIELD. The same names.

Mr. LENZNER. The same names. Now, I take it you are again in-

tending to indicate that this is a sensitive area with regard to possible repercussions.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Or possible embarrassment to the White House.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you aware that Mr. Colson was interested in the relating of Mr. O'Brien to possible crime figures?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; never.

Mr. LENZNER. Was there any feedback to you to pursue the question whether Mahen's alleged association with well-known Mafia figures might be also tied into O'Brien?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. You are sure of that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, can we have these two newspaper articles marked as exhibits 2 and 3 for today.

Mr. LACKRITZ. A newspaper article by Mr. Jack Anderson dated January 18, 1971, is exhibit 2; and exhibit 3 is an article written by Jack Anderson dated January 19, 1971.

[The documents referred to were marked Caulfield exhibits Nos. 2 and 3.*]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Both of those exhibits have to do with possible CIA involvement in a plot to kill Fidel Castro.

Mr. LENZNER. And others.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And others.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. You did not seek to inquire from anybody else?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have never had any contact as to the activities of the CIA; that is an area that I learned a long time ago to stay out of.

Mr. LENZNER. Except in one memo you suggested that——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I made a recommendation, and it didn't leave the paper for all I know. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, does that memo refresh your recollection as to whether your reference to Mahen's covert activity, in your February 1, 1971, memo, referred to the items in the subject matter of the Jack Anderson column, which you now looked at?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would respond by saying yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes, upon reading the January 18, 1971, article by Jack Anderson, that is what you are referring to?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's what I was referring to.

Mr. LACKRITZ. In your memorandum of February 1, 1971.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Were there any subsequent requests to follow up on that information in CIA?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No; not to me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you make any subsequent inquiries concerning that matter?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Off the record.

*See pp. 9911-9913.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall any requests that were made, possibly by Mr. Dean or by any individuals in the Justice Department, to pursue any of this information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you have any knowledge of an appearance by Mr. Maheu at the Justice Department to be interrogated concerning the Las Vegas casino?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ever have any contact with Mr. Wil Wilson from the Justice Department?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I met Mr. Wilson one time, coming back from California.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I believe it was following the chiefs of police convention in Anaheim—it wouldn't have been that time; I was out of there by then.

Well, all I can say I remember being introduced to Mr. Wilson at a California airport sometime in 1970 in connection with a law enforcement conference.

Mr. SEARS. Perhaps you can ask if he has ever spoken to Mr. Wilson in connection with this matter.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ever speak with Mr. Wilson about this matter, that you recall?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now, in your February 3, 1971, memorandum to Mr. Dean, you recommend that Mr. Dean watch the CBS-TV show dealing with the ongoing Hughes controversy.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Is this the transcript of that CBS "60 Minutes" show, dated February 2, 1971?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I assume so. I don't have any recollection, other than the fact the subject dealt with the Maheu-Hughes controversy; that's all I can recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. First of all, can I have that marked as Exhibit 4?

[The document referred to was marked Caulfield exhibit No. 4.*]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall learning about that time of the existence of a hand-written memorandum from Mr. Howard Hughes to Mr. Maheu?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no knowledge of that at all.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, do you recall that television show, on page 16 of the transcript Mr. Hank Greenspun stated that he had in his possession a good many copies of Hughes-Maheu memorandums, in Hughes' handwriting?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall that at all.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you learn on any subsequent occasion that Mr. Greenspun had possession of a large number of handwritten memorandums from Howard Hughes to Robert Maheu?

*See p. 9915.

Mr. CAULFIELD. The only thing I recall—I read in the newspaper about Mr. Greenspun's activities, and they were of no interest to me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall any inquiries that were conducted, or did you ask anyone to make any inquiries into Mr. Greenspun's activities out in Nevada?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. I would like to leave that for the time being. Turning to surveillance of Senators. Did you ever receive any request to place Senator Ted Kennedy under 24-hour surveillance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall when you received that request, and who made it to you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Dean, and I don't recall the exact time frame. I assume it was sometime in 1971.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And specifically, what was the request?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The request was to have the Senator, Ted Kennedy, placed under surveillance; and as I recall, he wrote a memorandum which effectively had the matter dropped.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And this was a request for 24-hour-a-day surveillance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Dean indicate to you where the request came from?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't know whether he indicated or I assumed that it came from Mr. Haldeman's office.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And your reaction to the idea, that it was a silly idea was the reason that the——

Mr. CAULFIELD. It was made in strong terms to Mr. Dean verbally, and I think it's a matter of record.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Prior to 1971, had you been asked to conduct any inquiries into any matters concerning Senator Kennedy?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes; in 1969 there was a request to have the facts surrounding Chappaquiddick determined by Mr. Ulasewicz—directed by Mr. Ehrlichman through me, to have Mr. Ulasewicz conduct an inquiry surrounding the incident at Chappaquiddick.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And was this on the occasion of the hiring of Mr. Ulasewicz?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. That was the first investigation Mr. Ulasewicz was asked to conduct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall how Mr. Ulasewicz was reporting back to you on the progress of the investigation?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Verbally.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And were these verbal reports subsequently typed up in memorandum form?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Only if there was any matter of significance involved, and I don't think there were very many reports.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall Mr. Rebozo coming to Washington, D.C. during this investigation of the Chappaquiddick incident?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Doing what?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Discussing the matter with you and the reports of Mr. Ulasewicz.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I had no conversation with Mr. Rebozo on this matter.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. And then you do not recall Mr. Rebozo being present in Mr. Ehrlichman's office watching television about the time of the Chappaquiddick incident, and listening with you to reports that Mr. Ulasewicz was sending back to you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, no recollection at all.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Why don't we turn to tab 3* of the documents. I would like you to review the documents in that tab, specifically with emphasis on the document from you to Mr. Dean.

Mr. CAULFIELD. OK.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, turn to the memorandum dated April 19, 1971, that is a memorandum from you to Mr. Dean, and reflects your signature on the bottom.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you remember writing this memorandum to Mr. Dean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How did that investigation originate?

Mr. CAULFIELD. This was of interest, going back to 1969, from the time Clark Mollenhoff came on board, that was generally recognized as an area of interest to Clark Mollenhoff. Mollenhoff felt there were same improprieties involved in this whole Maine sugar beet situation; and it was of interest from August 1969, as I recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see that is going through April of 1971 that your inquiry was made, judging from your memorandum.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Inquiries to whom?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Your inquiries into Senator Muskie's association with the Maine sugar industry; is that correct, Mr. Caulfield?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Now, wait. I see, but I don't like the way that question is phrased. Why don't you rephrase it for me, or repeat it, and then I will explain.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You testified before that this matter went back to 1969. I am asking you if this memorandum that you were writing, the date is April 19, 1971, indicated interest in the subject matter around the spring of 1971.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct, it continued to be of on-going interest.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And I take it that during the period of time that Senator Muskie was identified as the potential leading Democratic opponent to President Nixon in the 1972 campaign.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm not familiar with the dates of when he——

Mr. LACKRITZ. But it was certainly by the time he was identified as a potential Democratic Presidential candidate for 1972.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, that's true.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, in the last paragraph of that memorandum,

*See p. 9759.

you state, "because of the hazard of the White House pursuing this inquiry," what do you mean by that phrase?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, simply speaking, I felt that the White House would be well advised to stay far removed from the inquiry, and suggested that it belonged elsewhere.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You were worried about possible embarrassment should it be disclosed that the White House was connected with investigations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And when you said you endorsed Fagan and Nofziger for optimum results, that means from a media standpoint—from a media impact?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If that was what would have been decided, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. And do you recall, Mr. Caulfield, asking that Ulasewicz conduct an investigation into the Maine sugar beet industries?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I asked that Mr. Ulasewicz go up to Maine and obtain newspaper accounts of the controversy, and he did so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, turning to tab 4¹, do you recognize the memorandum dated July 6, 1971, from yourself to Mr. Dean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And do you recall what motivated the inquiry into Potomac Associates; who asked for that, and what was the purpose for that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall Mr. Tom Huston expressed an interest in the organization and who might have been connected with it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did you understand why Mr. Huston was concerned with the organization? Was it thought to be developing into another Brookings Institute type of organization?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm not certain just what Mr. Huston's interest in it was. My function and role was just to ascertain where they were located, and who was connected with them. I think Mr. Huston would be your best witness there.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ask Mr. Ulasewicz to conduct this inquiry?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And this memorandum reflects the nature of the substance of this inquiry?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Turning to tab 5², a memorandum dated June 24, 1971, from yourself to Mr. Dean, concerning McGovern's fundraising; I think those are your initials on the memorandum.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Who asked you to conduct the investigation into the McGovern fundraising—

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Dean.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Was this potentially valuable political information for the upcoming campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't know if I would go as far as to say po-

¹ See p. 9765.

² See p. 9767.

tentially valuable political information for the upcoming campaign; it was a piece of information that I was directed to obtain, and I did so. What the rationality behind it was, only Mr. Dean could respond to that.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. And do you recognize the memorandum dated July 1, 1971?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And do you know if there was any subsequent discussion of what to do with the information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no knowledge of any subsequent activity in this area.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Back on the record. To speed things up somewhat—

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, that would be a good idea.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Let me shift the questions to purely late summer of 1971. During that period of time, Mr. Caulfield, did you discuss with any other individual the formulation of a private security firm?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Which individual was that?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Mr. Dean.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What was his reaction to it?

Mr. CAULFIELD. He asked me to submit in writing some of my thoughts with respect to a private detective organization.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see, and then you prepared such a proposal for Mr. Dean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what was that called?

Mr. CAULFIELD. We called it "Operation Sandwedge."

Mr. LACKRITZ. And in this operation—what were the functions that operation would fulfill?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Substantially a private security entity which would handle the needs of the campaign organization.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, among the functions that this organization was supposed to fulfill, was it supposed to have an offensive intelligence capability?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That was suggested; yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And was it suggested that this organization was to have a covert intelligence-gathering capability?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK.

Mr. LENZNER. When you first talked to Mr. Dean about it, how did he describe what he wanted?

Mr. CAULFIELD. What do you mean?

Mr. LENZNER. When he described this new apparatus, what exactly was he describing that he wanted you to prepare?

Mr. CAULFIELD. We had just general verbal discussions on it, and he asked me to put my thoughts on paper, which I did.

Mr. SEARS. I don't think it was a matter of Mr. Dean telling Mr.

Caulfield his thoughts on what he ought to prepare. It was Mr. Dean saying write up what you think should be done; is that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. But your thoughts on it went beyond simply a Pinkerton-type operation, something with additional capability.

Mr. CAULFIELD. My thoughts went beyond and looked toward the future in terms of having ongoing political security—a security entity in place, following the campaign.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I would like to show you, Mr. Caulfield, tab 31¹ of these documents, and ask you to identify that memorandum on Operation Sandwedge.

Now, on the first page of the memorandum, the first paragraph, you talk about, “to ensure that the major offensive intelligence and defensive security requirements of the entire campaign and Republican Convention would be professionally structured, programed”—what did you mean by “offensive intelligence”?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Information which would be of value during the course of the political campaign.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did that include the placement of infiltrators in opposition campaigns?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Would you repeat that?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Would the offensive capabilities include placement of infiltrators into opposition campaigns?

Mr. SEARS. Well, I might object to the use of the word “infiltrators.”

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK.

Mr. SEARS. I think it would be fair to say that some intelligence gathering from the opposition campaign was encompassed by that.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, did the offensive capabilities envision placement of undercover personnel in the opposition campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, bearing in mind that is a suggestive memorandum and open to discussion following its being written, I would say that was a potential consideration.

Mr. LACKRITZ. A potential consideration?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I take it on page 5, where you discuss the offensive capabilities of the proposed organization—page 5 under A. “Supervise penetration of nominees’ entourage and headquarters with undercover personnel”—that is what you were referring to?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is a suggestion open to discussion.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right, that was a suggestion for the proposed organization.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, under B.—

Mr. LENZNER. Let me just interrupt for a moment because on September 22, 1971, referring to tab 11² of the materials, you wrote a memorandum to Dean with regard to Buckley, which, as you indicated to us in your prior interviews was with regard—you

¹ See p. 9899.

² See p. 9795.

knew that Buckley was involved and engaged in the placement of a chauffeur in Muskie's operation.

So, at least by September 1971 this was an activity that was already being conducted.

Mr. CAULFIELD. But not with my concurrence.

Mr. LENZNER. I didn't say it was with your concurrence, all I am saying was you certainly knew it was perceived as an acceptable political activity.

Mr. SEARS. The memo in tab 31, of course, was written long before this. The one that you are referring to was written September 22.

Mr. LENZNER. When was the Sandwedge memo written?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The best I can recall, it was in July of 1971, sometime around July. But, I see no connection between the two.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you have discussions with people with regard to the subject matter of surveillance, of penetration of the opposition party's campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As I indicated, that was a suggestion back in July. The Buckley memorandum which you speak of was entirely outside my area.

Mr. LENZNER. But I say, did you have discussions with other individuals with regard to the concept of penetration of the opposition campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't understand the meaning.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you discuss the subject of penetration of the opposition campaign with other individuals?

Mr. SEARS. Other than Mr. Dean?

Mr. LENZNER. Other than Mr. Dean.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I may have had a discussion on that matter with Mr. Ulasewicz as a general topic of discussion; but nothing ever came of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Any other individuals? What I am trying to find out, was that your own idea, or was that someone else's idea?

Mr. SEARS. I think it is fair to say that Mr. Caulfield's understanding at the time he wrote the memo that is in tab 31 here, that it was a normal kind of thing in political campaigns to be either in touch with people who are working with other candidates' entourages, or indeed to have people that you already knew get jobs with them. Where he got that impression, I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. That is my next question. Is that the impression you had, and if so, how did you get that impression, what experience did you base that on?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, without getting involved in a lot of specifics, I think it's fair to say that practices of the type I suggested should come under discussion, or are generally recognized as being pro forma in the area of political campaigns.

And, as I indicated to you a year ago, we had every reason to believe that activities of that type were engaged in by the opposition party in the 1968 campaign. And I think if one looked closely, one could find that the practice was not dreamed up in July, or September of 1971, but has been around for probably as long as political campaigns have been ongoing.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you discuss the penetration of opposition campaigns with Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I did not.

Mr. LENZNER. Or with Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, never did with Mr. Mitchell, and the only reason I hesitated a second on Mr. Ehrlichman, I think he said at one time that he had seen some sort of a proposal along those lines, which I don't recall submitting to him. I recall submitting this to Mr. Dean, and having discussions with him about it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, you knew it was going to be submitted above Mr. Dean.

Mr. CAULFIELD. He led me to believe that, but I had no specific information as to who he sat with and discussed it.

Mr. LENZNER. You knew that Mr. Dean wasn't going to make the final decision on it.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he not tell you at some point that he was going to discuss this with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think he did, yes. But I did not know, and I still don't know today whether or not this particular document was in fact submitted to them. I have no idea, I have no way of knowing that.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, didn't you have occasion to talk with Mr. Mitchell directly about the feasibility of going forward with it in the fall of 1971?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, not this specific document. I never had any specific conversation with Mr. Mitchell on this specific document. Mr. Dean has testified that he discussed it with Mr. Mitchell, and emanating from that the word "Sandwedge" became a word between the two of them.

I think the record will show that the interpretation of Sandwedge became confused along the lines. Mr. Mitchell was referring to Sandwedge having to do with the inquiry up—who was that Republican Congressman that ran——

Mr. LACKRITZ. McCloskey.

Mr. CAULFIELD. McCloskey—as a Sandwedge activity, where Mr. Ulasewicz went up and conducted an inquiry as to the status of the McCloskey campaign.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I think you described that, I don't want to go into that; it was described as a Sandwedge type penetration.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I don't like the word "penetration", a Sandwedge type inquiry is the word used in the memo.

Mr. LENZNER. All right, go ahead.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, going back to the Sandwedge proposal itself, Mr. Caulfield, what did you mean on page 5 under B, Offensive—you say "black bag capability—discuss privately." What is a black bag capability?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, what I meant by that was the carrying of moneys that might be collected in a political campaign. What I meant to propose by that was that Mr. Ulasewicz and anyone else that might be connected with such a proposed undertaking would have the capa-

bility to supervise the security of the carrying of moneys which might be collected during the course of a campaign.

I was well aware that there was a significant amount of that type of activity going on, and I felt that this particular entity could provide that type of service.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me go off the record for a second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Back on the record.

Since this is a continuation of previous testimony, can you explain what the relationship is between black bag capability and covert steps necessary to minimize Democratic voting violations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, you've got to go back to what I mean by minimizing Democratic voting violations in Illinois.

Mr. SEARS. It could suggest the payment of money to informants that might know something about voting violations, that kind of thing.

You have to keep in mind that this memo was written by a fellow who was really looking for a job, trying to cover those items that he felt people who would be reading it might be interested in, to show some awareness and some sophistication about the kinds of things that he thought went on in political campaigns.

Now, it is true in politics "black bag" means money, it is often referred to that way, cash money that is moving in some fashion.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would like to support the comments made by my attorney, and I think it would be fair to say that I—again, I would like to repeat I know what a "black bag" is, and I know what a "bag job" is, and they are two entirely different things, there is a world of difference.

I have been working with the FBI in my whole police career, and I am thoroughly familiar with what the words "bag job" mean, and they do not mean "black bag".

A "black bag" is a term common to the carrying of money in a political campaign; that was my intent there. Possibly for use, as my attorney indicates, to insure that there were not Democratic voting violations as there were in the 1960 campaign in Illinois and Texas.

Mr. LENZNER. And that is the interpretation that you stand by with regard to the Special Prosecutor's office?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And you so testified before the grand jury?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I recall testifying to this document before the grand jury, but I don't know that the questions you asked were specifically asked there.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you intend this memo to cover the possible needs of breaking and entering into particular locations?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Absolutely not. I think the record will show that other than the comments here in this document, that is all there ever was in connection with this.

Mr. LENZNER. It strikes me that an effort to insure that voting violations be minimized by paying informants would be a defensive, and not an offensive capability. An offensive capability, I believe, would be to offensively do something, which would be breaking and entering a particular location—

Mr. SEARS. It might be to offensively pay some people to let you know what is going on in the area of specific voting violations.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, was there an effort, or an attempt to pay election officials?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Possibly. I mean, it's such a vague and wide area.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I am asking what you intended when you wrote it. You must have had some intention in mind.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, my intention when I wrote it was, I was fully aware with the allegations that in 1960 there were substantive violations in Illinois and Texas.

Now, if moneys were necessary to pay people, to insure that didn't happen, and you want to call that "black bag", fine. That was my intention.

But the indication by Mr. Lenzner that conceivably, that might have been suggestive of burglary, that was certainly not my intention.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, why did you put in parentheses "discuss privately"?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Because I wanted to be given the opportunity to explain exactly what I meant; but was never so given an opportunity.

Mr. LACKRITZ. By Mr. Dean?

Mr. CAULFIELD. By Mr. Dean or anyone.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Dean ever ask what "black bag" meant?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If he did, I explained it to him as I did to you. I don't have any recollection as to whether or not we went over this specific point.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that recommendation was carried out in the 1972 campaign?

Mr. CAULFIELD. With regard to voting violations in Illinois and Texas?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I do know that the late Mr. Chotiner was in charge of—

Mr. SEARS. Security.

Mr. CAULFIELD [continuing]. Was in charge of security in connection with it nationwide.

Mr. LENZNER. Was he given a black bag of money?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I have no knowledge of that. I know that he was paid and had a staff to perform those duties.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if any officials were paid with those funds?

Mr. CAULFIELD. As the record indicates, I was not involved in the 1972 campaign.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm just asking you, do you have any information, whether you were involved, or not?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Caulfield, I would like to go back to page 3 of the same document, in paragraph E, on page 3.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You state in paragraph E—"principal, related

to a known Baltimore Costa Nostra figure and released from Federal service * * * is now in charge of Hughes' security operation in Las Vegas."

Was the source of your information the Hughes people, or Mr. O'Brien?

Mr. SEARS. The source of the——

Mr. LACKRITZ. Was this individual a source of yours for information?

Mr. CAULFIELD. This was mentioned to me in the course of social conversation, and I'll try to think by whom. I'm trying to think if it was someone in the Secret Service and if it was a social conversation—or someone else from one of the Federal agencies. I just don't recall.

It was put in there as a further boost to the selling of the document, which is really what it is. It is a document designed to interest people in the formation of a private security organization.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I understand that. Who was this individual to whom you were referring?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't recall just now. All I do recall, is it coming from a social contract.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Were you referring to Mr. Golden in that paragraph?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I doubt it for the simple reason that I didn't discuss security principles with Jim Golden.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, did you have knowledge——

Mr. CAULFIELD. I can't see telling—Mr. Golden telling me that information.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, who is the intelligence principal that you are referring to there?

Mr. CAULFIELD. The name was given to me, and I don't think I could have even recalled it when I wrote that. That's probably why I put it down that way.

Mr. LENZNER. You have no recollection now who that is?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember who told you?

Mr. CAULFIELD. No, I don't recall. As I say, it could be someone from the Secret Service; or it could have been from other sources in the law enforcement community. I don't want to take a stab at a name. That would be entirely off base, I just don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Mr. Boggs was familiar with the Hughes interests from his days in Los Angeles; isn't that correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, but I'm pretty sure it wasn't from Mr. Boggs.

Mr. LENZNER. Would you say that again?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I don't think Boggs was terribly familiar with Intertel. I think his involvement out there was long before Intertel was formed.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, do you have any recollection which a law-enforcement officer had discussions with you in this regard who worked with Intertel?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I think you have to be aware that around the time

of Intertel being a topic of discussion in the intelligence community, there were a number of people that had a lot to say about Intertel. It was generally recognized as a class of the retired Federal intelligence community, and Intertel frequently came up in the course of social conversations amongst many people. The Hughes controversy brought that to a head in many social conversations. I just can't put a name on who might have told me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. I would like you to turn to page 4 of that same document, Mr. Caulfield. In the second paragraph on that page it states,

It is recommended that consideration be given to have Intertel neutralized by Justice to preclude such developments from taking place or to discourage consideration by O'Brien or Stephen Smith.

What do you mean by neutralizing Intertel by Justice?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, again, the conversation in the law-enforcement community alleged that Intertel had unauthorized access to sensitive Government files in many areas.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes.

Mr. SEARS. It was simply suggesting that a stop be put to that.

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what did you mean, just simply not allow them that access to those files any more, when you say "neutralized"?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, that would have been by intent. I viewed it as an unwarranted access on the part of an organization.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you ever intend that Justice try to mount an investigation for possible criminal prosecution ultimately resulting in an indictment of the individuals?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Ultimately resulting in an indictment? No.

Mr. LENZNER. Or threatening any kind of a criminal investigation?

Mr. CAULFIELD. My feeling was that there should have been an inquiry into that to see if, in fact, what was being told had any substance.

Mr. LENZNER. But you were not interested in possible criminal prosecution.

Mr. CAULFIELD. No.

Mr. SEARS. I suppose that the fact whether it warranted some criminal prosecution would have been up to the Justice Department.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I didn't make any such recommendation.

Mr. SEARS. That is different from that.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, why don't you look at the paragraph below the one you have just been reading.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And one sentence there says—"indictment of Intertel principals would effectively minimize this threat, create a potentially debilitating intelligence weakness for O'Brien's forces and force them to try other, less sophisticated sources."

I would suggest to you that the word "neutralized" by directing Justice to open a case meant exactly that, that you were seeking and recommending that if criminal prosecution were possible, an

indictment be pursued by the Department of Justice. Do you want to respond?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would like to have the question again.

Mr. LENZNER. The question was, that the language here seems to clearly intend a recommendation that the Department of Justice neutralize Intertel by a criminal investigation, with a possible ultimate result of an indictment of Intertel's principals.

Mr. CAULFIELD. I would like to respond by saying that I view the wordage here given me by Mr. Lenzner—I point out that information came to my attention indicating that Intertel was unlawfully receiving information from Government files, and my intent here was to see if, in fact, that was the case because it was further indicated that there was a hazard that the use of this particular information might be used for political purposes.

Mr. LENZNER. And going back to page 1 of your so-called Operation Sandwedge, you indicate there that Lawrence O'Brien—or you suggested that he had a strong covert intelligence effort against us in 1972. Were you relating that to the Intertel organization?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That was an assumption, an intelligence assumption that one could make, based upon all of the loose facts that are outlined in the memorandum.

Mr. LENZNER. By the way, do you know if the FBI had the capability and conducted transfers of moneys from place to place, a black-bag capability that you referred to before?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Say that again.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have information, or were you aware whether the FBI had black-bag capability in transferring funds from person to person, and place to place?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, in the intelligence community I am sure that from time to time moneys are transmitted for local law-enforcement purposes; if that is what you mean.

Mr. LENZNER. Is that described, in Bureau parlance, as a black-bag operation?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I heard of black bag—black bag to me and to many people I know in the political sector refers to the carrying of moneys. Bag job, in the intelligence community, means a burglary.

Mr. LENZNER. And what does black bag mean in the intelligence community, in the Bureau parlance?

Mr. CAULFIELD. I'm not so sure that is used in the intelligence community, black bag.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, turn to page 2 of your memorandum, and paragraph C——

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And I quote, "Jack O'Connell, known by his colleagues to have been a black-bag specialist while at the Bureau. . . ." Was he known as a man who did bag jobs, or as a man who carried cash from place to place?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, I would have to say that is an incorrect way to put it.

Mr. LENZNER. He was known to be a bag man, then.

Mr. CAULFIELD. A "black-bag specialist".

Mr. LENZNER. Which means breaking and entering for the placing of electronic surveillance; am I correct?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, breaking and entering—placing of electronic surveillance would be a better way to put it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What it means is surreptitious entry.

Mr. CAULFIELD. For national security purposes, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. If necessary, right?

Mr. CAULFIELD. If necessary?

Mr. LENZNER. If it is necessary to enter a premise.

Mr. CAULFIELD. For national security purposes?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes. And I suggest to you that perhaps you misused the word black bag there, and you also misused it in the subsequent reference that we have just been discussing.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Well, that is a suggestion you can make, but I have already explained what I meant by it, what the intent was.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I would suggest to you, Mr. Sears and Mr. Caulfield, there are a number of other points in this memorandum we want to go over; and I think it might be useful for you and Mr. Sears to review this document at some length before we continue this interrogation.

So, I end it again with the instruction, I want you to understand, Marc, and Emily, that this information will not be transmitted in typewritten form, except the transcript that is provided by the stenographer, which will be sent in sealed condition to Senator Ervin's office.

Mr. LACKRITZ. The transcript is going to be sealed?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So, the session stands recessed.

Mr. LENZNER. Subject to setting another day. Do you want to set another day right now?

Mr. SEARS. A week from today.

Mr. LENZNER. Fine.

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the executive session in the above-entitled matter was adjourned, to reconvene on Saturday March 23, 1974.]

CAULFIELD EXHIBIT No. 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tab 1

August 4, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: BILL SAFIRE

According to Newsweek, Larry O'Brien (along with Cliff White) will be on the board of directors of an "international consulting firm." Lobbying for foreign governments without the appearance of lobbying, I guess.

Can't we raise a big fuss about this? Insist that he register as a foreign agent, demand to know what fees he will be getting for what work and "to what extent the Democratic National Committee is available for sale to foreign governments"?

We could have a little fun with this and keep O'Brien on the defensive.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DEAN

Will you please look into this, find out what the facts are and see what we can do.


H.R. HALDEMAN

Attachment

THE PERISCOPE

A BREAK FOR THE YANKEE DOLLAR

South Vietnam's President Thieu has finally yielded to U.S. urging and agreed to at least a partial devaluation of the piaster. At present, U.S. dollars sent into Saigon (an estimated \$500 million a year) buy only 118 piasters apiece at the official rate, while the free- or black-market rate is 360. Under the new plan, these U.S. dollars will be exchanged officially at about 235 piasters.

PEKING FACES WEST

Red China is accelerating a diplomatic buildup in East Europe. Peking will soon establish full relations with Tito's Yugoslavia and has ordered its ally Albania to do the same. The French officials who recently visited Mao are convinced China can do this because it has recovered from its cultural revolution. The French also expect Red China's No. 2 man, Chou En-lai, to visit France and East Europe within the next year.

CLOUT, INC.

A high-powered new international consulting firm (New York, Washington, London) will boast some of the top political operators in the U.S. Called Public Affairs Analysts, it is headed by F. Clifton White (a top 1961 Goldwater aide), backed up by Joseph Napolitan (sometime campaign strategist for JFK, LBJ, Hubert Humphrey and, last year, Filipino President Marcos) and includes Larry O'Brien, Democratic National Chairman, as a director. The firm will not handle campaigns in the U.S. but will specialize in government relations.

LONG'S LONE HAND

Despite the implacable opposition of its chairman, Russell Long of Louisiana, the betting now is that the Senate Finance Committee will OK the Administration's family-assistance program—and almost in the form the President wants. The White House, which can count on liberal Democratic support on Long's committee, now has lined up such solidly conservative GOP members as Wallace Bennett of Utah, Jack Miller of Iowa and Len Jordan of Idaho.

WHO LOVES THE SST?

William Magruder, the test pilot and engineer brought to Washington to ramrod the Administration's campaign to get Senate support for the controversial SST airplane, has found his toughest opponents within the Administration itself.

Treasury Secretary Kennedy, for example, dismisses the whole idea as a frill. The Senate is expected to vote on SST funds in about five weeks.

NOW, THE ANTI-ANTI-MISSILE

Those long-range Soviet missile tests in the Pacific last week demonstrated two points: (1) the Minuteman-type Russian SS-11 is now a multiple-threat weapon (the warheads tested included two decoys plus the metallic chaff used to fool radar); and (2) Moscow, which has about 800 of these missiles, has produced in three years a weapon that can penetrate the ABM defense the U.S. is still developing.

THIS CUSTOMER IS ALWAYS RIGHT

Iraq has added a new twist to the unremitting anti-U.S. campaign it started when Washington and Baghdad broke relations three years ago. The Iraqis have ordered that the modern U.S. Embassy in Baghdad (which the Belgians have been tending) be sold to an "authorized" buyer. The lone authorized buyer—Iraq.

HANOI TAKES NO CHANCES

Bombing raids against North Vietnam have been halted (except for a rare strike to protect scout planes) since November 1968, but Hanoi is not relaxing. It still maintains a net of 4,000 ack-ack artillery and machine-gun sites, almost 500 radar points and 40 batteries of Soviet missiles.

THE JAWBONE THAT FAILED

Despite the President's strong beefs about the failure of Congress to tax leaded gasoline (and thus cut air pollution and raise revenues), his chances look slim. The tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee is dead set against it because, as its No. 2 Democrat, Hale Boggs of Louisiana, grandly puts it: "We don't believe the power to tax should be used as the power to destroy."

THE HIGH COST OF SAVING

Though costs of the Vietnam war are down by half—from \$29 billion to \$14.5 billion—Defense Secretary Laird is busy showing how the "saving" is far less. Privately, Laird gave Congress this arithmetic: keeping up the combat troops that have left Vietnam but are still on duty takes \$1.5 billion; inflation and pay raises add \$5.9 billion. Even with \$2.8 billion pared from non-Viet spending, Laird ends up with \$6.9 billion, the exact sum trimmed from his new budget.

DISCREET INQUIRY RELATIVE TO A NEWLY FORMED ORGANIZATION KNOWN
AS PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANALYSTS

Discreet inquiry was made in connection with Bob Haldeman's direction to look into an organization known as Public Affairs Analysts. Such information was brought to H.R.H.'s attention in a memorandum by Bill Safire resulting from a news item in an August 10, 1970 Newsweek, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Inquiry reveals that an organization known as Public Affairs Analysts is currently located at 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone #296-6024. These offices of subject firm are housed at the above address in building known as the La Salle Building. The firm occupies Room #618 and is described as a two door office with only fair furnishings. It has been determined that the rental for such office amounts to \$300.00 per month and has been continually occupied for the past five years by Joseph Napolitan Associates.

A discreet interview of the rental agent located on the premises reveals that the firm of Public Affairs Analysts initiated business at the above location on July 15, 1970 at the direction of Mr. Joseph Napolitan.

Listed below are the names of individuals affiliated with an apparent group of businesses using the above described offices: Joseph Napolitan, Claud J. Desautels, Barns Munson Howard, Oscar Jager, and E. K. Blunt. Additionally the below indicated firms conduct business from the subject office: Joseph Napolitan Associates, Campaign Consultants, Murray Watson, Ltd., University of Chicago Club and Public Affairs Analysts.

Source advises that a discreet look at the interior office structure of the subject business indicates an answering service type environment with staffing inconsistent with the number of firms listed as doing business at that location.

While further inquiry will continue as to the structure and operation of the firm Public Affairs Analysts, it appears at this time that the firm is operating in shoestring fashion and may well be an ad hoc medium by which a group of well connected politicians can have on-going office space with a view towards taking advantage of the needs of candidates for professional advise and guidance. This is a common practice and one that is not alien to the Republican side of the coin.

Relative to the international consulting aspects of this new firm; a discreet inquiry will have to be accomplished either from friends in the business or more directly from contact with F. Clifton White who is listed in the attached article as heading up the subject firm. It seems to me that Dick Kliendienst would be in the best position to make this determination because of his longtime association with White. Advise if you wish for me to pursue this particular aspect.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Analysts

For some time Cliff White and Joe Napolitan have had a cooperative arrangement in which they pool their political contacts with corporations and other organizations in order to market their services as political consultants. Generally, the idea has been to provide corporations with programs for employee political education -- a nonpartisan "public affairs" program. Obviously, this type of service can be more easily marketed if it is clearly nonpartisan, which is why White and Napolitan decided to pool their efforts. From a business standpoint, this venture was designed to provide two political operatives with bread and butter in non-election years.

Napolitan has had some success in selling his political consulting services abroad. Apparently last fall, he and White met with some European political consultants in Florence and discussed those things which "pols" world-wide find of mutual interest. Shortly thereafter, Public Affairs Analysts (PAA) was established as yet another White/Napolitan operation.

As I can piece the story together, Larry O'Brien purchased from Napolitan some stock in the new enterprise. I am unsure of the precise amount, but it is less than 10% of the stock outstanding. By virtue of his stock interest, O'Brien was elected to the Board of Directors. He has no management responsibility and no authority in the day-to-day operations of the business.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Public Affairs Analysts is not a lobbying outfit, but a political consulting firm. At the present time, it has no foreign clients, although obviously it hopes to get some. Counsel for PAA is a prominent New York law firm which would be sure to advise White of the legal implications of any business arrangement with a foreign interest. Knowing the firm as well as Cliff, I am confident that any arrangement would be not only legal but prudent.

O'Brien's relationship with PAA is so minor that I would think it unworthy of further investigation.


TOM CHARLES HUSTON

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

August 18, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN

By a memorandum of August 5, 1970, you requested that I look into a suggestion from Bill Safire that we "raise a big fuss" about Larry O'Brien's reported (NEWSWEEK) involvement in an "international consulting firm."

Attached is the NEWSWEEK article indicating O'Brien's involvement in Public Affairs Analysts (PAA) along with Clifton White and Joseph Napolitan. PAA is located in an office on Connecticut Avenue in a location that has been leased for the past five years by Joseph Napolitan; some five different firms conduct business out of this office. For some time White and Napolitan have had a cooperative arrangement in which they pool their political contacts with corporations and other organizations in order to market their services as political consultants. The concept is to provide corporations with programs for employee political education of a non-partisan "public affairs" nature. Obviously this type of service can best be marketed if it is non-partisan and this is apparently why White and Napolitan have pooled their resources.

Napolitan has had some success in selling his political consulting services abroad. The NEWSWEEK article notes his involvement with President Marcos of the Philippines. I understand that last fall Napolitan and White met with some European political consultants in Florence and discussed areas of mutual interest. Shortly thereafter PAA was established as another White/Napolitan operation. Apparently Larry O'Brien purchased stock in the new enterprise from Napolitan; while the precise amount of stock is not known, it is estimated to be less than 10 percent of the stock outstanding. By virtue of this stock interest, O'Brien was elected to the Board of Directors -- as reported in the NEWSWEEK article. O'Brien has no management responsibilities and no involvement in the day to day operations of the business. Apparently his present activities with PAA are rather limited.

Based on the information that I have been able to obtain, I would recommend that no action be taken regarding O'Brien's involvement in PAA. To date they have done nothing that would require them to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and I think we can assume that they are well aware of the requirements to register because Napolitan has registered, when necessary, in the past. The involvement of Clifton White also makes it doubtful whether any political gain can be made from focusing on O'Brien's involvement and it might have a detrimental impact on White's efforts to manage the Buckley campaign in New York State.

John W. Dean

A TRUE COPY

MEMORANDUM

Tab 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON*Confidential*


January 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR ROY GOODEARLE

Bob Bennett, son of Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah, has just left the Department of Transportation to take over the Mullen Public Relations firm here in Washington. Bob is a trusted loyalist and a good friend. We intend to use him on a variety of outside projects.

One of Bob's new clients is Howard Hughes. I'm sure I need not explain the political implications of having Hughes' affairs handled here in Washington by a close friend. As you know, Larry O'Brien has been the principal Hughes man in Washington. This move could signal quite a shift in terms of the politics and money that Hughes represents.

Bennett tells me that one of the yardsticks by which Hughes measures the effectiveness of his Washington lobbyist is the important people he knows; that's how O'Brien got on board. Bob Bennett tells me that he has never met the Vice President and that it would enhance his position greatly if we could find an appropriate occasion for him to come in and spend a little time talking with the Vice President. Maybe you can think of a better way to do this than a meeting in the office; maybe there is a social occasion that Bennett could be included in on. The important thing from our standpoint is to enhance Bennett's position with Hughes because Bennett gives us real access to a source of power that can be valuable, and it's in our interest to build him up. Could I have your thoughts on this please?


Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
January 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM:

JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT:

HUGHES RETAINER FOR LAWRENCE O'BRIEN

Initial inquiry indicates that it will be most difficult to prove a direct financial transaction between Lawrence O'Brien and Howard Hughes. A reliable source postures the subject retainer in this manner:

O'Brien and Robert Mayhew are longtime Boston area associates, going back to the early or pre-Kennedy days. During the Kennedy Administration, assertedly, there was continuous liaison between O'Brien and Mayhew. When O'Brien left the White House and prior to becoming Postmaster General, Mayhew offered O'Brien a piece of the Hughes action in Las Vegas (believed to be \$100,000) and O'Brien came close to accepting.

O'Brien decided against it. Subsequently, after leaving the government, O'Brien formed a Washington-New York based P.R. firm bringing along one Claude Desautels, his Executive Assistant at the Post Office.

My source states the Hughes-O'Brien financial retainer transactions were handled between Desautels and Mayhew with O'Brien one step removed.

Assertedly, such retainer continued until the recent Mayhew disaster in Vegas.

This is an interim report. I have asked for additional information. Will forward when received.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
January 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: HUGHES RETAINER TO LARRY O'BRIEN AND RELATED MATTERS

A follow-up inquiry regarding this matter discloses the following:

O'Brien, following his departure from government as Postmaster General, established a public relations firm. This occurred during 1969. At that time, serious negotiations took place between O'Brien and Mayhew for O'Brien's firm to represent the Hughes interests in Washington. No hard evidence of the fee to be involved is available. Knowledgeable sources assert \$100,000 was the amount under consideration.

It is alleged that for unknown reasons the above discussed retainer did not materialize in this manner. Rather, O'Brien's longtime confidant Claude Desautels formed a P.R. type organization named DeSautels Associates, 1725 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., Tel. # 296-1338. It is reliably reported that this firm had handled the Hughes interests on Capitol Hill up until the Mayhew-Hughes controversy in Vegas. The fee involved for such undertaking is not known to my source.

As one gets closer to Mayhew's dealings, it becomes evident that his tentacles touch many extremely sensitive areas of government, each one of which is fraught with potential for Jack Anderson type exposure. For example:

Mayhew apparently forwarded Hughes' political contributions, personally, to both parties over the last ten years. It is asserted that he dealt with one Vic Johnson, now deceased, who was one of Richard Nixon's fund raisers over the years.

Former Californian Republican Congressman Pat Hillings is very close to Murray Chotiner. Hillings has been retained by Mayhew in connection with Hughes' interests for years.

Former F.B.I. agent Dick Danner has been an aide to Mayhew. Danner is a close associate of former Senator Smathers and professes a friendship with Bebe Rebozo. I have reason to believe the Danner-Rebozo relationship is peripheral at best.

Memorandum for John W. Dean
From: Jack Caulfield
Page two

January 25, 1971

Clark Clifford's law firm has been the Washington representative of the Hughes legal interests in Washington for a number of years.

Mayhew was a close associate of rogue F.B.I. agent John Frank, generally believed to have engineered the assassination of Jesus de Galindez in New York City on March 12, 1956 on behalf of the assassinated Rafael Trujillo.

It seems to me that before any action is taken vis a vis O'Brien and the Hughes retainer, we should authorize an in depth analysis of all (CIA, F.B.I., IRS) information available for White House perusal. There is a serious risk here for a counter scandal if we move precipitously.

January 26, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT: Hughes' Retainer of Larry O'Brien

Pursuant to your memorandum of January 18, 1971, I have conducted an inquiry into the relationship between Larry O'Brien and Howard Hughes. My preliminary findings are set forth below.

First, Lyn Nofziger, who you thought had been doing some work in this area, reported that he had no knowledge of specifics, but had hearsay information of the relationship.

Second, I discussed the matter with Bebe Rebozo who indicated that his information regarding the retainer had come from Robert Maheu, the recently released head of Hughes' Nevada operation. Bebe said that this information had come to his attention at a time when Maheu was professing considerable friendliness towards the Administration, but that it was not documented information. Bebe indicated that he felt that Maheu had possibly retained O'Brien for his services without any direct knowledge by Hughes himself. Bebe is under the impression that Maheu had a good bit of freedom with Hughes' money when running the Nevada operation. Bebe further indicated that he felt he could acquire some documentation of this fact if given a little time and that he would proceed to try to get any information he could. He also requested that if any action be taken with regard to Hughes that he be notified because of his familiarity with the delicacy of the relationships as a result of his own dealings with the Hughes people.

Third, I have also been informed by a source of Jack Caulfield's that O'Brien and Maheu are long time friends from the Boston area, a friendship which dates back to early or pre-Kennedy days. During the Kennedy Administration, there apparently was a continuous liaison between O'Brien and Maheu. When O'Brien left the White House prior to becoming Postmaster General, it is alleged that Maheu offered O'Brien a piece of the Hughes action in Las Vegas (believed to be about a \$100,000 arrangement).

O'Brien apparently did not accept the offer. After leaving the government, O'Brien formed a Washington-New York based public relations firm and brought into the firm a man by the name of Claude Desaultels, who had been O'Brien's Executive Assistant while he was Postmaster General. There is some basis to believe that the Hughes-O'Brien financial retainer transactions have been handled by Desaultels and Maheu, with O'Brien one step removed.

Caulfield's source further indicated that Maheu, apparently, was the man who forwarded all Hughes' political contributions, personally, to both parties over the last ten years. It is asserted that he dealt with a man by the name of Vic Johnson (now deceased) who he believed was one of the Nixon fund raisers over the years. I assume this is the Vic Johnson who was with the Congressional Campaign Committee. It is also noted that former Republican Congressman Pat Hillings, who is a friend of Murray Chotiner's, has been retained by Maheu in connection with the Hughes' interests for several years. It is further alleged that former FBI Agent Dick Danner has served as an aide to Maheu and Danner is an associate of former Senator Smathers and Danner professes a friendship with Bebe Rebozo. I have not confirmed this latter fact with Bebe. The Clark Clifford law firm has been the Washington representative of the Hughes' legal interests in Washington for a number of years.

Fourth, Bob Bennett, son of Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah, has recently left the Department of Transportation to take over the Mullen Public Relations firm here in Washington. Chuck Colson informs me that Bob Bennett is a trusted and good friend of the Administration. One of Bob's new clients is Howard Hughes. Bennett informs me that there is no doubt about the fact that Larry O'Brien was retained by Howard Hughes and the contract is still in existence. The arrangements were made by Maheu and Bennett believes that O'Brien, through his associate Desaultels, is going to seek to have Hughes follow through on the alleged retainer contract even though Maheu has been removed. Bennett believes that Larry O'Brien has removed himself from the operation in a visible way, but for all practical purposes, is still involved with the former Larry O'Brien Associates which is now run by Desaultels. Bennett believes that Desaultels is collecting on the Hughes contract and placing funds in a reserve account for O'Brien when O'Brien returns to the firm. Bennett also indicates that he will be going to the West Coast to talk about the specifics of his Hughes relationship with Mr. Gay (the man who is responsible for releasing Maheu). Bennett also indicated that he felt confident that if it was necessary to document the retainer with O'Brien that he could get the

necessary information through the Hughes people, but it would be with the understanding that the documentation would not be used in a manner that might embarrass Hughes.

As I am sure you are aware, information in this area is somewhat difficult to come by. Bob Bennett appears to be the best source readily available. I have requested that he get back in touch with me when he returns from California. I will report further at that time and shall continue to explore other sources in the interim.

Any other instructions? -----

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN 
SUBJECT: Hughes Retainer of Larry O'Brien

You should continue to keep in contact with Bob Bennett, as well as looking for other sources of information on this subject. Once Bennett gets back to you with his final report, you and Chuck Colson should get together and come up with a way to leak the appropriate information. Frankly, I can't see any way to handle this without involving Hughes so the problem of "embarrassing" him seems to be a matter of degree. However, we should keep Bob Bennett and Bebe out of it at all costs. Please keep me advised of your progress on this and any plans you decide on.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III 

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: HUGHES RETAINER TO LARRY O'BRIEN

Inquiry regarding the Hughes retainer to O'Brien reveals that it can be documented only indirectly in that payment was made via the Mahew-Claude De Sautels route (De Sautels is a long time confidant of O'Brien).

The revelation that an O'Brien-Mahew relationship exists poses significant hazards in any attempt to make O'Brien accountable to the Hughes retainer. Mahew's controversial activities and contacts in both Democratic and Republican circles suggests the possibility that forced embarrassment of O'Brien in this matter might well shake loose Republican skeletons from the closet.

In this connection, it should be remembered that Don Nixon visited the Dominican Republic with a group of wheeler dealers in September 1969, who assertedly were connected with Mahew mining forces in Nevada.

Further, former Republican Congressman Pat Hillings has long been on the payroll of Hughes in a P.R. capacity. Hillings is very close to Murray Chotiner. Whether or not business arrangements have transpired in this area is not known.

Mahew's covert activities from his Washington association with CIA in the early sixties to his Nevada involvement on behalf of Hughes are only generally known here, at this time. It is again suggested that in depth information be on hand before pursuing the suggested course.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: HUGHES-MAHEW

I am sure you will find it interesting if you view the last half of CBS's "Sixty Minutes" show last night. It dealt with the ongoing Hughes controversy, including an in depth interview of Mahew. Also an indication of Intertel's activity in Nevada.

February 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JACK CAULFIELD

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT:

Hughes-Mahou

Would you please arrange for me to view the last half of the CBS 60 Minutes Show of February 2, 1971, dealing with the Hughes controversy and the interview with Mahou. Please confirm the date and time with Jane. I think I should review it as soon as possible.

Thank you, Jack.

SUBJECT: HAZARD POSED BY WHITE HOUSE STAFF WITH SECURITY
OFFICIALS IN HOWARD HUGHES CORPORATION INTERESTS IN LAS VEGAS

Information has been received from a source believed to be reliable indicating that the Howard Hughes operation in Las Vegas is in serious financial difficulty. Source states that former FBI agent Mayhew, longtime associate of the Hughes operation, had been placed in complete charge of the Hughes hotel and gambling interests in Las Vegas. Source advises that Mayhew has gone completely sour in that close and ominous relationships have been established between Mayhew and well known Mafia figures. Further, that Mayhew and these figures have been criminally skimming huge profits from casino operations for their own benefit. Assertedly, only now are the Hughes corporate officials becoming aware of the extent of the monies being stolen. It is feared that substantial millions are involved.

Source advises that Mayhew is a consummate namedropper and has convinced Hughes corporate officials that he has close, influential contacts at the White House. Assertedly, only now are these officials becoming aware that Mayhew has no influence in this area.

It is alleged that representatives of Mayhew may have picked up hotel and bar tabs for the Presidential advance party in connection with the October 31st visit to Las Vegas. Further, that the same activity may have been involved with the V.P.'s trip there during the campaign.

MEMORANDUM

Tab 3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. COLSON
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: Ed Muskie



Charlie Fagan at the Commerce Department called me this week and indicated that a company in Maine called the Maine Sugar Industry, which has had a \$13,000,000 EDA loan and was put together during the Kennedy/Johnson years under the urgings of Muskie, will probably officially announce bankruptcy late this week or next week.

Most of the key political figures in Maine were instrumental in helping this company get this loan but Muskie was evidentially the leader. Fagan has all of the basic information and is the EDA contact on this subject. It would seem this might be something we would want to take advantage of.

cc: Mr. Strachan

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1971

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN DEAN

FROM:

CHARLES W. COLSON

WZ

Could you assign Jack Caulfield to dig out all of the facts with respect to the enclosed. I have some personal familiarity with this, and I know that there is a real live issue here.

At the time the loan was approved one of Muskie's men was a deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for EDA. I know that the loan was ramrodded through by Muskie and his people, and I also believe that some of the money interests behind the sugar plant in Maine have been large contributors to Muskie's campaigns. This needs, obviously with some discretion, to be looked into very carefully and also very quickly. I have ways, of course, of getting this out but I do need the facts which apparently, as you will see from the enclosed, are available from Fagan at the Commerce Department. He is a political loyalist and can be dealt with confidently.

Please advise.

Attachment

EYES ONLY

9761

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

See ONLY

April 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN DEAN

This relates to my earlier memo to you re the Maine sugar situation.

Will you please give me what you can get on this as quickly as possible.

C. W. Colson
Charles W. Colson

EYES ONLY

April 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Maine Beet Sugar Plant

Clark Mollenhoff will break this week an exclusive story on the tie-in between Senator Muskie and the about to be defunct Maine beet sugar plant. The EDA will lose \$13 million (all of it guaranteed during the Johnson Administration) when the Maine sugar plant files for bankruptcy. The loans were approved by Muskie associates, one of whom subsequently joined his staff.

There is a good bit of financial relationship with the promoter and I believe a fair amount of hanky panky that will fall out of this. I have reason to think that the issue will be kept alive.

This is just for your information.

cc: John Dean (EYES ONLY)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: MUSKIE'S ASSOCIATION WITH MAINE SUGAR INDUSTRY
FIRM ABOUT TO GO BANKRUPT

With respect to this matter, be advised that Lyn Hofziger is most knowledgeable in this area. I have worked with him on certain segments of it.

You should also be aware that considerable newspaper publicity has already been given to Muskie's involvement in this matter. Such publicity is a matter of record in the research division of the RNC.

The only new development here is that the subject firm is about to go bankrupt and we have Charlie Fagan in good position regarding the current development.

Because of the information available, because of the hazards of the White House pursuing this inquiry, I wish to strongly suggest that Chuck endorse Lyn and Charlie Fagan getting together for optimum results with minimal White House exposure.

April 29, 1971

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHARLES COLSON

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT:

Muskie - Maine Sugar Industry, Inc.

In view of the disclosures and notoriety of this case, and the fact that the FBI is investigating certain of Vahlsing's activities, I do not think it would be advisable for the White House to have any more direct involvement with Commerce in this matter. It would seem that the same advantages can be achieved by someone from the RNC getting together with Charlie Fagan (who has been pinpointed by Mollenhoff) for any additional facts and current information that might be needed, and this could be done with minimal Administration exposure.

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

Tab 4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: POTOMAC ASSOCIATES
1707 L STREET, N.W.
ROOM #500
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Above organization occupies space within the I.T.T. building which is operated by the Tower Construction Company of the same address.

Organization has a five year lease option beginning August 1970. Cost is scaled from \$12,000-\$15,000 per annum. Space is subdivided into four offices which include a storeroom, center alcove and reception room. Listings are indicated for:

Roger D. Hansen
Elizabeth W. King
William Watts
Jo H. Tunstall

Building appears to have good security with guard present in lobby during day and evening hours. However, a penetration is deemed possible if required. Attached is an example of the type of literature published under the sponsorship of the entity. It is noted that this particular work was commissioned as will future similar works.

Attachment.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
August 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: POTOMAC ASSOCIATES

Strachan called wishing to be pro forma kept up to date on any current information we might have on Potomac Associates. You should decide whether or not the attached is of sufficient interest.

I do not feel that at this time the red flag that went up last February warrants more than cursory overview.

10/14/71
Caulfield

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tab 5

6/22

(Date)

TO: JLCFROM: JOHN DEAN

ACTION:

DUE DATE: 6/25

✓ Prepare reply
for John Dean's signature

 Direct Reply Comments/Recommendations Please Handle Information File

REMARKS:

Make inquiry at Justice (Bill Sessions
- Criminal Division) - ext. 187-2313

I don't think this is government
stationery - rather personal paper he
orders at Senate Store - check it out!

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: MC GOVERN FUND RAISING SENATE STATIONERY

As suggested, I discussed this matter with Bill Sessions. At first blush his opinion is that if the expenses incurred in the printing are borne by Mc Govern, there would be no case.

He has asked that in order for a written response to come from his office he would have to see the document in question. I recommend we forward it for his perusal.

OK- Lyn Nofziger has been asked to show the stationery to Dole for an opinion as to whether this is government stationery. Will advise when response is received.

Maybe Dole will have some ideas, E.G. can out request citizens writing to him about it — referred to the Senate Ethics Committee, ? etc.

Propose RPT -

NO
not from white house

*M. to
Cason*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1971

*Duff
S&S
me*

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III
FROM: JACK CAULFIELD
SUBJECT: MG-GOVERN STATIONERY

Have discussed this with Lyn and he advises that we have no issue here in that similar types of fundraising stationery have been used in the past and come under review by our political opposition with negative results.

July 6, 1971

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON

FROM: JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT: McGovern Fund Raising Stationery

You requested my opinion as to whether Senator McGovern's use of the attached fund raising letter with a U.S. Senate letterhead possibly violates the law. As long as the expenses incurred in printing the stationery and letter are borne by McGovern, there would be no violation of law. We have not been able to find any indication that McGovern has used government funds for this fund raising project.

It does not appear that there has been an impropriety here either. We have been informed that similar types of fund raising efforts have been used with some frequency in the past. I should also point out that there are cases where White House stationery has been used for fund raising, although hopefully it will not occur in the future.

A TRUE COPY

July 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BUD KROGH

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

In your work on the Pentagon Papers and related issues you will become aware of the fact that there is a publication out of the Brookings Institute indicating that they are planning for the fall of this year a study of Vietnam based on documents of a current nature. Chuck Colson has made some efforts to determine what Brookings is up to but I don't think he has produced any solid evidence of the nature of this publication. I requested that Caulfield obtain the tax returns of the Brookings Institute to determine if there is anything that we might do by way of turning off money or dealing with principals of the Brookings Institute to determine what they are doing and deal with anything that might be adverse to the Administration.

Attached are copies of these tax returns and you will note that Brookings receives a number of large government contracts. You will also note that on the Board of Trustees there are several people who might be of assistance to us in dealings with the Brookings Institute, e.g., Peter Peterson and H. Chapman Rose.

When we discuss this issue I will also give you some additional background information on the Brookings problem.

July 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BUD KROGH

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

SUBJECT:

Brookings Institution

A few days ago I forwarded to you copies of the Brookings Institution's tax returns. Please note the attached memorandum on what should be done about the large number of government contracts now held by the Brookings Institution. If you want me to "turn the spigot off" please let me know; otherwise, I will assume that you are proceeding on this matter.

Thank you, Bud.

9773

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ATTACHMENT
"A"

Indicated below is an examination of the power, influence and activities of the Ford Foundation and Brookings Institution along with recommendations as to how the Administration can deal with them in 1972.

FORD FOUNDATION

The colossus of foundations - and apex of the academic foundation complex is the Ford Foundation. It's annual report for 1969, released March 8, 1970, showed assets at market value of 2.5 billion dollars, and a principal fund balance of 3.9 billion.

Established in 1936, it became a national organization in 1950. Since its inception, it is reported to have disbursed more than 3.6 billion dollars, including grants to 5,880 institutions in the U.S. and 82 foreign countries. Expenditures in 1969 were listed at 237.5 million dollars.

The foundation has provided money for the Brookings Institution, the Kennedy Memorial at Harvard, the Princeton Institute, and many other centers of academic-political actionism.

President of the foundation is McGeorge Bundy. Indicated below are the trustees of the organization who, in the words of Bundy "hold responsibility for our affairs and who set the policies and programs of the Ford Foundation:"

Chairman - Julius Stratton
(former President of M.I.T.)

Stephen D. Becketl
(senior Director of the Becketl Corp.)

Eugene R. Black

John Cowles
(former Chairman Minneapolis Standard
Tribune Corp.)

Benson Ford
(Vice-President of Ford Motor Co.)

Henry Ford II
(Chairman of the Board, Ford Motor Co.)

Kermet Gordon
(President of Brookings Inst.)

Alexander Heard
(Chancellor, Vanderbilt University)

Edwin H. Ford
(Chairman and President - Polaroid Corp.)

Roy E. Larsen
(Chairman, executive committee of Time Inc.)

John H. Loudon
(Chairman of the board Rogue Dutch Petroleum
Co.)

Robert S. McNamara
(World Bank)

J. Irwin Miller
(Chairman of the Board, Cummins Eugene Co.)

Bethuld M. Webster¹⁴
(partner, Webster, Sheffield, Heischmann,
Hitshcock and Brookfield of New York)

Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.
(Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, Boston)

Ford has financed such activities as a school decentralization project in New York City that stirred up racial strife and led to three strikes by a teacher's union; a Negro voter registration drive in 1967 that was credited with helping to elect Carl Stokes as the first black Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio; and efforts to organize Mexican-Americans in California and Texas.

The foundation has invested in many community action programs across the country, and helped fund such Negro organizations as the N.A.A.C.P., C.O.R.E., and the S.C.L.C.

In July 1968 the foundation provided "travel and study" awards to eight former aides of the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The total amounted to \$131,069.50 and was subsequently the subject of much hill criticism.

Additionally, the foundation gave \$12,717 in 1969 to Joseph A. Colefano for a travel study in connection with a book called "The Student Revolution A Global Confrontation."

In the 1969 Ford Foundation annual report, Bundy stated "The nations social ills were still a major focus of our activity in 1969. . . we hope to do much more in the Seventies."

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

In November 1970 Brookings reported to IRS total assets of \$48,960,000. Headquartered in Washington, the organization has emerged as the leading Democratic "think tank" in the Nation. Indeed, the large influx of former Democratic office-holders to the Institution in 1969 (See ATTACH "A") prompted one official to describe it as "a government-in-exile."

Brookings was a small organization until the 1960's. During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, it turned into a bigtime operation. While functioning as a kind of holding station for Democrats and of power, it attempts to influence public opinion and government policy. Access to huge sources of tax free money, such as the Ford Foundation makes the task immeasurably easier.

In recent years, the Institution has obtained more than 14 million dollars in Ford subsidies, including \$175,000 to produce a book called "Agenda for the Nation" immediately after the 1968 Presidential election.

The Wall Street Journal called it a collection of policy papers by 18 writers who "comprise an honor roll of academicians of the New Frontier and Great Society."

Shortly after the Nixon Administration took office in 1969, the Institution announced a "new program of foreign policy studies." It is alleged that the Ford Foundation agreed to fund 75 per cent of the project, estimated to cost 7 million dollars over a three-year period.

These studies were to cover such controversial issues as: the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; arms control and disarmament; the U.S. role in Asia after Vietnam, relations with Communist China; the U.S. role in defense of Western Europe; foreign aid, trade, investment and development policy, new social and technological forces in the world, the size of the U.S. defense budget, kinds of weapons, and military assistance to foreign countries; a permanent peace-keeping force for the United Nations; social change and domestic problems in the U.S.

It is clear from this cursory analysis that the financial wealth and influence of the Ford Foundation and Brookings Institution when used to engage in either direct or indirect political activity represents formidable opposition to the best interests of this Administration.

It would appear that an expeditious political response to this challenge would be the simple expedient of applying pressures to have the Internal Revenue Service strictly enforce existing statutes and promulgated regulations designed to threaten the tax exempt status enjoyed by these organizations.

In examining this potential with Administration loyalists at IRS, a disappointing picture emerges. For example, as a result of congressional pressure in 1969 an audit of the Ford Foundation was undertaken. It is still ongoing with no tangible results or progress seen to date. Purposeful delay appears to be the chosen bureaucratic tact.

Commissioner Walters, according to these same IRS powers, has not yet exercised the firm leadership expected at the time of his appointment. Additionally, there appears to be a reluctance on his part to make discreet politically oriented decisions and to effect major appointments based upon Administration loyalty considerations.

In this regard, career democrat William Loeb has been named as Walters deputy, a key policy position. Also, William Connett, another democrat, continues to function as Walters' Special Assistant for tax-exempt organizations. By written direction of Walters all tax exempt matters of substance must flow through Connett. Roger Barth is currently being eased out of IRS by Walters.

It is not believed, therefore, that this personnel alignment would allow a successful pro forma request for IRS action against Brookings or Ford. Indeed, under the above circumstances, such approach would appear to be politically inadvisable. Certainly charges of political interference would be raised in the media and elsewhere by representatives of the Ford and Brookings organizations and their many supporters.

In view of the above circumstances, the following recommendations are made with a view towards an effective and credible attack against Brookings and Ford designed to minimize the political impact these organizations will attempt to bring to bear during the coming election year:

A) The President direct Secretary Connally to give a major address forcefully dealing with the concern of both the executive and legislative branches (PATMAN) over political abuses and other apparent illegal activities of foundations and other tax-exempt organizations.

(If the Secretary were not inclined to specifically attack Brookings and Ford in that speech, the Vice President could effectively follow with a hard hitting specific effort in that regard. Pat Buchanan has such a speech prepared.)

The Secretary's speech could include the announcement of the creation of a new position in Treasury, such as Deputy Undersecretary for Taxation to oversee, on behalf of the Administration both tax administration (IRS) and policy. Such appointee would be the medium through which the Administration could force, following the Connally warning, stepped up IRS action and compliance in the tax exempt organization area during 1972. Understandably, this appointee would have to be outstanding in qualification and loyalty.

B) Clark MacGregor to be directed by the President to work with Congress and Treasury to obtain more restrictive legislation on the political abuses of tax exempt organizations. We should shoot for public hearings on Brookings activities.

C) Senator Dole to be directed by the President to have the RNC develop this entire area as a key issue for the '72 campaign. The purpose would be twofold:

1) Focus to be brought upon the ~~phases~~ FORD Foundation ~~founda-~~ financed voter registration drives.

2) Take this issue away from George Wallace where it now lies.

D) The President to direct George Schultz to see to it that the \$500,000 in federal grants (HEW, OEO, etc.) presently received by Brookings be cut.

While a loud public protest could be anticipated, it would be welcome for the implication would be clear partisan political involvement of Brookings, Ford and other anti-Administration foundations in 1972 would be fraught with peril.

NOTE: It should be recalled that Kermét Gordon, President of Brookings and a trustee of the Ford Foundation has been appointed to the Phase II Pay Board.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.
Washington, D. C. 20036

53-0196577

ATTACHMENT NO. 8

Schedule A. Line (a)

COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND TRUSTEES

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name and Code Per Instruction I</u>	<u>Time Devoted Per Annum</u>	<u>1969- Comp</u>
Chairman, Board of Trustees	Douglas Dillon (e)	4 days	No
Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees and member of Finance Committee	Sydney Stein, Jr. (e)	7 days *	No
Chairman, Executive Committee and Finance Committee	William R. Biggs (e)	17 days *	No
Trustee	Dillon Anderson (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.	1 day *	No
Trustee	Louis W. Cabot (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	Robert D. Calkins (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee	Edward W. Carter (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee	John Fischer (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee and President, The Brookings Institution	Kermit Gordon (e)	10 days *	No
Trustee	Gordon Gray (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	Huntington Harris (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee	Luther G. Holbrook (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	John E. Lockwood (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee	William McC. Martin, Jr. Elected May '70		No
Trustee	Robert S. McNamara (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	Arjay Miller (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee	Herbert P. Patterson (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee	Peter G. Peterson (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee and member of Executive Committee and Finance Committee	J. Woodward Redmond (e)	10 days *	No
Trustee	H. Chapman Rose (e)	2 days *	No
Trustee and member of Executive Committee	Robert Brookings Smith (e)	7 days *	No
Trustee and member of Executive Committee	J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr. (e)	1 day *	No
Trustee and member of Executive Committee and Finance Committee	Donald B. Woodward (e)	9 days	No

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
53-0196577

ATTACHMENT NO. 8, Page 2
Schedule A, Line (a)

COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND TRUSTEES (Continued)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name and Code Per Instruction I</u>	<u>Time Devoted Per Annual</u>	<u>1969-1970 Compensation</u>
Honorary Trustees:	Arthur Stanton Adams (e)	2 days	None
	Daniel W. Bell (e)	None	None
	Eugene R. Black (e)	None	None
	Leonard Carmichael (e)	2 days	None
	Colgate W. Darden, Jr. (e)	None	None
	Marion B. Folsom (e)	None	None
	Raymond B. Posdick (e)	None	None
	Huntington Gilchrist (e)	1 day	None
	John Lee Pratt (e)	None	None
President	Kermit Gordon	12 mos. - 100%	\$ 56,865.79
Vice President for Administration	Robert W. Hartley	-do-	33,843.95
Vice President	Edward K. Hamilton	8 mos. - 100%	24,782.88
Treasurer	Martha J. Long	12 mos. - 100%	16,389.11
Secretary and Asst. Treasurer	Edna M. Birkel	-do-	14,039.61
Controller	Felix B. Correll	-do-	24,610.59
Business Manager	M. Thomas Hooper	-do-	20,062.01
			<u>\$ 190,593.91</u>

* Approximated for Trustees.

a/ Figures representing compensation of officers include the cost to the Brookings Institution of the following fringe benefits: Contribution to the retirement system (which include the employees' voluntary reductions in base pay for purposes of the retirement contracts), social security taxes paid by the employer under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, group life insurance, major medical, disability insurance and group hospitalization.

Trustees may be reimbursed for actual expenses of attending meetings, but they do not receive expense "allowances".

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

Regarding your inquiry:

The party is identified as John D. Wilkes of 1024 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W. (Tel. # FE3-2315). A call to that location results in a voice recording assumed to be the voice of subject asking caller to leave recorded message and call back.

Voice can be described as a cultured, media type.

It has been ascertained that subject was a project specialist at DOD, Office of the Secretary, Personnel Division from August 1961 to July 22, 1971. It has been ascertained that the subject is presently affiliated with an organization known as Wilent, Inc., also of 1024 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.

Such firm is engaged in Applied Research which as you can see is a vague description encompassing anything.

A pretext call to the Muskie campaign headquarters asking for the subject resulted in a negative response. I am proceeding with further investigation in this area and will advise when further information is received.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON JOHN EDWARD DENBY-WILKES
OF CHERRY HILL APARTMENTS LOCATED AT 1024 WISCONSIN
AVENUE, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Subject born in Paris, France on May 26, 1922. He attended the following schools:

University Of Paris
Swarthmore College, Pa.
Columbia University
Princeton University
California Institute of Technology

Served in U. S. Marine Corps from 1944-1946.

Held positions at following locations:

University of Delaware
Northrop Aircraft Inc., California
California Institute of Technology
University of Southern California
Hughes Aircraft Corp. (1951)
Office Naval Research, San Francisco
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Recently has been considered for positions at NASA and AEC.
Has a clearance. From October 1970 to April 1971 was a non-salaried consultant to the International Planning Management Corporation at Bethesda, Maryland.

Subject is divorced. Wife's name not presently known.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: JOHN DENBY-WILKES

Be advised that Ron Walker called wishing to know what information we had on this guy. I told him we had made preliminary inquiry - that you would forward the results.

I am making a discreet political check and following through on Wilkes current involvements.

Will advise.

August 10, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RON WALKER

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

Attached is the information that we were able to obtain on the man found in the Bangor, Maine, airport with a tape recorder by one of your advance men. The information is less than conclusive as to why the man was lurking around the airport. As you can see, however, he does not appear to have been an overt Muskie type! If you would like any further information, please advise me.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Tab 8

WASHINGTON

August 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: 1972 CONVENTION SECURITY

The results of my meeting with Bill Timmons on the above subject are as follows:

Our discussion clearly indicates that the security needs at the San Diego Convention will have to be two-fold.

In the first instance, there will be a requirement for the Nixon campaign staff to be properly secured at the hotel wherein their headquarters will be located.

Timmons advises that the entire Nixon staff will headquarter at the not yet completed Sheraton Hotel located at Harbor Island in the San Diego Bay area which is five minutes from downtown San Diego and ten minutes from the Convention Hall.

Bill indicates that the Nixon forces will occupy the top four floors of the hotel. At this time it is anticipated that the President will spend little or no time at that particular location. Resultingly, a private security requirement will be necessary to enable that particular operation to run securely. We both agreed that the sensitivities of who can come and go into this area is a delicate problem that must be handled well and with discretion.

In addition, the staff communications trailer to be set up outside the Convention Hall creates a security need which the Nixon forces will have to address themselves to. Further, at this time, it is anticipated that a large group of eighteen year old Republicans (approximately 1,500) will be organized and will participate in rallies during the convention period, as well as at the Convention center itself.

The Nixon staff will be charged with providing them with secure housing and transportation. This development will require a private security capability if we are to prevent any embarrassing or ugly confrontations by the New Left and/or revolutionaries.

The above requirements are just one phase of security for the entire convention. The Republican National Committee will have significant security needs, not only within the Convention Hall, but also at the various hotels where key Republican committees and officials will be housed.

Memorandum for John W. Dean, III
 Re: 1972 Convention Security
 Page two

As Bill envisions it, there will be a need for two separate security forces. One programmed by the Nixon staff (and paid for by the Nixon organization), the other programmed and paid for by the Republican National Committee. We both agreed that the capability of one private detective agency to provide massive security is severely limited and the quality of personnel decreases as the size of the force increases.

Bill is interested in seeing that I am charged with the responsibility for both of these areas, and I have indicated that I would be willing to do so, but that I would want to explain our conversation to you before we decided to go forward, and he agreed. I made reference to the possibility that my stay here at the White House may be short-lived, and I might be entering the security consulting area in the private sector. I further indicated that should this development take place, I would probably be in a better position to handle the above responsibilities than if I were still on board the White House staff.

In response to Bill's observation that there is a clear dual security need, I indicated that while I would want to be responsible for the whole security picture, I personally would direct my prime attention to the Nixon staff security program. Further, I indicated that in my judgment Joe Woods would be an ideal candidate to handle the R.N.C. convention security requirements, and because of the close relationship that exists, coordination with me in this regard would be both effective and desirable.

Bill and I agreed that I should undertake an analysis of the capabilities of the private security forces to respond to the above described needs. We also agreed that we should have first call on the services of the best qualified private security agency. I indicated that I would initiate inquiry in this area.

Additionally, I agreed to join Bill in San Diego during the latter part of this month (he is leaving on Saturday for a two week trip to that area), with a view towards getting a feel for the entire operation and coming up with a ball park cost figure.

During the conversation, I suggested that we should be alert to the opportunities that the Presidency presents in this area to use federal, state and local security forces in a lawful manner, and thereby minimize an otherwise expensive proposition.

I also suggested that because of my contacts with the Service, as well as my law enforcement background and '68 experience in this area, I felt that much could be done in this area to promote cooperation and resultant lower costs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK CAULFIELD
FROM: WILLIAM TIMMONS *WT*
SUBJECT: Convention Park Permit

I am concerned about the possibility of the city granting demonstrators a permit to rally on Fiesta Island. As you know this area is 1-1/2 miles from the Sports Arena and does not really offer adequate containment security. Young radicals can bridge the water on foot at several locations, and it is just a short swim at other locations. Also, there is no legacy way I know for scaling the island if individuals want to leave peacefully, only to congregate at another location. Should there be 100,000 kids there it would be an unacceptable risk in my opinion.

Could you investigate the possibility of using Sessions Memorial Park if a permit has to be granted? This area is near La Jolla some 5-1/2 miles north of the Convention hall and out of TV camera range. If the demonstrators broke camp and moved on the hall there are only three arteries available: Mission Blvd., Ingraham Street and Interstate Highway 5. The rest is secured by water at Mission Bay.

Also it would appear that law enforcement authorities could establish a lock-up compound a mile from Sessions at Mission Bay High School.

I am not personally convinced that a permit should be granted but the Sessions area seems superior to Fiesta.

Could you take a look on the map and discuss in greater depth when we are in San Diego.

Thanks, Jack.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION POLICY AT SAN DIEGO

I think it important that you discuss with Bill Timmons the advisability of creating a controlling hold on the issuance of any demonstration permits for the Republican Convention at San Diego.

My recent conversation with the Sheriff of San Diego last week indicated the city fathers may be close to making decisions in this area which might well have a bearing on the orderliness of the convention proceedings.

I suggest, therefore, that a discreet means of control be instituted at this time to ensure that our interests are protected.

Advise.

SUBJECT: EMK VISIT TO HONOLULU AUGUST 17-19 1971

Indicated below are the results of an on the scene check of the movements of EMK during his stop-off visit to Honolulu enroute from India:

EMK arrived in Honolulu alone aboard Pan American Flight #2 from India via Tokyo (he didn't get off plane in Tokyo) at 11:00 AM August 17th. A running press interview took place with Kennedy obviously reluctant to make any statement. His only comment was with regard to the President's economic moves which he characterized as "sound, but late". He departed the airport quickly with two friends identified as follows: . .

- A) John W. Goemans
Attorney
Resides in Waialua City, close to Honolulu
Former EMK classmate and Aide to both Jack and Robert Kennedy
- B) John Carl Warnecke
Architect
Friend of Kennedy family
Designer of JFK gravesight

Ostensibly, EMK's visit was for the purpose of evaluating the creation of a National Park at the site of a black coral reef island off the Honolulu coast. The reef bears an identifiable likeness to the profile of the late JFK. It was determined that a local Democratic Councilman, Joseph E. Bulgo (Maui Island) is handling the project on behalf of EMK.

EMK made no public appearances during his stay in Honolulu. Inquiry ascertained that he occupied the private estate of one J. Otani, located at Diamond Head Road, Honolulu. Otani is initially described as a wealthy Japanese industrialist (attempts will be made to identify him further).

Discreet inquiry determined that Kennedy used the estate solely for sleeping purposes, took only his breakfast meal at that location and quietly visited friends at other locations on the island.

It is known that he played tennis on August 18 at the estate of one Lloyd Martin identified as a wealthy Honolulu contractor. Partners in the tennis match were Mrs. Warnecke, Mrs. Martin, Lloyd Martin and EMK.

EKK

An extensive survey of hotels, discreet cocktail lounges and other hideaways was conducted with a view towards determining a covert EKK visit. The results were negative.

Additional companions of EKK at the estates mentioned were:

Stan Himens
A friend of Wernecke's and
Walter Tagawa,
A friend of Martin's

It was also determined that during his island stay EKK worked on a speech which was given 8/26/71 at the National Press Club in Washington on the subject of Pakistan.

As previously reported, material relating to this matter was forwarded to Lyn Nofziger for use in the Monday publication. A review of the 8/30/71 issue indicates some of the material was in fact used in the EKK-Pakistani article.

In conclusion, it is believed that EKK activity during his stay in Honolulu was adequately covered. No evidence was developed to indicate that his conduct was improper.

Hyannisport sources indicate EKK will remain in that area until after Labor Day and then return to Washington when Congress reconvenes. A discreet inquiry at Hyannis is programmed by our source during this period.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: NEWSDAY ARTICLE

New York sources advise the following scattered pieces of information:

A) A discreet look at the newspaper's publication calendar has been accomplished. There is no indication at this time that the subject series of articles will appear during the month of September. However, this could be subject to change because of the high priority being given to the article.

B) Unusual and highly secretive steps have been taken to prevent the substance of the article from becoming known to other employees.

C) A trusted member of the newspaper's staff has stated that heavy outside pressure is being exerted to uncover the details of the story before publication. This pressure is independent of the efforts being programmed from my office.

D) A firm consensus has been reached that Ed Guthman of the L. A. Times is close to this matter. It is alleged that he was in New York at the time of the planning stages of the inquiry.

E) Robert Greene, leader of the investigative group, has been in both Washington and Florida within the past two weeks.

Will continue to push and follow through on this matter.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: NEWSDAY ARTICLE ASSERTEDLY FINANCED BY
KENNEDY FOUNDATION

Proving this assertion may not be possible. As you know, it is based upon Bebe's observation that Greene and Guthman are Kennedy loyalists and that Moyers is now with the Kennedy Foundation.

I cannot believe that a matter of this sensitivity would be identifiable through normal investigative technique. It seems to me that we need harder input than now at hand in order to proceed.

I would suggest, however, that consideration be given to an oblique Nofziger media drop vis a vis the Kennedys, Newsday, the L.A. Times et al - a sort of an alert that we are aware.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: JOHN BUCKLEY

During Donald Rumsfeld's tenure at O.E.O., John Buckley was his Director of Inspection and Investigation, therefore, I touched based with Donald and he advised the following:

A) Buckley is a Republican and he is considered trustworthy. In addition, he can be counted upon to respect a confidence.

B) While Buckley can be considered intelligent, Rumsfeld states that he is not "quick smart". Further, in matters of sensitivity it is Rumsfeld's judgment that he should be led and the specific details of an assignment should be clearly spelled out.

I recommend that you so advise Magruder and let them be guided accordingly.

SO advised

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 9/22/71

TO: JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JOHN J. CAULFIELD

ACTION:

 Approval/Signature

 Comments/Recommendations

 X For Your Information

 File

REMARKS:

9/22/71

SUBJECT: GOLDBERG, LAWRENCE YALE

I have conferred with John Mc Laughlin and he has referred me to Donald Wyatt the United States Marshal in Rhode Island.

Wyatt provided the following input:

A) Goldberg is wealthy, having been a principal owner in the American Wholesale Toy Company in Rhode Island. Assertedly, his father currently owns the business.

I am waiting for results of an I.R.S. check on Goldberg's financial status.

B) Goldberg has a long time (12 years) history of involvement in Republican politics in the State of Rhode Island. For example, during the period 1969-1980, he worked for R.N.C. in Washington, D.C. In '64 he worked for the unsuccessful Bruce Selya campaign for the position of Attorney General in Rhode Island.

Assertedly, for the past two years he has been the finance chairman of the Rhode Island State Central Committee. Selya, I am told, recommends Goldberg highly.

In addition, Goldberg has practiced law with former Republican Governor Del Sesto of Rhode Island.

C) On the derogatory side, it is asserted that Goldberg went through a messy divorce which was common knowledge amongst his R. I. friends, but apparently did not appear in the media.

D) It has been determined that Goldberg is actively engaged in Rhode Island B'nai Brith - Anti Defamation League activities. In January of this year, Goldberg and two other members of A.D.L. appeared backstage at a Boston theatre where a travelling Russian entertainment group was performing. Their purpose was to express dissatisfaction with the Soviet repression of Jewish civil rights in the Soviet Union.

E) Wyatt advises that at a summer '69 meeting of R.I. Republican officials, Goldberg made strong comments vis a vis U.S. policy toward Israel in the Mid-East. He attempted at this meeting to commit the assembled group towards the position of having the State Department modify its Mid-East policy.

Inasmuch as Goldberg is scheduled to function at 1701 in the Jewish area, consideration should be given to a potential question of loyalty with respect to the aims and purposes of that operation.

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

October 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: LAWRENCE YALE GOLDBERG



The attached history of financial contributions is for your information. As you can see, it postures an extremely heavy involvment in Jewish organizational activity.

I don't wish to raise this issue again. However, in my judgment, the Attorney General should be discreetly made aware in this regard. I regard this note as a memorandum for my files. I suggest you do the same, John.

Page 2 Part IV

CONTRIBUTIONS

NAME Lawrence Y. & Pearl Y. Goldberg
 ADDRESS 41 Intervale Road
Providence, Rhode Island 02906

Taxable Year
 Ended 1968

		AMOUNT
General Jewish Committee		2500 -
Temple Emanuel		235 -
Brown University		100 -
Misc. Federal Charities		150 -
BNA' BRITH		36 -
American Jewish Committee		25 -
Nazi-Defamation League		207 50
Jewish Community Center		45 -
TRAVEL & Lodging - DELEGATE Council of Jewish Fed.		220 66
" " " " UJA L.A. YCCA		75 -
" " " " UJA ANNUNCIATING		65 -
TOTAL		3659 16

1968

Once
nurses,

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc.

(Itemize) TEMPLE EMANUEL

481

ANTI-DEFFAMATION LEAGUE

521

UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

1,557

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

50

BROWN UNIVERSITY

5

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

25

PROVIDENCE HEBREW DAY SCHOOL

95

JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER

25

B'NAI BRITH

33

R.I. JEWISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY

11

MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES

144

TRAVEL & LODGING AS DELEGATE:A.D.L. NATL. COMMISSION

79

UJA YOUNG LEADERSHIP COMM.

26

ADL NATL. EXECUTIVE COMM.

152

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS

109

FROM CONTINUATION SHEET

124

11 Total cash contributions

3,553

12 Other than cash (see instructions on

(1)

NAME LAURENCE Y. F. ASHLEY Y. SOLOMONS

ADDRESS

60 BREDAWAY

PKIV, RI 0403

Taxable Year,

Ended 12-31-71

SCH "A" - CONTRIBUTIONS		CASH:		
JEWISH HOME FOR AGED		10		
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE		61		
R.I. JEWISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY		10		
COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS		38		
GENERAL JEWISH COMMITTEE		250		
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL		65		
BROWN UNIV. - HILLEL FUND.		25		
B'NAI BRITH		45		
JEWISH FEDERATION OF R.I.		74		
TEMPLE EICHAM-EL		328		
BROWN UNIVERSITY		100		
HADASAH		12		
B'NAI BRITH WOMEN		13		
PHI BETA KAPPA		10		
BRANDIS UNIV.		23		
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS		10		
UNIV. OF IOWA FUND.		10		
EBENEZER BAPTIST CHURCH		10		
PROTECT HEAD START		10		
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		146		
		1228		
<u>OTHER THAN CASH:</u>				
TRAVEL AND LODGING AS DELEGATE -				
COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS		190		

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 9/23/71

TO: JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JOHN J. CAULFIELD

SUBJECT:

As we have discussed, you might want to send a copy of the attached to John with any comments you deem appropriate.

I have seen to it that Jeb has been apprised.

An additional copy for Bob or John is included, if you so desire.

DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE

2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20037 (202) 333-8750

ROBERT S. STRAUSS
Treasurer


Dear Mr.

I am attaching a copy of the letter we have sent across the country in regard to our '72 Club.

I appreciate your interest and in taking the time to call us about it.

I am enclosing a response card which I hope you will return.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Strauss

Enclosures (2)

DEMOCRATIC

NATIONAL COMMITTEE 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20037 (202) 333-8750

ROBERT S. STRAUSS
Treasurer

(Date)

Dear

In less than a year from today the eyes of the world will be focused on the Democratic Party as we meet for our 1972 Convention at Miami Beach and begin the process of selecting the next President of the United States.

Our staffing and planning is underway and we hope to have the most constructive Convention in the long and glorious history of our Party.

The purpose of this letter is to ask you to join a special group -- the "72 Sponsors Club."

Each member is being asked to contribute \$72 per month for twelve months with such monthly contribution to be used to provide the basic financing for our Party activities as we move toward the Convention.

Aside from the knowledge and satisfaction of making a meaningful contribution to our Party and our nation's welfare, you, as a member of the "72 Sponsors Club", will receive special Convention reports from time to time. Also, we hope you will attend the "72 Sponsors Club" Cocktail-Buffer at the Fontainebleau Hotel which Larry and I will host on the Sunday evening before the Convention opens to present our candidates and other distinguished members in the leadership of our Party.

Additionally, club rooms have already been set aside in the Convention Building, to be comfortably furnished, where refreshments and special services will be available for you and the other members around the clock. On the evening our nominees are finally selected we will have the first occasion to honor them at a special cocktail party for our members.

To assist in these arrangements, within the next few weeks we expect to announce a special Convention coordinator, to facilitate housing and other, always existent, convention problems.

Whether you plan to attend the Convention or not, we think you will find membership in the "72 Sponsors Club" to be interesting and exciting, as well as most worthwhile. We need your support. Indeed, we hope you will complete and return the enclosed card indicating your desire for membership in the Club.

Larry joins me in assuring you that we will continue to strive to justify your confidence and provide the kind of leadership you desire. With your support and that of many others we take pride in having managed to fulfill our commitment to bring stability and responsibility to the Democratic National Committee and develop a hard-hitting political team. With renewed confidence we look forward to the next twelve months when we gather in Florida for a great Convention.

Sincerely,

Robert S. Strauss

DEMOCRATIC

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20037 (202) 333-8750


ROBERT S. STRAUSS
Treasurer

I am delighted and grateful to receive your acceptance of membership in the '72 Sponsors Club and your first month's payment.

Enclosed is your Sponsors Club card for the remainder of this year. More complete credentials will be issued for use during the Convention. We will be back to you with more details in the near future.

I won't take the time or the money to acknowledge each of your checks, but I want you to know of my very deep appreciation.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Strauss

P.S. Please let me know if, for your convenience, you would like to receive regular reminders of your monthly pledge.

Enclosure,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, (111)

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: GEORGE BELL'S INFORMATION RE VIRGIN ISLAND
CORPORATION

Spoke with Henry Petersen regarding this matter and he advises as follows:

A) Based upon the documents submitted for review (Howard Ross letter and newspaper article), it is apparent that any thoughts of anti-trust action are entirely premature, at best.

B) The signs of organized crime involvement alluded to in the material suggests that the situation should and will be watched by Justice.

I have passed on the additional article you have forwarded to Henry.

You should advise Bell that the matter is under scrutiny by Justice.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: BILLY GRAHAM, JOHN WAYNE IRS ACTIVITY

Graham is currently under IRS audit (Atlanta region). His 1965, 1966, 1969 and 1970 returns are being scrutinized with a view towards determining whether gifts made to Graham are in fact taxable income.

A discreet check indicates that an "anonymous" telephone call may have initiated the audit. A "back door" copy of the sensitive case report out of Atlanta has been viewed and contains a reference to this fact. However, the copy on hand at the Washington office indicates that normal IRS audit procedures caused the inquiry.

Some of the areas to be looked into are:

Construction work performed free of charge

Decorator work performed "

Clothing received as gifts from Charlotte & Ashville,
North Carolina stores

Tuition involved in sending Graham's children to foreign schools

The contacting of a number of Graham donors by IRS investigators suggests that the inquiry might possibly surface in the media. Judgments should be made accordingly.

The material requested regarding John Wayne is not yet in. Will advise.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Dean

10/1/71

(Date)

TO:

LARRY HIGBY - H

FROM: JOHN DEAN

ACTION:

DUE DATE: _____

_____ Prepare Reply For John
Dean's Signature

_____ Direct Reply

_____ Comments/Recommendations

_____ Please handle

☒ _____ Information

_____ File

REMARKS:

*Next question - can we do anything
to help - I don't know, but
I'm checking - NO - it's
already covered.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 10/6/71

TO: JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JOHN J. CAULFIELD

ACTION:

Approval/Signature

Comments/Recommendations

For Your Information

File

REMARKS:

The Wayne complaint when
viewed in the attached context
does not appear to be strong
enough to pursue.

subject: Audit Examinations of Individuals in the Entertainment Industry
Who are Politically Active.

Per your instructions of September 28, 1971, we have selected some individuals in the entertainment industry who were politically active during prior elections and determined their audit history. We attempted to select those individuals whose economic condition is similar to that of JOHN WAYNE. Our review showed the following:

RICHARD BOONE - SSN 564-14-6508

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
7012	Open in Audit	
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Examined	\$ 363
6712	Examined	1,014
6612	Surveyed Before Assignment	None
6512	Examined	No Change

SAMUEL DAVIS, JR. - SSN 362-24-9919

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Open in Audit	
6612	Examined	\$ 5,531
6312	Examined	8,683
6212	Examined	6,674
6112	Examined	15,795

JERRY LEWIS - SSN 144-12-6399

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
7012	Open in Audit	
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Examined	\$11,266
6612	Examined	30,099
6512	Examined	94,272
6412	Examined	28,131
6312	Examined	142,718
6212	Examined	28,471
6112	Examined	22,096
6012	Examined	26,437
5912	Examined	47,983
5812	Examined	30,839

PETER LANFORD - SSN 554-16-4546*

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6912	Examined	\$12,465
6812	Examined	10,348
6712	Examined	7,172
6612	Examined	2,735

* Prior year returns appear to have been filed in New York.

FRED MCCHURRY - SSN 564-09-2582

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6912	Examined	\$ 693
6712	Examined	No Change
6612	Examined	11,628
6512	Examined	607
6412	Examined	(1,371)
6312	Examined	6,788
6212	Examined	(4,340)

GARY MORTON & LUCILLE FALL - SSN 091-18-5014

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination</u> <u>Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Open in Audit	
6612	Surveyed After	
	Assignment	
6512	Examined	\$7,010

RONALD W. REAGAN - SSN 480-07-7456

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination</u> <u>Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
7012	Open in Audit	
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Open in Audit	
6712	Open in Audit	
6612	Examined	No Change
6512	Examined	\$ 1,122
6412	Examined	3,541
6312	Examined	3,660
6212	Examined	4,778

FRANK SINATRA - SSN 929-29-0367*

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination</u> <u>Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6812	Open in Audit	
6512	Surveyed Claim	
6412	Examined	\$ 5,708
6312	Examined	5,732
6212	Examined	7,271
6012	Examined	12,036

* Intelligence control card records show an open full-scale investigation on SINATRA covering the years 1962 through 1965. It is not known if this investigation involves subsequent years.

Mr. JOHN WAYNE's audit history, per the Form 1247 cards, is shown below:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Results of Examination</u> <u>Deficiency or (Overassessment)</u>
6912	Open in Audit	
6812	Open in Audit	
6712	Open in Audit	
6612*	Open in Audit	
6612*	Examined	\$237,331
6512	Examined	7,396
6412	Examined	6,389

* The 6612 year was re-opened due to an investment credit carryback.

The Revenue Agent currently assigned the JOHN WAYNE returns advised that the 1962 and 1963 tax years had also been examined, however, the Form 1247 record cards showing those years as being examined were not in the closed file at the date of our review.

(4)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
October 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: BALLOT SECURITY FOR 1972 (SUPPLEMENT TO
EARLIER MEMO ON '72 SECURITY NEEDS)

This is in the form of a reminder. The President has very strong views on this subject emanating from the '60 campaign.

I am strongly recommending that Joe Woods be placed in charge of the nationwide effort in this regard. Juliana has considerable experience in this area resulting from his involvement with Lou Nichols in '68. He can be quite helpful in getting Joe started.

The President gave Joe personal instructions in this regard in '68 and, as I have indicated, delayed a flight out of Chicago in October '68 to go over the matter in detail. I am sure he would agree with my recommendation.

Rose and Joe tell me that friend Charlie Barr (Standard Oil Indiana - out of Chicago) is also expert and was deeply involved in '68 in both ballot security and absentee ballots overseas. I am sure the A.G. is familiar with this subject. He should be apprised of my recommendation and the information (Juliana) that Lou Nichols does not wish to be so involved this time.

NOTE:

Just occurred to me, Has anyone considered the potential for fraud vis a vis the 18 year old vote on campuses? Mardian might be the guy to take a hard look at that possibility!

INTRODUCTION

The broad range of sensitive political activity associated with a Presidential Campaign mandates that a controlling security entity be established and programmed to effectively minimize, in practical fashion, the hazards for compromise by opposition forces and thereby ensure the smooth function of Republican Party business during 1972.

It is the purpose of this paper to cause focus to be brought upon those areas requiring such security capability. In addition, indication is given as to how the Security Consulting Group of Washington, Inc., the proposed name for the commercial security entity, will be able to function in this regard whether it be from an operational or overview standpoint, as follows:

A) Republican National Committee

Immediately after Campaign '68, Bob Maldeman authorized the author of this paper to institute and overview a security program at the Republican National Committee. This program has been ongoing for two years and a continual overview has been structured. Attached (Tab "A") is an account of the security procedures presently in place at the Committee.

They are found to be generally satisfactory with the exception of a requirement to tighten up the Pinkerton effort to include an analysis of the quality of their personnel and institute a polygraph examination of each guard working at the Committee.

For health reasons John Ragan will not be able to continue to perform in this area during the coming months. James Mc Cord,

a highly qualified Republican career security professional, (TAB "B") will be retained as a consultant to the Security Consulting Group and will perform operational overview duties at the Committee and elsewhere, as indicated, on a scheduled basis under the direction of the organization.

1701 Pennsylvania Avenue

The Security Consulting Group, Inc. will initiate (Mc Cord) and supervise a comprehensive security system at the above location. The procedures established at the R.N.C. (TAB "A") will be tailored to conform to the expanding requirements of 1701 Pennsylvania.

In addition, the following areas of security concern will be addressed, evaluated and programmed:

A) the requirement that a scheduled ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SYSTEM be established to include:

- 1) Office telephone network
- 2) Conference rooms
- 3) Residence phones of key political staff in Washington

NOTE: The system established will be adaptable to the Nixon staff and G.O.P. needs at San Diego.

B) The ability to recruit a two man bodyguard protective detail for the Attorney General throughout Campaign '72 is at hand. Because the A.G. may have personal preferences in this area, no steps will be taken, until advised.

C) Computer Security - An inspection capability to ensure the integrity of the Republican computer systems used in Campaign '72.

D) Poll Security

A security capability designed to ensure the confidentiality of key polls instituted by 1701 operatives will be programmed.

E) Undoubtedly, additional security requirements stemming from the 1701 operation will become evident as the campaign progresses. The above described structure will permit a professional response to these needs.

Republican National Convention

The vast private security needs of the Nixon team and Republican Party at San Diego can be best implemented in the following manner:

A) Nixon Staff Headquarters at the Sheraton Hotel, Harbor Island

The Security Consulting Group, Inc. will be charged with total operational security responsibility at that location. A complete ad hoc security-receptionist entity will be established utilizing off duty reserve deputy sheriffs from the San Diego Sheriff's office and Nixon female volunteers. The Sheriff of San Diego County, John Duffy (Nixon Republican) has agreed to provide such personnel, assured that they will be young, bright and capable and, importantly, that they all will be Republicans. It was agreed that a reasonable wage would be paid those performing in this regard from Nixon Staff funds.

The above procedure is strongly recommended to ensure that the Nixon Staff team will have qualified and loyal security personnel under proper controls at the important Sheraton Hotel (see below).

Included in the responsibilities of the Security Consulting Group at the hotel will be the institution of a sophisticated photo-ID system and elevator clearance process designed to minimize the hazard of disturbance, unwarranted access to sensitive work areas and the like.

B) Convention Security, San Diego

The R.N.C. has selected Ody Fish of Wisconsin to be the Sergeant at Arms for the Convention. In that position he will have security and usher responsibilities within the Convention Hall and at the GOP Headquarters at the Royal Inn at the Wharf during the Convention period.

Dick Herman has asked the author to have the Security Consulting Group act in an advisory capacity in this regard and initiate a comprehensive cost survey of the security requirements for the GOP Headquarters and Convention Hall. Further, Herman has asked that qualified professionals be recruited to assist Fish in this regard. This request has been agreed to and such survey will be conducted by the subject organization and submitted to the Arrangements Committee for review at the earliest possible time.

It is noted that various private detective agencies are already attempting to use Republican political influence to obtain what will be a prestigious and lucrative contract at San Diego. While the Security Consulting Group will ensure that all interested parties get consideration, the ability to perform should be considered the

prime factor in awarding the contract and recommendations will be made accordingly. Attached (TAB "C") is a recent article in the Washingtonian Magazine clearly indicating the poor quality of private security personnel in Washington. Generally speaking, the same pattern applies nationwide. (It is this factor that strongly suggests the use of reserve deputy Sheriffs at the Nixon Staff headquarters as indicated above).

In addition to the Sports Arena and G.O.P. headquarters hotel, early signs indicate the possibility of a security need at other locations. For example, the Nixon staff is contemplating the housing of a large group of 18 year olds at a local San Diego college for rally purposes. Additionally, the Arrangements Committee is looking at the possible use of a pier near the Royal Inn at the Wharf as a G.O.P. working area.

When these and other like them decisions are made, the Security Consulting Group can effectively program the security requirements after it is determined whether operational activity or advisory services are needed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Date October 8, 1971

TO: JOHN W. DEAN, III
FROM: JOHN J. CAULFIELD
SUBJECT: STEWART L. UDALL

In addition to the attached
Udall is a consultant to the Sears
and Roebuck Company. I have asked
for an IRS check to support this
material. Will advise.

*Back
Find out if he
owned any federal
contracts*

STEWART L. UDALL - BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

Shortly after being elected to a fourth term as the United States Representative from Arizona's Second Congressional District, Stewart L. Udall of Tucson was appointed by President John F. Kennedy to serve as the 37th Secretary of the Interior, a Cabinet position he held throughout the entire Administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. In that capacity, Mr. Udall directed a Department with wide-ranging responsibilities for the nation's natural resources. As Secretary, through the ideas he initiated and the programs he implemented, Udall made his imprint on the Sixties.

Following the change of Administrations in January 1969, Mr. Udall formed OVERVIEW, a pioneering international consulting firm devoted to creating a better environment for man.

Udall lectures frequently to university and business audiences. In addition, during the 1969-70 academic year, he was Visiting Professor of Environmental Humanism at Yale University. Since June 1970, in collaboration with Jeffrey Stansbury, he has been writing a twice-weekly column, "Udall on the Environment," which is syndicated nationally by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate.

In his first book, the Quiet Crisis (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), Mr. Udall outlined the land and people story of our nation, advancing the "proposition that men must grasp completely the relationship between human stewardship and the fullness of the American earth."

In his second book, 1976: Agenda for Tomorrow (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), Mr. Udall said: "I came to see that the total environment approach demanded concepts large enough to relate conservation to the overriding issues of our age. You cannot save the land unless you save the people. True conservation begins wherever people are and with whatever trouble they are in."

On the personal side, Mr. Udall is an outdoorsman and an avid reader. He has entertained the Soviet poet, Yevtushenko, in his home; he arranged for Robert Frost to read from his own poetry at the Inaugural of President Kennedy, and later Frost accompanied Udall on a trip to Russia. Udall brought live theatre back to Ford's Theatre in Washington, D.C., after a silence of more than a century. He has climbed Mount Fuji (in winter), and Mount Kilimanjaro.

A 1948 law graduate of the University of Arizona, Udall was born January 31, 1920, in St. Johns, Arizona. He and his wife, the former Ermalee Webb, have six children.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: OVERVIEW CORPORATION - FEDERAL CONTRACTS

Contact in this regard has been made with the following agencies:

EPA	-	No record (Ruckelhaus)
IRS	-	No record (Barth)
HUD	-	No record (Kingsley)
DOT	-	No record (Clapp)
Interior		No record (Hitt)

According to Overview's brochure, the above agencies would fall within their area of operation. Advise if you wish further checking.

Attachment

There is today a world-wide crisis of the environment. It stems from the extraordinary mass migration from rural to urban areas in virtually all regions of the planet. It stems from a much too rapid increase in population. It stems from the abuse and misuse of the earth's resources.

The OVERVIEW Group believes the crisis of the environment is rooted in shortcomings: in failures of design and planning; failures of politics; the failure in both public and private sectors to establish priorities responsive to the needs of man.

While many of these failures are not new, our era of exploding productivity and over-specialization has made them more acute. They are manifest in piecemeal growth and fragmented approaches to problem solving. There is resultant wide-spread indignation over the "affluent" measure of progress by machine rather than human—and quantitative rather than qualitative—standards.

There must be an "OVERVIEW": a broad systems approach in which gifted specialists coordinate the practice of their respective disciplines. The arts, sciences, humanities, technologies, communications, and politics must join in focusing their combined skills on rebuilding and renewing the total environment. The results must be both socially and economically viable.

This is the conviction of The OVERVIEW Group: the belief that modern man, through leadership, through participation, through creative and constructive implementation, has the potential and the capacity to civilize technology. Towards this end—man's enhancement of the environment of which he is inextricably a part—OVERVIEW assembles and directs the greatest talents and energies.

THE OVERVIEW CORPORATION is an international environmental consulting organization, founded in January, 1969, whose Officers and Principal Advisors are known throughout the world for the positions they have held in public and private life, and for the variety and significance of the work they have accomplished in diverse fields. Their experience and record is the foundation upon which OVERVIEW is based and builds.

Stewart L. Udall



Mr. Udall, Chairman of the Board and chief executive officer, was Secretary of the Interior throughout the Administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Prior to his Cabinet service he was elected to four terms as a Member of the U. S. House of Representatives from his native State of Arizona.

Under Stewart Udall's personal leadership, traditional conservation was ushered into a new era. Interior, since its inception a "western" oriented Department, initiated programs of national impact. For the first time people, as well as land and minerals, were thought of as a resource to be conserved. During his tenure, the broad conservation goals of the 1960's and beyond were set, public support kindled, and legislative and administrative machinery set in motion for the achievement of a truly nationwide environmental agenda.

Mr. Udall is the author of "The Quiet Crisis" (1963), and "1976: Agenda for Tomorrow" (1968).

Kimelman



leadership as Commissioner, per capita income and Government revenues nearly doubled, a fact given official cognizance by the Virgin Islands' Senate in a unanimous resolution of commendation.

Mr. Kimelman is presently Director of the Development International Corporation, San Juan, Puerto Rico (developers of "Habitat" for the entire West Indies area); President and Director of the Virgin Islands Hilton, Inc., St. Thomas, Virgin Islands; Chairman of the Board, Island Block Corporation, U.S. Virgin Islands; and a Director, Leeward Island Air Transport, Antigua, West Indies. Mr. Kimelman has also served as a Director of the Diners' Club, Inc., the West Indies Bank and Trust Company, and was for 8 years a Director of the American Hotel Association.

Mr. L. Kimelman, President, Treasurer, and chief operating officer, is a member of the Board of Directors of the United States National Parks Foundation. During the past years Mr. Kimelman has had comprehensive and varied business and government experience, in the United States, the Caribbean and more recently Washington.

He was the first Commissioner of Commerce (1961-1964) in the U.S. Virgin Islands and was Chairman of the Government's Economic Development Board during that same period. Under his

In 1967 Secretary Udall asked Mr. Kimelman to become his top Assistant at the Department of the Interior in Washington. In this position, Mr. Kimelman's responsibilities ranged throughout the Department and he represented the Secretary at natural resource and tourism meetings both in this country and abroad.



Mr. Halprin's world wide practice includes major environmental design and planning projects such as the Comprehensive Design Plan for the American Virgin Islands; the Sea Ranch on the California Coast, which was a notable first in ecological planning; the campus of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; the Nicollet Mall in Minneapolis; Ghirardelli Square in San Francisco; and the planning of several new towns now under construction. He is currently working on the replanning of many urban centers in major U. S. cities.

Mr. Halprin's books, paralleling his career, are consistent with his pursuit of answers to increasingly complex environmental problems. He is author of "Cities" (1963) and "Freeways" (1966). In "New York, New York" (1968), a study of the quality and meaning of open space in urban design, he explores the perceptions and possibilities of urban space. He is also co-author of "The Freeway in the City" (1968), a study for the Bureau of Public Roads, which defines design techniques for weaving transportation arteries into the socio-ecological fabric of urban areas.

Mr. Halprin, Chairman of The Executive Committee, and creative coordinator, is a recipient of the Allied Professions Medal of the American Institute of Architects, is a member of the National Council on Arts, and of the President's Advisory Commission on Historic Preservation.

Ever since he began his own practice as a landscape architect over twenty years ago, Mr. Halprin's work has been noted both for its spontaneity and for its intensity. But increasingly, out of an acute professional awareness of the confines of most disciplines, Mr. Halprin progressed towards a widened involvement with man and his environment.

OVERVIEW is not only an organization, but an approach—an approach which directs the interactions of creative and highly motivated experts to derive solutions that are both responsive and workable.

The first phase of a project is in-depth analysis by OVERVIEW. The analysis includes searching discussions with the client and client constituency: to identify the problem; define the parameters; and determine the personnel, program and techniques to be applied.

Only after doing this does OVERVIEW, as a second phase, assemble the appropriate working team that can utilize the best and latest and most relevant techniques, tools, and information. The team is put together not only with the expert knowledge and participation of the Principal Advisors, but also in consultation with the client.

In the third phase, The OVERVIEW Group and working team determine the precise requirements of the program: its budget; scheduling; specific character; and execution. OVERVIEW is unique in the emphasis it places upon uniting the planning function and product with strategies of implementation. Only this unity ensures effective results.

OVERVIEW gives great emphasis to practical political public relations, and to the communications skills necessary to obtain the participation and support of all the affected publics. OVERVIEW does not plan for its clients; it plans with them—seeking to inform and evoke. The Executive Committee of OVERVIEW makes decisions on approaches to projects and philosophy of operation. It provides day-to-day direction of the firm's activities as well as policy review and development.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1971

file
"Anti-Nixon film:
MILLHOUSE: A WHITE
COMEDY"

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: EMILE DE ANTONIO, PRODUCER OF THE FILM "MILLHOUSE:
A WHITE COMEDY".

Your attention is directed to the attached article from the Washington Post and the FBI report on De Antonio.

Inquiry by my secretary was made at the American Film Institute Theatre at L'Enfant Plaza and it was determined that the film played only one night. However, De Antonio, according to the article, is attempting to sell it to a distributor.

I recommend we watch the progress of the film, taking particular note to determine if Larry O'Brien is stupid enough to get behind it. If so, we can, armed with the Bureau's information, do a Nofziger job on De Antonio and O'Brien, thereby losing the battle but winning the war. Advise.

Attachment

Informed Kerkali
that we would
hold material &
keep an eye on it -
6/29
[Signature]

August 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: SHOWING OF UNCUT FILM OF RICHARD NIXON'S
1952 "CHECKERS SPEECH"

I have looked into this matter. Apparently the Business Week blurb refers to or is similar to a two week showing of the speech at the New Yorker Theatre in New York City last May. As the accompanying articles indicate, this apparently is not the same format as "Millhous: A White Comedy" which we looked into and determined significant derogatory information on the producer, Emile de Antonio.

I will have someone take a look at the Washington showing of the Checkers Speech once it is advertized, with a view towards determining if the showing is a shady money-making scheme or a politically directed attack - or both.

You might wish to so advise HRH and Timmons.

Attachment

October 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. Haldeman

FROM: Mort Allin

The NY Review of Books has an ad for rental of Millhouse -- "a film in the tradition of the Marx Brothers" -- and rental and sale of the Checkers Speech film. The latter is for rent at \$60-\$100 a throw and for sale at \$275. Millhouse's price isn't given -- one needs to apply to New Yorker films for the price conditions apparently.

(212+EN 2-6330, EN 2-6374, 5)

cc: Jack Caulfield✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: MILLHOUSE FILM

This matter seems to be building. You are reminded that a significant derogatory dossier is in the possession of the bureau vis a vis de Antonio.

My view is that we should use such information at a propitious moment - ideally when interest or support for the film is evidenced by Larry O'Brien and company.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: EMILE DE ANTONIO, PRODUCER OF "MILLHOUSE";
NEW YORKER FILMS, INC; AND DANIEL TALBOT,
FILM DISTRIBUTOR

Attached is a copy of a Variety article indicating the expected interest of the D.N.C. in "Millhouse". I recommend that it is time to move on the above firm and individuals, as follows:

- A) Release of de Antonio's F.B.I. derogatory background to friendly media.
- B) Discreet IRS audits of New Yorker Films, Inc., de Antonio and Talbot

NOTE: Talbot advised our source today that massive distribution of the film is planned for colleges after 1/15/72.

ATTACHMENT

10/31/71 Variety

After Walter...
Russell Oswald on...
CBS Evening News...
officials still refuse...
based on page 39)

UNDO PIC FROM P: MILLHOUSE G

Got His Gun," Dalton...
antiwar vehicle, based...
1931 novel, has been...
a bit. As a result the...
release, resubmitted...
& Ratings System for...
classification, has been...
GP, whereas it had...
eck's crop there's only...
ve R, namely Warner's...
y." Five make it as...
r's Memory," "Mary...
cots" and "Sometimes...
med on page 54)

Hollywood, Oct. 12.
Frank Cooper has an idea that...
the Far East is ripe for filmmaking...
a la Spain, Italy, England, and...
other European points in the east...
'50s. Agent will set out Thursday...
on exploration trip, concentrating...
on Japan and Hong Kong. Cooper...
feels impending visit of President...
Richard Nixon to mainland China...
is indicative of things to come in...
terms of increased travel and inter...
est among peoples of the East and...
Western worlds to get to know...
each other better.

He will attempt to get bearing...
on Asian interest in stories by...
American writers as well as prospects...
for coproduction ventures. In Hong...
Kong he will have meetings with...
Run Run Shaw, who has his own...
studio complex. Cooper believes that...
the Orient will enjoy a fad as a film...
backdrop during next several years...
and hopes to get in on the ground floor.

Jordan is executive vice president...
of Columbia Pictures International...
and while abroad he also...
implemented the new Columbia...
Bros. joint distribution...
(Continued on page 54)

SEZ ANTI-NIXON FILM SOUGHT BY DEMOCRATS

San Francisco, Oct. 12.
Emile de Antonio, director of...
the Nixon-slammung documentary...
"Millhouse," says he'll refuse to...
rent it to Democratic National...
Committee for political punch...
against White House.

Here for San Francisco Film...
Fest after the Stratford Film Fest...
showing de Antonio stated Demos...
have contacted him "asking if I...
would be willing to enter negotia...
tions for sale of rights. I won't...
sell it to them because I do not...
(Continued on page 22)

San Francisco, Oct. 12.
Within five miles of the...
of our nation they probably have...
more prostitutes than we have...
population in the entire State of...
Nevada," O'Callaghan said.

Asked about legalized prostitution...
O'Callaghan said, "I do not...
see it as a good thing, but as a...
very dangerous thing in the urban...
areas because of the associated...
problems."

Several Nevada counties have...
legalized prostitution.

O'Callaghan pointed out that...
the problems include "hoodlumism...
white slavery and narcotics."

Asked whether he would favor...
legalizing prostitution as a revenue...
measure, the governor said, "Ne...
vada does not need whore money."

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1971

Bed For Hollywood Front Money Houstonians' 2d Feature

Oct. 12.
Houston, Tex.
Houstonians' 2d Feature...
Oct. 12.
Houston, Tex.
Houstonians' 2d Feature...
Oct. 12.
Houston, Tex.
Houstonians' 2d Feature...

question is the way to immortality...
in Hollywood on innumerable...
fondness for practical jokes on...
the set?

Wiest...
(Continued from page 4)

wouldn't be able to cast ballots on...
pects for industrialists. Wiest says...
"the idea may be valid, but it's...
certainly not democratic."

In addition, Wiest says the dis...
sidents support reduction of the...
quorum requirements for SAG...
meetings and abandonment of con...
tract referendums in favor of ac...
ceptance or rejection of a contract...
by the reduced quorum.

Though the first of these ideas...
was withdrawn as a CIO proposal...
before it was voted on, and neither...
has been included in the inde...
pendents' campaign literature, Wiest...
calls them "hidden plans."

"Plaza Suite," "Coryn 22," "On a...
Clear Day You Can See Forever" and...
"I Want Your Wagon." Domestic...
rentals for "Love Story" are now...
figured at \$17,000,000. "Warren" is...
in at \$22,000,000. Worldwide, \$14,000,000...
of which is domestic.

Anti-Nixon Film
(Continued from page 1)

support any Democratic candidate...
other."

At press conference, director...
disclosed most of film's footage...
was bought from WAEC in New...
York "because ABC is the poorest...
of the three networks and you can...
get a better price from them be...
cause they're more anxious to sell...
film."

De Antonio, a self-described...
"radical," also contended the webs...
should have no right to charge...
anything for their news footage.

"The film belongs to all the peo...
ple; they have no right to sell it...
just because they're the only three...
who have access to the White...
House." His own request to inter...
view the President was never an...
swered, he said.

New York Sound

Lee Kingsley has joined the Judd...
Concerts. She's currently touting...
the Blue Oyster Cult. Film trade...
will recall her late husband, Ed...
distributor... Gordon Hitchens...
themed" issue of Film Culture, goes...
to Germany come November.

NATO has set up a special number...
for reservations and in need of...
other info, call 3328 and ask for...
Miss Bonnie Fisher. The 1971...
Oct. 25 at the Americana New York...
pamy exec exec-prer of RKO "for...
the inst... provided the Will Roger...
Memorial Fund." place within the...
framework of the President's...

Ingrid Eiger has been appointed...
booker of Formerly with Eve Pro...
ductions, she will be in local and...
national shipment of prints with...
Cowan assumes the duties of executive...
assistant of secretary. She will...
manage sales and ad... Ellman.

Michael Haddad, head of Beirut's...
Cinema Lebanon (he's also the RCA...
distributor and in suits), arrived...
with his cassettes expert in New...
York their two days' stopoff, en...
route to Hollywood. Five friends...
in the film business were away...
for Atonement. While in L.A., where...
his main case place, Haddad made...
a two-day detour to Los Angeles...
Actor Walter Matthau named "King...
of the Radio City Music Hall in...
honor of his record star of films...
playing at the Rockefeller show...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: DANIEL TALBOT, "MILLHOUSE" FILM DISTRIBUTOR

Talbot has been identified as follows:

Male, white, 42 years of age
 Resides at 180 Riverside Drive, Manhattan #362-1243
 Occupation - Film Distributor
 No criminal record - F.B.I.
 Member of Stop the Draft
 Movement-N.Y.C. in 1967 - N.Y.C.P.D.

Talbot was pretext interviewed during a visit to his office located at 250 West 89th St., Manhattan on 10/18/71. Such office is adjacent to the New Yorker Theatre located at Broadway and 88th Street, Manhattan. Such theatre is currently showing MILLHOUSE.

Talbot's office was observed as being a sloppy one room operation with one secretary. Rent was determined to be \$35 per month.

It was ascertained that the film is also being shown in Philadelphia and San Francisco.

Talbot advised that his future plans for the film include distribution to college groups on a lease basis. He also described plans to distribute the film to other cities, but careful questioning determined a market only in third and fourth rate theatres.

Talbot referred questions about possible Democratic pressures to acquire the film to the producer, Emile D'Antonio.

COMMENTS

Even though the financial handling and distribution of this film appears to be in the hands of amateurs, it must be remembered that it is getting considerable play in the liberal press. Additionally, D'Antonio was interviewed by Agronsky on TV this past week. Further, Variety reported the DNC has approached D'Antonio with a view towards acquiring the film.

I feel that there is potential here for this film to take fire and become a cause celebre. At the moment only the radical left is patronizing it. We must be quite careful not to be identified with any act or actions which would incite the interest of the general public. Resultingly, any action taken vis a vis D'Antonio or Talbot should be weighed carefully and well hidden. This includes my previous comments re D'Antonio's background and our capability at I.R.S.

October 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: JOHN DEAN

I am forwarding the attached material regarding the distribution of the film "MILLHOUSE" for your information. I will keep you advised as we monitor the situation and try to do anything we can to deal with it.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Date _____

TO: JWD

FROM: Fred F. Fielding

ACTION:

_____ Approval/Signature

_____ Comments/Recommendations

_____ Prepare Response

_____ Please Handle

_____ For Your Information

_____ File

REMARKS:

This could, of course, be used quite effectively to garner the 18-21 yr old vote for the D's (or against RN) — however, leaking derogatory info + doing IRS audits just doesn't seem to be a solution that will help us + it might send de Antonio flying into the arms of the DNC as well as giving the film more publicity.

Correspondence

Democratic Party Reform
New Republic 10/2/71

Sir:
I wish to reluctantly dissent from the optimistic tenor of Representative Fraser's communication in the August 21 *New Republic*, in regard to Democratic Party reform.

From my own experience as a member of the Missouri Reform Commission, and from information that I have received from New Democratic Coalition chapters around the country, the commitment of Democratic Party state organizations to party reform is generally nonexistent. While a number of states, including Missouri, have formally met national guideline requirements, the intent to use the new rules to maintain "the old gang" is quite apparent.

It would be most helpful if Representative Fraser, (whom I admire greatly) and other Democratic Party leaders would examine closely the realities of the power relations in state party organizations which make it extremely unlikely in many areas for written reform rules to be translated effectively into democratic delegation selection processes. Emphasis on literal reform, while a step in the right direction, is not enough. Democratic state party procedures must be open every day of every year if we are to realistically expect an open delegate selection process every four years.

Marvin L. Madeson
National Chairman
New Democratic Coalition

Author Replies

Sirs:

I was greatly pleased to see my book, *Tonkin Gulf*, reviewed in your September 18 issue by Carl Marcy. Mr. Marcy without doubt is one of the persons best qualified to comment on the Tonkin Gulf incidents and their significance.

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There is an important point, however, that I believe needs clarification. My book does not state that an American conspiracy lay behind the Tonkin incidents, but neither does it reject such an interpretation - as might be inferred from the review. The question of a Tonkin plot came up many times during my interviews of the American sailors and airmen who were involved with the naval action. The circumstantial evidence is plentiful. *Tonkin Gulf* does not presume to reach a verdict; it does discuss the evidence, pro and con, very seriously.

Eugene G. Windchy
Washington, DC

Kauffmann, from page 22

and so on, but a) there was a great deal more territory within their limits than within Benjamin's, and b) they rarely pretended to be anything but themselves in different settings. If one is going to go the Brando or Hoffman route of versatility, then one must be... versatile. Benjamin's exploding fantasist is no different from anything else he's done, and the tacit undercurrent of near-madness that might have given the part poignance - and comedy - is utterly missing. Just another Benjamin performance in which he's smarter than everyone else. (Is it in his contract?)

The best performance is by Chill Wills, the old Western actor, as the old Western actor. Over this half-baked film he pours a gravy of rich old Hollywood hokum.

Emile de Antonio, who made the pungent *In the Year of the Pig* about Vietnam, has now made a documentary about President Nixon called *Millhouse*. From the deliberate misspelling of the President's middle name in the title right to the end, de Antonio makes no pretense of objectivity. The film misses few chances to show Nixon at his worst. I wouldn't want to suggest that this is a difficult job, still there are lots of methods in the picture that could be used equally against de Antonio's heroes, whoever they may be. The first sequence is in Madame Tussaud's as they fit the waxen head on the Nixon dummy; it could have been Lincoln or Saint Francis. When Nixon is in trouble on his South American good-will tour, we get a snatch of *Chiquita Banana* on the sound track. When he's making TV tapes for his '68 campaign, we get his off-the-record comments and his fluffs in discarded material. What do they prove?

But then if one made an objective film about Nixon and did it with completeness, it would have to include the "Checkers" speech of '52, the calculated scurrility of his previous California campaigns against Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas, his farewell to the press after his '62 defeat in California, and the "let's-win-this-one-for-Ike" acceptance speech in '68. Also, between the time I saw *Millhouse* and the writing of this review, I saw the one annual TV show I never miss, the Miss America competition; and after looking at Bert Parks and listening to his sincerity...

Millhouse is a good political cartoon (figuratively). Besides, it brings out several points. It highlights the blatant newness of the "new" Nixon, with wide smile and upstretched arms. (Who decided on the change and coached him?) Second, Mrs. Nixon. Repeatedly, one sees her sitting absolutely rigid as her husband speaks, her face slightly smiling. I couldn't escape the feeling that she looked frightened - of what might happen to her later if she moved an inch or smiled a fraction more or less. That's an unprovable impression, of course; but it reminded me of the impression I used to get from Mrs. Thomas E. Dewey in photographs and newsreels. She always stood close to Dewey (a sort of Nixon forebear) with a forced little smile on her face, and I always imagined he was twisting her arm behind her back.

The most revealing moment in the film for me was a statement by a former California neighbor of the boy Nixon, who tells us that the future President's mother, after a long day's work or early in the morning, used to bake 40 or 50 pies for sale. That kind of grinding hard work around a child tends to produce one of two kinds of reaction: money-hate or money-worship. I mean worship, not necessarily itch for acquisition: veneration of money and of those who have it.

That memory of his mother, slaving that way, is very possibly part of the foundation of Nixon's world-view: money is the best good and anything that stands in the way of your getting it legally is the anti-Christ. Imagine how much more dangerous the present US economic situation must be than he has admitted - or his view of it, anyway. If he is forced to interfere even slightly with a laissez-faire system, how very frightened he must be. His new economic policy, flabby and biased as it is, denies the aspirations and acceptances he learned from his mother's pie-baking.

tallen for a number of the clichés of the films of the fifties is almost ironic—in his glorification of the sweetness of the village idiot, the perversion of the preacher's son, the secret affair between the rich lady and the rugged ir dualist. And his moods are so beautifully supplemented by the jukebox and radio sounds of the fifties that one regrets the patness of his movie-house offerings: *Faith of the Bride* for obvious contrast with Sonny's grubby romancing of the succulent Charlene in the back row, *Red River* for the theater's final offering—projected in a manner befitting the Music Hall rather than a one-woman dreary moviehouse. But none of these deters my feeling that *The Last Picture Show* is the best American film so far this year and that Bogdanovich is one of our most gifted moviemakers.

In contrast *The Debut*, the Russian Festival opener, is a sorry little film, inept, primitive in style, script and performance, an insult to the great tradition of Russian film. Directed and co-authored by Gleb Pantilov, it offers us the making of a film within the film, its plain-Jane heroine, Lina Tchourikova, starring in a movie about Joan of Arc amid flashbacks of her dull romance with a married man whom she lures from and loses back to his wife. Certainly the filmmaking scenes are incredible (not even the state-supported Russians make films in sequence, with dozens of extras acting around the star's close-ups) and the romance foolish. The attempt to show a homely warm-hearted silly girl triumphant on screen is as awkward as the attempt to show her as Joan; the film lacks the charm and subtlety that makes such a theme (carried off beautifully in *Loves of a Blonde*, *Shakespeare Wallah* and others) potent or even beguiling. It is simply superficial and sentimental.

Small doubt that Kotch is sentimental, but with Walter Matthau in the title role and Jack Lemmon making a most auspicious directorial debut, the charm predominates and the result is a very nice, neat and touching entertainment. With a screenplay by John Paxton based on Katharine Toppkins' novel, it's the story of a 72-year-old widower with a zest for life and a will to survive beyond his daughter-in-law's antagonism. Garrulous, given to over-watering the garden and to spoiling his infant grandson, Kotch escapes the threat of a super-jolly "retirement village" and winds up with a cottage of his own shared by an unmarried pregnant teenager. The outgoing, convivial old man and the uptight introverted girl make an odd couple, but Matthau, refreshingly

not too old totally in character, right down to the teeth-sucking ties of senility, and Deborah Winters, a cool kitten from *Hail, Hero!* and *The People Next Door*, give the relationship a shining authenticity. There are excellent performances too from Gerald Aidman, as the guilt-ridden son, and Felicia Farr, as the nerve-taut daughter-in-law, among others. Matthau shows a new dimension to his art and Lemmon proves his abilities behind the camera match those he has shown out front.

Paul Bogart, who directed *Marlowe* and *Halls of Anger* with a sure hand, comes upon script trouble with *Skin Game*, mainly because the bright idea derived from a Richard A. Simmons story is beaten to death in the attenuated screenplay by Pierre Marton, the *nom de plume* (or anonymity) Peter Stone has chosen for the occasion. The bright idea involves James Garner and Lou Gossett, that superb black stage actor too rarely seen in films, as a pair of confidence men roaming the pre-Civil-War South and conning slavers. Garner getting cash on the line for Gossett and Gossett rejoining Garner later for his share. It's Gossett's game (after all, he's "the color they're buying this year") but it comes a cropper when he is "freed" by John Brown's raiders and then actually sold. The script, alas, provides romantic interest for Garner in the form of humorless Susan Clark as a con lady and for Gossett in the form of Brenda Sykes as a purty slave girl and the ladies slow the game to a standstill. A pity. Garner and Gossett get off to a fine start—but Burt Lancaster and Ossie Davis carried things to a happier conclusion on a not too dissimilar theme in *The Scalphunters*, whose authors felt no need—as the Stone script does—to make the black man super-pure and the white man a goodnatured heel.

Making Richard Nixon super-ridiculous leads to the failure of *Millhouse*, a collage by Emile de Antonio, who made *Point of Order*, *Rush to Judgment* and *In the Year of the Pig*. A self-described "white comedy," "in the tradition of the Marx Brothers," the film is a non-chronological touching of highlights in the Nixon career, with commentary by Jules Witcover, Joe McGinniss, James Wechsler and others. Flashbacks to the Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas defeats, scenes from conventions and campaigns. But even the most ardent anti-Nixonite realizes early on that RMN is no laughing matter; enough already with the D.A.R. and middle-America types. And enough of converting the converted. The real art lies in making the truth of Nixon plain in a film the GOP biggies might watch.

Emile de Antonio

Emile de Antonio is a specialist in cinematic acrobatics. In such documentary essays as *Point of Order* (about the Army-McCarthy hearings) and *In the Year of the Pig* (a cynical chronology of the Viet Nam War), he needed some popular historic myths and a few political reputations. Now, in *Millhouse*, De Antonio has employed his usual technique of matching fragments of news film with quick on-camera interviews to produce an unflattering but funny likeness of the 37th President (whose middle name is Milhouse, not Millhouse, but let that go). To be sure, De Antonio's jubilant bias sometimes plays him false. Nixon is too often seen stumbling over a foot or a phrase, and sometimes satire descends to the level of easy derision, as when scenes of Nixon's South American visit in 1958 are accompanied by the old Chiquita Banana jingle on the sound track.

But when it works, De Antonio's sense of juxtaposition can be lethal. News film of Nixon's 1968 nomination acceptance speech ("Let's win this one for Ike") is intercut with footage of Pat O'Brien in *Knute Rockne* advising his lachrymose squad to "win one for the Gipper"—their hospitalized teammate, who, with anachronistic irony, was portrayed by Ronald Reagan. De Antonio is also shrewd enough to know when Nixon is his own worst enemy, and he devotes a long section of *Millhouse* to the Checkers speech alone. Reciting his list of assets, attempting to sound humble and folksy ("Pat doesn't have a mink coat, but she does have a respectable Republican cloth coat"), all the while struggling grimly to look natural, Nixon seems to emerge as the kind of binko artist of whom W.C. Fields always ran afoul.

Millhouse touches on everything from the campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas to all six crises, and includes some unfamiliar footage like J. Edgar Hoover making Nixon an honorary FBI agent. Subtitled a "white comedy," the film is hardly likely to win praise for fighting fair. But at its best, *Millhouse* has the impact of a David Levine caricature.

—Jayocks

From Adolescent to Puerile

That sound you hear is of checkbooks closing all over Hollywood. The books belong to the smart money; the reason for their action is *The Last Movie* by Dennis Hopper—the same Dennis Hopper who recently opened the checkbooks with *Easy Rider*. The faults of that film are legendary—the paranoid swagger, the inept drug trips, the comic-book heroism. But the film also shared with other examples of naive art an un-

* Not to be confused, although it undoubtedly will be, with Peter Bogdanovich's excellent *The Last Picture Show* (TIME, Oct. 11).

New York

10/4/74

NEW YORK 63

REPORTER

G, GP, R, X or GOP?

As this is written, Emile De Antonio's "Millhouse," a quasidocumentary on Richard Milhous Nixon, has yet to be classified by the Motion Picture Association of America's Code and Rating Administration. It ought to be rated GOP.

For with only a little editing by a Republican scissor, De Antonio's collage of newreel and TV clips could be turned into a Nixon campaign film for 1972. Having aimed for satire, the director has managed to get only about as far as sarcasm and instead of portraying a monster, he has shown a man.


This cannot have been the intention of the director of "Point of Order," a study of the hysteria of McCarthyism, and "The year of the Pig," an invaluable account of America's plummet into Vietnam. For De Antonio is no disinterested documentarian; he knows what he dislikes.

In "Millhouse," showing at the New Yorker, Broadway and Seth St., and the Plaza, 42 E. 58th St., De Antonio tries to entrap his victim in a celluloid web whose warp is chronology and whose roof is irony. But Nixon somehow escapes ridicule, so much so that an audience that came to laugh the other afternoon at the Plaza left mutely impressed, if not consoled.

It is not that De Antonio's eye and ear have failed him; they are as alert and acute as ever and editor Mary Harrington has arranged the assembled film clips with clever pace and timing.

That the film goes awry lies in the fact that Richard Nixon represents something that, whatever one thinks of him, strikes a chord whose note is harmonious rather than dissonant.

By traveling the road from Whittier to the White House, and encountering a good number of rats and demons along the way, Nixon has striven for and achieved the American dream. And, perhaps more importantly, he is no Easy Rider trucking down a solitary road; he has had at his side emotionally at least as multitude of other dreamers.



The last laugh?

The result is that one cannot help but be impressed with the Nixon of "Millhouse," even at such pathetic moments as his "Checkers Speech" or his "Last Press conference."

Take the Checkers incident: sure it was corny and a little bit embarrassing, but did one really laugh at a man who resides that he owes \$20,000 on his house, who had to borrow \$1,500 from his parents and is paying them 4% interest, who is confident that his wife can withstand these difficult times because she is rich and therefore very tough?

Nixon's recent penchant for "tactics" elicits a chuckle when he says that the disclosures he is making are "unprecedented in American politics."

And if Nixon does not severely damage himself when De Antonio lets him speak for himself, neither does the director do him much harm when he manipulates our response by juxtaposing film clips and sound tracks to point a ridiculous target.

De Antonio's suggestion that the Nixon who asks the Republicans to "win this one for me" is as ludicrous as the Route 66 who asked his Notre Dame footballers to "win one for the Gipper" just doesn't come off. The story of Nixon's plea induces strong emotions in many and, furthermore, both the GOP and the Fighting Irish won, didn't they?

Finally, De Antonio's implication that the Nixon who tells an audience "I see a day . . . I'm doing a bad imitation of Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream . . .'" does not denigrate Nixon as much as he might have liked. After all, King was an extraordinary rhetorician and, as Earl Stubble says in her critical biography of Rhineland, "genius is the gift of a clever thief."

The film has plenty of funny moments: Nixon standing through a rushing rain stream; Nixon in the kitchen with Ehrlich; Nixon and Barry Goldwater twining a sheriff's badge; comparing their forearms and signatures. But if Nixon is sometimes ridiculous and sometimes bad, well, who isn't?

There is one especially evil in "Millhouse" that all who see it would do well to take note of. That is cynicism and the cynical middle reports who cut Richard Nixon from a tentative statement into a professional who uses the ride the way Lash LaRue used the bullwhip.

We should certainly be concerned about this acquired skill. But we should be just as worried that a man who might have Nixon cut off after may be a man who out-Nixons him.

—JEAN GSTER

THE CALENDAR

(From the New York Post, Sept. 29, 1971)

James A. Wechsler

ON WHOM IS THE JOKE?

During many moments of the preview of Emile de Antonio's newest political documentary—"Millhouse: A White Comedy"—the predominantly young, anti-establishment audience howled with a kind of ecstatic laughter. But for those who have lived through the rise and fall and resurrection of Richard Nixon, there was a certain hollowness in the merriment. Has the joke so far really been on Nixon—or on the country, and even on some of the alienated young who found this an evening of broad comedy?

In two of his previous films, de Antonio, a gifted, spirited maverick skillfully recorded the decline of Sen. Joseph McCarthy ("Point of Order") and the political-military follies of the promoters of the Vietnam war ("In the Year of the Pig"). But in both instances the film appeared, in a sense, after history had rendered its verdict; Joe McCarthy had died an isolated, discredited figure, and our Vietnam role had been overwhelmingly repudiated when that production appeared, in November, 1969.

But "Millhouse"—the misspelling is a superfluity—is now to be shown in the crucial 13 months before the 1972 election. Richard Milhous Nixon is very much alive, and the notion of his re-election is far from frivolous. Amid the entertainment de Antonio's film will afford hard-core anti-Nixonites, one wonders whether it will say much to many millions of Americans who, whether we like it or not, still seriously contemplate voting for Mr. Nixon's re-election.

Nixon has long been vulnerable to caricature; but he has refused to fade away. One had the uneasy sense that large segments of de Antonio's documentary, hilarious as they seemed to most of the assemblage at the New Yorker Theater on Manhattan's W. 85th St., could evoke reverent attention on some streets in Manhattan, Kansas.

* * *

An obvious example is the celebrated Nixon news conference in 1962 after he lost California's gubernatorial race.

Some in the audience here appeared to find this non-instant replay a ludicrous interlude; some of the lines do indeed retain their universal vapidty. But in larger terms the portrayal may elicit more sympathy than derision. It shows a man in the very lowest depths of political despair, swinging out with weary bitterness at a hostile world; then, not too long afterward, he is seen dutifully campaigning for Goldwater and starting on the long road back to Republican rehabilitation. Beyond ideology, this is the ancient saga of the battered, bruised figure who will not yield to adversity. Who really wins those rounds?

The "Checkers" speech, in which Nixon is seen literally fighting for his political life after this newspaper's exposure of the fund created for him by various special-interest groups, remains a classic of political corn. But will those who considered it a moving soliloquy in 1952—and obviously there were many—view it as a vaudeville act now?

* * *

Admittedly I have my own special interest in that episode because I appear briefly as the commentator, explaining the nature of the Nixon Fund (and later his trial-balloon speech on Dien Bien Phu to the American Society of Newspaper Editors). This was my first cinematic performance and I should like to believe that my observations cast a devastating light on Nixon's devious evasions. But I did not steal the show.

As an incidental member of the cast of characters, I was also troubled by some indiscriminate sniping on the screen; Nixon's record of deccits and demagoguery is hardly illuminated by reciprocal treatment.

Thus the film treats the Hill-Chambers conflict as if history had firmly established Hiss' innocence and Chambers' guilt. The film's treatment of the Hiss episode with Nixon's uncomprehending admiration of Helen Gahagan Douglas and Jerry Voorhis is to engage in innocence by association.

At another juncture the film offers a glimpse of one of the major peace demonstrations of the Nixon era; the cameras focus long and hard on two Viet Cong flags, as if to suggest that the assembled multitude was committed to Hanoi rather than peace. The scene stirred applause here; in Manhattan, Kansas, it could produce a different result.

Finally there are intermittent close-ups of the elderly in Nixon audiences. Their faces presumably reveal something about the banality of both speaker and listener. But I suspect these images reveal nothing more than the cruel ravages of age, and that similar countenances could be found in any political assemblage.

* * *

There are marvelous interludes in "Millhouse," including some glimpses of Nixon in rehearsal for TV performances, and the organization of spontaneity. But the assumption that there is something palpably comic about Julie Nixon reciting a Thanksgiving prayer at the White House is, in its own way, as provincial as much of the Nixon Babbletry that the film burlesques. The truth is that Richard Nixon, despite all his absurdities, has a sneaky sense of middle-American susceptibilities. It is much too early to assume condescendingly that he will be derided the last laugh.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1971


WICHITA GARDY, N.Y. TIMES: "...superior action, as explanatory as 'An American Tragedy,' as mysterious as 'You Can't Go Home Again,' as funny as 'Why Are We in Viet Nam?' and as banal as 'Main Street'."

PHILIP ROTH: "Nothing so comically grotesque as Nixon's transformation into a President has happened since Kaika's hero turned into a cockroach; MILLHOUSE faithfully records that horrible American metamorphosis."

LEONARD HARRIS, WCBS TV: "One thing is sure...as you watch...the campaigns against Voorhis, Helen Gahagan Douglas, Stevensen, Kennedy, Humphrey, the Hiss case...the farewell speech in California...as you watch, you'll be choking or fuming. No one will sleep through MILLHOUSE."

JULES KRIEGER: "A zapped portrait of Nixon from Voorhis to Vietnam: part camp, part Horatio Alger run amuck—the dark side of the American dream."

Drawing by David Levine, Copyright © 1966, NINCY, Inc.



EMILE de ANTONIO'S

MILLHOUSE

A White Comedy

A NEW YORKER FILM'S RELEASE



Fitz

By Tom Fitzpatrick
Syracuse Correspondent

NEW YORK — Emile de Antonio sat in an overstuffed blue chair in the Chelsea Hotel Suite, reflecting on the 51 years he has lived and the 17 years.

De Antonio has been many things. Graduate of Johns F. Kennedy at Harvard, lawyer in New York's Hatcher, publicity director at William and Mary College and even star of an as yet unreleased Andy Warhol movie called "Drink."

De Antonio's role in that film consisted of playing a count of Scotch in 20 minutes and "tapping" to the floor in a airport.

It's LIT, as a large captain layered two years while he was studying for his PhD at Columbia University. "It was the best in the world," de Antonio recalled. "I was paid \$100 a week, and I had this huge room which I filled with books and which turned out to be one of the best places for parties."

De Antonio attended Harvard at 16, Kennedy was three years older at the time. "I found that charming," de Antonio recalled. "But a few years later, however, he also had something to say to all people who grew up with money. He had great assurance, and he always knew where he was."

De Antonio apparently always has known where he was too.

BUT NOW de Antonio may be on the brink of becoming a national celebrity for a documentary he created about President Nixon that is drawing record crowds at the New Yorker Theater here.

The film is called "Millhouse." De Antonio describes it as a white comedy in the Marx Brothers tradition. "I think it represents the best of a time anyone has taken on a President of

Revolutionary's film success

De Antonio Nixon with (Groucho) Marx

Chicago Sun-times
10/4/71

the United States while he was still in office," de Antonio said.

He bowed modestly at the Groucho bottle that had just been offered to him.

De Antonio drained the Coke in one huge gulp.

To be a part of history is to go in with what is already a large comedy for food and drink. De Antonio J for a second Coke.

"Every Sunday I do two films," he said. "I promise to go on the wagon, and I start a diet. Generally, both of them last less than a week."

DE ANTONIO SMILED at that, and his tired blue eyes tried to light up without success.

He has been making what he refers to as left-wing documentary films for nearly 10 years. They all have been critical successes, but on until "Millhouse" has he had a chance for large financial gains.

True others, like "Point of Order," "Year of the Pig" and "Push to Judgment," never made it at the box office.

"This time," he said, "we're going to make money. It's already booked into 25 theaters across the country. In fact, it will be opening at the Playhouse Theater in Chicago on Oct. 12.

"I think this is going to be the first documentary other than the rock music films that will become a runaway hit."

DE ANTONIO ADMITS, up from, that his portrait of Mr. Nixon is not balanced.

"It's very biased," he said. "I'm a man who generally does a slow burn, but Nixon's style just began to outrage me more and more."

"But what I think this movie does, right from the start when we show the wax dummy of Nixon being created, is to do something that is generally funny. I really tried to do

something in the genre of the Marx Brothers, Chaplin and W. C. Fields. I think the film is totally pre-empted, and that's the way I wanted it to be.

"There's not enough reverence in our lives today."

De Antonio admits he didn't know how well the film would go over until it premiered last month at the American Film Institute Theater in Washington.

THE AUDIENCE consisted largely of senators and congressmen. Most of them laughed voraciously at the film clips tracing Mr. Nixon's political career.

These include the famous "Checkers speech," Mr. Nixon's "Win me for Ike" exhortation and even shots of Mr. Nixon advising reporters they wouldn't have him to kick around anymore after he had been defeated in the 1962 California gubernatorial race.

"When the movie ended," de Antonio recalled, "the audience applauded for five minutes."

De Antonio meditated on that for an instant and then said something that apparently had been at the back of his mind all the time.

"You work on a film like this for a whole year, and you just don't know if it will work. I had had a screening of it for myself and my wife, Terry, a week before. She assured me it would be fine, and I trust her judgment."


DE ANTONIO LAUGHED again. "I been married five times, you know and she's been the best of them all."

De Antonio rubbed his forehead with his left hand.

"I think you should know this about me," he said. "I am a revolutionary, but I love America."

"It's just that I think it needs such radical changes right now. And I don't like the price

young people have to pay to get there. "The penalties for achieving freedom in this country are getting rougher and rougher every day."



EMILE de ANTONIO. . . . Every Sunday he promises to go on the wagon and start a diet.

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SEE LISTINGS FOR RENTAL PRICES

THREE GERMAN CLASSICS

The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari and Metropolis

SEE LISTINGS FOR RENTAL PRICES

Lenny Bruce on TV The standard on developed as a live form, as a performer in times of free speech. Lenny at his best. 35 min.

Kiron's Checkers Speech A film document in which Kiron, a young 19 min. 40 min. Rental \$1.00

THIRD WORLD DOCUMENTS

Saul Landau and Haskell Wexler Interview With President Salvador Allende An informal interview with President of Chile on his struggle to make socialism work in his country. Color. 31 min. Rental \$1.00 American Premiere October 21-27 at Whitney Museum

Saul Landau's Fidel A close up of the Cuban leader including live from Sierra Maestra and the fall of Batista. speaks frankly of Cuba's problems, discusses them with villagers and workers he travels throughout the country on. Color. 95 min.

Saul Landau and Haskell Wexler Brazil: A Report on the Situation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: EMK- TOYOTA

Dick Allen has passed information to HRH indicating Kennedy people have engineered a regional Toyota franchise in New England.

My memo of August indicating EMK visited with an asserted Japanese industrialist (J. Otani - not further identified) during a two day layover enroute from India now suggests a follow-up on J. Otani. Such inquiry is underway.

W. J. Felt
10. 14. 71

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: J. OTANI

Inquiry to date has determined the following:

Otani is a multi-millionaire Democrat with extensive real estate and business holdings in Hawaii. He is President and General Manager of the Otani Company which is a successful wholesale seafood enterprise.

Sources advise that Otani significantly controls local politics in Honolulu to the extent that he is referred to as the "Mayor Maker".

He is a frequent visitor to Honolulu's Customs area, particularly when important Japanese visit the island.

U.S. Customs sources contacted in this regard were unaware of any relationship between Otani and Toyota. Since there apparently exists a friendly relationship between Otani and Customs officials in that area, further inquiry through this source is deemed inadvisable.

Other means of inquiry designed to prove or disprove the allegation are currently being explored.

cc: R. Allen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1971

Reburr
10/14

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: ANTONIO CORTESE

You should put a hold on this project. There are signs indicating Cortese may be a small time con man.

Additionally, there is no record of any income tax filing for Cortese West of the Mississippi. We are doing a nationwide check.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: ANTHONY CORTESE - WINE VAULT, INC.,
VIKING SAUNA, INC.

A pretext interview was conducted at the San Jose offices of Viking Sauna, Inc. The results are as follows:

A) Subject, Anthony Cortese, was hired by Viking Sauna to effect the gift of a wine storage vault to the Western White House. The Viking Sauna executive interviewed is under the impression that a close relationship exists between Cortese and the President. Apparently Viking Sauna hopes to profit by the installation of the vault at San Clemente.

B) Cortese has been identified as the owner of an Oldsmobile agency in El Cerrito, California. His IRS returns reflect an operations loss of \$102,000 over the last two years. His net income for 1970 was \$20,800. He has not been audited. Cortese, according to the Viking Sauna V.P. is no longer with Wine Vault, Inc., but has returned to his Oldsmobile agency.

C) According to the Vice President, the wine storage rack has already been installed at San Clemente. Cortese assertedly worked with a Los Angeles attorney by the name of Cullum in effecting its installation.

NOTE: You will recall the Cortese letter here indicated a willingness to stock the wine storage rack. We should ascertain whether or not this was done.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO: Jack Carter 10/19
(Date)
FROM: JOHN DEAN
ACTION: DUE DATE: RUSH

_____ Prepare Reply For John .
Dean's Signature

_____ Direct Reply

_____ Comments/Recommendations

_____ Please handle

_____ Information

_____ File


REMARKS:

What additional info do we
have on this —

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To. Hill.

informed Kalubach
of info re Contese -
he will call Contese
& tell him we
are not interested -


10/19/71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN DEAN

FROM:

JOHN J. CAULFIELD

SUBJECT:

L.A. Times - Anti Trust Action

I spoke with Lyn on this matter. He had little to give except to advise that the Times is coming out with a new street edition which, in his judgment, will stifle newspaper competition on the Southern California Coast.

It is Lyn's view that this move may be countered by an anti-trust action and strong administration steps designed to limit the number of newspapers which one corporation can own.

However, he feels that we should not precipitously move in this area until he completes his Newsday project which is moving along quickly.

Adivse.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN

FROM: DAVID WILSON *DW*

SUBJECT: Antitrust Action Against the
Los Angeles Times

You have inquired about the possibility of antitrust action against the Los Angeles Times as suggested in the attached memorandum from Jack Caulfield. This proposal is apparently triggered by the fact that the Times is coming out with a new street edition which is expected to eliminate certain competition on the Southern California Coast.

The most likely antitrust action that might be considered in this situation would come under either Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization or attempts to monopolize. As defined in the leading case of United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the offense of monopoly has two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."

If the area of expansion of the Times is contiguous to Los Angeles, the market area might be drawn to include all of the Los Angeles area and thereby give the Times a percentage share of the market which would approach monopoly proportions. If the area of concern is further down the coast, the market area would probably be narrowly limited giving the Times far less than a monopoly share of the market and eliminating any possible charge of monopolization.

A crucial element of this offense, over and above pure size and power, is a deliberativeness in acquiring and maintaining the monopoly power. Thus, a natural monopoly such as most local newspapers which are the only newspaper in town, do not unlawfully monopolize merely by acting as strong, dynamic competitors. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960). These natural monopolies are defensible because they have had monopoly thrust upon them in a market which cannot support more than one viable competitor. An unlawful monopolizer must engage in some sort of predatory, unfair practice aimed at eliminating any possible competition.

The offense of attempting to monopolize requires proof of even more specific intent to commit predatory practices than mere monopolization. Furthermore, newspapers can be charged under Section 3 of the Clayton Act if they engage in such practices as selling below cost with the intent to destroy competition. Proof in these situations, however, is very difficult -- particularly in the newspaper industry which operates on very marginal economic grounds. The trend is toward fewer and fewer newspapers because of the economic limitations on the number of newspapers in a given market which can be viable. In these circumstances, practices which might in other conditions violate the antitrust laws are sometimes used and accepted as part of the struggle to survive.

Congress recognized this problem in its passage of the Newspaper Preservation Act (P. L. No 91-353 (1970)). This law immunizes existing joint newspaper operating agreements from the operation of the antitrust laws and exempts new agreements approved by the Attorney General upon finding that one of the jointly operated newspapers is in "probable danger of financial failure." The Antitrust Division also learned these harsh facts of life recently when a newspaper in Chattanooga after suit was brought by the Government folded rather than attempt to live with the restrictions proposed in the suit.

Therefore, before any action might be considered against the Los Angeles Times, there must be strong evidence of predatory practices on their part such as selling below cost, offering rebates to advertisers, or attempting to purchase smaller competitors. In discussing this general area with Bruce Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, he mentioned almost all the cases concerning newspapers in which the Division was currently involved. The Los Angeles Times was not included among these, indicating that so far it has not engaged in any practices which have caused a competitor to complain.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:


JOHN DEAN

FROM:

JOHN J. CAULFIELD

SUBJECT:

Political Issues in Florida



1. In connection with paragraph #1 of the attached confidential memorandum I suggest you talk with Dent and then place a call to Ray Farrell, establish that the assertion is accurate and, if so, insure that Yeager remains at his position.
2. My impression with the rest of the memo suggests that we might be wise to have someone with political astuteness performing at HEW in an on the scene capacity.

My good friend Jack Sherwood, former head of the Nixon Secret Service detail during the Eisenhower years, is leaving Rossides staff on or about December 15 and returning to Dade County where he resides.

He has expressed interest in a consultant position at HEW, specifically desiring to overview HEW programs in Dade County. Jack is very astute politically having been through many political wars with the President.

It seems to me that if he were given a consultancy position as he desires by Henry Hyde, true Nixon loyalist and Special Assistant to Elliott Richardson, he would be the ideal operative from the inside to keep a close watch on what appears to be a very significant political matter. He could report in to Harry Dent in cover fashion. Decisions could then be made accordingly in 1972.

Advise.



Republican
National
Committee.

November 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR ✓JOHN DEAN
JACK CAULFIELD
FROM LYN NOFZIGER *LN*

I think you ought to take a look at this.

National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Committee

November 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM
Confidential

TO: Laszlo C. Pasztor
Director
Heritage Groups Division, RNC

FROM: Manuel R. Giberga
Advisor, National Cuban Coordinator
Heritage Groups Division, RNC

MRG

SUBJECT: Imminent Political issues in Florida

1. There is a lot of pressure being made by Democratic Party politicians to remove from the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) office in Miami - Deputy District Director, C. Gordon Yeagar. Mr. Yeagar is a registered dedicated Republican, and every effort should be made to keep him in that position in Florida - by the RNC.
2. The appointment of Phillip J. Rutledge (a Kennedy man) to become Deputy Administrator of SRS which gives him responsibility for administering special programs including the Cuban Refugee Program in Florida, represents a great threat to our aims of furthering the Republican Party cause and the re-election of our President in the State and especially in the Dade County area where the bulk of the Cuban-Americans reside. (HEW memorandum attached)
3. A new project is in the process of being approved by the State of Florida, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Division of Family Services, which through a U.S. HEW grant Title IV A of the Social Security Act of 900,000 dollars, sets up 18 referral centers in the impoverished neighborhoods of Dade County to serve the poor. The purpose of the project is to provide, in effect, storefront service centers in order to receive the poor, diagnose their needs, refer them for services and to represent them if services are not complete or satisfactory. The actual operation will be jointly controlled by the United Fund, The County Manager of Dade County and such individual agencies as the Urban Coalition.

Upon approval by the State of Florida, and the Federal Government and with the arrangement of the final details, the plan will be implemented as a worthy type of social service. It has implications, however, far beyond its social merits. It, in fact, sets up a network of workers, known to and looked up to by the neighborhood poor who

will exert great influence on the individuals served. Since it is controlled by the County Government and the welfare establishment, it can be expected that this organization will be used for political purposes. Since there are no republicans in the county government and few democratic conservatives, it can be assumed that any political bias would be towards the left.

Specifically, however, I feel it necessary to point out that certain features which we understand to be a part of the staffing pattern for the new program will do incalculable damage to the standing of the Cuban community and its political outlook. In a nutshell, the program is designed to be administered by and to employ Blacks, even in those areas where the population is predominantly Latin American. This will not only hinder service, but will create a problem in the Cuban Community where qualified people are willing and able to perform these services even on a temporary basis. While some effort is being made to force the program to hire bi-lingual Latin Americans, so far, these efforts have met with failure.

The County Manager of Dade County (D) Mr. Ray Good controls the United Fund and Urban Coalition through the leftist Democrats, Mr. Bernardo Benes and Mrs. Athalie Range, Special Assistant to the Governor in Minority Affairs.

I feel that it is imperative to arrange a meeting with Harry S. Dent, Special Counsel to the President in order that jointly with the RNC, pressure should be brought to bear on Executive Departments concerned to stipulate that with four centers being in predominantly Latin American neighborhoods and others in areas with a large concentration of Latin Americans, staffing should follow neighborhood ethnic patterns as closely as possible for representation on behalf of Cuban-American ~~Democrats but also~~ Republicans and other Spanish Speaking minority groups.

\$900,000 managed by Ray Good and Bernardo Benes is a devastating blow for our Republican Party in Florida and to our new citizens registration program.

cc Chairman Robert Dole
Co-Chairman Thomas B. Evans
Harry S. Dent
Peter Millsbaugh

4.- HOW TO IMPROVE THE REPUBLICAN PARTY POSITION IN FLORIDA, AND
CAPTURE THE CUBAN VOTES.

- f) Meeting in the Office of Mike Thompson ,Republican Party State Committeeman in order to coordinate a Program on behalf of furthering the cause of the Republican Party and develop an strong coalition with Cuban-Americans of Dade County .

The meeting was attended by the following Cuban-American Republicans :

- Manuel R Giberga -	National Coordinator
- Ruben Mendiola	Former Cuban Senator and President of the Cardenas Municipalities.
- Humberto Quinones-	Assistant to the Director of the Cuban Refugee Center.
- Rene Diaz	Vice President of the Municipalities
- Jose Cabrera	Ass. Director of WQEA Radio

Mr. Buttari and Mr. Hevia , did not attend and they are blocking Mike Thompson's efforts for a Cuban-American coalition.

Manuel R Giberga made a proposal that every new citizen shall receive a Diploma when adopting U.S. Citizenship. It will be very helpful if the Diploma could be issue with the signature of the Vice President or the President himself.

The Diplomas can be printed with the signature and leave the name in blank , to be filled by the Office of the Republican Party in Florida.

I have made arrangements with top INS Official ,to have the name of the citizens to be , 15 or 20 days in advance , and their addresses as well. Therefore, we would be able to have all the Diplomas ready by the time of the swear-in ceremony or delivered to them personally by a volunteer group which we are already organizing.,which could operate easely with the Mobile Registratic Unit.

- ±) The Rotary Club Banquet in honor of the Cabinet Committee's Chairman (Dr. Ramirez), Mr. Buttari, and myself as Vice-Chairman was a compltie success with an attendance of close to 450 Cuban Community Business and Civic leaders .

We were honored to have with us :

Congressman William J Keating (R) Ohio .
" Lou Frey Jr. (R) Florida
DAVE ZACHEM
MIKE THOMPSON .

ational Republican Heritage Groups(Nationalities) Council

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN DADE COUNTY.

The election of 1968 was the first real , if limited , opportunity for Cubans to participate in a presidential vote. This election differed from those in the past in that there were, for the first time in many years, three relatively strong presidential candidates for the race . Two of the candidates , RICHARD M NIXON and GEORGE WALLACE, both expressed many political views that can be characterized as middle of the road to conservative in nature. The Democratic candidate HUBERT HUMPHREY, expressed views generally conceded to be middle of the road to liberal. Nevertheless , even with a three-way race and two candidates popular to the South, the voting in Dade County went as follows :

HUMPHREY	176,000
NIXON	135,000
WALLACE	53,000

HOWEVER, the three Cuban neighborhoods , in contrast gave the Republicans a slight majority over the Democrats, showing their greatest strength in the Hialeah-Miami Springs area by taking 12 of 20 precincts, eventhough only 13,500 Cubans were able to vote out of a total of 26,000 Cuban citizens in the area, from which the difference (12,500) were not registered , therefore not eligible to vote .

As could be seen , NIXON lost DADE COUNTY by only 41,000 votes a great achievement considering that total registration in DADE COUNTY reflects 5 to 1 against the Republican Party.

STATE VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL OF 1968

NIXON	886,000	votes
HUMPHREY	676,000	"
WALLACE	624,000	"

In the rest of the State ,WALLACE showed a great strength specially in the areas with old-retired persons.

THE CUBAN SWING VOTE IN DADE COUNTY AND FLORIDA STATE.-

<u>NEW CITIZENS.</u>	1968	1971
Elegible voters	13,500	22,000
Non-registered	12,500	34,000
		<u>56,000</u>
New Citizens at the rate of close to 1,000 per month since July 1971 to October 1972		<u>15,000</u>
<u>Cuban citizens :</u>		<u>71,000</u>

It is essential that a Campaign registration Drive should be launched in order to register these Cubans in the Republican Party .


Numbers do not lie , and if with only 13,500 Cubans voting in 1968 we lost DADE COUNTY by only 41,000 votes , with a total of 71,000 Cubans in the area (if registered), President Nix

can take the County for the Republicans for the first time and established Republican stronghold areas in places that were before in the hands of the Democrats such as the Hialeah . Miami Springs area , and other areas of the Southwest.

SUMMARY.-

I strongly recommend that the RNC give this area an special attention ,specially ,resolving the items that I have presented in the enclosed AGENDA.

Washington, D.C.
November 1st 1971


Manuel R. Giberger
Cuban National Coordinator
Heritage Division, RNC.

RANDUM

ADMINISTRATOR, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, AND
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE
Office of the Administrator

SRS Executive Staff

DATE:

OCT 20 1971


Administrator
Social and Rehabilitation Service

CT: Appointment of Deputy Administrator


I am extremely pleased to announce that Philip J. Rutledge will become Deputy Administrator of SRS, joining us in early December.

Phil has a distinguished background in the human resources field, and can make a very significant contribution to SRS in the period ahead.

While I'm sure he is known to many of you, the attached news release provides details of his background.


John D. Twine

Attachment



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C. 20201

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, October 20, 1971

KELSO--(202) 963-4241

(Home)--(202) 833-2012

BRUBECK--(202) 963-4241

(Home)--(301) 681-7483

The appointment of Philip J. Rutledge as Deputy Administrator of HEW's Social and Rehabilitation Service was announced jointly today by Secretary Elliot L. Richardson and Mayor Walter Washington of the District of Columbia.

Mr. Rutledge has been Director of the Department of Human Resources of the District Government since March, 1970. Earlier this month he received the Louis Brownlow Award in Public Administration for reorganizing and administering the "complex and sensitive human resource programs in the District."

Under the President's proposal for a Federal Department of Human Resources SRS would become the primary instrument for building State and local capacity to deliver social and rehabilitative services in a more coordinated and systematic way.

Secretary Richardson said, "Phil Rutledge's efforts to unify the many fragmented programs which try to serve the same people in the District of Columbia parallel what we hope to accomplish nationally."

SRS, headed by John D. Twinn, will play a key role in the health and welfare reforms proposed by the Nixon Administration. It administers the present welfare program and is particularly concerned with the administrative separation of welfare payments from services required under reform; it is developing more effective linkage of SRS-administered social services with manpower, education and other human service systems; and it is making changes in its Medicaid program that support health reform.

In addition to these programs, Mr. Rutledge will have responsibility for administering within SRS special programs for the aging, youth development and

-2-

delinquency prevention, rehabilitation services, and the Cuban refugee program.

Mr. Rutledge, 46, a native of Dawson, Georgia, holds degrees from Roosevelt University, Chicago; the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and has done additional graduate work at Wayne State University, Detroit.

In 1969-70, he served as assistant to the Mayor for Human Resource Programs, Government of the District of Columbia, and during the two previous years he was executive director of the President's Committee on Manpower, and Associate Manpower Administrator, U.S. Department of Labor.

Other assignments have included service as Director, Mayor's Committee for Human Resources Development, Detroit; and Director, Bureau of Health Education, Detroit and Wayne County.

Mr. Rutledge has served as a consultant to the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and has been a member of the Director's Task Force on the Community Action Program, Office of Economic Opportunity; the Michigan Governor's Commission on Urban Problems, and the Michigan Governor's Commission on Higher Education.

He is a member of the National Association for Community Development; the American Public Health Association (a fellow); the American Society of Public Administration (President of the National Capital Area Chapter and a national executive council member); the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the American Political Science Association; and the American Sociological Association.

Mr. Rutledge is married to the former Violet Eklund. They reside at 15204 Red Clover Drive, Rockville, Maryland, with their four children, Phyllis, Janet, Edward, and Patricia.

#

Public Affairs Office, District of Columbia Government

news release

District Building, Room 520

629-2577 - 2706

STATEMENT OF MAYOR WALTER E. WASHINGTON

October 20, 197

I am reluctant to accept the resignation of Mr. Rutledge.

However, at HEW he will have an opportunity to use at the national level the great administrative and organizational talents he possesses and his expertise in the field of human resources.

Under his leadership, the D. C. Department of Human Resources has been organized into an operating department that has coordinated and strengthened a wide range of programs and services and improved the delivery of services to the community.

I appreciate sincerely the personal assistance Mr. Rutledge has given to my office in helping meet the most basic needs of our citizens.

Mr. Rutledge is highly regarded as a member of my cabinet and his innovative approaches to the human resources system has earned for him a reputation of a top administrator in this field.

The departure of Mr. Rutledge will be a great personal loss to my administration and the City. I wish Phil every success in this new undertaking and I know that his commitment to the human resource system will continue.



DADE COUNTY REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN
ROBERT A. ROS

2008 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33137

TELEPHONE 374-

October 12, 1971

Mr. Tom Evans, Co-Chairman
Republican National Committee
Dwight Eisenhower Republican Center
310 First Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Tom:

You are very likely aware that Howard Palmatier, the Director of the Cuban Refugee Center, recently suffered a severe heart attack. He will require a long convalescence and less strenuous duties once he is out of the hospital.

While in no way wishing to add to his personal problems, it is obvious that now is the time to replace him with a director who would not be so antagonistic to Republicans in particular and the Administration generally.

There can not be the slightest doubt that the prestige of President Nixon has suffered badly in the Cuban community because of the retention of a Kenned follower in a key role. Replacement of Palmatier with someone generally conservative and known to be loyal to Nixon would help all of us. However, if we are to be much better off than now, it is imperative that another mistake of the magnitude of the Buttari appointment NOT be made.

On the other side of the coin, we are starting to make some headway with our Latin Action program, as such. I am sure you already know we had some final success from the Pawley dinner, though Cuban support was almost non-existent

We would like to officially dedicate our new Latin Action Center (Partido Republicano Centro Latino-Americano) on either the afternoon of November 5th, or the morning of the 8th. Your attendance, along with Dr. Manuel Gilberga, Senator Gurney and State Chairman Tommy Thomas, would permit us to capitalize on the dedication among the entire Latin community as well as the press. To so it would be a big help would be an understatement.

Hopefully, it will be possible for all those listed above to attend on one the two dates. Since Senator Gurney is having such a tight schedule and having to remain available for votes, I picked Friday afternoon or Monday morning. However, it will be appreciated if I am notified of any conflicts at the earliest possible time.

- 1 -

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRESPONDING SECRETARY RECORDING SECRETARY TREASURER

Mr. Tom Evans
October 12, 1971
page 2

Sincerely,



Bob Rosasco,
Chairman

RAR/pw

CC: Dr. Manuel R. Giberga
Senator Edward Gurney
Honorable Tommy Thomas
Mr. Derlyn Moe, Latin Action chairman
Mr. Mario Meneses, Latin Action Center Director

December 7, 1971

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN W. DEAN

SUBJECT: Condition of George Meany

Dr. Marvin Fuchs, George Meany's personal physician, was discreetly interviewed today. In brief, Dr. Fuchs provided the following information on Meany's condition:

- Meany suffered a mild heart attack on November 26th. The attack is medically defined as a "myocardial infarct" (acute coronary thrombosis) and described as the stoppage of blood to a part of the heart tissue with resulting damage to that part of the heart.
- Dr. Fuchs emphasized that it was a mild heart attack. Meany did not lose consciousness at any time. Meany's stay in the intensive care section of the hospital was characterized as routine for the condition; the isolation was also said to result from the fact that Meany experienced anginal pains for a five day period.
- Meany was removed from the intensive care section on December 3rd. He is presently in a private room in an open ward and has been walking for the last two days.
- This was Meany's first heart attack. His present condition is described as good and it is anticipated that he will be released on December 10th or 11th.
- Dr. Fuchs feels that Meany has an excellent life expectancy if he follows a program of diet, rest and exercise.

The information we have obtained was reviewed by Dr. Lukash, who feels that Meany will have to restrict his activity (physical and emotional) considerably. Dr. Lukash also notes that Meany is clearly susceptible to a fatal heart attack, which could be triggered by a sudden emotional situation.

I shall continue to monitor this situation and report any significant developments.

See: Check 01-1-1

CONDITION OF GEORGE MEANY

Dr. Marvin Fuchs, George Meany's personal physician has been talked to today on a very discreet basis by a physician working at George Washington University Hospital wherein Meany is confined. It is believed that the below indicated information therefore is accurate and reliable:

Fuchs stated that Meany suffered a mild heart attack following the AFL-CIO Convention in Florida.

The condition is referred to in medical terms as a Myocardialinfahrt. *myocardial infarct*
This according to Fuchs was confirmed by EKG and by enzyme changes. *acute myocardial infarction*
There was a stoppage of blood to a part of the heart tissue causing a death to that part of the heart. There is a remaining tissue scar at that location.

Fuchs emphasized that this was a mild heart attack. Meany did not lose consciousness at any time. Such attack apparently is considered to be a routine case.

Meany has received routine care in this regard which includes his stay in the intensive care section of the hospital.

Fuchs stated that the reason Meany has been in isolation is due to the experiencing of anginal pain for a five day period.

Meany left the intensive care section on December 3. He is currently in a private room in an open ward and has been walking for the last two days.

Dr. Lindsay, Chief of Cardiology at G.W. U. Hospital, did examine Meany on at least one occasion. While he was visited by a surgeon, it is clearly stated that no heart surgery is needed or under consideration at this time.

Meany has not previously had a heart attack. His heart is described as being in good condition at this time and it is anticipated now that he will be released on December 10 or 11.

Fuchs further stated that Meany's life expectancy will be excellent if he follows a program of diet, rest and exercise. Failure to do so will reduce his life expectancy by 1/3 according to Fuchs.

The source advises that the above information is as close to an actual examination as one can get.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1972

*copy to:
Gordon Strachan
F.Y.I.*

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: MEMBERS OF THE D.C. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
FOR THE '72 CONVENTION

Attached is a list of proposed members of the above advisory committee. The source is reliable and the information believed to be accurate.

You should be aware that former F.B.I. Assistant Director William Sullivan has joined the indicated James Ahern at the listed Insurance Crime Prevention Institute. It would be safe to assume that Sullivan's expertise in the militant area might well be utilized by Ahern in connection with his above committee duties. This observation might be of interest to both the A.G. and the Deputy A.G.

Attachment .

PROPOSED MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SECURITY

1. Wes Pomeroy - Head of the Department of Law Enforcement Administration of the University of Minnesota and former Deputy Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and former Under-Sheriff of San Mateo
2. Cliff Cassidy - Chief of the Department of Public Safety of Texas
- X 3. James E. Bassett, III - President of Keenland Race Track and former Chief of the Kentucky State Police
4. James Ahern - Former Police Chief of New Haven, Connecticut, and former member of the President's Commission on the Causes of Violence
5. Floyd Boring - Former Inspector for the United States Secret Service
6. Henry Montague - Former Chief Postal Inspector for the United States Post Office Department
7. Howard Baugh - Superintendent of the Atlanta Police Department

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Address List

Mr. Wesley A. Pomeroy (612-373-7713)
222 Northrop Auditorium
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

Mr. J. E. Bassett, III (606-254-3412)
President
Keenland Association and Company
Post Office Box 1690
Lexington, Kentucky

Mr. Henry B. Montague (202-938-8765)
Apartment 204-B
111 Center Street, North
Vienna, Virginia

Mr. James Ahern, Director (203-226-6347)
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute
21 Charles Street
Westport, Connecticut 06880

Superintendent Howard Baugh (404-659-1313 ext. 305)
Crime Prevention
Atlanta Police Department
175 Decatur Street, S. E.
Atlanta, Georgia

Mr. Floyd Boring
2017 Oakwood Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C. 20031

Mr. Cliff Cassidy (214-235-3724)
Richardson Savings and Loan Association
Richardson, Texas

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT FINCH
FROM: JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: Derogatory film
about the President

During a recent trip to Los Angeles, we received information that the Smothers Brothers were producing a derogatory film about the President. A pretext inquiry at the offices of SmoBro International Productions, Inc., Los Angeles, revealed that that company had just completed production of a film entitled "Another Nice Mess." It is scheduled for nationwide distribution beginning in March.

The film is described by SmoBro's press agent as a satirical spoof. The President and Vice President are portrayed as Laurel and Hardy.

I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on how we could develop further information about this film, its proposed distribution, and its backers, in order that we may be in a better position to assess its potential impact.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Chuck Colson

ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTED

9875

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Date 1/17/72

FRED FIELDING

TO: _____

FROM: JOHN J. CAULFIELD

ACTION:

_____ Approval/Signature

_____ Comments/Recommendations

 X For Your Information

_____ File

REMARKS:

1/17/72

SUBJECT: RUMOR SMOTHERS BROTHERS ARE PRODUCING
A DEROGATORY FILM ABOUT RICHARD NIXON

A pretext inquiry at the offices of SmoBro International Productions, Inc., Los Angeles developed the following information:

SmoBro has just completed production of a film to be entitled "Another Nice Mess". It will be distributed to nationwide theatres beginning in March.

The film is described as a satirical spoof. According to Lanny Scher, SmoBro's press agent, Richard Nixon will be portrayed as Oliver Hardy and Spiro Agnew as Laurel Hardy. Rich Little and Herbert Voland, not further identified, will play the respective roles.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

2/4/72

FOR: JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: THE FUND FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

An early indication regarding the Fund for Investigative Journalism points towards an affiliation with the Philip Stern Family Fund. That fund is believed to have financed Seymour Hersh's disclosures on the My Lai massacre.

Additionally, it is believed that the Fund for Investigative Journalism financed the Senator Tom Dodd financial disclosures.

Details will follow.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: FUND FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
2933 Ordway St., N.W.

A discreet inquiry has positively determined that the Fund for Investigative Journalism enjoys a tax exempt status granted by the Internal Revenue Service in April, 1970. It has been further determined that the FFIJ is supported entirely by monetary contributions from the extreme left Stern Family Fund.

It has also been learned that the FFIJ was the financial medium for the financing of the My Lai massacre stories written by Seymour Hersh.

A request has been made for more detailed information relative to these matters and will be in hand on a discreet basis during the early part of next week.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: ADVANCE COPY OF THE BOOK "POLICE IN TROUBLE -
OUR FRIGHTENING CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT"
BY JAMES G. AHERN

We have received from a reliable source an advanced copy of the book "Police in Trouble" by former New Haven Police Chief James F. Ahern. Ahern is now affiliated with the New England based Insurance Institute, along with former Assistant FBI Director William Sullivan.

Ahern also served as a member on the Scranton Commission on Civil Unrest and is generally recognized as a liberal spokesman on law enforcement matters with a similar philosophy to former Assistant Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

A review of the document indicates that it can be described as a liberal treatise on the overall problems confronting police and the entire question of law enforcement at both the local and Federal level.

Ahern makes biting and severely critical comments with respect to the President, the Attorney General, the Administration and the FBI. Some the areas marked for criticism by Ahern are:

A charge that the Administration has created a leadership vacuum with respect to law and order in the nation.

The President has injured the cause of police professionalism.

The President has contributed to the reasons why police are feared, hated and sometimes killed by segments of the American society today.

A charge that the President interfered with NYCPD policy by injecting himself into the issue of whether or not police officers should wear American flag emblems.

Implied criticism of the President in connection with his support of Governor Rockefeller's actions in suppressing the Attica riot.

Memorandum for J. W. Dean, III
 "Police in Trouble"
 Page two

A charge that John Mitchell's role as Attorney General has been political and insensitive to the overall objectives of federal law enforcement.

Severe criticism of Director Hoover and the FBI in the area of police coordination and the Bureau's approach to the Black Panthers. Further, Ahern claims that an analysis of the stolen Media, Penna. FBI files reveals a conscious FBI policy to create fear amongst the political left.

Ahern calls for and recommends the removal of FBI Director Hoover.

It can be anticipated that this highly critical document will be well read by the leading Democratic Presidential candidates.

It can be further anticipated that the liberal left media will initiate highly favorable reviews of the book. Indeed, it is probable that one of the major candidates will examine the document with a view towards using it as a master plan response and criticism of the Administration's overall law enforcement effort.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN DEAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

What should be done on this in my view is:

- a) A research job on crime in New Haven, while Ahern ran the show;
- b) An investigation of public records to ascertain Ahern's connection with the Democratic Party;
- c) Preparation of a review of the book when it hits, which can be published widely and can take apart his contentions about RN and the Scranton Commission, and others; and take Ahern apart as a liberal propagandaist, associated with whatever candidate he is associated with at the time;
- d) We should seek to have our friends review the book in whatever papers we can -- and then move those reviews around to places where the book is having any impact whatsoever. The problem for us of course is that we appointed this turkey to the Scranton Commission.

Buchanan

MEMORANDUM

Tab 28

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN DEAN

FROM:

CHARLES COLSON *CC*

Can you do anything with the attached? I have no idea, obviously, whether there is anything to it, but it might be worth taking a look at. It seems to me I do recall some publicity about this about two years ago.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM: STEVE KARALEKAS *SK*

It has been suggested to me that the appropriate office in this Administration should commence an investigation into the background and circumstances surrounding the leasing arrangement of the Department of Transportation headquarters building in Washington.

According to my source, it seems that Larry O'Brien, present Democratic National Chairman, and two cohorts were involved in very shady dealings with LBJ. These dealings resulted in an extremely lucrative leasing arrangement with O'Brien and company as the lessors and the U. S. Government as the lessee.

I am unable at this time to be more specific, but according to my source, it is well worth checking. His suggestion was triggered by the current ITT - Jack Anderson revelation.

April 6, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHUCK COLSON

FROM:

JOHN DEAN

Per your suggestion, I have looked into the possibility that Larry O'Brien and others were involved in some highly questionable leasing arrangements with the United States Government during the Johnson Administration. Specifically, I reviewed the subject of lease arrangements with GSA for the DOT Headquarters Building, but apparently his activities were even more widespread.

As a result of my investigation and discussions, it appears that it would be extremely difficult to establish the direct tie-in between O'Brien and GSA. Even if this could be done, however, it is the consensus of all with whom I have discussed this that raising the issue might open a Pandora's Box that we would later regret opening. It is not that this Administration or prior Republican Administrations have been as culpable as it is obvious the Democrats were; rather charges of alleged impropriety could be leveled against the current GSA Administration, and our point would be lost in the smoke.

This is not to say that I think we should forget the whole matter. For your information, Senator Proxmire has had GAO people investigating the GSA leasing policy for some time now. If it appears that the Senator will attempt to make this another of his "causes" during the election year, which I currently think is not a realistic possibility, we should be prepared to show that we are at worst guilty of bad judgment whereas the Democrats were actually guilty of criminal conversion, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


CONFIDENTIAL/
EYES ONLY

May 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED FIELDING

Henry Kimelman is Campaign Treasurer/Fund Raiser for McGovern. He was nearly indicted last year because he is a liquor importer in the Virgin Islands and apparently he really rakes off the profits. While Udall was Secretary of Interior he wheeled and dealed because the Virgin Islands was under Interior. We believe there must be material at Justice and Interior on this sleezy character that we would like to obtain through your fantastic sources. We could, of course, control the release of this material but need your help in getting, what apparently is some pretty good stuff.

Thanks.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dick", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

W. Richard Howard

de w. ...
clear
D

Henry Kimmelman

We would like to know any relevant information about Kimmelman's activities and associations. This might relate, inter alia, to the following:

- Questionable land deals or favored treatment in Virgin Islands, while Udall was Secretary of Interior.
- Signs of organized crime involvement.

By way of background, we know the following involvements:

- Chairman of the Board - West Indies Corp.
- Co-owner - Virgin Islands Hilton, St. Thomas.
- President - Overview Corp. (environmental consulting firm)(Stewart Udall is chairman of the board).
- Liquor importer in Virgin Islands.
- Apparently has substantial landholdings in Florida (perhaps some hotel syndicates).

June 5, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK HOWARD
FROM: JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: Henry Kimelman

Per our conversations, to date we have been unable to come up with any material on Kimelman that might be used to illustrate the true nature of the money man in McGovern's life.

Last September we did receive information alleging the possibility that Kimelman's corporate activities might be violative of the anti-trust laws, and also allegations of organized crime involvement. At that time the information was reviewed by the Department of Justice and we were advised that there was no sufficient basis to verify such charges.

I am still seeking further data on Kimelman from Interior and other sources, and will keep you advised of the results of these inquiries as soon as they are available.

JWD:FFF:bav

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

A TRUE COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

June 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN DEAN

The attached is additional information on Kimmelman and, as you know, George Bell spent a lot of time in the Virgin Islands. As Colson says, there must be something that we can use someplace in this government and he wonders if we are still pushing to try to locate this information.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dick". The signature is written in dark ink and is flanked by two horizontal lines, one on the left and one on the right, which extend slightly beyond the ends of the signature.

W. Richard Howard

William N. Greer Associates
CONSULTANTS

June 12, 1972

Kimmel

Brian

The Honorable Harry S. Dent
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dent:

Enclosed herewith is a copy of information sent by my husband to Jack Anderson. At the time he sent this to Anderson, he felt that a disclosure of this kind should come from one who is nominally a Democrat or who is sympathetic to the Democratic party.

Yesterday O'Brian made much of the failure of the Republicans to disclose the names and amounts of campaign contributors. I believe that this material might be used as a counter-attack.

The statements made in the memorandum have been carefully researched and are correct. This can be verified by the Justice Department's Criminal Intelligence section.

You have always helped us with our problems. I hope this will help on the national level.

Sincerely,

Nellie Greer

Nellie Greer .

Home phone #

(809) 774-1165

SUBJECT: HENRY L. KIMMELMAN
 Finance Director
 George McGovern Campaign

Henry Kimmelman has close family and business ties with what is known in Criminal Intelligence circles as the "Kosher Mafia".

Kimmelman is married to the daughter of Sidney Kessler.

Kessler was an important figure in the liquor business before and during the last war. Before that his name was familiar to the prohibition law enforcement officers in and around Boston, Mass.

Sidney Kessler set himself up in business (distilling) in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands during the last war and became a close associate of Ralph M. Paiwonski whose name is also familiar to the prohibition law enforcement officers of that era.

Ralph Paiwonski is better known as a former Democratic National Committee Man and, later, as Governor of the Virgin Islands. He was appointed by Jack Kennedy. He served during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

It was Paiwonski who shoved Kimmelman down the throat of Stu Udall when he, Udall, was Secretary of the Interior.

As you may know, the Virgin Islands is virtually a fiefdom of the Interior Department. A big operator could find it very convenient to have an understanding friend in an important spot in Interior.

Kimmelman is a handsome man, well spoken and plausible. It is quite possible that George McGovern is totally unaware of Kimmelman's connections. If he does not know of it he should be informed. If he does know of it he should not be President.

Kimmelman, personally, may be clean but I personally doubt it very much. I do know that he is not, and can not be, a free agent. Sidney Kessler set him, and his other son-in-law Eliot Fishman, up in the hotel business. When that didn't work out he set them up in the liquor business (Henry Elliot, Ltd). The ownership of record has since changed.

Mr. Anderson, If you have good contacts in the Criminal Intelligence section of Justice I am sure

that they can verify what I am about to tell you. They have a very fine criminal intelligence network in the Caribbean staffed by some very competent agents.

A year ago, last January, a kingpin of the "Kosher Mafia" died. He was a close friend and associate of Sidney Kessler. His name was Morris Rosen. He spent some time here getting his ducks in a row to introduce gambling to these islands. Rosen was very high up in the mob hierarchy - probably next in line under Meyer Landky who is now in exile in Israel.

Rosen's death, and the fact that Ralph Paiwonski was not elected Governor, as he fully expected to be, pulled the rug out from under Kessler, Paiwonski, Kimmelman and others including the American Motor Inns which temporarily dropped plans for a new hotel with gambling. Motor Inns recently decided to go ahead which makes me believe that they now think gambling will make it this time. Kessler tried it before in 1950-'51. A fellow named Bill Greer owned a radio station here at that time and beat him hands down.

In any event, the mobs are rapidly taking over these islands through corporations whose individual stockholders can never be found. General Trading Corporation as an example, owned by fifty or sixty little corporations located on many islands and countries including some tax havens. The owner corporations are, in turn, owned by fifty or sixty others - ad infinitum. I don't think that even the Department of Justice has the manpower to sort out the ownership.

Kessler, Paiwonski, and their associates probably, including Kimmelman, are all tied in with this mob in one way or another and I would hate to see this gang make inroads into the very top echelons of the national government, which might happen if George McGovern is elected and is inducted to Henry Kimmelman.

I don't think I should go into more detail in this memorandum and am sorry that I can't sign my name. I'd be glad to talk to you but even that should not be necessary. The criminal intelligence boys can fill you in. Its not a nice picture.

Good luck.

May 11th, 1972

P.O. Box 4306, St. Thomas, V.I.
Telephone # (809) 774-1165

Mr. Jack Anderson
1612 K Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Anderson:

Congratulations on your Pulitzer Award. Like many others, I feel that it is well deserved.

I am sending you the enclosed memorandum that you might find interesting. It is unsigned for reasons that will be apparent to you.

I have a wife, two children and several grandchildren presently residing with me and, for their safety, I hope that my anonymity will be preserved. This action of mine could be very dangerous. I will have to rely on your discretion.

I knew Drew slightly and his father much better, when he was Governor of the Virgin Islands in the middle thirties. You don't know me. For that reason I am giving you the names and addresses of some people in Washington that you might call to learn just who I am. I'd appreciate it if you would not refer to the contents of the enclosed if you do contact these people.

George C. Davis
6500 Ridge Street
McLean, Virginia 22101
Tel. - ELMwood 6-3021

Arthur Schroeder
Miller, Schroeder & Bankson
Suite 514
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel. - 659-4400

Since establishing residence in the Virgin Islands in 1950, I have served on the Governor's Advisory Committee on Education, the St. Thomas Police Commission and as United States Marshal. Just before the last war and until June, 1942, I served on the Central Civilian Defense Committee in San Juan, Puerto Rico under Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell. That's about the size of it.

Yours very truly,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON

FROM: GEORGE T. BELL *GTB*

As you undoubtedly know, Kimmelman, McGovern's finance chairman, is one of the Virgin Islands' really well-known fast buck artists. He is the son-in-law of Piawonsky, has been involved in every conceivable deal down there during his regime, was some kind of assistant to Udall and got him into that Overview Corporation contract, etc., etc. Interior has plenty of knowledge about him, and I know Justice and IRS have files on him. In addition, Lt. Governor Maas can give you chapter and verse.

It just might be useful to have in stand-by a good rundown on him.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN DEAN
SUBJECT: McGovern War Record

As I am sure you are aware, following the release of the attached article and a reiteration of the same charges by William Loeb, McGovern has asked DOD to release his military "201" personnel file.

Arrangements have been made to insure that if and when the Army does release copies of the contents of this file to McGovern, a public announcement of the same will be made which will indicate the number of documents in the file. This should reduce the chances that McGovern will only release selected and favorable documents.

You should also be aware that there is nothing in McGovern's file which directly substantiates the allegation about his cowardice. We are advised that there is only one paragraph in one of the documents which is not complimentary to the Senator. Also, the file lists the number of combat missions McGovern flew, and although no additional notations are made the reviewer stated that the number seemed somewhat low by comparison to other pilots flying in combat at that time. The file also contains the citations for McGovern's decorations, including his Distinguished Flying Cross, and reflects his various promotions during his military career.

The party reviewing the file also advised that there is no evidence that any documents have been removed heretofore, or that there had been any tampering with the file.

ADMINISTRATIVELY RESTRICTED

cc: Chuck Colson

JWD: FFF:bav

An Intelligence Report

Frank A. Capell evaluates intelligence from both private and official sources in Washington and around the world.

AMERICANS of Polish extraction will soon be asked to contribute funds to help equip a Warsaw scientific center for astronomy research. A group of American scientists connected with the National Academy of Sciences in Washington plans to present Communist Poland with a \$1 million astronomical research center next year, marking the 500th Anniversary of the birth of Nicolaus Copernicus. Here is the ring: All but \$100,000 of the money for the project will come from Polish zlotys accumulated by the United States in Poland from the post-War sale of surplus agricultural products.

Included in the equipment to be presented to the Polish Communist Government is an I.B.M. 1130-class computer, a very sophisticated device capable of being used for important military purposes.

Early in May, Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, made a trip to Warsaw to discuss Polish-American scientific exchanges and the proposed astronomy center. Dr. Handler spoke with Professor Jan Kaczmarek, Poland's Minister of Science, Technology and Education, who was quite pleased with the proposed offer. As a result of these conversations, plans have been made

to increase next year by 25 percent the scientific exchanges between the U.S. and Communist Poland, with even more in the near future. Only one "problem" exists -- approval by the U.S. Congress will be required to use the accumulated U.S. funds. Concerned Conservatives might consider this election year a good time to raise the matter with their Congressmen.

Why was B-24 pilot George McGovern sent home during World War II with fifteen missions of his scheduled four still unfulfilled? Intelligence personnel with firsthand knowledge of the matter say it was because Lt. McGovern landed his aircraft on the island of Vis in the Adriatic and refused to fight. These sources report that the co-pilot had to return the plane to combat without McGovern.

Now Senator McGovern, and fond of citing his "war record" as proof that he could face down America's enemies, McGovern seems compelled to emphasize that he is no coward. The Army Air Corps thought differently. Intelligence sources report that, after abandoning his B-24, Lt. McGovern was relieved of his command and brought before a board of officers which heard evidence of his cowardice and recommended a dishonorable discharge. General Ira Eaker is reported

June 7, 1972

53

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN

FROM: CHUCK COLSON *CC*

Has anyone run any checks or investigations on the key McGovern staffers? I was told yesterday that Gordon Weil has some very questionable things in his background. He is apparently one of the chief brain trusters who travels with McGovern.

cc: Pat Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHUCK COLSON

FROM:

STEVE KARALEKAS J.K.

Max Friedersdorf sends the following report:

We arranged an administration speaker for Rep. Glenn Davis (R. -Wisc.) in Milwaukee last weekend and Davis' administrative assistant, Jim Bolton, called today to thank the White House for our efforts. Bolton also passed along information that his son who is on Secret Service detail guarding McGovern, reports detail was upset last weekend because the candidate stayed at the Massachusetts estate of a Belmont Tobin. Bolton said his son described Tobin as "a commie who is no. 1 on the Massachusetts State Police list of subversives."

Bolton's son has promised to keep his dad informed of these and any other kinds of activities, who in turn will communicate the same to Max.

I'm discreetly checking the above information out and will report any additional findings.

*Dict - Colson
Chasen did not
also ask Tolson to
invest Tolson - D.C.
must have
file*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1972


ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY


MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN DEAN

Per Chuck Colson's request on the attached, can you check out the facts as well as Tobin's background. We could certainly use this information if true. Please let us know.

Thanks.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick", with a horizontal line extending from the end.

W. Richard Howard

A handwritten note in cursive script that reads "Pete check with Bob Hays for me -". Above the note is a small, illegible scribble.

SUBJECT:

OPERATION "SANDWEDGE"

Tab 31

INTRODUCTION

The 1972 Presidential Campaign strongly suggests a definitive Republican need for the creation of a political intelligence-security entity to be located within the private sector. This entity, surfacely disassociated from the Administration by virtue of an established business cover, would have the capability of performing in a highly sophisticated manner designed to ensure that the major offensive intelligence and defensive security requirements of the entire campaign and Republican convention would be professionally structured, programmed and implemented. In the author's judgment, this effort would make a significant and perhaps crucial contribution towards the reelection of Richard Nixon.

Indicated below, therefore, are a series of considerations and suggestions posed in this regard for the review of those requested to endorse the suggested undertaking.

I. OPPOSITION INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

The presence of Lawrence O'Brien as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee unquestionably suggests that the Democratic nominee will have a strong, covert intelligence effort mounted against us in 1972. The 1968 L. A. Times, New York Post, U. S. Marshal team which operated from former U. S. Attorney Morgenthau's office (assertedly without his knowledge) is evidence of O'Brien's modus operandi and indicative of what we can expect this time around.

In this regard, we should be particularly concerned about the new and rapidly growing Intertel organization (See Tab "A"). Should this Kennedy mafia dominated intelligence "gun for hire" be turned against us in '72, we would, indeed, have a dangerous and formidable foe.

Close scrutiny of this organization's activity has been ongoing here. Indicated below are a series of points designed to suggest the political hazards that this group represents:

A) The organization was co-founded by Bill Hundley, former Special Assistant to A. G. Bobby Kennedy and Bob Pelloquin, Kennedy loyalist who functioned as Senior Attorney in Justice's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, also under Bobby Kennedy.

B) Other Kennedy mafia types, including the so called mysterious David I. Belisle, former Director Investigations for the National Security Agency, are principals in the organization.

C) It has been reliably determined that Stephen Smith, EMK's brother-in-law, has privately visited Intertel's New York office headed by former FBI supervisor Jack O'Connell known by his colleagues to have been a "black bag" specialist while at the Bureau. Smith, unquestionably, would think Intertel should EMK go for the big prize.

D) On Intertel's Board of Directors is Jerome S. Hardy, Executive Vice President of the Dreyfus Corporation which is chaired by Howard Stein. The media reports that Stein will be a heavy contributor to a Democratic-Liberal or 3rd Party Presidential candidate. Shortly before this media revelation, the aforementioned Jack O'Connell

accompanied an electronics specialist to both Stein's and Hardy's offices for sweeping purposes.

E) It has been very reliably determined that some of Intertel's principals possess gambling weaknesses or have been quietly let go from their sensitive federal law enforcement positions because of financial improprieties. One Intertel principal, related to a known Baltimore Cosa Nostra figure and released from federal service because of an established gambling weakness, is now in charge of Hughes' security operation in Las Vegas.

F) The investigative reporter fraternity is taking a closer look at the potential for Intertel to be exposed as a mafia front or a mafia exploitable tool for its Caribbean and Vegas operations. The recent Look article on Howard Hughes alludes to this point. Bill Kolar (former Chief of Intelligence at IRS) and Resorts International's President I. G. (Jack) Davis, recently testified before the New Jersey legislature advocating legalized gambling in that mafia ridden state.

All of the above facts are mentioned to suggest how the weaknesses of Intertel, intertwined with established Democratic-Kennedy loyalties make the organization most susceptible to a '72 intelligence gun for hire approach by O'Brien or the Democratic Presidential nominee. The deep concern here is that the assignment could be accepted on a compartmentalized basis and easily hidden from republican James Crosby, Chairman of the Board of Resorts International (assertedly owning 591 of Intertel stock). Jim Golden, formerly with Intertel, has now switched over to the Hughes'

Tool Company and is far removed from the day to day intelligence activities of Intertel. Thus, the operating headquarters is bereft of any Nixon support or loyalty.

It is recommended that consideration be given to have Intertel neutralized by Justice to preclude such development from taking place or to discourage consideration by O'Brien or Stephen Smith. This can be accomplished by directing Justice (if it has not done so already) to open a case with a view towards determining if the organization has unauthorized access to sensitive government files. It most certainly has.

Among other factors supporting this contention is the consensus in the federal intelligence sector indicating that Intertel, in all likelihood, delivered the details of a reported Justice-IRS skimming investigation of Bob Maheu to Hughes causing Maheu's fall and Hughes' departure from Vegas. The manipulated threat of indictment of Intertel principals would effectively minimize this threat, create a potentially debilitating intelligence weakness for O'Brien's forces and force them to try other, less sophisticated sources. Additionally, "Operation Sandwedge" would be free to operate both offensively and defensively without a dangerous adversary.

PROPOSED "SANDWEDGE" RESPONSIBILITIES

The total offensive intelligence, defensive security requirements for the '72 Presidential Campaign and Republican National Convention will be a large and sensitive undertaking.

Operation Sandwedge proposes that it be charged in this regard with the following responsibilities:

OFFENSIVE (New York City based - clandestine operation)

- A) Supervise penetration of nominees' entourage and headquarters with undercover personnel.
- B) "Black Bag" capability (discuss privately) including all covert steps necessary to minimize Democratic voting violations in Illinois, Texas, etc.
- C) Surveillance of Democratic primaries, convention, meetings, etc.
- D) Derogatory information investigative capability, world-wide.
- E) Any other offensive requirement deemed advisable.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

- A) Select and supervise the private security force hired in connection with the Republican National Convention. Conduct all political security investigations at Republican Convention.
- B) Establish and supervise nation-wide electronic counter-measures capability in connection with all non-presidential security aspects of '72 campaign.
- C) Supervise all security operations at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, RMC. Conduct all security investigations (leaks, personnel, etc.)

- D) Ensure the political security aspects of the travelling campaign staff.
- E) Conduct any Republican Party-Campaign oriented investigation nation-wide.

OPERATING COVER

The consensus dictates that a privately created corporate business entity would be the most effective tool to implement the sensitive responsibilities indicated above. The corporation would posture itself as a newly formed security consulting organization ostensibly selling itself as a group of highly talented investigator-security experts with impeccable Republican credentials who actively seek only Republican Corporations and law firms as clients.

Since the key operating principals (3 or 4 persons) in the corporate entity would be well known Nixon loyalists in the law enforcement area, the defensive involvement, as outlined above, would be plausible and readily acceptable to all friend or foe inquiries.

The offensive involvement outlined above would be supported, supervised and programmed by the principals, but completely disassociated (separate foolproof financing) from the corporate structure and located in New York City in extreme clandestine fashion. My source would be charged with setting up and supervising this operation. In other words, he would not surface. Rather, his responsibilities would be increased and he would be charged with setting up the clandestine operation in exactly the same fashion as he did during his career. You are aware, of course, that his

expertise in this area was considered the model for police departments throughout the nation and the results certainly proved it.

"SANDWEDGE" PRINCIPALS

It is suggested that the best method of ensuring the success of Sandwedge is by limiting the principals to an absolute minimum, but to allow for an expansionary backup of consultants on a case by case basis where the need arises. The involvement in defensive campaign activity as indicated above would, under inquiry, be postured as a natural "ad hoc" contribution on the part of the corporation to the '72 Republican effort. The covert or offensive side of the operation, in no way connected to the corporation, would be untraceable to any of the principals or the Administration.

Necessarily then, the principals should be strong Nixon loyalists, possessing the necessary credentials to perform in this highly sensitive area, professionally, with the described effective cover. Below are listed the principals who are ready, willing and able to so participate in the manner designated.

JOHN J. CAULFIELD

1. Cover - Because of White House experience and contacts, has decided to create a Washington based security consulting-investigative organization which would seek Republican corporations and law firms as clients.

2. Assignment - Receive and program all activities and

assignments, including the New York City operation, act as liaison with selected White House staff before and during campaign for sensitive investigative needs. Liaison with Cabinet when necessary. Liaison with 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue operation on all security-investigative needs, Liaison with Republican National Committee in connection with their investigative needs (Nofziger). Liaison with the RNC on the programming of all security at the Republican National Committee.

JOSEPH WOODS

1. Cover - Since only engaged part time as a County Commissioner in Illinois and needing funds to support his large family (true enough!), has decided to become a principal in a potentially lucrative, Washington based, Republican oriented security consulting firm utilizing expertise in law enforcement (FBI - Sheriff Cook County) and political contacts nation-wide. Will seek to build the organization in the mid-west, taking advantage of the large influx of Republican big business into the Chicago area.

2. Assignment - In charge of all private security forces at the Republican National Convention. In charge all covert efforts (discuss) designed to preclude voting frauds in Illinois, Texas, etc. Liaison active and retired FBI agents, nation-wide, for discreet investigative support (Hoover also? - Evaluate). Liaison nation-wide with Republican State Chairmen for investigative support. Support New York City covert operation.

NOTE

It is interesting to report that Intertel made a lucrative offer to Joe Woods last week (\$30,000 per annum, stock options, etc.) indicating he would be in charge of their new Chicago office. This tack is viewed as an attempt to purchase White House prestige. In the author's judgment, the compartmentalized political hazards, previously indicated, would still constitute a real and present danger.

VERNON (MIKE) ACREE - Deputy Commissioner IRS, Inspection Division

Mike is the highest ranking Republican career official in the Internal Revenue Service. A synopsis of his outstanding career is attached hereto. (TAB "B"). He is a strong Nixon loyalist and has so proved it to me, personally, on a number of occasions. His management and investigative expertise will be invaluable to the undertaking, especially in the financial investigative area - crucial in a campaign of this type.

1. Cover - Mike has decided to retire after 32 years of federal investigative service. He has witnessed the financial success of Intertel and has decided to join a small group of Republican oriented principals who wish to emulate and improve on the Intertel experience dealing only, however, with republican corporations and law firms.

2. Assignment - IRS information input, financial investigations, liaison federal law enforcement establishment nation-wide, preparation of reports, briefings to key Administration campaign figures on results. Support New York City operation.

CONSULTANT PERSONNEL

Under the cover of the corporate entity hiring Republican consultants to assist in meeting the needs of its clients, a medium for the likely required expansion of the covert aspects of the undertaking would be established in compartmentalized fashion, thereby minimizing any threats to exposure inherent in a large covert operation. The consultants would be brought on to perform ad hoc assignments on a case by case basis in any area or undertaking.

CORPORATE STAFF

As suggested, a bright young Nixon loyalist with attorney and business managerial credentials should be brought on board to take complete charge of the corporation's business requirements. He would function as a technician with little or no responsibility or knowledge regarding the covert aspects of the operation.

No candidates will be considered for this assignment until the concept receives a go. Anne Dawson, understandably, would be a key and valuable asset to this undertaking. Trudy Brown (presently in White House Security liaison with FBI) would, if willing and could be spared from her present duties, also be highly valuable. Any other administrative help brought on board would be of the same caliber as Anne and Trudy.

FUNDING

Reviewing the above proposed broad ranged responsibilities of Operation Sandwedge, it is clear that it would be impossible to judge, at this time, what total costs for such an undertaking would be involved. The major initial costs, of course, would relate to principal, management, technical and secretarial salaries, as well as office space and equipment in Washington and Chicago. It is expected that substantive additional costs would become evident as the requirements for effective operation come more clearly into focus.

What is obviously needed, therefore, is a funding technique which would enable the corporate cover to raise whatever monies would be required on a legitimate and painless basis. It is suggested that the business cover, indicated above, provides the ideal and proper framework to resolve this problem, as follows:

The overt security consulting services to be offered Republican corporations by the business entity would clearly be a deductible business expense. There are no IRS requirements dictating the amount, type or quality of service which must be performed for a given consulting fee. This is strictly a matter for negotiation between the client and the entity performing the service.

Thus, it is clear that if the new Corporate Security Consultants International firm were in a position to "negotiate" as many lucrative consulting agreements as required on an expandable, need basis with trustworthy Republican corporate giants, the funding of this effort could go smoothly forward with no direct financial connection to the Administration.

or Republican National Committee. Farther, the sensitive and often traceable area of political contributions would be eliminated as a hazard to this undertaking.

As indicated, funding for the proposed New York City operation would require special measures. There are some very discreet and viable approaches to this matter but, it is suggested that they be discussed on a private basis only.

CONCLUSION

This paper, then, is submitted with a view towards presenting, for review, a highly sophisticated approach to a critical aspect of the 1972 Presidential Campaign. It is suggested that the various subheadings indicated (SEE TAB "C") in the proposal provide a proper agenda after high level review for a meeting between the principals indicated and the officials charged with final decision.

It has been indicated that it is already very late for this proposed undertaking to be in review status - the authors concur. It is respectfully requested, therefore, that the highest priority attention be given this matter. We await your reply.

Forum

MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1971

SECTION B, PAGE 3



Six CIA Attempts to Kill Castro Failed—Plot Hushed

By Jack Anderson

LOCKED IN THE darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

THE PLOT TO KNOCK off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before members were apprehended. This happened around the last February or first of March, 1963.

NINE MONTHS LATER, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion — unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings — that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

TO SET UP THE Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes's Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown.

THE CIA ASSIGNED two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James "Big Jim" O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

FOR THE FIRST try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

THE CUBAN WHO had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again. The CIA, unsure whether the plotters had failed or the poison simply hadn't been strong enough, decided to try again with a more powerful dose. Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life, using Cuban assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. At intervals in the dark of night, Roselli personally delivered the teams in twin powerboats to the Cuban shores.

THE PRINCIPALS IN the CIA conspiracy, sworn to deep secrecy, refused to comment on the caper. We got an admission out of Maheu only that he had handled special jobs for the CIA, but he refused to discuss them. Roselli responded with a flat "no comment."

My associate Les Whitten located Harvey, who left the CIA about two years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high regard for him.

WE GOT AN ADMISSION from "Big Jim" O'Connell, who is still with the CIA, that he had met Roselli through Maheu. But when we asked about Roselli's CIA mission, O'Connell also clammed up.

Finally we spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made without his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

CAULFIELD EXHIBIT NO. 3

(Miami Herald, Tues. Jan. 19, 1971)

DENIALS ALL AROUND, BUT . . .*Were Trujillo, Diem,
CIA Targets Too?*

By JACK ANDERSON

WASHINGTON — The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1—Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-



Anderson

Senator George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

★ ★ ★


The last surviving brother, Senator Ted Kennedy, could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Senator Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

★ ★ ★

SMATHERS told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous."

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or



implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up — and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a

coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."


"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

★ ★ ★

THE November, 1963, coup caught the U.S. completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Admiral Ulysess Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

CAULFIELD EXHIBIT No. 4



60 MINUTES

VOLUME III NUMBER 11

as broadcast over the

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Tuesday, February 2, 1971

10:00-11:00 PM, EST

With CBS News Correspondents Morley Safer and Mike Wallace

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Don Hewitt

WALLACE: Spiro Agnew on his father's knee at ten months. With his dog, Frisky, at ten years. His high school graduation picture. Drafted before Pearl Harbor. Married at 24. Vice President of the Kiwanis Club in 1959. Vice President of the United States in 1969.

AGNEW: I don't think that it's fair to say that suddenly a yokel has descended upon the national government.

SAFER: Las Vegas, I suppose, reflects just about the worst of America. And it was to here, four years ago, that Howard Hughes came. In what seemed a matter of days he laid claim to the city and the state.

HANK GREENSPUN: Now here's the world's wealthiest man suffering from malnutrition. He was - he had three blood transfusions in the past week. His hemoglobin count was down to four. If you have any medical knowledge it means that you're not functioning too well, certainly not - nothing's going into the brain where you could make a rational decision.

WALLACE: I'm Mike Wallace.

SAFER: I'm Morley Safer. Those stories and more tonight on 60 MINUTES.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

WALLACE: In 1959, Spiro Agnew was elected Vice President of the Kiwanis Club of Lochraven, Maryland. Nine years later he was elected Vice President of the United States. And there in a nutshell you have the American dream. From suburban obscurity, the son of a Greek immigrant vaults to fame and power. If what he was is the key to what he is, 60 MINUTES thought a look at early Spiro Agnew might be useful.

This is the block where the Agnew family lived when Spiro was born fifty-two years ago. It hasn't changed much. Their apartment was on the second floor. It might surprise Mr. Agnew to know that it is now occupied by a young art student. The life style she represents has been a frequent target of his. Spiro's father, holding the future Vice President on his knee, migrated from Greece. His mother was a Virginian by birth. Both parents now are dead. Father was a stern parent, not a pal, but the authority in the family. Spiro with his dog Frisky.

His grades at Forest Park High School were mediocre at best. We asked to see the grades but school principal Charles Michael told us Agnew's record was pulled from the file when he became Vice President. The 1937 Yearbook shows two Agnews in the senior class.

One his cousin, Catina Agnew. Among her activities and honors, the Presidency of the Leaders Club. Young Spiro played the piano at assembly, but he belonged to no clubs, won no honors. Since graduation though, he has never missed a class reunion. Spiro, it seems, was a fun-loving adolescent. A friend since high school, Attorney Lee Harrison, recalls those early days.

MR. HARRISON: We'd go to football games. We'd go out to clubs or things of that sort that we could be admitted to as teenagers in those days and perhaps have a drink illegally. We cheated a little bit too, I suppose the way kids do nowadays. He was a very clever guy and he was always a very witty guy. And I knew that he was always a great man on limericks. And he had some very witty and very clever limericks.

WALLACE: Oh, he had a feeling for language even back then?

MR. HARRISON: Oh, yes, because even back in those days, I can recall that he had, I suppose, a fixation you might call it, on learning a new word a day. And he really did, even as a kid.

WALLACE: From high school, he entered Johns Hopkins University when he majored in chemistry. Again, his grades were no source of pride and Spiro Agnew dropped out of college after his second year, when his father just cut off his support. So, to support himself, Agnew found a job paying eleven dollars a week in the file room of an insurance company. Later, he enrolled in night classes at the University of Baltimore Law School, an institution not accredited by the American Bar Association. Here too he did poorly scholastically. He admits he cut a lot of classes. But at work he won a promotion and the title of Assistant Underwriter in the Sprinkler, Leakage and Water Damage Department.

In September, 1941, three months before Pearl Harbor, Spiro Agnew's career in insurance was terminated by the draft. Four-and-a-half years in the Army won him the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Bronze Star. He served as a company commander in the 10th Armored Division. He saw action in four campaigns including the Battle of the Bulge and was discharged with the rank of Captain.

Back home, twenty-seven years old and married now to Elinor Judefind of Baltimore, who used to work at the insurance company with him, Agnew went back to night law school. After Agnew won his law degree he opened a practice of his own but he couldn't make a go of it. So back he went to the insurance business. A few months later he quit that job to take a better one as personnel director at a supermarket. Like the other employees, Agnew often wore a smock with the words, "No Tipping Please" on it. For several years Agnew was part of the management team at the market, but a dispute with the boss got him fired.

By now, Agnew was in his middle thirties, a family man with three children and a home in the suburbs. He needed work, money. So he

joined another law firm, but he soon resigned, again, to open his own law office. His principal client was the Meatcutters Union. Local President Harry Menapace, recalls those days.

MR. MENAPAGE: Up until he became Vice President, I always considered Ted Agnew a real liberal, progressive, practical guy who was a friend to the labor movement and to the workingman.

WALLACE: The liberal, progressive Agnew was a registered Democrat 'til he was nearly thirty. Attorney Lee Harrison explains why Agnew switched.

MR. HARRISON: Because there was little hope of being recognized and achieving anything in the mass of Democrats in Baltimore County.

WALLACE: So the only way that he could be upwardly mobile, so to speak, would be to go to the Republicans?

MR. HARRISON: Well, I feel that not the only way, but certainly the opportunities were much greater to become a Republican in - in a heavily Democratic county where he would immediately come to the forefront and be recognized.

WALLACE: Whether or not he had planned a long-range strategy Agnew's next moves were ideal building blocks for a political career. He moved his practice to Towson, the County Seat. The underdog party was hungry for campaign workers. First he campaigned for a Republican Congressional candidate, General James Devereux, hero of Wake Island. And Devereux won. Later, in appreciation, the party got Agnew appointed to the minority seat on the Zoning Board of Appeals in Baltimore County. And Spiro Agnew was on his way.

His new home in nearby Lochraven Village underscored the tone of suburban respectability that was to characterize his public life.

Agnew joined the PTA, The Inter-Community Council and the Kiwanis Club of Lochraven Village, and for the next seven years he never missed a Kiwanis Club meeting.

Clark Langrall, a Kiwanis past President, remembers.

MR. LANGRALL: We felt that we needed some music and we were looking for a piano player, so they could accompany Happy Birthday, and the anniversaries and all the fellowship things we like to do. And Ted Agnew was introduced as a prospective member who could play the piano.

WALLACE: During some political infighting regarding his seat on the Zoning Board, his name became, in Baltimore County, a household word; and he ran for County Executive. The local Democratic machine had been badly hurt in a primary fight and Spiro Agnew

breezed in, the first Republican elected since before Civil War days. In conservative Baltimore County, Agnew was considered a moderate, or even a liberal, especially on racial matters. He forced through a civil rights program opening all public accommodations to blacks.

Agnew's interest in national politics blossomed early. During his first year as County Executive, he called upon the Republican Party to draft Senator Thomas Kuchel, the California liberal, for President in 1964. Later, Agnew actively supported the candidacy of Governor William Scranton and he took part in the Stop Goldwater movement at the Republican Convention. But in his own county, Agnew was headed for trouble. He fought hard for an urban renewal project, but urban renewal was decisively rejected by the voters. It was during Agnew's fight for civil rights that he attacked politicians he regarded as opportunists. "The greatest enemies of effective, intelligent government," he said, "are opportunists who have learned that a measure of popularity can be cheaply purchased by boldly assuming oversimplified positions on highly complex, volatile issues." Agnew's County Solicitor in those days was Scott Moore, a good friend.

If he had run for re-election as County Executive would he have won?

MR. MOORE: The people who were the ultra-right in this county had such a large following that they would have defeated him.

WALLACE: Was he an ambitious man?

MR. MOORE: Yes. He wanted to run for Congress, he wanted to run for the County Council. He wanted to be a judge. Anything that would improve himself, he was always working in that direction.

WALLACE: Convinced that he would lose if he ran for re-election as County Executive, Agnew raised the stakes to double-or-nothing. He ran for Governor. This was one of his television commercials during that campaign.

WOMAN: (SINGING) Our kind of man, Ted Agnew is. A great new talent for Governor and what's more....

WALLACE: His opponent was a Baltimore road contractor, Democrat George Mahoney, a six-time loser who campaigned principally against open housing.

MR. MAHONEY: Your home is your castle.

MR. AGNEW: This slogan is being sold as a ring that is being drawn around a house saying that this is all your responsibility, to yourself, to your family. You have no responsibility to your community.

WALLACE: The issue of racism shattered the unity of the Democratic Party. Agnew won the endorsement of the blacks, the white liberals, the ADA, Americans for Democratic Action, organized labor and college professors. State Senator Clarence Mitchell explains why he backed Agnew.

MR. MITCHELL: Primarily because we really didn't have a choice. Mr. Agnew was a nonentity, was an unknown and Mr. George Mahoney, the Democratic candidate for Governor, was running a racist campaign. An anti-open housing campaign and Mr. Agnew was pro-open housing.

WALLACE: Agnew became the fifth Republican Governor in 180 years of Maryland history. An analysis of the vote shows that two out of three blacks favored him. In high income white precincts he was favored by three out of four voters. The Jewish precincts favored him. But in the white working class neighborhoods, he got little more than one in three votes. So it turned out that it was the Democrats, the people who are now so vocal against Agnew, who helped to put him here in the State House in Annapolis. And it is those voters who are now such Agnew enthusiasts, including the hard-hats, who tried to keep him out.

And so, Spiro Agnew moved up a rung. His inaugural speech included a quote from the Maryland State Constitution that bespoke his political philosophy just five years ago.

AGNEW: Whenever the ends of government are perverted and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right, ought to, reform the old or establish a new government. The doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.

WALLACE: Governor Agnew put more blacks on the state payroll, he set up a Human Rights Commission, he pushed through the first State Open Housing Law south of the Mason-Dixon Line and he set up programs to control pollution. And all the while, he found time for national politics.

AGNEW: As you know, I recently assumed, I guess that's a good word, temporary leadership of a national Draft Rockefeller Movement, with headquarters in Annapolis.

WALLACE: Sometime later, he stated his position on Richard Nixon.

AGNEW: You recall when I was asked during the time I was most violently campaigning for Mr. Rockefeller, I guess violent's a good word, because I was probably as active as anyone, was this Stop Nixon Movement. And I said at that time, and I repeat, I'm not against Mr. Nixon. He may, may, even be my number two choice.

WALLACE: And then Governor Rockefeller announced his decision.

ROCKEFELLER: That I am not a candidate campaigning directly or indirectly for the Presidency of the United States.

WALLACE: Agnew was embarrassed and deeply hurt that Rockefeller would pull out without advising him in advance. Although Rockefeller changed his mind eventually and ran, he had lost Agnew's support for good.

Meanwhile, problems were developing for Agnew. When Bowie State college students staged a sit-in at the State House, Agnew had 227 of them arrested and he closed the college.

Then after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Baltimore was torn by riots. A few days later, Governor Agnew called in the moderate black leaders of Baltimore.

AGNEW: If you'll observe the ready-mix, instantaneous type of leader is not present. The circuit-riding, Hanoi-visiting type of leader is not present. The caterwauling, riot-inciting, burn-America-down type of leader is conspicuous by his absence. This is no accident, ladies and gentlemen. It's just good planning. Do you repudiate black racists? Are you willing as I am willing to repudiate the white racists? Are you willing to repudiate the Carmichaels and the Browns?

WOMAN: We've already done so.

AGNEW: Answer me! Answer me! Do you repudiate Rap Brown and Stokley Carmichael? Do you? Do you?

WOMAN: We don't repudiate them as human beings.

AGNEW: That's what I was afraid of.

WOMAN: Wait a minute.

WALLACE: Some seventy-five black leaders walked out. But Senator Mitchell remained.

SEN. MITCHELL: I condemn Rap Brown. I condemn Stokley Carmichael. I condemn George Wallace. I condemn Ross Barnett. I condemn all of the racists in this country. But I'm not going to pick out Negro racists and -

AGNEW: I didn't ask you to.

SEN. MITCHELL: Negro racists only.

AGNEW: I didn't ask you to.

SEN. MITCHELL: Let's condemn the entire broad spectrum of this -

AGNEW: That's exactly what this is all about. If we can get that done then we can start without those people to solve some problems.

SEN. MITCHELL: Agnew felt that we had not lived up to our commitments to him, to keep the place cool, to keep things cool, even though he had lived up to his commitment to the black community. He didn't understand why all black people couldn't be like Roy Wilkins and then said that. He felt that we had let him down. He expected the black leadership to be able to control the total black community, which is certainly unrealistic. He slapped - attempted to slap our hands, insulted us. And I'm convinced at that point he was seeking a position with the Nixon Administration, and had been told that he had to develop a conservative image in order to be included.

MAN: That in my judgment could not be any further from the truth. He thought it was right and therefore he did it.

MAN: He couldn't say that I'm going to go on helping you and let you burn down the city. What he said was, the same as I would say to my children and the same as I'm sure he said to his children, that when you want adult privileges you must demonstrate adult responsibilities.

WALLACE: Whether motivated by principle or by politics, Agnew's image indeed changed.

AGNEW: And I emphasize my absolute conviction and my determination to react aggressively against this kind of violence.

WALLACE: The blacks and the liberals turned against him. And just one month after the Baltimore riots, Richard Nixon announced that he had added Agnew's name to his list of Vice Presidential possibilities.

Two months later, in July of 1968, Agnew denied that he had changed.

AGNEW: I had a fellow say to me the other day, how come you have changed your stance from that of liberal to conservative? And I said, well, I really haven't, it's just that I've stayed still, while literally thousands of people have rushed past me in a wild dash to the left.

WALLACE: Then came the nomination and the campaign of 1968 and Agnewisms like "Fat Jap" and "If you've seen one slum, you've seen

them all" rattled across the nation. Two weeks before he took office as Vice President, I visited Mr. Agnew at the Governor's Mansion in Annapolis.

After the election and on this broadcast 60 MINUTES your Democratic Vice Presidential opponent, Senator Muskie, said, "A lot of the slips that Governor Agnew made were the slips of inexperience. So the question is whether the Governor is politically educable fast enough to catch up with the kinds of responsibilities we're told he's going to be given." Is this a fair statement of the problem that confronts you?

AGNEW: To a degree it's - it's fair, but one of the things I think is - is a fiction about the basis for that kind of statement is that I've suddenly been jerked from a zoning board into the Vice Presidency.

I don't think that it's fair to say that suddenly a yokel has descended upon the national government.

WALLACE: Governor, the publication Current Biography characterizes you as a "self-made, middleclass, middlebrow suburbanite straight out of middle America, that broad core of American society that feels its values threatened by social turbulence and permissiveness." How do you plead?

AGNEW: Guilty.

WALLACE: That's you?

AGNEW: I think that's me, and I hope I don't ever change.

WALLACE: Spiro Agnew came to the Vice Presidency a much underestimated man.

For the first two years of his Vice Presidency he has been coolly successful at doing the jobs he's been assigned there. He has kept the conservatives, notably the Southern conservatives happy. He has put - and kept - the press on the defensive. And he has travelled the low road, when it was deemed useful, to hold Democratic feet to the fire.

Now, one hears that Mr. Agnew's image is being retooled for 1972, that we shall be seeing a less colorful, less abrasive Agnew. After all, it is said, he has changed before.

Well, I wouldn't be on it. For one thing, he clearly enjoys the gadfly role in which he has been cast. But more to the point, despite the gnashing of liberal Republican teeth, the President needs the constituency the Vice President has developed, if he's to be re-elected.

"Dump Agnew" may be a wistful war cry in 1972, but political logic seems to indicate that the man who was the object of all of the "Dump Nixon" talk back in 1956, will turn a deaf ear.

Brad Jacobs is the editor of the Baltimore Evening Sun. He has been an Agnew-watcher for the past decade and here's his instant psychoanalysis.

BRAD JACOBS: We Marylanders find it helpful to think of Ted Agnew not as one man but as two men quite different and even contradictory. The first Agnew on public display, I suppose, was the Agnew of cool intelligence, of rational approach to tricky problems. We saw him a moment ago - the progressive county executive fighting for a better break for county blacks - poor county blacks. Suddenly there was the other Agnew - and you saw him too. This one was the testy one who operates, I suppose, less on intelligence, more on instinct. This Agnew found young people disconcerting, news reporters irritating and black people, when they acted up, scandalizing.

Here's the point. We see two Agnews co-existing - one the hip suburbanite, unafraid of a long philosophical look into the future. He knows the future belongs to the young, the poor and the black. In his early phase as a practical political leader, he was just hurrying to catch up with his followers. But always inside was the other Agnew, the immigrant's son, still quick to resent an imagined slight, still jolted off balance by bad manners, disorder. One side of him reaches out to the social goals he cannot help but recognize as inevitable. The other side recoils in distaste for that twisty, sometimes rutted, path that leads to those goals.

Agnew has a tiny but revealing personal habit. Whenever he sits down in a chair, he carefully keeps his legs uncrossed so that no wrinkle will disturb the crease in his trousers. What makes this revealing is that both the cool, deliberate Agnew and the not-so-cool, uneasy Agnew show through side by side.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

SAFER: Tonight we have a tale to tell or part of a tale. The whole story may never be known. It includes some of the most extraordinary people you will ever meet and a most extraordinary person whom you'll never meet.

It is the story of a rich, secluded king whose health has failed, and around him all the barons are struggling for all the riches of the kingdom. And there is a court jester too, who is privy to all the secrets of the kingdom and whose main interest is to reveal them.

The story is confusing. The main character is missing. The minor characters are evasive; not surprising, perhaps, when the kingdom, at current market prices, is valued at two billion dollars. The tale, such as we know it, begins here, in Las Vegas, Nevada, the center of the kingdom - where this is the power - and the glory.

Las Vegas, where all the girls are beautiful and all the men are rich, or that's what they would have you believe.

Las Vegas, I suppose, reflects just about the worst of America. It is the ultimate in bad taste - and getting worse - a blemish on the raw beauty of Nevada, but it has become an economic necessity to the state, a fallen woman who knows no other way to make a living. A beacon in the night to all the suckers adrift in the world.

And it was to here four years ago that Howard Hughes came. In what seemed a matter of days he laid claim to the city and the state. Hughes, the sportsman and pilot, engineer, eccentric, but most of all, billionaire. He made Nevada his home and empire.

Up there in the penthouse suite of the Desert Inn Hotel he cut himself off from the rest of the world. Total, absolute seclusion. But the kingdom quietly thrived until last November, when Hughes, now 65, stopped roaming the penthouse. He fell ill, desperately ill - and we learned that his hemoglobin count had fallen to four. He was suffering from anemia and malnutrition. He had a heart condition and pneumonia. On November fourth and fifth he was given a number of blood transfusions; doctors said he should be put into a hospital immediately. Then he disappeared.

Someone once described him as the presence that is also an absence.

Paul Laxalt, who until a few weeks ago was Governor of Nevada, has never met the man, but he has felt the presence.

LAXALT: Howard Hughes is one of those people around whom there is always going to be mystery, always, until the day he dies and thereafter. I think that if he personally came forward as has been suggested, and dramatically said, "I'm Howard Hughes" for all the world to see, "I want this and that done," there would be still many, many people who would not even accept the fact that he was Howard Hughes.

There was a time when there was no doubt about who he was.

In the mid-thirties Howard Hughes was one of the most attractive young men in the land. He designed his own airplanes, flew them, broke aviation speed records. He was young and handsome and rich. Even then he was a bit shy of publicity, a bit laconic, but it only made him more attractive. He was the kind of character that Gary Cooper could play so well.

And he was brave. He walked away from a number of crashes himself - and was embittered by the death of Will Rogers and Wiley Post.

HUGHES ON FILM: You've asked me to say something but at this time it's very difficult for me to think of much in connection with flying except the death of Will Rogers and Wiley Post, which is

so damn - I don't suppose I can say damn, can I - but I mean it's so ghastly and so terrible that it makes me wonder whether all this flying is worth the cost, whether there's any reason to get from one place to another so quickly.

SAFER: In 1947 Hughes developed a plane practically as big as today's 747, an eight-engine troop transport made of plywood and nicknamed "The Spruce Goose." With Hughes at the controls, it was flown only once - for a distance of one mile and an altitude of 70 feet. Hughes was called before a Senate Committee and was accused of wasting 18 million dollars in government money. It turned into a personal vendetta between Senator Brewster of Maine and Hughes. It was one of the rare times he showed emotion - and just about the last time he showed himself publicly.

HUGHES ON FILM: When Senator Brewster realized that he was fighting a battle against public opinion, a losing battle, he folded up and took a run-out powder. Yes, that was the tip-off - when Senator Brewster hit the road for the backwoods of Maine, that meant the hearing was over - Washington was too hot for him. He couldn't take it.

SAFER: In the mid fifties Hughes was described as a Swinger. He spent a lot of time in Las Vegas, flying his own planes by day and squiring film stars at night. In 1957 he married actress Jean Peters. They are now separated. He liked Vegas. Perhaps the sheer glare of it all enabled him to become anonymous. He returned in 1966 and took up residence, and started to buy everything in sight.

His investments went beyond the city. He spent 18 million dollars on mining claims covering thousands of acres of Nevada. One expert says they could eventually be worth 600 billion dollars.

But Las Vegas was where his big stake was and Hank Greenspun, the crusading publisher of the Las Vegas Sun, second largest property owner in town, is the man who knows everyone's secrets.

How much did he pay for all this land, all this scrub land here?

GREENSPUN: Well, it's hard to tell, because a lot of it was bought through other names so they wouldn't know Hughes was buying it. But his total investment in land, buildings and property here was about two hundred and thirty million dollars.

SAFER: Do you think that was a good buy?

GREENSPUN: Well, I think he can double his money right now, not on the land as much as on the hotels, the gaming hotels. He paid twenty-three million for the Sands. He can get forty-two million right now for it.

SAFER: How much did he pay for the Frontier?

GREENSPUN: The Frontier, I think the total was about twenty-four million.

SAFER: Here's the Desert Inn where he lived.

GREENSPUN: Yes.

SAFER: How much did he pay for that?

GREENSPUN: Well, it was six and a quarter million, he assumed about seven million in debt, it was about thirteen and a quarter million. And he lived right up there on the ninth floor in the penthouse.

SAFER: And now, on the left here is the Silver Slipper. Tell me about the Silver Slipper.

GREENSPUN: Well, you see that large slipper up there?

SAFER: Yeah.

GREENSPUN: That's very illuminated at night - the brightest, garish light you can imagine. And it used to bother him up there, so he decided he wanted it turned off, but they wouldn't turn it off, so he decided he'd buy it. Well, after he bought it, I think he paid about five point three million for it.

SAFER: A mere bagatelle.

GREENSPUN: Yeah, then he was told the sign is necessary to bring in the patrons. Well, if it was good for business, now he had second thoughts about the sign, so the sign remained.

SAFER: This television station, Hank, which used to belong to you?

GREENSPUN: That's right, I built the first one in Nevada.

SAFER: How much did he pay for that?

GREENSPUN: I think he paid, well, with the debts which he assumed, was about four million nine, something along that line.

SAFER: Why on earth was he interested in a television station?

GREENSPUN: Well, he perks mostly in the small hours of the morning, you know, after midnight, and he likes to watch television, he likes to watch pictures, things of that sort, and we used to go off at one o'clock in the morning. And he'd like to see it until about five in the morning or a little - a little later if necessary. And the calls became so frequent, you know, why don't I run the westerns, why don't I run aviation pictures, why don't I run WINGS over again, and some of Jean Peters' pictures that I finally said, "Why don't you buy it?" And I think that's how this thing came about that he purchased the station. Now, they run all night long, twenty-four hours a day. And they show all the good movies that he likes. Westerns.

SAFER: You got almost five million dollars for this station. Is that a good price?

GREENSPUN: Well, I was very satisfied. I don't know if he can get a return on his money, but I was happy. In fact, I sold him a golf course also.

SAFER: Just like that, a golf course.

GREENSPUN: He gave me a good price, two million six. It wasn't making too much money; that's why I sold it so cheap.

SAFER: We have a man who lived up on the top floor of that hotel in that penthouse there - would see no one, was protected by security guards, armed guards, by five male secretaries. Why does he cut himself off this way?

GREENSPUN: Well, he was always afraid of being overheard on the telephone. He claims many years ago the Japanese stole his secrets for their Zero, from a conversation that they overheard him talking. So he was super careful. But as far as being a recluse is concerned, that was almost necessitated by his health. Because of the many crashes he had, he became very vulnerable to respiratory problems and could have been fatal to him if he did. And that's why they say this germ phobia developed with him. He wouldn't let anybody come close to him even, that could possibly breathe on him, you know.

I've studied this man for four years, being exposed to his memorandums and being very close to many of the people who were around him continually, you know, upstairs, and I'd have to say he had periods of complete brilliance, I mean he was a genius really in all his thinking. But there are other times when he would sack out and was just completely unreachable. You couldn't get to him. And those periods would last for as much as fifty-two hours at a time where he wouldn't even eat or sleep, he just wasn't interested, so to speak. And the greatest decisions in history are waiting for him and he couldn't, wouldn't make the decision. And then snap out of it and by God, he came back and moments and hours, and days didn't mean a thing to him.

SAFER: Hank, tell us what life was like up in that top floor of the Desert Inn? How did it work out, did Hughes live in one room and the secretaries in another?

GREENSPUN: No, the secretaries lived on the ninth floor, on the eighth floor. The whole ninth floor was reserved for Hughes. And, he pretty well roamed around the ninth floor. But after a while, it got to the point where he would never leave this little apartment of his, which was just two bedrooms and a living room in the center which doubled as a sort of an office.

SAFER: Did anybody else come into those rooms?

GREENSPUN: Well, once in a while if it was very urgent, one of the secretaries would come in, but most of the time they would hold up signs to him, so and so is on the phone. He just didn't want to get too close to anybody because of this involvement, this respiratory involvement.

SAFER: What kind of medical attention is he getting?

GREENSPUN: The medical testimony shows - now the sheriff's office suspected foul play so they called in the local physician who last attended him up there. And the sheriff's office got the report, you know, because they were suspecting something which was irregular and they reported that he was suffering from nutritional anemia. Now, here's the world's wealthiest man suffering from malnutrition. He was - he had three blood transfusions in the past week. His hemoglobin count was down to four. If you have any medical knowledge, it means that you're not functioning too well, certainly nothing is going into the brain where you could make a rational decision.

SAFER: Rational or not he decided to leave Las Vegas. Some people are sure he went to a sanitarium in Los Angeles, others are convinced he went to the Bahamas to another ninth floor penthouse.

We tested the theory and were gently, but firmly, thrown out.

I'm from CBS News, and I'm looking for Howard Hughes.

GUARD: (Indistinct)

SAFER: Wherever Hughes may be, the battle for control of the Nevada kingdom centers on a curious cast of characters. On the right, Chester Davis, for ten years general counsel for the Hughes Tool Company. He's never seen Howard Hughes. And Bill Gay, senior vice president. He hasn't seen Hughes for ten years. They claim that Hughes approved the firing of a third senior executive Bob Maheu, a former FBI agent and counterspy who had been paid half a million dollars a year by Hughes to run the Nevada operation.

Hughes also built him this house, said to have cost another half-million. Maheu says he was Hughes's alter ego. Davis and Gay say Hughes wanted to get rid of him and they have a letter they say proves it.

The letter says: "Dear Chester and Bill, I do not understand why the problem of Maheu is not yet fully settled and why this bad publicity seems to continue" and it goes on to say it's damaging his business. And it's signed Howard R. Hughes.

Maheu refused to believe Hughes ordered his dismissal. Then Governor Paul Laxalt said he got a call from Hughes confirming it.

SAFER: You're one of the last people who actually spoke to him. What did he say to you in December?

LAXALT: Well, essentially, he told me first of all that he was feeling all right. That he had left voluntarily, that he was in the Bahamas on vacation. And then he indicated that he wanted to personally advise me that he wanted to terminate Bob Maheu, and asked me to communicate this to him directly.

SAFER: There's no doubt at all in your mind that it was indeed Howard Hughes you were.....

LAXALT: No doubt at all. No doubt at all. I had talked to him previously and he's one of those people, after you've talked to him you simply don't forget him.

SAFER: So you then did what, you transmitted his thoughts to Mr. Maheu?

LAXALT: Yes, this must have been three o'clock in the morning or so. And I had the very unpleasant chore of going to Bob's home and advising him of the telephone call.

SAFER: Can you tell us about that night when Paul Laxalt came over with the word?

MAHEU: Well, he didn't tell me that I had been fired. He confirmed what had been told me previously, and I am sure that the former Governor feels that he was talking to Mr. Hughes.

SAFER: And how do you feel?

MAHEU: I had then my doubts about it and still do. I felt reasonably sure that if Mr. Hughes had been dissatisfied with any of my operations that he would have been the first to so inform me as he

had without hesitancy in the past, which, of course, makes what has happened even more incredible to me. He would have not waited one moment to pick up the telephone and really lay me out in lavender, so to speak, if I had pulled what he considered a big boo-boo.

SAFER: I asked Bob Maheu if it would be valid for us to assume, considering Mr. Hughes' condition, that other people are making decisions for him.

MAHEU: I would hate to go that far, except that I certainly have - have challenged some of the decisions, thinking that they were not, in fact, his true desires.

SAFER: Do you think that the truth is being kept from him?

MAHEU: I'm not sure. I've seen incidents in the past where certain communications by design were not passed over to him.

SAFER: Just how close were you to the man? How well did you know him?

MAHEU: I felt that I was extremely close. We have had conversations from time to time wherein he discussed with me things of utmost confidence. He gave me assignments of great magnitude, left to me decisions to make in three instances in matters involving in excess of 150 million dollars.

SAFER: One of the things that we've touched on a number of times in this conversation is the fact that somebody is first of all after you. Why? To take over the entire Hughes operation, or is it a simple vendetta against Bob Maheu?

MAHEU: Well, the fact that somebody is after me has become quite clear to me, especially of recent vintage. However, it's not something with which I was not familiar. As a matter of fact, over the years Mr. Hughes himself has on many occasions called to my attention certain inputs that he had received from some of his executives and in each case he would say to me, "Let's make sure that we don't allow these people to cause any cleavage between you and me as individuals."

SAFER: Were those executives Davis and Gay?

MAHEU: Not necessarily. He knew that there was intense jealousies because of the relationship that had built up over the years between him and me.

SAFER: Jealousies is putting it mildly when there is two billion dollars at stake, and Hughes, it seems, has a knack for playing one side off against the other with letters. Hank Greenspun has a knack for finding copies of the letters.

GREENSPUN: I have a document in my pocket. I don't know if I can show you. I have friends in very low places so I can get lots of information. I'm not going to read this document to you, but this is his own handwriting.

This was when Mr. Hughes was being pressed by Mr. Maheu to send Bill Gay's daughter a wedding gift when she was getting married. And he refused. He says, "I have read your message about Bill again, and the more I read it, the more angry I get. I certainly cannot get very sympathetic about Mary Gay being shook up when Bill's total indifference and laxity to my pleas for help in the domestic area, voiced urgently to him week by week throughout the past seven to eight years, have resulted in a complete, I am afraid, irrevocable loss of my wife. I am sorry, but I blame Bill completely for this unnecessary debacle." This is Bill Gay who succeeded to his entire empire.

SAFER: During all the filming in Las Vegas, we had the feeling and some evidence that we were being watched.

GREENSPUN: Morley, you're sitting out here on the Strip of Las Vegas. Your car's being under surveillance at every moment. The conversation most likely is being bugged by all the sophisticated equipment. It's a group that this Chester Davis brought in here called Intertel. A lot of ex-FBI agents, ex-Secret Servicemen. ex-Revenue agents.

SAFER: In Nevada, the Hughes empire reached everywhere even into the Governor's mansion, during the time Paul Laxalt was Governor.

Among the reports that are circulating in Las Vegas, and I'm sure you hear a great deal, all of them, is that you are being groomed to take Maheu's place in that job.

LAXALT: There was speculation to that effect.

SAFER: Did you talk about that on the telephone when you spoke to him in December?

LAXALT: He indicated to me as he had previously indicated, that he wanted me to join his organization. I had advised him that this is not within my plan.

SAFER: In your law practice, do you have anything at all to do with the Hughes organization?

LAXALT: Oh, yes, our law firm has done some legal work for the Hughes organization. I don't know whether they'll continue to do so or not. So in that area, of course, as a member of my law firm, we may do Hughes' work.

SAFER: What was the relationship between you and Maheu during your tenure as Governor and since?

LAXALT: The very best. The very best. And during the time that I was Governor we had a good close personal relationship.

SAFER: Did you have many straightforward dealings with his immediate associates other than Bob Maheu?

LAXALT: Yes, I dealt, of course, with Tom Bell, his general counsel.

SAFER: Tom Bell is not only Howard Hughes's general counsel in Las Vegas, he is a partner in the Laxalt family law firm.

Since Davis and Gay would not agree to filmed interviews, the last questions go to Bob Maheu.

Do you walk away from Howard Hughes a rich or potentially rich man?

MAHEU: No, I do not.

SAFER: Does Howard Hughes have a will?

MAHEU: I have no idea.

SAFER: Who would be the heir to his fortune?

MAHEU: I have no idea.

SAFER: Relatives?

MAHEU: I have no idea.

SAFER: If Howard Hughes is well enough to watch this broadcast, what would you say to him, if he were watching you on television right now?

MAHEU: I would, I guess, have to put forth as my first preference that he please call me.

SAFER: Mr. Hughes, if you are watching, Bob Maheu has moved out of that half-million dollar house you lent him at the request of dear Chester and Bill. Possibly, because tomorrow he is suing you for fifty million dollars.

WALLACE: Morley, do you know for sure where Howard Hughes is at this moment?

SAFER: We know very little for sure about the story, but one senior executive of the Hughes Tool Company told us quite flatly that he is in the Bahamas, and when we said how come telephone calls to and from the Bahamas don't exist, there's no trace of these, he said, Aha, all the calls go through a magic secret switchboard in Miami.

WALLACE: You mentioned something about surveillance of you and the 60 MINUTES crew while you were doing this piece.

SAFER: Well, for example, we were staying in the Sands Hotel in Las Vegas, which is a Hughes-owned hotel. We got a call one day from a man who simply identified himself, and said please call me back, but don't call me back from the hotel. We went out of the hotel to a telephone booth and were followed, quite clearly and obviously followed. We went to a second telephone booth, followed again, but anyway we made the call. And it was simply an invitation to meet with a couple of executives, senior executives of the Hughes Tool Company in another city.

WALLACE: To what end?

SAFER: To give their side of the story, but the meeting as they described it was a meeting that didn't take place. It's interesting - the people - I asked Bob Maheu if it was - if they were people for him, agents of his who were following us. And he said "Really, Morley, it wasn't any of my agents. My agents are all too busy following the Davis and Gay agents." Mike, if this sounds like a cheap B spy movie, it isn't. It's a very expensive B spy movie.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

SAFER: The Howard Hughes drama could take an interesting turn. Art Buchwald, the Washington Post columnist, has a plan.

BUCHWALD: This is the time when everyone is suggesting someone for President of the United States in 1972.

I would like to propose the perfect presidential candidate. His name - Howard Hughes. Now, before you start laughing at me I would like to tell you why I believe Howard Hughes is the only one to run this country.

Since Howard Hughes owns the State of Nevada, he has a bigger financial stake in this country than any other man and he would do everything in his power to keep from going down the drain.

He is the only man in the United States who would never have to go up to Congress and ask for money. Any funds he wanted for his administration he'd put up himself or borrow from Frank Sinatra.

I know many of you out there are thinking, "But we've never seen Howard Hughes." This, I believe, is a big advantage. Howard Hughes is the only personality in America who is not suffering from overexposure on television.

One of the troubles with our country is that they know too much about their Presidents. They know everything that is going on in the White House from the Blue Room to the bedroom.

But Hughes would add mystery to the Presidency. He'd be holed up on the top floor of the Executive Mansion and nobody would even know if he was there or not.

As far as foreign relations went, Howard Hughes would be a tremendous asset. He could meet heads of state on dark street corners at three o'clock in the morning. No country would be sure where the President was or even if there was a President. It would put the fear of God in the Russians and Chinese. One of the reasons our Presidents have so much trouble with other countries is that they keep saying all the time that they're willing to go anywhere at anytime to meet with other world leaders. Since the leaders know he's there all the time, they're not in a hurry to meet him.

But with Howard Hughes it would be different. No one would ever be sure if they could see him or not, and they'd soon be pounding on the White House door.

The truth of the matter is that, with modern communications, familiarity has bred contempt for Presidents. We could reverse this trend by electing a man whom nobody knows, or will ever know during his term of office.

We could bring a mystique back to the highest office in the land that we haven't had since Warren Harding was in the White House.

This broadcast has been paid for by the "Howard Hughes for President" Campaign Committee. Don't write us, we'll write you.

WALLACE: Most of our mail the past two weeks was about our story on Helen Leavitt, the lady who wants to ban all private cars from the cities. An official of the New York State Department of Transportation wrote us: "Contemporary man craves the freedom, convenience and privacy of driving his own car no matter what the consequences...to stop building highways would be disastrous."

Another viewer wrote: "Right on! Wow! And whoopee!....cars are so dumb. I've waited a long time to hear somebody say ban them."

And there was a lady who wrote: "Hooray for Mrs. Helen Leavitt! As the wife of a man successful in the automotive business, I lack Mrs. Leavitt's guts to sign this letter."

About our story on the cloistered life of the Carmelite Nuns, a mother wrote: "My daughter is a nun...my husband who is not a Catholic...was very impressed with your program and is now content that our daughter can find peace and happiness in such a life."

A viewer who described himself as "not a hippie and over 40," wrote of the Carmelite Nuns: "If you had photographed a group of hippies in a secluded commune...the general consensus would be that they had copped out...when nuns do the same thing, it's called dedication to God."

And another viewer wrote: "Suppose all the beautiful women were to place themselves....in monasteries? There would be no beautiful babies in the world."

Finally, when our guest columnist, Nicholas von Hoffman, included The Maine Times in his list of the best of the underground newspapers, the publisher of that paper wrote: "It will titillate...our readers - the majority of whom are Republicans over the age of thirty - to learn they subscribe to an underground newspaper...but, Mr. Wallace, my mother will never understand."

SAFER: I'm Morley Safer.

WALLACE: I'm Mike Wallace. We'll be back four weeks from tonight - that's four weeks from tonight - on March 2nd, with another edition of 60 MINUTES.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room G-334, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Ervin, chairman, Talmadge, Montoya, Baker, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsel; Marc Lackritz, and James Moore, assistant majority counsels; Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel; Robert Silverstein, and Richard Schultz, assistant minority counsels; Carmine Bellino, chief investigator; Scott Armstrong, and Emily Sheketoff, investigators; Richard Rust, office of Senator Inouye.

Senator ERVIN. The committee will come to order. Would you hold up your right hand? Do you swear that the evidence you give to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. REBOZO. I do.

Mr. LENZNER. Thank you, Senator.

We have been over a variety of these areas with Mr. Rebozo so I think we can go ahead right in. I think Mr. Rebozo understands that the scope of the inquiry—and for Mr. Frates' benefit, I should cite that it is related, Mr. Frates, I think we have discussed before, to sections 2, subsections 11, 12, 13, and 16, of S. Res. 60.

I do not want to get into a long discussion, at this time, but have any documents been brought with you today in compliance with the subpoena?

Mr. FRATES. Well, the subpoena is not a subpoena duces tecum. It did not call for any documents.

Mr. LENZNER. I mean a prior subpoena.

Mr. FRATES. We have brought documents. We have brought all that we thought were the relevant documents, although I want the record to clearly show that we are here under a subpoena that is not a subpoena duces tecum. But we really want to conclude it, and that is why we brought the documents that we feel are relevant and material, and hopefully, we will have no problem on that.

Mr. DASH. Well, just for the record, and there is an outstanding letter, the last letter—do you have the letter, Marc? The outstanding letter that Senator Ervin last sent, which I think put together all of the outstanding subpoenas in the past?

I know that you are here under a subpoena ad testificandum for executive session testimony. There are outstanding subpoenas which were put together, I think, in a letter from the chairman of the com-

mittee asking that it be complied with, and I think the question to be put is that in order to get it over with, all we want to get on the record is what documents that are contained in that request have been brought today. That is all.

Mr. FRATES. Well, gentlemen, we are here. We were subpoenaed here to appear before this hearing by subpoena. It required no documents. We have brought all the documents we thought were relevant material and we are certainly going to try to cooperate.

And I think if we proceed on, as Senator Baker said, with the interrogation, and then see what happens about the documents. We are here trying to conclude this matter, Senator, so I would rather not get into an argument before we start so we might avoid any argument down the line, but I think the record, Sam, I don't quite understand you—I think the record, technically is, we are here under the subpoena requiring our presence here.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Chairman, may I just say this?

Senator ERVIN. What I would suggest, it seems to me that the best way to proceed is to ask oral testimony, and then after you get through with the oral testimony, then call for any records you think are relevant to the oral testimony, because we can bog down in a discussion of documents.

Mr. DASH. Well, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't want to do that right now and I didn't want us to bog down. I just wanted to open on the record that on March 12, 1974, a letter was sent by you to Mr. Bruce Harper, in Mr. Frates' firm, which finally put together all of the matters that were outstanding as far as subpoenas, and asked for their compliance.

Senator ERVIN. I think all of the past subpoenas that have been issued are still effective, but I think it would be better to go ahead with the oral testimony because certainly Mr. Frates is entitled to raise—if he thinks he's been called for a record that is not relevant to the matters that the committee is authorized to investigate—he certainly has a right to raise that point.

And I think that we had better get the oral testimony down before we go to the documents. The documents will keep, and better sought now is the oral testimony.

Mr. DASH. Well this is the procedure we intended to follow.

Senator BAKER. Well, if I might interrupt, Mr. Frates, Mr. Chairman, because I have to leave. Let me say, quickly, I entirely agree with the chairman. I think we are, in effect, borrowing trouble. Let's get into the testimony and see what we find out and if we have difficulties, the committee can rule on them.

Mr. LENZNER. I think the record should reflect that Senator Weicker joined the group.

Mr. Rebozo, could you give us your address for the record, please?

**TESTIMONY OF CHARLES GREGORY REBOZO; ACCOMPANIED BY
WILLIAM S. FRATES AND ALAN G. GREER, COUNSEL**

Mr. REBOZO. 490 Bay Lane, Key Biscayne, Fla.

Mr. LENZNER. And tell us what duties or responsibilities you had during the 1968 campaign—the Presidential campaign?

Mr. FRATES. 1968?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRATES. Well, I don't want to start again on the technical objections, but that is beyond the resolution. And if we are going to have some ground rules—and Senator Weicker and Senator Ervin, I am not here to technically involve ourselves in this thing, but why that has anything to do with the resolution 60 I do not see.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, as I understand it——

Mr. FRATES. And if that's the way we're starting, then it seems to me we're starting on the left foot.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, as I understand it, I am trying to get into the conversations that Mr. Rebozo has already told us about with Mr. Danner and I'm trying to lay the groundwork to determine whether Mr. Rebozo, prior to his conversations with Mr. Danner with regard to the Hughes contribution, had any official duties with the campaign and inquiries in the past, as Senator Ervin and Senator Weicker have gone into, the past histories of campaigns and I would cite as a precedent, one executive session of Mr. Cartha DeLoach, D-e-L-o-a-c-h, conducted by Senator Baker, which went into the 1964 Presidential election and the FBI survey done during the 1964 election, and I think this ties in more closely——

Senator ERVIN. Well, unless you can tie it to the 1972 election——

Mr. DASH. Would you repeat the question, Terry?

Mr. LENZNER. The question was: "What duties did Mr. Rebozo have, if any, for the 1968 Presidential campaign?" I think it's easier to answer the question than it is to argue it.

Mr. FRATES. No, it isn't, because it's an improper question. I don't think it's a proper way to start this and I think the chairman has already ruled. It's a broad question, completely outside the scope of the resolution—and I don't want to object to your questions.

We are here to let you interrogate as broadly as we can to conclude this matter, but the first question is what were your duties in the 1968 Presidential campaign, and we object to it, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Unless that can be tied to the campaign in some way, I would have to rule that we are not authorized to investigate it under the resolution. Now can you tie it in some way to 1972?

Mr. LENZNER. Well, let me go ahead, Senator, and ask some other questions.

Mr. Rebozo, when did you first have discussions with regard to obtaining a contribution from the Hughes Tool Co. or Howard Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. The first time was during the campaign of 1968.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you remember, approximately, when that conversation took place?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it had to be somewhere in the summer.

Mr. LENZNER. The summer of 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. The summer of 1968.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall where that conversation took place?

Mr. REBOZO. The arrangement was made for me to meet with Danner and an attorney who represented Hughes. I had been under the impression that the conversation was held in Washington, but I think

it must have been held in New York because I was not going to Washington much at the time.

Mr. LENZNER. This is with Mr. Danner and the Hughes attorney?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Prior to that discussion, did you have discussions with Mr. Danner with regard to the possibility of getting a contribution for the 1968 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, of course. He brought it up one time and wanted me to meet this man.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall where he brought it up, or where you were?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably on the phone, but I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall if anybody else was present?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall how long before you met with Mr. Morgan and Mr. Danner that Mr. Danner brought the contribution up to you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it could have been a matter of a few weeks, a couple of weeks, 3 weeks. If it was in New York, it would have been because I occasionally went to New York to visit the now-first family. They were living there and I would occasionally go up, so that is why I think probably I did meet them in New York. But I really can't be sure. I read somewhere that we met in a restaurant. I don't even recall whether we did that or not. I remember meeting in the hotel.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, when the discussion first arose, did you bring it up with Mr. Danner, or did Mr. Danner bring it up with you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, Danner brought it up with me. I had no reason to bring it up with Danner. He was a practicing lawyer in Washington and was not even connected with Hughes.

Mr. LENZNER. So nobody had discussed the contribution from Hughes, prior to Mr. Danner raising it with you?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Now did you ever have a discussion with President Nixon—or then-candidate Nixon—with regard to the Hughes contribution during this same period of 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. You never met with Presidential candidate Nixon and Mr. Danner and discussed the possibility of obtaining a contribution from Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. Never.

Mr. FRATES. Terry, excuse me. You say "Hughes," and then you say "Hughes Tool Co."

Mr. LENZNER. I say Howard Hughes or the Hughes Tool Co. It's not clear exactly who is dealing with whom.

Mr. FRATES. Well you've been changing the terms here and I want to make sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I should say, and I mean to say, either Howard Hughes or the Hughes Tool Co., or somebody representing Howard Hughes or the Hughes Tool Co., when I say that. I would like to be that specific.

Mr. FRATES. Well so long as you are communicating and the witness understands.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you understand, Mr. Rebozo, that Mr. Danner has testified before this committee that Mr. Nixon and you discussed with him the question of a contribution from Hughes, or the Hughes Tool Co. during the 1968 period?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I saw something about that in the paper, but that doesn't conform with my recollection of any discussions we had. The President just doesn't discuss those things.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying you never had a discussion with the President in 1968, or after 1968, with regard to specific contributions for his campaigns?

Mr. REBOZO. After 1968, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. But not before? December 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. I want to make sure it's clear on the record, then. You are saying now that prior to December 1968——

Mr. REBOZO. Now let me make a point here. We are talking about something 6 years ago and I just—I may be depending on logic, and I may be depending to some degree on my knowledge of the President's MO, I don't know. But I don't believe that we ever had any conversation—and the reason I want to qualify it is because if there was some passing comment that escaped, but when you speak of sitting down and just going over campaign contributions, no; that would never have happened.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying no, it never could have happened prior to December 1968? Or ever? It could never have happened?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I have previously testified, I did discuss with the President, after the election——

Mr. LENZNER. The Hughes contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. That was in 1973. Aside from 1973, let's say before his election in 1972, in November of 1972, did you have any discussions with President Nixon, prior to November 1972, with regard to specific contributions, or specific possible contributors to his campaigns?

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Chairman, I'm not going to object, but I think we are going far afield. It seems to me we ought to get to the issue and then if it relates—obviously, I think under the rules, if it relates, he can come back to it; but it looks like we're going to spend an hour or two on 1968.

Senator ERVIN. Well, we have information—or rather we've taken evidence—which indicates that this thing was sort of a continuous process as far as the Hughes thing was concerned.

Mr. FRATES. I think it was. We can say that; yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. And the actuality was that these had—the Hughes contribution was supposed to have a relation to the 1972 campaign. However, I think that Mr. Rebozo has answered that question several times.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. As I understood Mr. Rebozo to say, in effect, that

he never had any conversation with the President about a campaign contribution.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Before the 1972 election?

Mr. LENZNER. Before November 1972.

Senator ERVIN. Or after?

Mr. REBOZO. After the 1972 election, I have testified that I, of course—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, that's correct. After the November 1972 elections you did have a conversation, we're going to get to that, but—Senator, you wanted to say something?

Senator WEICKER. My interpretation of what Mr. Rebozo has testified to is the same, I believe, as the chairman's which aside from the specific situation which arose in 1972, or 1973, whenever it was, as I understand Mr. Rebozo he said that he didn't discuss such matters, in other words, with the President.

I gather that to be rather broad. Except as an incidental comment might come up, you did not discuss campaign contributions with candidate Nixon, or President Nixon, except as it relates to the specific matter that comes up in 1972? Is that correct? Am I correct in that interpretation?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Is that what the chairman gathered?

Senator ERVIN. That's what I understood.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, let me—so the record is clear, let me ask this question. Did the President ever ask you, before November 1972, to contact any particular contributor or discuss with you a specific political contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, never. You know I could qualify this, but it would take another 15 minutes.

Mr. FRATES. Well don't.

Mr. LENZNER. The answer is no?

Mr. REBOZO. The answer is no, emphatically.

Mr. LENZNER. OK. Now going back to your initial conversations with Mr. Danner, did Mr. Danner tell you what he would do—what was your reaction to Mr. Danner? Let me ask that first. When he first brought this Hughes contribution to your attention?

Mr. FRATES. Well now just a minute. Which one are we taking about? Terry, you've asked three questions—so the record is clear.

Mr. LENZNER. Well I think I only asked one and a half.

Mr. FRATES. Well I heard three, I'm sorry. What question are you asking him now, please?

Mr. LENZNER. What was your response when Mr. Danner first talked to you about the Hughes contribution in 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. As I said, I went up there and met with him and with Morgan, and the atmosphere just didn't seem appropriate to accept the contribution.

Not that I thought there was anything morally wrong, or legally wrong; it was just that I had been a friend of the First Family for over 20 years and I recall, vividly, the incident of the 1958 loan to the President's brother, and the fact that Drew Pearson had made a

lot of that in the 1960 campaign, and then in the Governor's campaign in 1962. It was rehashed over and over again.

The fact that Ed Morgan represented Drew Pearson and the fact that I just did not want to be responsible, in any way, for anything that might create embarrassment. I declined.

Morgan, I presume, had the money with him—I don't know—but he wanted to hand the money to the President, himself, and I told him that the President would never accept it. I know he has never, ever, to my knowledge, ever accepted anything of any kind, for anything. He just does not handle money, and this is part of the things I referred to when I tried to describe him.

I could recognize that if I were living here and reading the Post and the Times every day, and Newsweek and Time, I would not believe what I am saying right now—but I have never known a person who cared less about money than he. And everything was done through appropriate channels.

So I declined on the basis that the Morgan situation, and on the basis—and while Danner was a friend of mine, I didn't know what his position in this whole picture was because he was a practicing lawyer in Washington and he was not working for Hughes at the time and I think I probably should, to set the foundation—and I swore I wasn't going to talk much and answer questions—but I think that, frankly, I've always admired Howard Hughes and still do and I don't think that—I admire him because he's a person who did inherit some money, but then went ahead and did a lot on his own, without living off of it or becoming a bum.

Danner, while I have seen him described in the press as a "Hughes henchman," it's a very unfair description of Danner who is a very responsible citizen in Miami. He was agent in charge of the FBI during the war. He's sort of a local hero. He figured prominently in the most famous kidnaping down there and the most famous vice case that they had. Then he managed Smathers' campaigns in 1946 and 1948, and became city manager for 3 years. So if you speak of Dick Danner in the Miami area, you don't hear anything derogatory about him—so I want to dispell that thought.

But I just had a feeling, after agonizing with the loan to Don Nixon, how it had been repeated year in and year out over the years, and that true story has never been told—for example, it's my understanding—

Senator ERVIN. I believe you're going a little far afield now.

Mr. REBOZO. All right, I'll limit my answers to yes or no, but this is the background.

Mr. FRATES. Well, Mr. Chairman, while we have a break here, I'm glad you stopped him. I don't know about the air-conditioning, but I see our interrogator here is puffing away at that pipe, and it's getting down here, and I'm wondering, at the end of the day—now there's no reflection on North Carolina tobacco, Senator, but I'm just wondering—

Mr. DASH. It's an appropriate request.

Mr. FRATES. Just take a bottle or a blanket.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, was any specific amount discussed with you and Mr. Danner, or Mr. Morgan?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, he said \$50,000.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he indicate it was going to be in cash, or a check, or some other means?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know if he indicated how it was going to be. I guess I had the impression it would be in cash.

Mr. LENZNER. He didn't specifically say that, though?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. And Mr. Morgan indicated whatever it was, he wanted to give it directly to the candidate?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And I think you also indicated, at some point in our prior interviews, that you first agreed to accept it and then changed your mind. Is that correct, or not correct?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I never agreed to accept it first.

Mr. LENZNER. So you never indicated that you would accept the money on behalf of the campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, I don't believe I ever did, because I declined it immediately when he said that he wanted to give it to him directly. I knew the President would not accept it. Then subsequently, when they wanted to give it through me, I still declined for the reasons I have mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have any other contact with fundraising efforts during the 1968 campaign, besides this one?

Mr. REBOZO. The 1968 campaign?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. I don't think we are authorized to investigate the 1968 campaign.

Mr. FRATES. No, sir, again I didn't want to object, but—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you ever advise Mr. Danner or Mr. Morgan that they ought to discuss this matter with the finance committee or the finance people, rather than you?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Senator, can I ask this question? Were there other occasions when you talked with contributors during the 1968 campaign, with regard to contributions?

Mr. FRATES. Senator, this has nothing to do with the issue.

Senator ERVIN. Frankly, we're not authorized to investigate the 1968 campaign. Now the conversations he had about the 1968 campaign, I don't see where they are relevant, unless they bore some fruit in 1972, frankly.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I'm trying to determine, Senator, whether this was an aberration in his discussions, or whether this was in the regular course of his duties during the campaign, and that is relevant.

Senator ERVIN. Well it's not relevant. He might have managed the campaign in 1968, but that would be none of our business unless he saved some funds from that campaign and used them in 1972 or had them in 1972.

I drew this resolution very specifically and confined it to the 1972 campaign, and the campaigns related to it—that is, the preceding campaigns for the nomination because I realized that we would never get through with an investigation.

Now it's true that on one or two occasions that people went off on a tangent, as Fred did one time—he got over in Vietnam, back there in the Diem days with Mr. Hunt.

I suggested that he was going outside the scope of the resolution, and we would have been investigating every campaign since George Washington ran for President if we hadn't restricted this thing. So, unless you can relate what happened in 1968 to 1972, I don't think we've got authority under the resolution to go into it.

Mr. DASH. Well, I guess, Mr. Chairman, the question Mr. Lenzner was putting was not to go into the 1968 campaign—in fact, not to ask an additional question on 1968, but to look to the response of Mr. Rebozo on the question of method of operations, whether or not his answer is consistent.

Senator ERVIN. Well, why not go down to the method of operation with relation to the 1972 campaign?

Senator WEICKER. I think the chairman is absolutely correct because if you will recall there was an attempt during the hearings to do this very same thing, as far as campaign tactics were concerned, relative, I think, to Haldeman and then Ehrlichman, relative to earlier California campaigns, and we ruled no.

Mr. DASH. The only time we ruled otherwise was with Mr. Dean and his being fired at an earlier period of time. I know that was consistent.

Senator WEICKER. But if it's 1968 funds, that is a different thing.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, we do have some evidence—why don't we put that on the record and see if that makes any difference.

Mr. FRATES. Well, it seems to me—and the chairman has overruled your interrogation—it just seems to me we're starting off on the wrong foot. I've often wondered why—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Senator Weicker has made a good suggestion, Mr. Frates, and I'd like to pursue it. Let me ask this question, Mr. Rebozo—

Mr. FRATES. Well, excuse me just a minute. You have asked a series of questions. The chairman has ruled them out of order. I can't think of one more out of order than the one you just asked.

Mr. DASH. Well, the chairman just said if you can link the 1968 to the 1972, he's now trying to do that.

Mr. FRATES. Well, he's talking about funds, but it seems to me we all know why we are here—to interrogate on a \$100,000 contribution. It just seems to me he hasn't had any interrogation—we ought to go to the issue and then come back and develop from that, otherwise we'll be here a week—and we are prepared to stay a week—but your whole line of questioning has been off the issue, in my opinion.

I am sure we are not going to object in anything that is related to it. I think you can be entitled to interrogate him about it.

Mr. DASH. Well Mr. Chairman, I think—let the next question be asked. If it's out of order, rule it, and then—

Senator ERVIN. OK.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, did you retain any 1968 campaign funds in your possession after the election in 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. You're talking about funds that belonged to the campaign?

Mr. LENZNER. Funds that either belonged to the campaign or were received from a campaign committee.

Mr. FRATES. The question is campaign funds in 1968?

Mr. LENZNER. I am asking of funds received from a campaign committee or of campaign funds—

Mr. GREER. One question at a time.

Mr. FRATES. Well, ask the question.

Mr. LENZNER. I thought I did.

Mr. FRATES. You asked two questions.

Senator ERVIN. Let Mr. Lenzner put the question.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you retain or control, after the election in 1968, any funds received from a campaign committee?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I know what you're getting at and the answer can maybe save some time. There was—the funds that we controlled were for the—I forget what it was called now, but it was the committee for the 1968 campaign—and during that time, we deposited everything to the account.

We sent the appropriate records to the headquarters and paid the bills. We had the headquarters office down there where we paid the rent and the water and the Xeroxing and the stamps and so forth, and I think three paid employees, they were paid out of that account.

Additionally, we had the convention down there. We had a number of other activities going on, and very often I would personally pick up bills, for one thing or another.

When the campaign ended, they owed me \$6,000, in round figures, and I sent back everything, down to the \$6,000. I went to draw a \$6,000 check to me and I figured well, hell, it's just going to look, at some future date, somebody's looking at this and wondering what I did, so I really just forgot that it was there. I left it there intending to get it out and I finally got it, subsequently. Now that's probably what you're talking about?

Mr. LENZNER. So you're saying that this \$6,000 was put into the trust account of Mr. Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And you are saying that those were funds—

Mr. REBOZO. Those were funds that belonged to me.

Mr. LENZNER. That you were reimbursed for expenses you had incurred?

Mr. REBOZO. What happened to it though, after we had done that, I had earlier told them that I had this account if they needed some extra money, we probably have some there that I could send them, and after this was done, Kalmbach had asked me for a couple of contributions—I don't recall the amounts and I just sent him checks for that which really brought it down to \$4,500-and-something, and I just paid it and let it go at that.

Mr. LENZNER. You say you told somebody about the money in the account? I didn't quite get that, Mr. Rebozo.

Mr. REBOZO. I had reported that we had this account there and I reported regularly the income and expense items so the contributors could be properly thanked by the finance office in New York. And they had all the records of that.

Mr. LENZNER. But I thought you said you advised somebody that you had a remaining \$6,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no; during the time that I had this money, I had advised them that I had this account and if they needed some additional help, I thought that we would probably wind up with more money than we did, but I advised them and then I got called upon after I had already disbursed everything but the \$6,000, so I just went ahead and sent them that.

Mr. LENZNER. What I'm trying to find out is who did you advise that you have that \$6,000?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was Kalmbach, who was Stan's assistant at the time. I believe—

Mr. LENZNER. Did he have some continuing responsibility after the election, to your knowledge?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't follow you.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, you said that you sent him some money and that he had a continuing fund raising responsibility.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I don't know about that. I'm sure your continuing expenses—I know the good Senators, here, after the campaign is over, there are bills that are unpaid.

Senator ERVIN. I never had an unpaid bill, yet. Every time I have run, I have refunded money to my contributors.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't mean that, I mean the bills coming in.

Mr. FRATES. You're a minority group, Senator.

Senator ERVIN. I think myself and George Aiken are the only two in that class.

Mr. REBOZO. That must shock a few constituents to get a check?

Senator ERVIN. Yeah, well I gave them a 20-percent dividend last time, unspent.

Mr. FRATES. You sound like a good investment.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall—let me ask you this. Did you have discussions with Mr. Kalmbach with regard to those funds—what you should do with them?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't follow you.

Mr. LENZNER. Well you said at one point you sent some money out to Mr. Kalmbach. What I'm trying to get at, how did you arrive at that arrangement?

Mr. REBOZO. He just asked me for it. He told me he needed a couple of checks and I sent them to him.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ask you orally, or in writing?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was orally.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he indicate the purpose for which the funds were to be used?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, I didn't ask. I wasn't concerned with the purpose. He was just a little late in asking me and I thought everything was paid. But it had been some time earlier when I suggested to him that perhaps we could be helpful.

Mr. LENZNER. But you did not know when you sent the money to him what he was going to do with the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, no.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you recall, was the \$6,000 received from the Florida committee for Nixon?

Mr. REBOZO. That is the account's title, I think.

Mr. LENZNER. Why did you set up an account in the name of Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, actually, I wanted to—I wanted to get my \$6,000 back, but I didn't know how to do it, frankly, because I just thought—

Mr. FRATES. Well, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bellino is hollering "Oh Jesus" down here, and I resent that and I ask that you caution him and these other investigators to at least conduct themselves in a proper manner.

Senator ERVIN. I didn't hear him, but I would suggest that everybody keep quiet.

Mr. DASH. I heard him. Mr. Frates is correct and I would join with Mr. Frates' request that no staff react to any question.

Senator ERVIN. I think that conversation and explanation should be restricted to the cross-examiner and the counsel and the members of the committee when they have to rule on something.

Mr. FRATES. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, what was the question—why did you put the account in the name of Mr. Wakefield? The \$6,000 account?

Mr. REBOZO. Well I suppose it just seemed like the best way to get my funds back without drawing them to attention. There was nothing wrong with it, it's just that you have to worry about how something might look in years later and Wakefield handles a lot of business for me, closings and whatnot, so that was the reason.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall when you first talked to Mr. Kalmbach with regard to sending those funds out to him?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it probably was immediately before I sent them. He probably called up and said he needed a check and I sent it.

Mr. LENZNER. This would have been in 1969 would it not?

Mr. REBOZO. Whatever it was. I don't know what the date was.

Mr. LENZNER. And you were not aware at that time, or any later time, that Mr. Kalmbach actually put those funds in an account to pay for Mr. Tony Ulasewicz's activities?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I read about that somewhere. This might save you a later question, but I never heard of Mr. Ulasewicz. I never saw him and never knew he existed until I saw him on television and read about it in the paper.

Mr. LENZNER. But you were never aware, then, of any efforts on behalf of the White House or Mr. Kalmbach to set up a separate entity to conduct these kinds of investigations?

Mr. REBOZO. It was none of my affair. I was not involved in the mechanics of the White House operation.

Mr. LENZNER. I take it the answer is "no," you were not aware of the efforts to set up a separate entity?

Mr. REBOZO. That is correct, the answer is "no."

Mr. FRATES. Now Mr. Bellino, you say the Senators don't know what the facts are? Now, again, Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether he's saying that just so you can hear it or what his motivation is—

Senator ERVIN. What I think—Mr. Bellino has a right to assist counsel, but I would suggest that he does so in as near an inaudible fashion as possible.

Mr. DASH. Well if you can read it that would be better.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Mr. Bellino was merely suggesting——

Mr. DASH. Well, excuse me for interrupting. If you could write——

Mr. BELLINO. I'm trying to write, when I can.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Bellino was merely suggesting that I have an exhibit marked as an exhibit to show to Mr. Rebozo. I would like to have that done. Could we have that check marked?

Mr. FRATES. Well we certainly have no objection. That's an orderly way to do it and we have no objection to that.

Mr. GREER. It hasn't been marked.

Mr. LENZNER. Why don't we mark it so we can refer to it?

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 1 for identification.*]

Senator ERVIN. Let me see, that looks like April 15, 1969?

Mr. LENZNER. Why don't you go ahead and look at it, Mr. Frates, and Mr. Rebozo. Take your time.

Mr. FRATES. No, go ahead and interrogate him. Are you going to ask him some questions about it?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes sir. Can you identify that as a check that you signed setting up the trust account which has been previously described?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. So you were the signator for the committee from which those funds were drawn?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes, we kept the books on it. We paid all of the bills for the Cubans for Nixon and all the work that they did. We kept the books on it.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, you simply could have drawn yourself a check, payable to cash, if you wanted to, but instead you set it up as this Wakefield account?

Mr. REBOZO. I could have. I could have. But, again, you know, I really didn't know what to do and later I frankly just forgot that it was even in there.

Mr. LENZNER. You forgot that the account existed?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. When did you recall, after this transaction, after you sent the money to Mr. Kalmbach, when did you recall that you had money remaining in that account?

Mr. REBOZO. It was quite some time later. I think my bookkeeper called it to my attention.

Mr. LENZNER. That would be Miss Moncourt?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall approximately when that was?

Mr. REBOZO. No, but it was some time later. We have, I guess, a dozen accounts and everything that I'm involved in we have a separate account, just to simplify bookkeeping, and to have your receipts and so on.

Mr. LENZNER. And what happened after Miss Moncourt reminded you that the fund existed? Did you do anything with those funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I spent it.

*See p. 10155.

Mr. LENZNER. When was that, sir?

Mr. FRATES. Your Honor, we have an objection. I know we've gone far afield in this matter. We have objected to these documents, as the Senators know, and you've not ruled on it.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I frankly don't see the connection between this and the 1972 campaign.

Mr. DASH. I think we can explain that, Senator, that we can.

Senator ERVIN. Ask him a direct question on—even a leading question that sets out how this related to the 1972 campaign. But I can't see the relationship.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Senator, he already testified he sent Mr. Kalmbach \$1,000 which ended up——

Senator ERVIN. He never said when he did it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, we'll take care of that.

Senator ERVIN. Well, let me understand. I understand your testimony that this was money that was left over, that you had some connection with the management of the campaign in 1968 in the Key Biscayne area—in the Florida area, and these were funds that you had spent—\$6,000, approximately \$6,000 of your own money. And this \$6,000 that you had deposited in the account of Mr. Wakefield was to reimburse you for those expenditures. And, thereafter, at sometime Mr. Kalmbach contacted you and asked you for some financial help of some kind for political purposes and that you sent him approximately—or others—approximately \$1,500, leaving \$4,500 under your control or Mr. Wakefield's control?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator ERVIN. When was it that Mr. Kalmbach asked you for that money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. It apparently was sometime after I had mentioned to him that I had some funds available and he didn't know and I didn't bother.

Senator ERVIN. Can you give the year?

Mr. REBOZO. I am sorry. I really couldn't.

Mr. GREER. Well, Mr. Lenzner has the check.

Mr. LENZNER. Could we make this exhibit 2?

Senator ERVIN. Well. I want to get directly to these things.

Mr. FRATES. Well, Senator, our objection is he has testified that these are his funds; that he did give the difference between the \$4,500 and the \$6,000 to Mr. Kalmbach. I think if that was related to the 1972 campaign, he has testified to that and so we have not objected. Now he's asking, what did you do with the other money? Now that goes into personal.

Senator ERVIN. Put that down as exhibit 2.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 2 for identification.*]

Mr. FRATES. Personal funds? What he did with his personal money? We're taking the position that you're going far, far afield on that. And, again, I call the Senator's attention to the fact that we have raised the entire situation here and the full committee has not ruled on it, and what I would like to do is get off of this and

*See p. 10156.

back on to fundamental issues without making an issue on this at this time.

Senator ERVIN. Well, that gives a date on which he gave \$1,000 to Mr. Kalmbach.

Mr. LENZNER. That was July 1969.

Senator ERVIN. July 1969. And I still don't see where——

Mr. DASH. Well, the record shows the testimony already that Mr. Kalmbach used that money for the payment of Mr. Ulasewicz on behalf of the 1972 campaign. That is on our record, Mr. Chairman, so, that transfer money did get into the 1972 campaign.

Mr. FRATES. The \$1,000?

Senator ERVIN. Well, Mr. Rebozo says you can ask him if he knows anything about the transaction between he and Mr. Kalmbach.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, would it not be accurate to say that if he gave money to Kalmbach which was used in the 1972 campaign, the fact he gave that money and what Kalmbach did, is relevant, but all of the background and what he did with the other money and all of that would not be relevant. Would that not be accurate?

Senator ERVIN. I would think so.

Mr. FRATES. Very well put.

Senator ERVIN. I would suggest to counsel that if counsel thinks it's relevant to 1972, what he did with the rest of the money, to ask him a leading question.

Mr. LENZNER. I was about to do that, Senator. Were any of the remaining funds spent in any way related to the 1972 Presidential election?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Was it spent——

Mr. FRATES. Well, now——

Mr. LENZNER. Let me finish the question.

Mr. FRATES. Well, I think that's a fine question—that's the end of it, I hope.

Mr. DASH. There may be another question.

Mr. FRATES. Well, Mr. Lenzner?

Mr. DASH. I think Mr. Frates should object correctly, but I don't think he should instruct our counsel how to ask questions.

Mr. FRATES. I think somebody, in fairness now, I'm very fond of Terry, but I think Terry has a tendency to wander all around and ask the same question three or four times and I think we do have a problem here. We have two Senators sitting here——

Senator ERVIN. I think the last question was the most direct question.

Mr. FRATES. That's fine. I have no objection and he answered it and he answered "No."

Mr. LENZNER. I asked one direct question anyway, but let me just go on and ask you, did you spend those funds that were left over on behalf of any employee of the White House or the campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he frequently has funds of mine for various things and he keeps them and I don't think he's ever given me a refund when he needed more money.

Mr. DASH. Well, who is "he"?

Mr. REBOZO. My attorney, my attorney.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Wakefield, you're referring to now?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware when you talked to Mr. Kalmbach, prior to sending that money out, that Mr. Kalmbach was raising funds for the 1972 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I knew that he was making contacts—well, I don't know, this was in 1969. No, I don't believe I knew it then. I believe that maybe a year or so later—I know I am under oath and I don't want to conjecture, but I can only say, to the best of my recollection, I did not know what his part would be. You know, he was assistant to Stans, in 1968. That is where I first knew him and I did not know at that time who was going to be in charge, but I knew somewhere along the line that he was—

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask this question, then, if I might? If you did not understand that the funds were to be used relative to the employment of Mr. Ulasewicz, and if you did not understand that the funds would be used in the campaign effort of 1972, what did you understand that the funds were to be used for?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I said, very often there are bills that come out very late for the campaign and I recall in about 1962, the President got a bill for \$12,000 from the 1960 campaign and paid it out of his pocket because somebody had failed to pay for some advertising, 2 years later. I just assumed that—

Senator WEICKER. So you assumed that this was money to be used for the paying of bills from the 1968 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. The 1968 campaign, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of Mr. Kalmbach telling you in 1969 that he was, in fact, at that time, raising contributions for the 1972 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. He told me at sometime but I can't tell you what year it was.

Mr. LENZNER. You don't place it around the same time?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't see much of Kalmbach until 1969 when the President bought the home in San Clemente and I made occasional trips out there and ran into him.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, after the 1968 election, did you again have a conversation with Mr. Danner with regard to the Hughes contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, of course.

Mr. LENZNER. And approximately when did those begin again?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, Mr. Danner used to come to Miami occasionally. His mother lives down in Florida and I could not tell you just when, but I think it was sort of continual, you know, periodically, he would bring it up again.

Mr. LENZNER. And was it he that always raised it with you? And not you that raised it with him?

Mr. REBOZO. I am sure that was the case.

Mr. LENZNER. You never were the person who initiated the conversation with Mr. Danner with regard to the contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. I possibly could have.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator Montoya has entered the room, for the rec-

ord. I don't know if the stenographer got the last question and answer, Mr. Rebozo.

Did you, at any time after the 1968 election, initiate discussions with Mr. Danner with regard to him obtaining a contribution for—from the Hughes people?

Mr. REBOZO. Not that I can recall. It is my recollection that he always initiated it because they were still trying to get me to accept that money.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of ever making the statement that you couldn't remember whether you, in fact, were the one that approached Danner or Danner approached you?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe I would have made that statement, but there was no reason for me to approach Danner. He wasn't even working for Hughes. He was an attorney practicing law in Washington and an old friend.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, didn't he discuss with you, in January and February of 1969, whether he should in fact go to work for the Hughes Tool Co?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, yes. He mentioned it one time that he was offered this position.

Mr. LENZNER. So you knew at that time that he was considering it. Did you learn after that, that he had in fact become employed by them?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. But you are saying that despite that, you don't recall ever making the statement that you couldn't recall whether it was he who initiated discussions on the contribution or you.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it just didn't seem relevant, and it doesn't to me now, who initiated it. I believe that he always initiated it because of my original turndown of the original offer.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you explain to Mr. Danner, by the way, why you had turned that original contribution down, the reasons for it?

Mr. REBOZO. I think so. There was a combination of reasons, some of which I had mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell Mr. Danner in 1969, that you knew Hughes had made a substantial contribution to Mr. Humphrey's campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. Danner told me.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Danner told you that. Did you ever, in the spring of 1969, approach Mr. Danner and ask him to raise funds for polling purposes for the 1970 congressional election?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall anything like that. Again, 5 years ago, but I don't recall it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you have any duties——

Mr. REBOZO. I have read a lot about that, but he did tell me when he gave me the \$50,000 that it was the same money that he had tried to give me before when he had been in the vault, and I finally agreed to take it, and I read a lot about it, and I know the testimony has indicated that that is what he gave it to me for, and if he said anything about it, I would have thought it was just sort of a face-saving device to give it to the President's next campaign because there was no suggestion made about what races were to be favored,

or who to give it to, or anything like that. And it was money that was intended for the President.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, was the specific purpose of the money discussed with Mr. Danner between the two of you, Mr. Danner and yourself, when you discussed it in 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know that it was. I think that the discussion principally was around my taking money which I had refused repeatedly.

Mr. LENZNER. So you're saying now—I want to get this straight, because, as you're saying, Mr. Danner's testimony has indicated that it was his understanding it was for the 1970 campaigns, that your recollection is that there was no specific discussion with regard to what campaign this money would be intended for.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I stated that they did not suggest that I give it to any specific categories, that if they were interested in the 1970 campaign, and if something was said about it, I would have just assumed that they were saying, "Look, I want you to have this," and that's because they were trying too hard to give this to me.

Mr. LENZNER. I am sorry, I missed that.

Mr. REBOZO. Because they had tried so hard to give it to me.

Mr. LENZNER. Did they ever indicate to you, did Mr. Danner ever indicate to you that it was for—

Mr. REBOZO. I've answered that question, the question that he could have said it in the past, but it didn't make any impression with me because I was only interested in money raised.

Mr. LENZNER. And that was the 1972 reelection of President Nixon.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Were there a number of occasions when Mr. Danner offered the money and tried to furnish you with the money during 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you approximate how many times that occurred?

Mr. REBOZO. It would be purely a guess, but I suppose that he must have approached me on it four or five times.

Mr. LENZNER. In person or telephonically, or mostly in person?

Mr. REBOZO. Mostly in person.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he, on any occasion, have the funds with him when he approached you on those occasions?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, on one occasion I know he did.

Mr. LENZNER. And where was that, in Key Biscayne?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he show you the funds at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I just saw the envelope.

Mr. LENZNER. But he indicated that he had \$50,000 in cash in the envelope.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever suggest to him during that period of time that he should give those funds to the Republican National Committee?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I honestly wasn't interested in the Republican National Committee. I was interested in the President.

Mr. LENZNER. But they could have supplied the funds to the President's campaign, could they not?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that's—

Mr. FRATES. That is a statement.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I'm asking a question.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that's getting into a question that is beyond the area, that's beyond the scope of my activities or knowledge. I have made my point that, as far as I am concerned now and was then, that it was for the President's 1972 campaign.

Mr. LENZNER. I know, but what I'm asking you is, are you saying you were not aware of the fact that the Republican National Committee could have held those funds and furnished them to the President's campaign in 1972?

Senator ERVIN. Isn't that sort of—that's going out of the realm of evidence and discussion I believe, Terry.

Mr. FRATES. Thank you, sir. I think everybody knows that the political committee can help any candidate for the party that it's supporting.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, could you describe on the occasions that Mr. Danner tried to offer you the funds, could you describe what he said to you and what you said to him on those occasions?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I have described it about as well as I can.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you indicate to him why you didn't want to accept the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I did, partly.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you relate to the committee what those reasons were as you described them?

Mr. REBOZO. Again, it goes back to my apprehension over the original \$205,000 loan and the adverse publicity that evolved from that, the facts of which have never, even to this day, been clarified publicly, and I lived with that in the 1960 campaign and the 1962 campaign, and in the interim I was just apprehensive, I think, that—I didn't think there was anything wrong with taking the money. It is just that I wanted to avoid any possible embarrassment.

Mr. LENZNER. So, your main reason was as you describe it.

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Were there any other reasons?

Mr. DASH. Well, Terry, can I interrupt a minute? There are a lot of people in the room, I am beginning myself to feel the fumes, so I wish you would refrain from smoking.

Mr. REBOZO. Maybe that'll limit the interrogation.

Mr. LENZNER. Limit my endurance.

Mr. FRATES. You're not supposed to be the nervous one.

Mr. LENZNER. Was there any other reasons why you did not want to take the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, there were other reasons that it didn't conform to the pattern that I felt comfortable with. I was told that they had given considerable money to Senator Humphrey and that Hughes Tool had the Senator's son on their payroll, and that they had paid Larry O'Brien six figures. And with all of this combination of facts, together with the history of the original \$205,000 loan and the Ed Morgan-Drew Pearson connection, it was just a combination of

everything that made me apprehensive again, not because I felt that there was anything wrong with it, but it was just I felt I didn't want to risk, even remotely, any embarrassment to the campaign.

Mr. LENZNER. How did you learn that Mr. O'Brien was receiving a six-figure income from the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I was told that, and more recently, I read it somewhere.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, obviously you knew about it at the time in 1969 when you had the discussions with Mr. Danner. Do you recall who told you that then?

Mr. REBOZO. I think Danner told me.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember how that came up in the discussion?

Mr. REBOZO. No. As I say, Danner and I have been friends for 30 years. We talked about a lot of things. It probably just was mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you not, in fact, raise that as an issue to Mr. Danner as to why the Hughes people should, in fact, contribute the additional funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I could have.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you not also cite the fact that Mr. Humphrey's son was on the payroll as another reason why they should raise the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No. He told me that. He told me that. I didn't know anything about it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you, on occasion, cite that to Mr. Danner as a reason why the Hughes people ought to get up a contribution for the President's campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I think what I probably said was that I could not understand if he was genuinely trying to support the President, why all of these other activities were going on, too, or something along this. I just couldn't understand.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you remember what Mr. Danner's reaction was when you made that statement?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Danner is not the type of fellow who reacts too much to situations like that. He is a strong, quiet type of fellow, and again, we're talking about something that happened 6 years ago, and if you ask me specifics about it, about who said what and what was his reaction and all of that, it is not easy to recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, what I'm getting at, Mr. Rebozo is, didn't you, on occasion, indicate to Mr. Danner that you knew the President's campaign for 1968 had not received a contribution from Hughes but the Democrats had, and you were going to see—you wanted to see what Hughes was going to come up with?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have said something about that in our conversations, but he's the one who told me about it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Danner come back to you on one occasion and indicate to you the specific amounts that, in fact, the Hughes people had given the Republican campaign in 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. Only that—what I have stated about what they were paying Larry O'Brien and those are the exact words he used—six figures. He did not give me the amount.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me break here and see if anybody has any additional questions in these areas.

Mr. LACKRITZ. One thing I wasn't clear about, Mr. Rebozo. You said Mr. Danner brought you a package in 1969 to your home in Key Biscayne, Fla., and that you turned down the money in person on that occasion.

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't say when it was. I don't recall what the date was when he brought the package.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Who was with Mr. Danner when he brought that?

Mr. REBOZO. No one.

Mr. LACKRITZ. He was by himself?

Mr. REBOZO. [Nods in the affirmative.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. And can you describe the package that he brought?

Mr. REBOZO. It was one of these letter-sized thick manila envelopes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And did he explain to you that he had \$50,000 in \$100 bills inside the package on that occasion?

Mr. FRATES. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have gone over this before and these are repetitious questions, and again, I don't want to be technical and we want to conclude this, but I think this is the problem of several people interrogating. Every person thinks he can ask the questions.

Senator ERVIN. All three of those questions have been asked and answered at least once, and we're asking them again.

Mr. LENZNER. I don't think the last question has been asked or answered.

Senator ERVIN. All of this relates to 1969, and I have not seen it tied to the 1972 campaign.

Mr. DASH. This is the 1972 contribution. This is the Hughes contribution for the 1972 campaign which Mr. Rebozo said he received.

Senator ERVIN. Well, I thought that was the one he said he refused to take.

Mr. FRATES. It is.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But he eventually did take that very same contribution, as he has testified.

Senator ERVIN. Well, it would seem to me it would come down to the one that he took.

Mr. FRATES. Well, sir, I hope we're going to get to that before the day is over.

Senator ERVIN. I just don't think—I think what happened in 1969, unless he got some money then and kept it for the 1972 campaign, is not within the ambit of our investigative power.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Senator, let me rephrase my question. At the time that Mr. Danner brought the package to you and said there was \$50,000 in it for you, were you raising any money at that time for the 1972 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. By raising money, was I out actively soliciting?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Were you accepting contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. Accepting—now, wait a minute, wait a minute. Are you talking about 1969?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You were not accepting any contributions.

Mr. FRATES. The answer was "No".

Mr. REBOZO. No. You see, this gentleman, now, I've never seen him before. Lenzner and Armstrong, they've been through all of this before. We've had 4- or 5-hour sessions.

Mr. DASH. This is an executive session on the record, and there are many questions that may be put to you, Mr. Rebozo, that you've been through before.

Senator WEICKER. The thing which I don't quite understand is, if you were not accepting contributions for the 1972 campaign, how is it that people arrive on your doorstep with \$50,000 in manila envelopes? Is this to pay past bills?

Mr. REBOZO. I think the question was, was I accepting other contributions?

Mr. FRATES. Well, Senator, excuse me. Since this is going to be on the record, and since, apparently, it goes out to newspapers in various places, and certainly——

Senator ERVIN. I hope it doesn't go out to newspapers from here, and I'll have to agree that all congressional committees have too many leaks, but I would say that nobody in here should say a word outside this door as to what happened, what the testimony was.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I don't think you were in here, maybe you weren't in here when he described his longtime relationship with Danner and I think your statement, again, "arrive on his doorstep" overlooks the fact that they have been friends for a long time, and he's indicated to no question that he was trying one way or the other, Danner, to get some money for the President, or as he said previously, for the congressional races, to Mr. Rebozo.

Senator WEICKER. Were these the 1970 and 1972 races? That is all I am trying to establish.

Mr. FRATES. Well, sir, there again I think there's been some conflict in it, as Mr. Rebozo has repeatedly testified. I think he has said here that, in his mind, it was for the 1972 Presidential——

Senator WEICKER. What I am asking your client is this, on the matter of the \$1,500 that we just discussed, we established the fact that he thought he was sending this money to pay bills for the 1968 campaign. We established that.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Now, what I'm trying to establish is this other amount of money which Mr. Danner produces, what was your client's impression as to what this money was for, for paying off bills or for campaigns? What, in your mind, was this money to be utilized for, this money that you refused? What was this money for?

Mr. FRATES. Can I raise one objection because the chairman raised it for me, that that 1969 has nothing to do with Resolution 60?

Mr. DASH. Our committee has ruled that the 1972 campaign began the day after the 1968 election ended, and if it was raised in that period, it is in the resolution. The chairman did rule that.

Mr. FRATES. Well, I'm just quoting the statement the chairman did rule.

Senator ERVIN. Well, wait a minute. I don't see—it's very interesting as to what we get money for, as Mr. Rebozo says he refused to take. It's interesting, but I don't see how it sheds much light on what we're investigating.

Mr. DASH. Well, Senator, it does.

Senator ERVIN. How?

Mr. DASH. We have to do it in executive session inquiry, and as to his motivation of why it was refused and later accepted, and his explanation as to why he later accepted it and why he first refused it, and unless you get into this question, Senator, you are asking to ask the ultimate questions which cannot be understood unless you lead up to it with the earlier questions dealing with the same money. It's not—without all the questions, we can't get into the understanding of this contribution.

Senator ERVIN. I don't see why we can't ask him directly when he actually received it and what he did with it.

Senator MONTOKA. Mr. Chairman?

Senator ERVIN. Now, it's very interesting. That's the important thing, and then we can ask him why, why he received it. I don't think what motivations a man had when he didn't take any money shed any light on the thing.

Senator WEICKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, my question was—

Senator ERVIN. But the whole basis about why he received it and why he didn't aren't very important.

Senator WEICKER. Mr. Chairman, my question about motivations was, was this money for the 1972 campaign? That is what I asked.

Senator ERVIN. I thought your question was proper.

Senator MONTOKA. Mr. Chairman, I might say that Mr. Rebozo stated that, in his mind, during the conversation with Mr. Danner, and on one occasion when he brought the \$50,000 and ultimately when money passed to him, he was in his own mind under the impression that it was for the President's campaign. Now, if any money was brought by Mr. Danner during this period, it had to be for the 1970 campaign.

Senator ERVIN. Not necessarily.

Senator MONTOKA. Well, because he received it with that in mind.

Senator ERVIN. We had testimony from Mr. Kalmbach that he had vast sums of money left over from the 1968 campaign which were used in the 1972.

Senator MONTOKA. I'm talking about the big contributions which came eventually from Mr. Danner. Now, if he receives them with the thought in mind or with the impression that they were to be for the President's campaign, the question I was going to ask was, what fact or conversations took place that led you to believe, in your mind, that the money that Mr. Danner had was for the President's next Presidential campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I think you might say principally the fact that the money was first proffered for the President's campaign, and he cited to me that the money that he finally gave me were the identical bills, the envelope had been in a vault all of that time.

Mr. FRATES. I don't know whether the Senator was here when he was talking about 1968, the preliminary offer.

Senator MONTOKA. Well, I assumed that from the conversations.

Mr. FRATES. In 1968 for the President. He wanted to give it directly to the President.

Senator ERVIN. Your question is proper and relevant, and it is right within the ambit of our investigatory powers.

Senator MONTROYA. That is what I am asking. What was in your mind when these conversations were taking place with respect to the Presidential campaign, and what facts transpired, what conversations took place that led you to believe that, in your mind, the monies that were to be contributed were for the Presidential campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. That is—well, that's what I explained. Perhaps you weren't present.

Senator MONTROYA. That's what I wanted to ask. You said that in your mind this was for the Presidential campaign. Now, what in your mind, what facts triggered that in your mind, what thought?

Mr. REBOZO. I suppose nobody ever offered me any money for any other campaigns. It was always for the President, and the President was the focus of the original tender and the subsequent ones, and there just was no question in my mind, just as I read now that Senator McGovern got a half million dollars for his campaign 2 years in advance.

Senator MONTROYA. But, if Mr. Danner came to you and said, "here is \$50,000," he wasn't just going to hand it to you and let you assume it was for the President.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he had offered it numerous times.

Senator MONTROYA. For the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. All right.

Mr. REBOZO. And, as I said a while ago, we had had many, many discussions with Danner. He stayed at my home. We had been friends for many years, and he could have easily said, "if you want to use it for the 1970 campaign, do it," but they never specified any congressional races or Senate races or anything else.

Senator MONTROYA. Let me ask you one other question. Now, this is after the 1968 campaign, and so is it reasonable to assume, when you were speaking with Dr. Danner about the contributions, that you had the thought in mind, and it was reasonable to assume that any money contributions were with respect to the 1972 campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I did not accept contributions from anybody for anything else.

Senator MONTROYA. All right. That's all I wanted to know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you say, in answer to Senator Montoya's questions, that Mr. Danner said you could use it for the 1970 campaign if you want?

Mr. REBOZO. I said he might have. Now, you see, we're talking about something that happened 4 years ago, and I've read a lot of this stuff, and I am trying to be careful not to be conjecturing and not to believe what I read always. But I've read about his testimony and the many, many conversations that we've had over these 6 years, well, you could have easily assumed that. I would just have assumed it was sort of a means of getting me to take the money that was really for the President. But here is a face-saving excuse to give it. I can't tell you what was in his mind.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm not asking what his intentions were. I'm just asking what you recall him saying to you, Mr. Rebozo.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I said, we've had many conversations. I can't specifically recall everything that was said.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, if he said, "Use it for the 1970 campaign," did you then put him on notice?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he didn't say that.

Mr. LENZNER. He never said that?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall stating last year to somebody, making this statement that the money was in fact to be applied to the Republican congressional elections in 1970? Do you remember making that statement last year?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I don't recall any such statement.

Mr. LENZNER. You say you never made that statement?

Mr. REBOZO. I said I don't recall ever making such a statement.

Mr. GREER. If they've got a record or something—

Mr. FRATES. Since you have repeated and are referring to the record, we ask one of the Senators, Senator Weicker or Senator Montoya, whoever's presiding, to refresh his recollection, if you have any document there or any statement.

Mr. LENZNER. I will refresh his recollection if I can. Do you recall meeting with Special Agent Whitaker of the FBI in 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, yes, sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember asking him to come to your office, and do you remember talking to him at that time about the money, about the money that you had received from the Hughes people?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Was anybody else present on that occasion when you were talking to Whitaker?

Mr. REBOZO. I think Wakefield, the bank's general counsel, was there. I'm not sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall telling Agent Whitaker, at that time, that the money that you had received was to be applied to the Republican congressional elections in 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I am positive I didn't say anything like that. I will tell you where that misconception could have come in, and we might forestall some subsequent questions on this point.

Mr. LENZNER. All right, sir.

Mr. REBOZO. I know I shouldn't elaborate—

Mr. DASH. Well, I think the witness has a right to add and elaborate and explain his answers.

Mr. REBOZO. After the 1972 campaign, then I was hoping it might be used for the 1974 congressional election. Now, Whitaker, I might have said something like that to him, I don't know, and that is where your misconception might have come from.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me ask you this, Mr. Rebozo. Did you seek any advice from anybody during this period of time that Mr. Danner was trying to give you the contribution as to whether you should take it or not take it?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. All right, sir. Then I take it there came a time when you did, in fact, decide to take contributions.

Mr. REBOZO. The decision was purely mine.

Mr. LENZNER. You didn't consult with anybody else?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you remember approximately when you decided to take the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't. As I recall, again, to give background to put things in appropriate perspective and understand what my logic was at the time, it would take too long, but I'll make it very, very brief. As I recall, Danner then had been working for Hughes a couple of years or so. I had come to know Maheu, whom I didn't know when he first offered the money. Morgan was seemingly out of the picture, and I began to get a little confidence in the fact that maybe this money could be utilized, and it wouldn't present any embarrassing problems. So it was somewhere after he had been with them for sometime that I agreed to take it.

Mr. LENZNER. And you're saying a couple of years. Is that what you said before?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know what the timeframe was. It was——

Mr. FRATES. Well, excuse me. I think what he said, Mr. Lenzner, that Danner had been with the Hughes people approximately 2 years.

Mr. LENZNER. When you decided to take the money.

Mr. FRATES. That was a factor.

Mr. REBOZO. He might have been there a year.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, if he started in February of 1969, which I think is accurate, Mr. Rebozo——

Mr. REBOZO. Well, then, it would have been a year and a half.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, are you saying now during the year 1969 you did not decide then to accept the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No, that is correct, that's correct. It was decided shortly before he gave me the first envelope and he was going to come to Miami to do that, and I said, "Well, I'm going to be in California next week, and I'll save you a trip." And that is the way it came about.

Mr. LENZNER. How did you communicate to him when you decided to accept the funds? Was this in response to another offer by him?

Mr. REBOZO. I am sure it was. As I said, it came up any number of times and it was really beginning to strain our relationship because I was refusing it.

Mr. LENZNER. So you're saying that he continued to offer it during 1969, and then into 1970, and at some point you indicated to him OK.

Mr. REBOZO. He wasn't calling me every day.

Mr. LENZNER. I understand. On occasion he wanted to see if you'd still accept the funds. Did he indicate how much the total contribution was going to be before you accepted the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I don't think so. He may have given it to me and said there will be more later, but again, I read that as though—that's probably correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And you're saying now that when you received the funds on the first occasion, it was your understanding at that time that there would only be a \$50,000 payment.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I didn't say that. I said that he may have said there was going to be some more, but I don't think he ever said how much more.

Mr. LENZNER. And when did you receive those funds?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think we have well established that the first contribution was made on July 3d of 1970.

Mr. LENZNER. And that was where, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. In San Clemente.

Mr. LENZNER. And exactly where in San Clemente?

Mr. REBOZO. Apparently it was done at the administration offices because this all came up—the only reason I would know the date at all came up in my IRS examination, and then I think, subsequently with you people, I dug up an airline ticket, and I thought that he had stated the San Clemente Inn, where I frequently stay, but I had them check their records out there, and they reported that they had never had him registered there.

So, then I just had to assume that the other was the case. I sometimes stay at the residence, and so, apparently, I was staying at the guest cottage in the residence, and then I think that he came over, and I think that we had lunch over there at the administrative mess.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying that you are certain now that the first payment that you received from Mr. Danner was in California, in San Clemente, rather than in Florida?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I am as certain as I can be. Again, I put a lot of things together, and during all of these months, and that appears to be the fact. As I understand it, Danner had originally thought that it was here and then later changed his testimony and said that it was out there.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, let me ask you this. Do you recall when we first talked to you, Mr. Rebozo, do you recall at that time you recalled that you had received the first payment in 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. I told the IRS I had received it in 1968. That is how bad my recollection was at the time. I didn't know when I had received it. I had thought I had gotten the first in 1968 and the second in 1969, but I was sure that the first was given in California.

Mr. FRATES. Senator Weicker, I think Mr. Lenzner doesn't mean to mislead, but you're talking about the first interview. He said he originally thought it was 1969 until they had checked the airline tickets with Danner, and then it became obvious that it was July 3, 1970, and so he didn't say that he got it in 1969. At that interview the date was established as July 3, 1970, and I don't know what you purport to be stated in your question, that he told you that it was in 1969, because he didn't say that, and we have the records of that, and the typed records and the recording of that.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, that was the second interview we had with Mr. Rebozo.

Mr. REBOZO. We have notes of it, and I don't think there's any question.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, there's no sense in arguing about it. Let me ask you this, Mr. Rebozo—

Mr. FRATES. Well, excuse me. Senator Weicker, I think there is, because he did not make the statement that he got it in 1969 at that hearing. He said originally he thought he might have gotten it in 1969 until Danner checked his airline tickets at San Clemente.

He had only been there one time, and we gave Mr. Lenzner the copy of Mr. Danner's affidavit, I think to the IRS. I have a copy of it where that date was clearly established as July 3, 1970, the only time that he had gone to San Clemente, and that was—you have all those records, Terry. And I'm sure you don't mean to——

Mr. LENZNER. Which records are you referring to?

Mr. FRATES. Danner's records. I gave you the affidavit sitting in our conference room.

Mr. LENZNER. What does that suggest?

Mr. FRATES. The first contribution was made—this is Danner's affidavit, of which copy I voluntarily gave you. I assume you have it.

The first contribution was made to Mr. Rebozo on July 3d, 1970, while he was visiting San Clemente, Calif. I determined that date from my expense vouchers from the Frontier Hotel, Las Vegas, Nev. This \$50,000 was, according to my best recollection, the money apparently had been collected in 1968 for a possible contribution in 1969 Presidential campaign. I am now certain that this was the occasion of the first contribution, July 3, 1970.

Mr. LENZNER. I think that is the second affidavit, not his deposition.

Mr. FRATES. Terry, you've seen this.

Mr. DASH. Well, you have his interrogation. The only point I raise is you need a statement and the statement calls for clarification. I'm sure you didn't mean to——

Mr. LENZNER. Let me tell you this way. In fact, didn't you make the statement in 1973, that you had received the first contribution in 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I just got through saying that I had first told the IRS that I thought the first thing was in 1968 and the second was in 1969. I never made such a statement as you refer to.

Mr. DASH. Statement with whom? Clarify the record.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, do you recall telling, again, Special Agent Whitaker from the FBI, in June of 1973, that you received the funds in 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. No. June of 1973—I don't know if that was a period when I wasn't sure that I received it. As I've repeatedly stated, I originally even thought it was 1968, as I said. But we have firmly established that regardless of what you say I told him, the payment was made July 3 of 1970. That has been very, very firmly established.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry, I can't hear with all this talking going on, Mr. Rebozo. I apologize.

Mr. REBOZO. I said I believe it has been firmly established that the first payment was made on July 3, 1970, regardless of what you say that I told Whitaker.

Mr. LENZNER. All I'm asking now, though, sir, is when you had that conversation with Special Agent Whitaker, do you recall telling him that it was, in fact, 1969 that you received the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I don't recall telling him that. I could have.

Senator WEICKER. I gather—correct me if I'm wrong—Mr. Rebozo admits to the fact that quite frankly, at one time, he said it was 1968 and very possibly, he told you it was 1969, and now that he's sure it's 1970. That's my understanding of what's going back and forth here.

Mr. FRATES. You summed it up nicely, sir.

Mr. DASH. Is the assurance based on Mr. Danner's recollection of the records?

Mr. REBOZO. His and mine, and my plane tickets.

Mr. DASH. Well, are the records that you just referred to, Mr. Rebozo, are those what reminded you that the first payment was in 1970 in San Clemente?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, because I had contacted the San Clemente Inn and asked them to check out what dates Danner was there in 1968 or 1969, and they said he was never there. They checked 1970, 1971 and said, "He has never been checked in here." I didn't recall that.

Senator MONTROYA. I just want to ask one more question. Mr. Rebozo, you said that Mr. Danner visited you in Florida four or five times and he was trying to give you a contribution during 1969. Do you recall that?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he visited me a number of times and he didn't always stay at my house. I think he stayed there one time.

Senator MONTROYA. And he had this money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know that he always had the money. He talked about it.

Senator MONTROYA. How many times would you say—

Mr. REBOZO. On one occasion, I know he had the money because he brought it over.

Senator MONTROYA. And it was the same yellow type manila envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator MONTROYA. At which time it was used to deliver the \$50,000?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator MONTROYA. Was anybody else at San Clemente when you said he delivered the first contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No, there was nobody present when I say he delivered the first contribution.

Senator MONTROYA. What did you do with the funds after you received them at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe I put them in my bag and brought them back.

Senator MONTROYA. I mean did you open the envelope and count the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator MONTROYA. So you didn't open the envelope at all before you put it in your bag?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you introduce Mr. Danner to anybody at San Clemente after he delivered the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. If anybody would have walked up, I would have introduced him.

Senator MONTROYA. Do you recall having a conversation with President Nixon and Mr. Danner after you received the funds on that date?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall him seeing the President on that visit. Someone has said that we went in to visit him, and if the President were free, yes, I think it would have been a very logical thing.

Danner has known the President for more than 20 years. But I don't recall just going in there and talking to him. If we had, you can be sure that there was never any money discussed. It would take a long time to prove this point, and a lot of incidents and examples that I could use that would prove it, but I know in the interest of time, I'll not go into that now.

Senator MONTAYA. Have you made any effort to have—I know you told us at one time that you had the compound records checked to see when Mr. Danner was in the compound. Did you attempt to determine from the President's logs whether he and you and Mr. Danner met on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I did check—what I was referring to was the gate. I wasn't sure that they had it, and I did check the gate and he was logged in.

Senator WEICKER. Where did the actual transfer of the money take place?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe there at the staff mess. He just came in with his briefcase and I don't know whether we went to my cottage or not. I just don't know. It was just a plain manila envelope.

Senator WEICKER. To the best of your recollection, the manila envelope was given to you in the staff mess, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. I really don't know. It could have been there, it could have been at the cottage. The reason I'm inclined to doubt that we saw the President when I visited, is because when he is in that office, he has one appointment after the other and I don't like to inject something like this if there were Cabinet officers or Senators or someone there. But he could have. I don't recall it.

Mr. LENZNER. You recall the President being there, though, whenever it was, on that date?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall having a conversation with Miss Rose Mary Woods, Mr. Danner and yourself, after you received the funds in San Clemente?

Mr. FRATES. That day?

Mr. LENZNER. The same day.

Mr. REBOZO. We may have. I don't know whether he knows Rose or not. So if he does not, we wouldn't have had occasion to stop there.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you give Mr. Danner a receipt?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And I take it he did not request a receipt?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you make any record of the existence of the transaction? I mean did you make any written record?

Mr. REBOZO. I have a pretty good record right here [tapping his head].

Mr. LENZNER. What did you do after you got back to Florida with the funds in your briefcase? What did you do with the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I put it in the vault.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you open the envelope before you put the envelope in the vault?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I think at a subsequent time, I did.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, Senator. Mr. Rebozo has been interrogated on four or five occasions and I would just like to caution him, because I think he's talking—I have already told you this, Terry, but you must realize that this is being transcribed, so you have to tell the complete story of it.

Mr. REBOZO. OK.

Mr. LENZNER. Did I miss something?

Mr. FRATES. No, I just say I think you are on about the fifth conversation with him, and I want to make sure he's telling the complete transaction, make it clear on the record.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you want to add something, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. I have nothing to add.

Mr. LENZNER. You say you came back and took the envelope unopened and put it in a particular safe-deposit box, or just a vault?

Mr. REBOZO. A safe-deposit box.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you make any markings on the envelope at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; I just marked "HH" in the corner of it.

Mr. LENZNER. That is the only record, I take it, of the existence of the—that the funds were from Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. No, as I previously testified I wrote a letter and put it in the director's box, and on the envelope I wrote, "Instructions to Wakefield, General Counsel," who had the extra key to that box, that if anything should happen to me, to turn these funds over to the finance chairman or the campaign director when they are named. At that time, there was none. I did not tell my attorney what was in there; I simply said there were some important documents and if sometime something happens to me—I'm flying a lot—to open the box and follow instruction.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry; you wrote those instructions on the envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. I wrote them on the envelope and I also wrote another——

Senator WEICKER. Just to clarify, because I don't think—as I understand, this is a different envelope.

Mr. REBOZO. The same envelope.

Senator WEICKER. I thought the only thing that happened to the manila envelope was "HH" in the corner.

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Senator WEICKER. That one gets put in the box, right?

Mr. FRATES. With a letter.

Senator WEICKER. With a letter?

Mr. FRATES. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And the letter went into the director's vault?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And this letter is what you're now talking about?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Not the manila envelope with "HH" on it, is that right?

Mr. FRATES. Yes. Well, just to make sure——

Mr. REBOZO. Both.

Mr. FRATES. You put both in?

Mr. REBOZO. I wrote on the manila envelope instructions and then I wrote a letter and put it in the—addressed to Wakefield—in the director's box.

Mr. LENZNER. And this is at the time that you originally—the first time you put the envelope, which you assumed was money, in the safe-deposit box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I would say it was that evening or a few days later, but I think it was done at the same time.

Senator MONTROYA. Let me clarify one point. You said you put this letter of instruction in the director's box. What is the director's box?

Mr. REBOZO. The director's box, the attorney also has a key to that. It contains financial statements of directors that the bankers periodically review, and any other papers pertaining to the bank—

Senator MONTROYA. And in the letter, you stated that you had this package in your safe deposit box, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. And you identified it in the letter?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. How did you identify it?

Mr. REBOZO. I simply said it was in box No. 224.

Senator MONTROYA. How did you identify it?

Mr. REBOZO. And the instructions were on the envelope, the same instructions, really, that were in the letter. I don't know why I doubled up on it. I just assumed I would lose the key or whatever.

Senator MONTROYA. Is a copy of that letter of instruction available?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir; I don't think so.

Senator MONTROYA. Was it torn or destroyed?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, when the signals changed, you know, I just got rid of it, put the letter in a different envelope.

Mr. DASH. That's ambiguous. What do you mean, the signals changed?

Mr. REBOZO. That gets into a substantive aspect of it.

Mr. LENZNER. We'll get into it. If you want to get into it now, Mr. Rebozo—

Mr. FRATES. May I, if the Senator will permit, let him go ahead and tell the full story? I don't know if they want to come back after lunch. Go ahead and tell the factual part of it.

Senator MONTROYA. Just tell me when it was destroyed and then you can continue.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm not sure when it was destroyed, but it was somewhere along the time that—I think when Howard Hughes had his problems. You see, this first contribution was July 3 and the second one was a couple of months later, somewhere along in there.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you have the same instructions with respect to the subsequent contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. As I recall, it was attached to the same envelope. I had rubberbands around two of them. Thanksgiving of that year was when Howard Hughes pulled out of Las Vegas, and then they started having this donnybrook between the different ones—Maheu—Hughes fired Maheu; Maheu had hired Danner; and then bad blood immedi-

ately ensued between Danner and Mahen, and I got more apprehensive of how this might be interpreted. Not that I felt there was anything wrong with it, but after the previous experience, I was mostly concerned with how it would be interpreted. So as time went on, I just thought it better not to use that money for the 1972 campaign and try to see if things cleared up and hold it for the 1974 or 1976, some point where I could turn it over to the properly appointed authority. But matters went from bad to worse with the Hughes organization and I could just see one talking about the other, and I felt that sooner or later, this matter would come up and be misunderstood. This was the reason——

Senator MONTROYA. Did you consult with anybody on making that decision?

Mr. REBOZO. No, the decision to just hold onto it was my own. I didn't start with anyone until after the election, the balance of it.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me again. If I may interrupt, I think the records show, Senator, that he did tell Rose Mary Woods that the money was there. That was the only person.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; I did tell her.

Senator MONTROYA. Was that after the election?

Mr. REBOZO. No, before.

Senator WEICKER. I think counsel's suggestion is a good one, to just let Mr. Rebozo, in narrative form, to go on here, because otherwise, it does get a little difficult to follow.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Just to help you, we're back at the point where two envelopes have been put into the safe.

Mr. FRATES. At Key Biscayne Bank, which he actively runs.

Mr. REBOZO. With the appropriate instructions. Then, of course, when all this happened, the instructions stayed on it until—I think it was after this Watergate business.

Mr. DASH. You mean the break-in?

Senator WEICKER. I think it might be helpful if you do exactly what your counsel says. We still haven't gotten to the point where the second envelope has gone into the safe. We're just at the point where \$50,000, with letters of instruction, have been put into the safe.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I see. Well, this second envelope, of course, it was brought to Key Biscayne and put into the safe, attached to the other.

Senator WEICKER. Could you give the details of the receipt of that money?

Mr. REBOZO. It was in an envelope identical to the first one and Danner brought it. I don't remember whether he brought it to my office or my home; I don't recall. But after the Hughes problem in 1970, then these other problems arose, so it was getting more complicated all the time.

I almost have to digress a little bit to further clarify the basis of my apprehension. I'm sorry to bore you with this, but it has to go back to the original group thing involving Drew Pearson and Ed Morgan and so on. My understanding of that loan—it has been written up so many times as having never been repaid. My under-

standing of that loan was that the property was appraised, the money was loaned through Mrs. Nixon, Hannah Nixon, his mother. The property was appraised at something like just under \$230,000. Part of the condition of the loan was that they were to spend \$40,000 of the money to build a service station on the property, and that is what they did.

My further understanding was that when Don Nixon went broke, they deeded the property back and the lessors rights on the service station and that Hughes didn't lose anything on it. But in spite of my understanding of that, it still gets play in stories after all these years. That was in 1958, I believe, when that happened. So it is easy to see how anything connected with the Hughes name, especially where money is concerned, raised a flag with me. So I took all the precautions I could.

Now, when it came to returning the money, I took into consideration that there may be some question about whether I was—had used the money and was replacing it, or what, because IRS had come in and I had told them about it. So I debated just how to go about returning it and proving that it was identical money.

My first inclination was to call the Chief of the Secret Service, but he is so closely identified with the administration—they work under the Treasury—I decided to call the head of the FBI locally, whom I also knew. That is Whitaker, who was just mentioned. He came over and I told him the purpose in having him there was that these funds had been in the box all these years and I wanted to see if, through their crime lab, they could ascertain that the money—by smell, feel, touch, deterioration, or something—had been locked up, in fact, that long. And too, I told him that I'm sure that everybody who works in Las Vegas is fingerprinted and they could fingerprint those bills and find a Vegas print on every one of them so that this question could never arise.

So he was there at the opening of the box, and the attorneys. They counted the money. He didn't stay for the full count. He initialed a few of them and looked at them all, and so on. And he was very, very careful so as not to obliterate the prints. The attorney took an eraser and took each bill by the very corner, turned it up and read the serial number off, made a list of the serial number, and prepared a receipt for them to sign for those identical bills.

When they got through counting them, as you have probably read—of course, I was a little apprehensive that somebody may be short of \$100,000 and be accused of something. It turned out that we had an extra \$100 in there. We returned 1,001 \$100 bills, with the serial numbers.

Mr. DASH. At what point, sir, to follow your narrative at what point did you say you did destroy the letter, or that the letter was destroyed, after the Hughes incident?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that the letter—again, time is hard to follow, but I think that the letter was destroyed later. I think the letter remained in there. You see, the campaign director and chairman—I do not believe were engaged until February or March of 1972, and it was shortly after that that the problem started.

Mr. FRATES. May I interject by saying in clarification, Tom Wake-

field, who he had written to, is one of the people who was there when the money box was opened and the money was counted. Four people were there—Wakefield, Rebozo, Barker, and Whitaker. Ken Whitaker is the FBI man. And the instructions were written. They were to Wakefield, of course.

Go ahead.

Mr. REBOZO. I think that—you asked me when I changed the signals. I don't recall when that was done, when I decided to take that off, but it was somewhere in that timeframe, after the Hughes problems started and the campaign got underway, somewhere along in there. I don't recall, really.

Senator WEICKER. Prior—I'm a little confused. This envelope, this is prior to the opening of the safe and the counting of the money in the presence of the FBI Agent, Whitaker?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. So, in fact, the envelopes in which the money was situated were not the same envelopes that were the original envelopes?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator WEICKER. And at the time that occurred, neither was there a letter in the director's box, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I took that out. I had forgotten that was in there until I went into the director's box one day, and then I took that out because the signals were no longer valid.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, the day that you changed the envelopes on the money was not identical to the day that you took the letter out of the director's box?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I destroyed the envelope that was in the box where the directions were on the big envelope. But the letter in the director's box I did away with later.

Senator WEICKER. Could you give us some sort of timeframe as to these two actions?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't go in there very often and it could have been—anything I say will be a guess.

Senator WEICKER. 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have—no, I think it was—I really don't know.

Senator MONTAYA. I would like to ask a question along that line.

Senator WEICKER. Sure.

Senator MONTAYA. This is the first time you have said this since I have been here, that you put a manila envelope, a yellow manila envelope, with \$50,000 in the safety-deposit box and that later on at Key Biscayne, you received another envelope with \$50,000 and you proceeded to tie that to the other manila envelope so that it would be found pursuant to the instructions that you had left in the letter in the director's box.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I also had directions on the first manila envelope, too.

Senator MONTAYA. Yes, you had directions on the first manila envelope and you had directions in the director's box addressed to your attorney?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, then, now you say that sometime subsequent to the placement of those envelopes in the safety deposit box, you took the money out and destroyed the envelope with the instructions, right?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator MONTROYA. Now, what did you do with the money? Where did you place it?

Mr. REBOZO. I put it in the other—what happened was—and I didn't recall until after we had been talking one time down there. I didn't recall why I didn't put it back in big envelopes until during the conversation there. I recall that I took the box into my office to do it and I didn't have any big envelopes in there, and I put it in—I don't know, 10's or 20's—in large brown envelopes that I have in my desk. Then I tied them together. I continued to separate the two and then the number 50's by—although it was in two or three envelopes each, I put elastic bands around those and when I—when we inventoried the money and recorded the serial numbers of each one, the inventory list separated—I think it is A and B, whatever it is—the two and then the number 50's, so I was trying to clearly identify in every way possible every detail of the transaction and even separate the two contributions.

Senator MONTROYA. When was this done?

Mr. REBOZO. I really—

Senator MONTROYA. More or less when you took them into your office?

Mr. REBOZO. I really don't know. It was sometime—I don't know. I'm afraid to guess.

Senator MONTROYA. In what year was it?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I said, I even thought the contribution was in 1968 and it was 1970. I'm afraid to guess.

Senator MONTROYA. Yes, but this was more recent.

Mr. REBOZO. Even so it was still probably more than a year ago.

Senator WEICKER. 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. It very easily could have been 1972. It probably was.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me ask you on that, aren't the procedures such that you have to sign in and sign out on your safe-deposit box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; all the customers do, and I used to do it when I first opened the bank. But we're a small bank and we only have 18 people in the whole operation, and the girl who handles that is almost invariably busy, so I just quit doing that. I would go get the key and go in and do it myself.

Senator MONTROYA. So there would be no record of your being signed in or signed out?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. The only record is we did all sign the card when Whitaker came and counted the money. All four of us signed the card.

Senator MONTROYA. But prior to that, there would be no record of your coming or going?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Now and then, we used to have one receptionist there who would say, "OK, sign it for me this time," and I would sign it. But most of the time, I would just go in.

Senator WEICKER. Now, counsel, you are the one—I certainly want to make this at your convenience and certainly your client's. We have been going a long time. Would it be your desire to break now?

Mr. FRATES. Sir, we are here at your convenience.

Mr. DASH. I take it as human beings, we're going to have a lunch break. We could go on until 12:30 unless——

Senator WEICKER. Why not put it this way? We're talking about a matter of a few minutes. Why don't we break for lunch now and what would be a good time to come back?

Mr. DASH. May I ask Mr. Frates for his convenience—and I ask it solely for your convenience and Mr. Rebozo's convenience. Unfortunately, we have a horde of people.

Mr. FRATES. That is one thing we don't hold against you.

Mr. DASH. First of all, we have arranged for enough people out there so you can go and come as you will.

Mr. REBOZO. You did an extra good job.

Mr. DASH. I made sure we had an extra good group there. Now, if you want to leave and go to lunch alone somewhere else, that is up to you.

Mr. FRATES. Again, I want the Senator to realize we're here at your convenience. It appears to me it's not going to be a day's session, it's going to be a 2-day session.

Mr. DASH. With the narrative, it has been very helpful. With specific questions, we can follow it up.

Mr. FRATES. If we may, if we can go, I would like for our group to go. The officers have been wonderful. If they can get us down there, and Mr. Rebozo down there, we can eat, when your Honors set a time to come back, we'll come back.

Senator WEICKER. Then I would suggest that we recess until 2 o'clock.

Mr. FRATES. Fine.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me ask you this: Would you have any objection if we reviewed during lunch hour the records you brought us so we can see whether or not——

Mr. FRATES. I would rather not, Terry. We have done this before and I can assure you we're going to cooperate with you completely, but I think that is just going to lead to ——

Mr. DASH. In other words, you want a Senator in the room.

Mr. LENZNER. We can abbreviate the session if we didn't have to break——

Mr. FRATES. That is what we have said several times, but it never worked that way.

Senator WEICKER. We'll come back at 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

· Senator TALMADGE [presiding]. Mr. Rebozo has already been sworn.

Mr. DASH. Yes, he has, Senator.

Senator TALMADGE. Then we'll proceed.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, did you have any official fund-raising responsibilities in 1969 when Mr. Danner began to discuss the Hughes contribution with you?

Mr. REBOZO. The answer is "no."

Mr. LENZNER. During that period in 1969, did you on occasion have discussions with other individuals with regard to contributions for the 1972 campaign?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, Mr. Lenzner. Senator Weicker, I guess I'll direct this to you. It seems to me, again, we're right back in 1968, and I thought the chairman had——

Mr. DASH. I think his question was——

Senator WEICKER. Let me say, I did not hear the question. What is the question?

Mr. LENZNER. The question is, did you have discussions with other individuals, in addition to Mr. Danner, with regard to contributions for the 1972 campaign?

Mr. FRATES. All right. That question is all right.

Mr. REBOZO. You mean in——

Mr. GREER. In 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. You mean discussions with respect to raising money?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator WEICKER. How about in respect to receiving money?

Mr. REBOZO. No, neither one. I simply thought there may have been some casual conversation that he was alluding to, but no, I had no conversations with respect to soliciting or accepting contributions at that time.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me clarify it, then, because it's not clear. What I was asking is, did you speak to any specific individuals other than Mr. Danner in 1969 with regard to specific contributions for the 1972 election? That is what I meant to ask?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I probably spoke with Kalmbach sometime or other. I didn't participate in requesting a contribution or accepting any contribution in 1969.

Mr. LENZNER. But you spoke to Mr. Kalmbach with regard to——

Mr. REBOZO. I said, I may have. I may have because I saw him whenever I went to California, and I may have. He may have mentioned contributions. We discussed a wide variety of things from time to time, and that may have been mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Kalmbach ask you to see any specific individuals with regard to contributions—for the 1972 campaign, now?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think that later on, I don't know whether it was 1969 or 1970—it might have been 1970—he asked me to make an appointment with him with a couple of people that I knew. One was Paul Getty and another was Raymond Guest.

Mr. LENZNER. Who was that, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. Raymond Guest.

Mr. LENZNER. I don't even know who that is.

Mr. REBOZO. He was Kennedy's Ambassador to Ireland.

Mr. LENZNER. I see.

Mr. FRATES. That's a generation gap.

Mr. LENZNER. You said he requested sometime in 1969 or 1970 for you to make an appointment for him to speak to those two individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so.

Mr. LENZNER. Any other individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. Not that I can recall.

Mr. LENZNER. And that was for the purpose of obtaining contributions for the 1972 election?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Had you been asked by anybody else to speak to Mr. Getty yourself?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. You had not been requested by anybody else to seek to obtain money from Mr. Getty?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if Mr. Kalmbach received contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. I understand he did.

Mr. LENZNER. Did those funds go to him and to you, or just to Mr. Kalmbach?

Mr. REBOZO. Direct to the campaign committee, I think.

Mr. LENZNER. Not to you, though, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if those were checks or cash?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know what the amounts were?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator WEICKER. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator WEICKER. Back on the record.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, did I ask you what amounts those contributions were?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, you did. I said, I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have occasion to speak to the President with regard to those two contributions or contributors?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And you can't remember the exact day when those contributions came in, I take it?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. But Mr. Kalmbach did report them to you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir; I don't. I would imagine it was 1971 or—I don't know.

Mr. FRATES. Let's not start to guess. I'm sure you don't want to guess.

Mr. LENZNER. But you have no specific record?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when Mr. Danner and you met in San Clemente, Calif., do you recall, was that at his request or your request, that meeting?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I stated, I had finally agreed to accept the contribution and he was going to bring it to Miami and I said, "well, I'm going out"—I think it was the following week—"to San Cle-

mente," and I said, "to save you a trip out here, I'll get it out there."

Mr. LENZNER. And he agreed to that?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you on any occasion suggest to Mr. Danner that he ought to retain the funds until the Republican Finance Committee was formed for the campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you ever suggest to him that a check would be more appropriate to use than using cash?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. When you went to San Clemente on that occasion, did you know he was going to furnish you with cash?

Mr. REBOZO. I assumed it, because that is what he offered before when I had turned it down.

Mr. LENZNER. We have, Mr. Rebozo, some records from Mr. Danner on his telephone. I'm told that they do not reflect any calls just prior to July 3, 1970, to you. Is it possible that you called Mr. Danner and allowed us how you were going to be in San Clemente, if he wanted to be with you?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. I'll ask Senator Weicker—he referred to records and some explanation of them. What records are those? His home or his phone, or all telephone calls, or does he deny that he talked to Mr. Rebozo? It seems to me you ought to delineate.

Mr. LENZNER. We're not getting into his testimony. I'll state for the record, that we subpoenaed and received what he described as his telephone bills, both from the hotel and, I believe, his residence, which did reflect a number of calls between Mr. Rebozo and Mr. Danner, but none immediately preceding—in fact, none in the month of July 1970—or I'm sorry—or June 1970. The last phone call reflects his May 21, 1970, calls. What I'm asking you is, based on that record, is it conceivable that you called him?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall who called who.

Mr. DASII. Could the record say that it would be possible that you did call him?

Mr. REBOZO. I guess it's possible. That didn't necessarily mean that I called him about this. We've been friends for over 30 years.

Mr. LENZNER. So your recollection is not clear on that, is that fair to say, who called whom to set up the San Clemente meeting?

Mr. REBOZO. [Shakes head in negative.]

Mr. LENZNER. He did call you—I withdraw that question. Let me ask you this. You had luncheon, apparently, with Mr. Mitchell—this is from Mr. Mitchell's diary—on May 28, 1970. Do you have any recollection of discussing with Mr. Mitchell the Hughes contribution on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. To this day, to this moment, I have never discussed the Hughes contribution with Mitchell, ever.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I hate to go back to this, but in 1968, when you went to New York to see Mr. Morgan and Mr. Danner, isn't it true that you met with Mr. Mitchell at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. As I stated before, that was some sort of a conclave planning for the campaign and I met all these people. There wasn't any specific meeting for the purpose of this type.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember being in Mr. Mitchell's office with Mr. Danner and receiving a phone call from what you described, allegedly described, as a Hughes representative, that you interrupted the meeting, and when you came back into the meeting——

Mr. REBOZO. I don't remember that.

Mr. LENZNER [continuing]. When you came back into the meeting, you allegedly said, and this is based on other evidence that we have, that the contribution would not, you could not go forward with accepting the contribution, and that Mr. Mitchell was present at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't remember that.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when Mr. Danner first gave you the funds in San Clemente on the first occasion, did you tell him what you were going to do with the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think I felt it was necessary. I don't think I specifically did. He told me they were the same funds that he had earmarked for the campaign, that they had been in a vault, trying to get me to accept it all that time.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he tell you what vault, where they had been?

Mr. REBOZO. He may have mentioned it, but I don't know. His office vault or something; I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. But you did not tell him that you were going to put them in your safe-deposit box and retain them there?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I wasn't that specific with him.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, how soon after you—by the way, did you see the President yourself after you received the funds in San Clemente?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I'm sure I did, because I was staying at the guest cottage at his residence.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you advise the President——

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. No, sir; I never discussed it with the President.

Mr. LENZNER. I was going to ask you, did you advise the President that his friend, Mr. Danner, had been there?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have. As I said before, Danner may have even seen him and said hello to him. I don't recall any such thing happening, but it could have happened. I probably would have told him that Danner had been by.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of having a discussion with the President and Mr. Danner with regard to shows in Las Vegas and what seemed to be clean shows and what weren't clean shows in terms of entertainment?

Mr. REBOZO. We may have, but I don't——

Mr. LENZNER. You have no recollection of that?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell Mr. Danner that you would not tell the President about the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm inclined to think he knew that already. I'm sure I didn't specifically tell him that. At the appropriate time, of course, I intended to tell him. He knows the President pretty well, too.

Mr. LENZNER. When you say, "he knew that," you mean from his prior——

Mr. REBOZO. I would assume that he knew that, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. But you didn't explicitly say that?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when you say, "at the appropriate time, you would tell the President," what do you mean, "at the appropriate time"?

Mr. REBOZO. I intended telling him after the election, as I did in 1968 with respect to previous contributions then.

Mr. LENZNER. Was there any reason why you would wait until after the election to tell the President about the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, those who have worked with the President closely, who know him well, know that he just doesn't like to discuss these matters. Afterwards, he should know who helped.

I was interviewed during one of the earlier sessions. I remember in 1960 when I was given money for him and directed to hand it to him. When I went to do it, he wouldn't even touch it. He said, "Give it to Len Hall, the campaign manager."

Mr. LENZNER. So had you furnished the money to the campaign, you would have waited until after November and after the election to tell the President with regard to that money?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that is true of most of those who knew him well and worked with him.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, how soon after you received the money did you leave for Key Biscayne?

Mr. REBOZO. I wouldn't know without finding the plane ticket. I think the plane ticket indicated I went out on the first and probably was there a week.

Mr. LENZNER. So where did you retain the funds after Mr. Danner gave them to you?

Mr. REBOZO. In my bag.

Mr. LENZNER. In your bag in your room?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And you told nobody else while you were in San Clemente that you had those funds with you?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And then you brought them back on an airplane. How soon after you arrived in Key Biscayne—what did you do with them after you arrived in Key Biscayne?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. When you say "nobody else," I don't know how to interpret that. His testimony is he told no one at that stage about receiving it.

Mr. LENZNER. That's what I mean.

Mr. FRATES. I thought you did.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me go back over that.

Mr. REBOZO. I put it in the vault after that.

Mr. LENZNER. What I was asking before, Mr. Frates, let me ask again. Did you advise anybody that was in San Clemente on about July 3, 1970, that you had, in fact, received \$50,000 from Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I don't think I did. I don't know when I first—I may have told Rose Woods then, but I don't know. I know I told her shortly after having received it, but it may not have been—it may have been later, because there just always isn't a chance to be alone.

Senator WEICKER. If I could ask a question here. When Mr. Dan-

ner gave you the money at San Clemente, did he give it to you with the idea that this was for the President's campaign of 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that is the understanding I had.

Senator WEICKER. Now, you have indicated that in the past, when similar situations have occurred, either in this campaign or the previous campaign, you would accept money but you would not tell the President until after the election.

Mr. REBOZO. Normally, I turned it right in to the finance chairman.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. REBOZO. With a list.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. REBOZO. And I think he reported the contributions after the election and if I had occasion to mention it, I would do so, but after the election.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, in this particular instance, did you indicate the receipt of this money to the finance chairman or anybody connected with the finance committee?

Mr. REBOZO. There was no finance chairman at the time. That is why I put it in the vault. You see, I received the money in the middle of 1970, and the finance chairman wasn't named until 1972.

Senator WEICKER. But you wouldn't have, for instance, indicated to the treasurer of the Republican National Committee or any other ongoing entity that you received the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask right now, have you ever had occasion, before or since, to hold a campaign contribution in your safe-deposit box, of this nature?

Mr. REBOZO. You mean to hold—you say "of this nature." To hold it for some time, you mean?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir, following up on Senator Weicker's question.

Mr. REBOZO. No. If I got contributions and put them in there, I turned them in at the earliest date. I took some up at one time and took some up in 1968.

Mr. LENZNER. I couldn't hear you.

Mr. REBOZO. I took some up in 1968 that I had and I was holding it temporarily.

Mr. LENZNER. But that was before the election, I take it.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And shortly after you received the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. But you had kept, I take it, funds in this same safe-deposit box—that is, political contributions—on prior occasions before you put Mr. Danner's money in there?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think what I told you was that I used—we have three boxes that I have access to. Sometimes, if I were going into the box and the bank was busy, rather than tie up everybody, if I had something for two or three boxes, I might put it all in one and transfer it later. Whenever I was going north, then I would take out what I wanted to turn in.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, maybe we ought to get clear for the record, you had three boxes. You say now you used all three boxes to hold political contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. No. no. I don't know what I put in—I have one box, my personal box. One box is the director's box, and this other box here that I have shared with my attorney for many years. What I'm saying is that from time to time—I don't go into the vault that often. From time to time, when I go in, I'll have things in my drawer, stock certificates or whatever, and might have something—maybe I had a contribution—and I just put them in. Maybe I put them in the contribution box until some other time when I'm ready to take them out and deliver them, and transfer whatever I had in that other box when I needed to go in there.

Mr. LENZNER. When you say contribution box, you mean the box that was shared with Mr. Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Yes, that is a misnomer, because it is a box that had other documents in it—my will and stock certificates and a variety of things like that.

Mr. LENZNER. That was box 224?

Mr. REBOZO. Correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when you had contributions in there on prior occasions, did you use a similar recordkeeping thing? In other words, when you previously had cash as contributions, had you written instructions on the container?

Mr. REBOZO. No. It wasn't necessary, you see, because any other contributions came in during the campaign and it was already set up. This was the only contribution that came in before there was a campaign director or finance chairman named.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, if a campaign contribution came in, on prior occasions, you just put it in a box, but you wouldn't make any written notation with regard to that contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes. I think that I always notified the finance office that so and so had made a contribution, because I wanted him to be acknowledged at the earliest date, and rather than just jump on a plane and run up there, I would wait, because I went up there frequently enough and took it with me.

Mr. LENZNER. So you would just correspond and your correspondence would be the record of the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think a lot of it was done by phone.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when you—did you go immediately to the bank when you got to Key Biscayne and put the money into your safe-deposit box?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so. I don't recall when I got into town. When I came in at night, I couldn't have. I would have kept it at home that night and put it in the next day.

Mr. LENZNER. When you put it into safe deposit box 224—

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER [continuing]. And it was in an unsealed envelope and you still had not unsealed it at that time.

Mr. REBOZO. In a sealed envelope.

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, you're absolutely right, in a sealed envelope that you had not unsealed.

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you, at the same time that you put the envelope in, did you also write on the envelope the materials that you previously described?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm not sure we have the record. What, exactly, did you say on the envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think I said something like:

Addressed to Thomas Wakefield. In the event something happens to me, please see that the contents herein are delivered to the Finance Chairman for the Re-election of the President or the Campaign Director, when named.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you indicate from whom the funds had been received?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you, at the same time, prepare a letter for your director's box?

Mr. REBOZO. I think the letter may have been a month, may have been a couple of weeks, I just don't know. At one time, when I was in the director's box for some other things and it suddenly occurred to me that I had other notes in there, and I want to change my will—my lawyer gets after me for trying to do that by separate note. But anyway, I put things in there where he can readily get them. I think it was a short time afterwards that it occurred to me that—why not just double it up with that in case something happens to me and if he had to go to the director's box, he would go there first.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember what that letter said?

Mr. REBOZO. The same thing.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you know—do you have any recollection of whether that was a typed letter or——

Mr. REBOZO. Handwritten.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell Mr. Wakefield that that letter was in the director's box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think I did. I think I did; I'm not sure. I know that I told him about the other box and he had a duplicate key to it.

Mr. LENZNER. Had you advised him that the contribution was in 224?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't tell him it was a contribution. I simply told him there were some important documents in there that I wanted him to take care of immediately.

Mr. LENZNER. Was there any reason why you didn't want Mr. Wakefield, your counsel, to know that you had a contribution in there in case anything happened to you?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I didn't think it made a difference. He didn't ask. He wasn't involved in the campaign. I felt that my notes had served the purpose intended.

Mr. LENZNER. Did your notes also indicate that Mr. Danner had been the one to provide you the money if any question had come up?

Mr. REBOZO. No. My letter may have said that it was a contribution from Howard Hughes, but I don't recall the exact wording of the whole thing now.

Mr. DASH. I understand, at this point, Mr. Rebozo, you had made up your mind to accept it, thinking that there was no longer a serious problem, and there had not yet come another time when you had thought that there may be a problem. So at this time, there would be no reason for you to want to keep secret, other than your prior

practice of not telling the President, the fact that this contribution had been made?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably that and my practice of being a very private person until the last few months.

Senator WEICKER. Did you intend, at that time, to turn it over to the appropriate finance committee for the campaign of 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. That was your intention at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any specific recollection of other documents being in 224 when you put the envelope in?

Mr. REBOZO. Gee, I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. You have no recollection like that?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not at this stage, because things get moved around. I don't have any specific recollection.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall—did an officer of the bank have to go with you when you put that contribution in?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. How long after you put it in did you have occasion to go into that box again and see the envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. Gee, I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did there come a time—you can't estimate at all how long it was before you had occasion to go back into the box?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir; I don't know.

Senator WEICKER. Was there a time between when you put that envelope with the money into the box and when you put the second amount of money into the box that you went into the box? As I understand from this morning's testimony, is there a 2-month interval?

Mr. REBOZO. That is right. My guess is there is about 2 months' difference. I probably had occasion to go in there.

I don't know whether in that timeframe—we had a property down there that I have a lot of stock in and a lot of stock certificates, and they were in an envelope in there, too, because if I were out of town and we had a contract to sell the property, if I were out of town, my attorney would have needed that. So it was in there. I don't know when I went in or out.

Mr. LENZNER. You say that contract was in the box at the time?

Mr. REBOZO. Not the contract. My stock certificates with stock powers were in the manila envelope—in a manila envelope.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, the record seems to indicate that Danner, although Mr. Rebozo has no clear recollection, it was August 19 or 20 of 1973 for the second trip.

Mr. LENZNER. You mean 1970?

Mr. FRATES. 1970. Did I say 1973? 1970 was the second trip made to Key Biscayne.

Mr. LENZNER. Did there come a time when you did go back into the box, though, to open this envelope finally and count the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes—no, I didn't count the money. But at one time, I thought I ought to take a look at it and I saw it had Las Vegas wrappers on it, so I took them off and put rubber bands on it—again concerned about how it might be misinterpreted.

Senator WEICKER. Was this between the first group of money and the second group or collection?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know.

Senator WEICKER. If you had done that the first time, would it have been logical to do it a second time, if it came from the same source?

Mr. REBOZO. It might have been after the second group. I don't recall exactly.

Mr. LENZNER. Did all the cash have wrappers that said Las Vegas? What you're saying is all——

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. As I recall, they were all from a Las Vegas bank. Actually, that's the one of the factors that made me feel that I didn't have to worry about it being skimmed money or something drawn from the bank.

Mr. LENZNER. So neither of the cash contributions had wrappers that indicated that it came from any of the casinos or the hotel?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I'm sorry I didn't leave them on.

Mr. LENZNER. But the answer is "No, they didn't"?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall the name of the bank that it had?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. All it had was the name of the bank, and said, "Las Vegas, Nev."

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I just saw "Las Vegas" and the bank and that was all.

Mr. LENZNER. Could you explain on the record to Senator Weicker why you decided to remove the wrappers?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, just because of the stigma that is applied——

Senator WEICKER. I think he already has.

Mr. REBOZO [continuing]. To anything from Las Vegas.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you concerned about people possibly proceeding with what you call skimmed money from the casinos?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I tell you, at first, I had some consternation about it, but as I talked to them more and as I was told that the money came from Hughes' privately owned casino and that taxes were paid on it, and I could see no reason to doubt that.

Mr. LENZNER. That you were advised by Mr. Danner with regard to that?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think Danner told me that that was one of one—during one of the numerous discussions. I don't know. I may have felt that I had some apprehension about that and volunteered it. I don't know how it came out, but that is the story that I got.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, between the time—as I understand your testimony, you're not sure whether you took the wrappers off the first money you received before Mr. Danner brought you the second amount?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct. My inclination is to think that I hadn't even looked at the money at that time. When the second one came in, that's when I first looked at it, I believe, and saw those wrappers, and I knew.

Mr. LENZNER. How soon after the first contribution do you think you got the second contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was a matter of weeks. It could have been 3 months.

Mr. LENZNER. Three months?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been 3 months, it could have been 6 weeks. I really don't know. I think I saw something where Danner had indicated it was in August and that would be correct.

Mr. LENZNER. How was that meeting arranged, Mr. Rebozo? Could you describe that?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I recall, I didn't even know he was bringing any money on that trip. I think he just probably called and said he was coming down, or that he called me when he got there. He comes down quite frequently—not to see me. As I said, his mother lives in Florida; he lived there many, many years. I ran into him once at the golf course at Key Biscayne and I didn't even know he was in town. He was playing golf in my backyard. But he's an old friend of Senator Smathers, and he visited him. He lives in Key Biscayne. So I don't know what different times we had discussions about various things.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, what I was getting at, did there come a time when you became aware of the fact that he was going to deliver another \$50,000 in cash?

Mr. REBOZO. As I said, just now, I really don't remember him telling me he was going to do it.

Mr. LENZNER. I see.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm inclined to think he just brought it. I could be mistaken, but I don't recall any arrangement on that. I recall the first one.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, after the first delivery, did you expect a second delivery of money?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that he had indicated that there would be more.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he indicate how much more?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And when he came the second time, did he come to your house? I mean when he came to deliver it at Key Biscayne, was it at your home, or is it your recollection it was at the bank?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. He probably came to the bank. He probably came in the daytime.

Mr. LENZNER. Again, I don't want—is this your best recollection, or are you guessing on this?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, both.

Mr. LENZNER. I mean, do you have a recollection of seeing him physically with the funds in the bank?

Mr. REBOZO. No. As I said, he probably did. I'm conjecturing I guess. I don't know whether he gave it to me at home or at the bank, but my guess would be that he brought it to the bank.

Mr. LENZNER. Was anybody else present when he delivered the money to you?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. How was it packaged?

Mr. REBOZO. The same way as the first one.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you open that envelope at the time?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. What did you do with the envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. Put it in the box.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Danner with regard to the purpose of the fund at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he tell you how much was in the envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. He may have. It was the same size envelope and probably weighed about the same.

Mr. LENZNER. So when you put the second envelope in, you're not sure whether you knew there was a total of \$100,000 in the box or not?

Mr. REBOZO. He probably told me that there was another 50.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you make any notations on the envelope that would reflect any new information at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. On that, I think I just put a rubber band around it and put it in the box and later put a rubber band around them. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. But you didn't add anything to the letter in the director's box or on the envelope itself?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I may have written Wakefield's name on it, too. I really don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Was Mr. Mahen present on that occasion with Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. No; he was never there when Danner gave me the money on either occasion.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection, though, of advising or making a statement in 1973 that Mr. Mahen was present with Mr. Danner when the money was delivered to you in Florida?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think what you're referring to is at one point, I said that I thought that on one of Danner's visits, Mahen was with him at the hotel, but not with him when he delivered the funds.

Mr. LENZNER. At the hotel in Florida?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; I think he was with him there.

Mr. LENZNER. So the answer is, you have no recollection of making that statement in 1973, that Mahen was with Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. No, and I'm pretty positive I didn't make the statement.

Mr. DASH. Terry, did you get into the question—there was a time, as I understand it, you went, when you opened the envelope to look at the money, and then you took the wrapper off. There was a time you mentioned this morning that you took the box into your office and you broke, you put it into other envelopes. Was that the same time, the time you took the wrappers off?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I had done that previously.

Mr. DASH. In other words, you had done what previously?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe I had taken the wrappers off previously.

Mr. DASH. Previously. Then, when was the time that you took the box into your office and put the money into different envelopes?

Mr. REBOZO. Somewhere in there when I decided that the letter and the message were no longer appropriate. So I took the box into my office to switch it and I didn't have any big envelopes, so I just put it in this oversized manila brown envelope.

Mr. DASH. Can you recall when that occurred, Mr. Rebozo? You say it occurred at a time when you—I think you said “switched the signals,” or you were concerned?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I was asked that question before and I still don’t recall.

Mr. DASH. You did mention this morning once, and I don’t know whether this refreshes your recollection, you did think it may have been at the time of the Watergate problem. I think you said this morning—could that have been after the break-in of the Watergate, when all the news was——

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I changed the signals principally because of the Hughes problems at Las Vegas. I was—because of the violent flareup between Maheu and Danner, and both of them had to be in on this, I didn’t want to risk even the remotest embarrassment about any Hughes connection with Nixon. I was convinced that it cost the President the 1960 election and didn’t help him in 1962 in California.

Drew Pearson had gone out there during the 1962 campaign and spent 2 weeks out there and every day, he was talking about that.

Mr. DASH. Was it your concern, when you say the Hughes flareup that ultimately got Maheu fired, was it your concern that maybe this \$100,000 would be claimed to be not an authorized expenditure from the Hughes funds? Was that the concern? I’m trying to pinpoint what the concern was.

Mr. REBOZO. The concern, I think, was principally any disclosure that the President had received Hughes money—not because, again I want to repeat, that I thought there was anything wrong with it, but because of the way the previous loan had been handled and kicked around for all those years.

Mr. DASH. But if there had been no flareup at all, you had made up your mind at the time you received the money that it was all right to receive it, and you put “HH” on the envelope and you were going to, I guess, when there was a finance committee, to turn it over and give Hughes credit for it.

Mr. REBOZO. That’s right.

Mr. DASH. So you had no concern, then, that it was a Hughes contribution. So it wasn’t just the Hughes money, was it?

Mr. REBOZO. I don’t follow you.

Mr. DASH. I’m saying you had made a decision when you received the money that it was all right to receive it.

Mr. REBOZO. That’s right.

Mr. DASH. That would have been a recognition that once you gave it over to the campaign organization, that Hughes money was going into the President’s campaign.

Mr. REBOZO. That’s right.

Mr. DASH. That didn’t bother you at that point?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, but you’ll recall that at that time, they didn’t have to report those funds that were turned in. I’m sure that Hughes probably didn’t care about it being reported. He was giving to both sides.

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask this question: When did you abandon your intention to turn this over to a finance committee? You said you accepted it with the intention of turning it over, so when did you abandon your intention to turn it over?

Mr. REBOZO. Somewhere along in—when the Hughes flareup came about, I thought that maybe it would blow over, but it got worse and then they got involved in suing each other. Then I realized that it was bound to create some embarrassment, because somewhere along the line, somebody was going to bring it up.

Senator WEICKER. I think what might be confusing Sam Dash, as it confuses me, is that there are two different situations that seem to have caused you concern: One in the past, one that occurred after you received the money. In other words, that which related to—I'm not familiar with these facts—the loan to Nixon, et cetera, that related to the 1960 and 1962 campaign, and then that situation which actually occurred when you had the money, which was a blowup between the various factions in the Hughes empire. Is this correct, Sam?

Mr. DASH. Yes, that was the area. That is where I was a little confused. It was as to what was the real concern. It apparently was of no concern, when you received the money, to receive the Hughes money, but you have said that's because you didn't have to report it.

Mr. REBOZO. There was considerable concern when I received the money.

Mr. DASH. Yes, but you said——

Mr. REBOZO. Finally, there was no problem, and they were bugging me to take it.

Mr. FRATES. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. DASH. You did come to the conclusion that it was all right finally; and that is between that time and when you again got worried. Is it your position that you were satisfied to accept it, but you were also satisfied, since this was appearing and you didn't have to report it, that it wouldn't come out that it was Hughes money, because if you turned it over to the campaign organization, they wouldn't have to report it as a Hughes contribution, so this would be sort of an anonymous gift.

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I'm sure we all recall, but a lot of events had passed until the Hughes thing broke up and it was a pretty dramatic and interesting thing, as you recall, with a lot of repercussions. The whole empire then was fighting each other. I think it was in that context.

Senator WEICKER. I understand that. Could I just ask for an answer to the question, then, when did you decide not to turn this money in to the appropriate finance committee?

Mr. REBOZO. It had to be somewhere between Thanksgiving of 1970 and February or March of 1972, when the committee was appointed. As matters got worse and worse and the publicity to go with it, along with the Clifford Irving thing and the interview with Hughes on the telephone, where he called Mahen a thief and I had heard that Mahen was fired and Danner was kept on, Mahen got mad at Danner. When you get family squabbles sometimes, they shoot from the hip in every direction and I thought that I just didn't want anything, even remotely, to reflect on the campaign. Unfortunately, the Hughes name had almost become a stigma with

respect to campaign contributions because of this previous issue, which really was not a campaign contribution issue. It was a loan to the President's mother, not his brother.

SENATOR WEICKER. Did you discuss with anybody on the finance committee or Mr. Danner the fact that you had these mental reservations relative to turning over the money?

MR. REBOZO. I didn't discuss it with Danner, and I discussed it, of course, later after the campaign. I just kept thinking, hoping, that maybe something would straighten out and that we would be able to do——

MR. DASH. If I may, I want to follow this one bit. You made the decision after the flareup, and recognizably, when people fall out, people start talking. Apparently, you were concerned about the danger that somebody then may raise the question of the contribution and, therefore, you didn't put it into the campaign.

MR. FRATES. Excuse me. I don't think that is—that's not a correct summary. I think not the contribution, but what each might be saying about the contribution.

MR. DASH. Whatever it is, the fact is that \$100,000 from Hughes had been given to you for the President. This could be very embarrassing if that came out. You got to feel that because of the squabble. But wouldn't it have been true that, whether you sent it by withholding it from the campaign organization and yet holding onto it, you faced the same danger of, say Maheu or somebody saying that that \$100,000 had been paid over. In other words, the fact that it occurred. So that whether you gave it to the campaign or held onto it, the danger that there would be an exposure that that contribution had been made was still going to happen.

MR. REBOZO. Except that I still had the money in its identical form.

MR. DASH. You had the money.

SENATOR WEICKER. In other words if I can just get a complete answer, you did not discuss what to do with the money with anybody.

MR. REBOZO. No, that was purely my decision, just as it was my decision to hold it and see what happened. I did tell the President's secretary only because I felt that somebody should know about it in case something happened to me and I wanted the appropriate ones to get the credit for it.

SENATOR WEICKER. All right, now, let me be very careful on this point. From the time of the receipt of the last \$50,000, you did not discuss this \$100,000 contribution with anybody, with the exception, as you have noted, of the President's secretary.

MR. REBOZO. That's correct.

SENATOR WEICKER. And with the exception of the—I'm talking about that time when there is \$100,000 in the safe—and with the exception of the instructions in the envelope and on the envelope in the bank in Key Biscayne. Is that correct?

MR. REBOZO. Yes, sir, that's correct.

SENATOR WEICKER. Those would be the only two sources?

MR. REBOZO. Yes. Now, there were newspaper stories to the effect, way back then, that Hughes had given me \$100,000.

SENATOR WEICKER. I'm talking about as far as you're concerned.

As far as you're concerned, if you had passed off the face of the earth, there were only two persons that would have known, Rose Mary Woods and the written instructions in the vault. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Senator WEICKER. Now, at what time did the written instructions get eliminated?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I've heard so many stories about someone——

Senator WEICKER. No, this is yours; I don't want any news stories or reports. I just want your best recollection. If you can't remember, then say that.

Mr. REBOZO. I can't remember.

Senator WEICKER. So when that event occurred, whenever it was, then the only person that had any knowledge, aside from yourself, was the President's secretary?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think again, for the record, I'm sure that up to that date—in other words, there was a subsequent date, of course, where it was revealed and discussed and returned.

Senator WEICKER. That's absolutely understood. Counsel is entirely correct.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I discussed that with several people afterwards, about the return of it.

Mr. LENZNER. OK. Up to that point, as I understand it, there were just those instructions and Miss Woods. And as I understand it, you set the date of when you decided not to furnish the funds to the campaign at approximately March of 1972—or have I misunderstood that?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I didn't say that.

Mr. LENZNER. Approximately when did you decide not to furnish the funds to the campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I decided to just hold them and see if this matter cleared up and when it didn't clear up, then we decided to return them. That was maybe March of 1973.

Mr. LENZNER. That's when you decided to return them?

Mr. REBOZO. Somewhere along in there. I don't know the exact date.

Mr. LENZNER. So what you're saying is that—but you held through the November election, with the hope that things would clear up and you could then turn them over, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. What I said was that then I could turn them over to appropriate committees for congressional races and so forth.

Senator WEICKER. Of 1974, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. And you held that feeling until March of 1973, when you decided that you had to return the funds back to Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, during that period of time, did you ever count the funds prior to returning the money? Did you have occasion to go into your safe deposit box and actually count how much money was in there?

Mr. REBOZO. I never counted it until the day it was inventoried to return it. And I didn't count it then, the others did.

Mr. LENZNER. All right. Now, sir, as I understand it, we have three contacts with the safe deposit box: When you first put the money in, the first contribution in; when you put the second contribution in; at some point later on, you opened the box and—I'm not sure if I got this straight—you changed the envelopes.

Senator WEICKER. No, that's not true. He testified that he took the wrappers off.

Mr. LENZNER. The first thing you did is you took the wrappers off and you put the money in rubber bands. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. On that occasion, did you put the money back into the envelopes which had the instructions to Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so—no, I don't know. I really don't know whether I did it then—yes. I must have, because at that point—I believe at that point—I assumed that they were going into the campaign. So I don't know when—I think the instructions were on there all along.

Mr. LENZNER. So when you, sometime after you got the second contribution—

Mr. REBOZO. I'm really trying to be specific, and if I sound vague it's because the only reason that I have as good a recall about these instances is because we've been hashing them over now for so long and some of these dates come to mind. But I really don't know the timeframe involved.

Mr. LENZNER. Right now, I'm just asking if you have a recollection that when you took the wrappers off and put the rubberbands around the money, that you put the money back into the original envelopes with the Wakefield instructions or into the new envelopes?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, there did come a time, then, when you took the money out again—I take it on a fourth occasion—and put the money into different envelopes? At some point, you did that?

Mr. REBOZO. I did that when I wanted to eliminate the instructions on the envelope. That was the sole purpose of changing envelopes.

Mr. LENZNER. And as I understand it, on that occasion you destroyed the original envelopes and put the money then into four or five other envelopes. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that's right.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you count the number of packages on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I separated them. As I recall I put them in the several other smaller envelopes and put a band around each of those so that, at all times, the two 50's would remain segregated, and they inventoried that way on the inventory which you have.

Mr. LENZNER. But as I understand it, the money was broken up into four or five envelopes?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. How could you tell which envelope went with the shipment and which with the second?

Mr. REBOZO. No, the money first was in two envelopes, just as it was given to me. It was broken out when I moved them into the envelopes, emptied them out, put them into several envelopes, sealed them, put the rubberband around them, and then did the other.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you make any markings on the envelopes—the new envelopes?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have done the same thing, put “HH,” but I don’t—

Mr. LENZNER. No other markings, other than that?

Mr. REBOZO [continuing]. But I don’t really recall.

Mr. LENZNER. How could you tell, after you put them into those other envelopes, which was the first shipment of money and which was the second shipment of money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don’t know. I think that—I don’t know if I had it correct or not. I was principally interested in separating the two, so I really don’t know that I could positively say which was first and which was the second.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, you’ve described this incident as, you said, changing signals. Do you have any recollection of approximately when you did this and why you did it?

I mean, you had these instructions on for Mr. Wakefield. Why did you suddenly want to—

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I thought I explained that. What do you mean there?

Mr. LENZNER. I’m trying to get at what you mean by changing signals.

Mr. FRATES. Well, Senator, we did go into that, but I think the quickest way is to explain it and do it again. But I think that question was asked and answered at least twice.

Mr. REBOZO. I, as you recall, said that when the incidents began fermenting out at the Hughes organization, then I realized that we may not want to use those funds in the campaign. Somewhere in there is when I changed signals, as you express it.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you advise Mr. Wakefield of the change?

Mr. REBOZO. There was no reason to. He had the instructions.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, he had the same instructions, to turn the money over to the campaign if anything happened to you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don’t think so. When we put it in the smaller envelopes, I don’t think that the instructions were there. It was later that I found the envelope in the other place.

Mr. LENZNER. And you destroyed the other letter?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. In the director’s box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, if something had happened to you after that, what instructions did Mr. Wakefield have as to what to do with those funds?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that could have been a problem.

Mr. LENZNER. But is it not accurate to say that he had no instructions with regard to those funds if something happened to you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think that all I told him was that the instructions in there were to follow instructions as they were listed there.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, if you had an unfortunate—

Mr. REBOZO. You’re getting into details that at the time didn’t seem like they would be significant. I naturally don’t chronologically piece everything together like perhaps I should be able to, but I can’t.

Mr. LENZNER. What I was trying to figure out was, was there a period of time, though, when, if something happened to you unfortunately, Mr. Wakefield would not have known—he would have found the money later but would not have had any instructions on what to do with the money?

Mr. REBOZO. It's possible. I don't know if I might have told him to call Rose or what. I may have told him that, I really don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. You think you may have told Wakefield to call Miss Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have, but I really don't know. I know I didn't have any written instructions left in there.

Mr. LENZNER. After the blow-up with Mr. Mahen, did you have occasion to call Mr. Danner and request instructions from him on what to do with the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have occasion to call him and ask him what was going on with regard to the conflict out there and how it affected—

Mr. REBOZO. No. I didn't have to do that. I saw him on occasion, and naturally, that was a topic of conversation at that time.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever ask him if you should or should not keep the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And he never told you, I take it, then, that it's OK, Mr. Rebozo, you keep the funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not until I tried to return them and tried to get him to take them and he was reluctant to take them back.

Mr. LENZNER. That was in 1973, though?

Mr. REBOZO. It was later.

Mr. LENZNER. In 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have occasion to call him after the Anderson article, which was on, I think, August 6, 1971?

Mr. REBOZO. If I called him, it was coincidentally. It wouldn't have been because of the Anderson column. I'm one of the few people who don't place a lot of credence in those columns.

Mr. DASH. But that was correct, that column. That story was true, wasn't it? I mean the fact—

Mr. REBOZO. I mean I just don't read it because of my—

Mr. DASH. Were you aware of that column?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I read it now and then. If somebody points something out to me.

Mr. DASH. Following the question, up to that point, there had been no public disclosure and this Anderson disclosure—

Mr. REBOZO. I think he wrote about it two or three times, and I think there were other columns or something.

Mr. DASH. Now, since you had wanted to keep this, as a private man, and also you were concerned about these matters, then you saw it in the column: you were not the one who revealed this, obviously, to Mr. Anderson. The only persons who knew it now were Rose Mary Woods and, of course, Danner, who gave it to you.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, Mr. Dash. And Mahen and the Hughes organization. They certainly may have.

Mr. DASH. Certainly, others in the Hughes corporation. Did it occur to you to want to call to find out what was going on?

Mr. REBOZO. No. But Mahen, of course, knew about it and he was having this problem with Hughes and, I understand, IRS, and he was a friend of Morgan's—had him on a retainer. I felt that is where it all came from. All that did was fan the fire that I was already trying to tend.

Mr. DASH. As a matter of fact, though, even though he wrote about that in that column, there wasn't any pickup on that.

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. DASH. That sort of died, didn't it?

Mr. REBOZO. Right. No one ever asked me about that.

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask you this: You referred to the fact that your actions, relative to the money, were influenced by the problems of the Hughes organization, and then later, the Clifford Irving business, et cetera. At any time, were the matters of Watergate, as they became public, an influence on your decisions as to what to do with the money? And if so, when?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, Watergate came along in 1972.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. DASH. June 17, 1972.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. REBOZO. I think if anything, the Watergate thing must have confirmed the inadvertent wisdom of my apprehensions. But the main problem—

Senator WEICKER. In what way?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, by now, there were even problems involving the finance committee, so it made matters that much worse. I really was in a dilemma about what to do about it. I finally consulted with a few people and then tried to get him to take it back and had a hard time doing that.

Senator WEICKER. When you say you consulted with a few people, who would you consult with?

Mr. REBOZO. I talked to several people that I have a lot of confidence in, lawyers and—

Mr. DASH. Fixing that time, though, it was sometime in 1973, wasn't it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, in 1973.

Senator WEICKER. No, this isn't quite the same thing at all. We arrived at a deadline of that point when the money is returned. I'm sort of in between the period of June 1972, when the Watergate thing occurred, and—what's the date the money was returned?

Mr. LENZNER. June—

Mr. FRATES. 27.

Mr. LENZNER [continuing]. Of 1973.

Senator WEICKER. When you say you discussed this matter of what to do with the funds—there is this time span of a year.

Mr. DASH. When was that?

Mr. FRATES. I think the Senator's question is: Was the Watergate affair having some impact on his action?

Senator WEICKER. Which I gather he answered, yes, it did.

Mr. FRATES. I think so.

Senator WEICKER. In the course of that answer, he indicated that he discussed with others what he should do, and I'm asking who he discussed that with.

Mr. REBOZO. I discussed it with Bill Griffin, who is a New York lawyer, a fellow whom I have a lot of respect for. I think I discussed it with my accountant, and I discussed it with Gemmill, Kenneth Gemmill. I don't recall who else, but I was getting opinions from a few people that I trusted, and they said, well, the best thing to do is to give it back.

Senator WEICKER. And of course, you have indicated that your concerns were of a political nature, as to any unfavorable impact that might relate to the President, both as to the Hughes matter and then Watergate came along. Was anybody, in other words, aside from these gentlemen, of a political bent that you turned to for advice? Since it had become—it wasn't a matter of your personal financial concern, it was a matter of concern that you had vis-a-vis the President.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Yet those individuals that you're discussing now are ones that you might logically turn to if this were your personal concern. That's why I asked the question of you as to whether or not there were those individuals of a political bent that you discussed it with.

Mr. REBOZO. I mentioned it to the President, too, and he thought I ought to give it back.

Senator WEICKER. When was that?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. It was probably early 1973, I would guess.

Senator WEICKER. When you say early 1973—

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been March.

Senator WEICKER. Of 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Was this mentioned—obviously, this was a matter of deep concern to you. This is not the type of thing that comes up in a casual conversation. Did you make a specific appointment with the President to discuss this matter?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I sometimes save up things to discuss with the President, because during all this period, he was certainly busy with a lot of very important decisions, and I never want to throw something else in the pot that further would tend to clutter his thinking or have him be concerned about me. He worries more about his friends than he does about himself.

So I just waited for an appropriate time and mentioned it, and he just that quick said, "You ought to give it back." Immediately he said that.

Senator WEICKER. You mean that was the extent of the conversation? You described it and all he said was, "Give it back"?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Senator WEICKER. He didn't inquire at all as to the history of this situation?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Well, I had already told him that at this point.

Mr. LENZNER. I was getting into these contacts at the safe deposit box. Let me ask you with regard to Senator Weicker's question, as

I understand it, you consulted two attorneys and then sought the President's advice and decided to give the money back immediately after that. Is that accurate? And your accountant—I'm sorry. And that basically it.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes—no, I may have discussed it with some others.

Mr. LENZNER. I mean right after——

Mr. REBOZO. It was no secret anymore. There was no reason for it to be a secret. It had to come out someday or other and it was just a question of getting the best advice I could get. I still had hopes, futilely, that maybe the money could be used to help in some campaigns.

Mr. DASH. I don't think the record shows very clearly—I think you have now said the time is around the time you spoke to the President, I think you said around March of 1973. That was around the time you spoke to some other persons. Could you just pin down, generally, when the first time was that you spoke to anybody about this concern—Mr. Gemmill, Mr. Griffin?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was all in that period.

Mr. DASH. In early 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have any other contacts with the money in the box other than the ones you have already described, before you got back to the question of returning it, in 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I've said, I go into those boxes from time to time. When you say contact with the money, I might have opened the box to put in or take out something else, but I don't know if you call that contact with the money.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I wonder if we can take a 10-minute break.

Senator WEICKER. Yes, why don't we take a 10-minute break?

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator WEICKER. Are we all set?

Come to order.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, prior to the time that you had the money returned to the Hughes people in 1973, did you ever on occasion remove the money from the safe deposit box for any period of time?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. With the exception of what he has stated he took into his office in the box, with that exclusion. We want to be sure he understands.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me clarify by saying, did you ever take the money or have the money taken out of the bank physically prior to 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no. The money remained all that time, the money remained in the box all that time. This is why I thought—I read about all of the sophisticated equipment that the FBI has and I thought they could test it and prove that it had been locked up all that time.

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask a question in that regard, Mr. Rebozo. That is this: Did you request an FBI investigation or an FBI presence when the money was counted, or did you request the presence of Mr. Whitaker, who was a member of the FBI, but was asked to be present as a friend, rather than in an official capacity?

Mr. REBOZO. No, Mr. Whitaker is agent in charge.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. REBOZO. So I just went to the top man. It happens that I know him, but I've lived there 55 years. I know a lot of people.

Senator WEICKER. So when you asked him to be present at the counting of the money, you asked him to be present in an official capacity, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. He asked me what I wanted him to do with the report and I said, "You do whatever you're supposed to do."

Senator WEICKER. What do you mean?

Mr. REBOZO. He asked me, what do you want me to do with this report that I've got?

Senator WEICKER. Let me just drop back a little bit. I'm asking about the request of Mr. Whitaker to be present. Never mind after you got through with the counting. I'm asking when you requested him, did you request that he be there in an official capacity?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't use the term, "official capacity." I would assume that he would know that.

Senator WEICKER. It's just your assumption?

Mr. REBOZO. It's just that I wanted someone present identified with the Government in the highest responsible position locally, who could perhaps prove that this was the identical money just in case it ever came up.

Senator WEICKER. So that when you asked Mr. Whitaker to be present, you did so believing that this exercise or the knowledge gained would become or go into—come into the hands of the U.S. Government, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I, of course, assumed that his responsibility is to perhaps make a report, or whatever it is, I don't know. I didn't suggest or impose or even hint any limitations on what he did with it.

Senator WEICKER. Is it usual for agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ask persons who are not members of the Bureau as to what they are to do with their reports? Why would he ask you that kind of question?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether that was, you know—

Mr. DASH. Senator, could I follow that up?

Senator WEICKER. Let me just finish.

You indicated that he asked you, "What do you want me to do with the report." I just wondered—

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know that it would be usual. I asked him to make the report because I felt I had nothing to hide and I wanted to make the picture as clear as possible, and I wanted a representative of authority to—

Senator WEICKER. I understand, and I'm in no way disputing that at all.

Mr. REBOZO. I first thought of calling Newbrand, who was in charge of the Secret Service, who I understand would have a lot to do with currency. Then I thought, no, I've known him 20 years and he's identified with the administration more, even though he's under Treasury. Then I thought, well, the FBI is the only other entity, and so I called on the help of the FBI.

From time to time, you know, operating a bank, you have exposure to the FBI.

Senator WEICKER. I understand.

Mr. REBOZO. We have always cooperated with them fully in their investigations.

Senator WEICKER. I understand. So that it's my understanding from your response to this, to categorize your response, it is, that you very definitely were under the impression when you called Mr. Whitaker in, that he was there in an official capacity. My only question now is that apparently, after the continuing process took place, you indicated to me that Mr. Whitaker turned to you and said, "What do you want me to do with the report?"

Mr. REBOZO. Well, maybe those were——

Senator WEICKER. I asked you the question, is it usual, in other words, for someone with the FBI to turn to somebody outside the FBI and ask for instructions as to what they wanted him to do with the report.

Mr. REBOZO. Maybe I didn't quote him exactly. I made a paraphrase of what he said.

Senator WEICKER. Well, how did you respond?

Mr. REBOZO. I thought, at least, that what he meant was should I send this report to any specific person, or something like that, and I said, "You do whatever you think is proper in your position." That's about the extent of it.

Senator WEICKER. That you turned to him and said that he should do with it whatever he saw fit?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Senator, I just want to follow on afterwards.

This goes to the role of Mr. Whitaker, say, in his official capacity with the FBI. I think it is quite understandable how the FBI had occasion to have something to do with the Federal banks, or banks generally. But I take it that there was no—in turning back this money to Mr. Danner or to Hughes Tool people—that you weren't reporting a theft? There was no crime involved, a Federal crime that would come within the jurisdiction of the FBI? In fact, I think you said, Mr. Rebozo, that you were interested, you read about or heard about this equipment and you would like for them to be able to fingerprint and other things to show it was the same money. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. DASH. If they did that, though, they would have to use their crime facility laboratories, and I think the record would show that they do that for law enforcement purposes within their jurisdiction. If they did that for you, this would be sort of as a private favor.

Mr. REBOZO. No, if there was anything wrong with it, there would be something done about it, I presume.

Mr. DASH. Were you making any claim to the FBI that there might be something wrong with it?

Mr. REBOZO. No. At that stage, I didn't think there was anything wrong with it. Early in the game, I was concerned, you know, sort of casually, could it be skimmed money. But then, as I got to learn more about the Hughes operation and all, I was convinced that it wasn't.

Mr. DASH. What jurisdiction did you think the FBI would have, through Mr. Whitaker or anybody else, to use these crime labora-

tories to make a determination whether this was the same money Mr. Danner had given you, not related to any Federal crime or something that the FBI wouldn't get into?

Mr. REBOZO. I felt I had three choices: the Secret Service, the FBI, or the county sheriff's office. I felt that of the three, the Secret Service was logical, but I thought because of my—I've known Whitaker like a year or two. I've known the Secret Service chief 20 years.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Whitaker agree to utilize FBI crime facilities to check——

Mr. REBOZO. No, he told me that they don't have any equipment that can tell how long money has been in storage, and he said that they could get prints off of it, but it would deface the money or something. So we took the numbers and returned them, and at any time those prints could have been taken and I presume they still could. I don't know whether they still have them or not; we were very careful in handling them.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, did Mr. Whitaker ever have financial dealings with you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. There is a K. Whitaker in the Fisher Island journal entries. Is that the same K. Whitaker?

Mr. REBOZO. It is K. Whitmer..

Mr. FRATES. Kenneth Whitmer, ophthalmologist, a very famous one in our area. That's W-h-i-t-m-e-r.

Mr. LENZNER. Going back to the other question I had, did you ever make a statement or tell anybody else that in fact, you had removed the money or caused it to be removed? Did you ever make that statement to anybody?

Mr. REBOZO. No reason to.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever make the statement to anybody that you had used the money or had somebody else use it on behalf of other individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. I don't think anybody else did, either.

Mr. FRATES. Could I ask Mr. Lenzner, or ask you to instruct him, Senator, as to where did he get that statement or who made that statement? Because this is the very kind of thing that has been leaking out and the press picks up, just as they have done on several interviews we have had with the staff, with Mr. Bellino, Mr. Lenzner, or Mr. Armstrong.

Mr. LENZNER. You forgot Miss DeOreo.

Mr. FRATES. Miss DeOreo is just a sweet young girl. On what basis did you make the statement that he told somebody he used the money? Because he has never made that statement to anybody, and you know that from your previous interrogation of him. If you have somebody who says that. I think he should be permitted or should tell him who it is, or who allegedly said that.

Mr. LENZNER. We're not going to disclose the basis of our information.

Mr. FRATES. No, you aren't, because nobody said it. If you asked that kind of question in a court of law, you would never get away with it.

Senator WEICKER. I think he's asking the question of the witness as to whether or not he did. He's not saying the witness did this.

Mr. FRATES. But, Senator, the press, or whoever reads this, that's the only inference that sources will say that that there is someone who has said that. I might say to you, sir, that no one has said that, that he used the money, that knows anything about the facts of it.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let that be a part of the record. Would you repeat the question, or would you care to have the reporter repeat the question?

Mr. LENZNER. The question was, have you ever made a statement or told anybody that the money had been used on behalf of other individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. The answer is "no."

Mr. LENZNER. In November of 1970, you had a fairly long telephone conversation, according to Mr. Danner's records, with Mr. Danner. Of course, that was about the time that the Hughes problems arose in Las Vegas, as I recall it. Do you have any recollection as to whether that phone call related to the Hughes conflict and the Maheu problem?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have. I don't recall.

Mr. LENZNER. It was a \$8 phone call.

Mr. REBOZO. He paid it or I paid it?

Mr. LENZNER. He paid it. Do you have any recollection of what that fairly lengthy phone call would have involved?

Mr. REBOZO. Danner is a slow-talking fellow. He doesn't talk that slow. He has a great sense of humor, and sometimes when we get into conversations, he throws a lot of extraneous matter in. Was November the 18th before Thanksgiving or after?

Mr. FRATES. It should have been before.

Mr. LENZNER. It has to be before.

Mr. REBOZO. So, I don't know what it could have been about specifically.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, press reports that we have referred to in August of 1971 by Mr. Anderson came out reporting the existence of this contribution, or at least alleging it. Did any representative or agent or employee of the White House inquire of you as to that column?

Mr. REBOZO. No, strangely enough, nobody ever mentioned it.

Mr. LENZNER. Nobody ever asked you about that at all?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever make any effort too contact any employee of the White House or anybody else and try to discuss it with them?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. That would include the President, I take it?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Mr. LENZNER. And is it not a fact that as a result of that column, the existence of the contribution was a matter of public information? That's clear, is it not?

My question is, since it had already become a matter of public information, why did you not thereafter go ahead and furnish the funds for the campaign, since it already was out in the public?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it may have been construed as a matter of public information among those who believe Jack Anderson. Two days after Watergate, he went on television and said I financed the whole burglary and was paying the legal expenses of the burglars and everything else. There's just about as much accuracy to that as there has been to many other columns. So obviously, there are a lot of people who do not believe him, but there isn't anybody who even brought it up.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of speaking with Mr. Danner immediately after that column came out and going over it with him as to how Mr. Anderson—

Mr. REBOZO. No; I don't have a recollection. I think it's possible that I could have spoken to him about it, but I don't recall it.

Mr. LENZNER. So what you're saying is, you evaluated the column as not sufficient public information to allay your fears about possible embarrassment, if you did turn over the contribution to the campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it might have compounded my fears rather than allay them.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, weren't you concerned about continuing columns by Mr. Anderson? He does have a habit of repeating columns when he—

Senator WEICKER. I think the witness has answered that question, to be honest with you. I think it has been sufficiently answered.

Mr. LENZNER. All right, sir. Mr. Armstrong at this point has a series of questions on the next subject.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. Does this include the Hughes questions?

Mr. LENZNER. No, these will be followups on other areas involving the Hughes questions.

Mr. FRATES. But it's related to it?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, it's all related.

Mr. FRATES. Oh, all right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, prior to the time that you received the money from Mr. Danner, the first payment, which you place now as July 3, 1970, did you indicate to anyone else that you were going to receive such a contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And subsequently, the only person you feared, you testified, was Miss Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, again, this is again what happens when several people start interrogating. These all have been asked several times.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If you will let me ask the question, then—

Senator WEICKER. Counsel, I think what Mr. Armstrong is trying to do is be level, rather than trying in anyway to harass your client, only to catch things up. If he goes on, as I said—I think this will probably be more level.

Mr. FRATES. All right, sir. Thank you.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When you spoke with Miss Woods subsequent to the first contribution, did you indicate to her that she was the only one you were going to talk to about this subject?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you indicate to her why she was the only one that would be aware of this?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. What was the reason you gave her at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, she would know that I didn't want to discuss it with the President, and there was always a possibility of something happening to me, and I felt that she should know about it. She has been with him over 20 years and she knows how he operates, too. As I said, you know, this point could be far better clarified and proven, but it would take a lot of examples and a lot of time and a lot of examples of previous experiences to bear this out.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you give Miss Woods any instructions at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. Of course, she knew what it was for.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But you gave her no explicit instructions as to what she would do with it in case you——

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so.

Senator WEICKER. In past interviews or today, has anybody established the date of this conversation?

Mr. LENZNER. No, that should be the next question.

Senator WEICKER. Can you tell me when?

Mr. REBOZO. Senator, I've been asked that question and I honestly can't—I'm sorry. I'm trying to see if I can tie it into something, but I can't do it.

Mr. DASH. Would it be shortly after you got the first contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Shortly after what?

Mr. DASH. The receipt of the money.

Senator WEICKER. Shortly after the first contribution or the second contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I think both times. I think I discussed it with her on both times.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, upon one occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Was there any time after that, that you discussed it with her again?

Mr. REBOZO. I suppose I alluded to it, you know, in conversation, but never any specific meeting to try to discuss this matter. Over the years, as you know, I go to the White House. I discuss a lot of things with a lot of people there, but very little of it to do with Government or business. I try to stay out of it as much as I can. Sometimes I get in it and wind up like I am now.

Senator WEICKER. Have you discussed or tried to refresh your recollection by discussion with Miss Woods in the last several months as to these times?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir; I haven't. I probably should. I probably should. I don't know whether she could be helpful in that or not.

Senator WEICKER. Counselor, is there anything here you can shed light on——

Mr. FRATES. I have a copy of her testimony before the committee, and I'm trying to find out her answer.

Mr. DASH. That's a copy, I take it, of Miss Acker's notes of our informal interview with Miss Woods?

Mr. FRATES. I don't recall specifically what she said about that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could I inquire how you got that, sir?

Mr. FRATES. The same way, Mr. Armstrong, you got many of the documents you had. It was legally furnished to me.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I'm sorry, I was just asking how you got it.

Mr. FRATES. It was legally furnished to me.

Senator WEICKER. Go ahead, proceed. Who was asking the question? I initiated the question of the date. You go ahead and pursue it. I'll tell you what's going to happen. That's a vote.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I believe that earlier we placed the point of your discussion with Miss Woods at sometime either during the time you were at San Clemente or immediately thereafter. You characterized it as a short time after. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that's correct.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall whether you spoke with her in person or on the phone?

Mr. REBOZO. In person. I am sure it was in person.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it your recollection that it was in San Clemente or that it occurred in Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't really know whether I was able to tell her then or afterwards. I may have been back to Washington from there and told her. I don't recall.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You also informed her of the second contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you do that by phone or in person, do you recall?

Mr. REBOZO. I think in person.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall where that would have been, where that conversation would have taken place?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably at the White House.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And would you have informed her whom the contribution has been received for?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. From, and for what purpose it was received?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And that would have been for the Presidential campaign of 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And would you have indicated precisely how it had come to you, from Mr. Danner as opposed to being a Hughes contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Precisely. Simply that Mr. Danner had given it to me. That's about as precise.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Had you indicated to her where the money was being kept and in what form?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And the instructions for all of that were given?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And the fact that Mr. Wakefield was the party designated in the instructions?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At some point, did you discuss with Miss Woods the conflict and confusion in the Hughes organization that arose?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure we probably discussed it several times.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you discuss that in light of the money that you were holding—the contributions you were holding?

Mr. REBOZO. Very likely.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did she ever offer an opinion?

Mr. REBOZO. Did she ever offer me an opinion on what?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Regarding the confusion as to what you should do regarding the confusion on the Hughes organization.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you give us an estimate of how many times you might have discussed the contribution with her between the first two discussions and this final return?

Mr. REBOZO. No. You know, we have many discussions on many topics. Generally, it pertains to the First Family's best interests or activities, or something of that nature. So occasionally, in some of these discussions, undoubtedly, we touched on this. But to say how many times, if I were going to guess, maybe I would say three or four times.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, at any time, have you indicated in the past to anybody that you had not discussed this conversation with anybody, including Miss Woods, prior to 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. I know I indicated to you people on four different occasions.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. I think the question is confusing. Would you mind repeating it?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The question is, have you indicated to anyone in the past that you had not discussed the contribution with anyone, including Miss Woods, prior to 1973?

Mr. GREER. That's an impossible question.

Mr. FRATES. That is a triple negative, I think.

Mr. REBOZO. How could I tell them I hadn't discussed it with anyone?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you tell anyone at any time that prior to 1973, you hadn't discussed it with anyone, including Miss Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. I have already said that, so I wouldn't be telling anybody else that I had only discussed it with Miss Woods, because I would have been discussing the very matter that I have also stated repeatedly I had not discussed.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You might have discussed in 1973 the fact that you had not discussed it prior to 1973 with anyone, including Miss Woods.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I may have. I see no reason that I would have concealed it at that point, so I may have.

Mr. LENZNER. I think there is some confusion.

Mr. GREER. I'm totally confused.

Mr. REBOZO. And you have a law degree.

Mr. FRATES. I think the question you want to know is, prior to this date, or prior to whatever date, have you told anyone that you did not discuss the contribution with anyone—no one.

Mr. DASH. No one; that's right.

Mr. FRATES. That's the question.

Mr. LENZNER. Right.

Mr. GREER. That's still confusing.

Mr. FRATES. But that's what he's asking.

Mr. REBOZO. What do you want me to answer?

Mr. DASH. Do you understand the question?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Sam, could I try this once?

You're having a conversation with somebody and you said, "Look, I have never talked about this with anybody until you came into the room," and this allegedly happened in, say, 1973.

Did you make that statement in 1973 to anybody—basically, "I have never talked with anybody about this until you started talking to me"?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. As I said before, I discussed this when it was already a moot matter, and I decided to return the money. So I may have told somebody that I hadn't discussed it before. There would be nothing wrong with that.

Mr. DASH. And that way, I guess the question is, an inference in it that you had concealed the fact that you had discussed it with Miss Woods. The question put to you is: have you ever told anybody that you hadn't, prior to telling it at that point, with anybody else, which means that you hadn't discussed it with Miss Woods.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sorry. I don't have a law degree. I don't even have a college degree. You're way over my head.

Mr. FRATES. I think what they're trying to find out is, at any time, did you say or make a statement that you had not discussed it with anyone?

Mr. REBOZO. Obviously, they have some indication that I did tell someone—make this statement to someone. Tell me who that was and I might be able to—

Mr. FRATES. I don't think, obviously, they have necessarily made that statement, because they have asked several of those questions.

Mr. REBOZO. I realize that.

Mr. FRATES. He's asking you if you have any recollection of ever making a statement that you hadn't discussed the contribution with anyone.

Mr. REBOZO. You know, again, I've read so much about perjury and I'm trying my utmost to be honest in this thing and I don't want to say anything off the top of my head that may not conform. I don't see the relevance to this to begin with. If you ask me a specific question, did you ask Joe Blow, did you tell him that you have never discussed this with anybody, I could probably recall whether or not I had made such a statement. But I would have no qualms about saying it, once the decision was made that this money had to go back.

Mr. LENZNER. But the point was if you told Miss Woods and then, after telling Miss Woods, you have indicated to someone that you didn't tell anybody about it, why then, would you have concealed the fact that you had, in fact, advised Miss Woods with regard to the money?

Mr. DASH. It makes an assumption, I know.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, if I had concealed the fact—if I admitted I have—concealed the fact from anybody else except Miss Woods, why would I go to somebody else and tell him, Miss Woods is the

only one I told this? They would say, told what? It doesn't make sense.

Mr. LENZNER. But I'm saying, if you talked with Whitaker—hypothetically, now, as an example, and we said——

Mr. FRATES. Let's not go on a hypothetical. Let's ask you if you have some evidence that a witness has said that he told me he didn't tell anyone about it, I think you should tell him who it was and who said it if anyone said it.

Mr. LENZNER. I don't think we have to——

Mr. FRATES. No, using names like this leads right into what has happened over and over again. You people operate on a stated assumption that somebody told you of some rumor that some of your paranoid investigators have picked up, and you say somebody told it. Now, you're making a serious accusation. You're saying a man is lying. Now, who did he tell that to, if anybody.

Mr. LENZNER. Is it your position that you don't want to answer that question, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. FRATES. His position is not that. We're calling on you or Mr. Armstrong. You're asking him a question which indicates that he might be stating a falsehood or an inconsistency. Now, who did he state that to, if anybody? That's all we want.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Are you directing him not to answer?

Mr. FRATES. No, we're not directing him. But I would say from my experience with you, Scott Armstrong, you're just the type who would make a statement that you picked up somewhere or manufactured from a source, and then tried to ask somebody about it. What you're doing is reprehensible stuff in a court of law. But I don't think you're a lawyer, are you, Mr. Armstrong?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, I'm not.

Mr. DASH. Let me say this. In any executive proceeding, Mr. Frates, I don't believe it's the responsibility to give to the witness the name and information of everything we get. I do think that Mr. Rebozo was quite accurate in his concern, and I think he expressed it quite well when he said that he has heard a lot about perjury and that he doesn't want to venture an answer when there may have been some specific information that he doesn't recall. I don't believe any question should be asked of him that should lead him into that kind of situation.

Ordinarily, I would suggest to him that he can only give his best honest recollection. If he has no honest recollection at this time for that, that would be an honest answer.

I would say, Scott, that Mr. Rebozo is at least entitled to know whether or not we do have a statement from somebody credible to us that such a statement has been made. And I don't believe that we have to reveal our investigation sources at this point, whether or not this is a hypothetical question or whether or not it is based on information we do have from a credible source.

Mr. FRATES. I appreciate your attitude, because I'm not taking the position that you have to, but I think in something—and I think you've put your finger right on it—in something of this nature, we're entitled to it.

Mr. REBOZO. In this instance, it's not a case of my being afraid of perjuring myself. I don't understand the question yet.

Mr. DASH. I understand that, and I think because everybody has tried it, we're compounding it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It's not a hypothetical question. It's based on information that we have.

Mr. FRATES. From whom?

Mr. LENZNER. We're not going to disclose it.

Mr. FRATES. That's right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The witness can answer it or not. Let the record show the witness is not going to answer it.

Mr. FRATES. Don't say let the record show that the witness is not going to answer the question, because that is not what the record shows. I see no reason why you cannot, under this assumption, tell us who said that. I think that you can certainly—you don't have to, I guess, but in fairness it would seem to me that you should, because I'm always interested in Mr. Armstrong's sources.

Mr. LENZNER. I would be glad to confirm the fact that we have received information. We're not at this time going to disclose where the information came from, because witnesses come to us, as you know, and we're not going to go around disclosing who said what to whom.

Mr. FRATES. We're taking the position that no credible person has made that statement, and I would like the record to show that, that no credible witness has made that statement. If you want to deny that, put that in the record and tell us who the credible witness is.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm willing to answer the question if I'm made to understand it. I don't understand it yet.

Mr. LENZNER. Just ask the question and see if he understands it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The question, Mr. Rebozo, is was there ever an occasion that you indicated to someone that you had not told anyone about the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. When?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. During 1973.

Mr. GREER. Obviously, they're referring to Mr. Whitaker.

Mr. REBOZO. Again, we get right back to it. By the time Whitaker was in the scene, sure, I probably told several people that Rose Woods was the only one that knew it.

Mr. DASH. The actual question, Mr. Rebozo, is did you ever tell someone in 1973 that you had told nobody, including Rose Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, no.

Mr. DASH. You see, "nobody" is the question. To the best of your recollection.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, no. To the best of my recollection, I don't recall making a statement like that.

I could have said, well, the President doesn't know about this, or nobody knows about it, or, I've kept it quiet, or something along those lines, and he could have drawn that conclusion. But I don't see where the question or the answer is pertinent to this whole discussion.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you discuss with Miss Woods your concern that you wanted to return the money, return the contribution?

Mr. FRATES. When? At any time?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I'm asking if he discussed it.

Mr. REBOZO. I probably did.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And when did you discuss it?

Mr. REBOZO. I probably did.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you tell use when that would have been?

Mr. REBOZO. That would have been a long—all of this occurred in or around March of this year—1973.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And not prior to that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been February, could have been April.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But certainly not in 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And can you tell us when you last talked with Miss Woods about the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. When I last talked with her about it? Oh, it has been a long time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you talk with her subsequent to its return?

Mr. REBOZO. What?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you talk with her about it subsequent to its return, to its actually having been returned?

Mr. LENZNER. That would have been June of 1973.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe I did. I don't think there would be any need of it. It was all over the papers. Everybody knew it had been returned.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I don't believe there had been any reference to the contribution in the papers in June of 1973. Do you recall—

Mr. FRATES. There was what?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I don't believe there was any reference to the contribution in the papers in June of 1973.

Mr. FRATES. You mean the return or the contribution?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Either one.

Mr. FRATES. In 1971, it was in Jack Anderson's column several times.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We're referring to 1973. I don't believe he ran his column—

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, about that time, and I don't know the exact date, when the IRS showed up, it was all over the papers.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At that time, did you discuss with Miss Woods the fact that you were removing the instructions from the contribution in the box?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it your recollection that you did?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You're not sure?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall if you told her you destroyed the letter in the director's box, which you found again subsequently?

Mr. REBOZO. I doubt that I even mentioned the letter in the director's box. It was just a backup advice.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. After Miss Woods, who is the next person you informed of the existence of the contribution? Who was the next person to learn of it?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, she learned of it early. No one else learned of it until after the elections of November 1972. Who the first person was, I don't know, but I know I did tell the President on one of his visits.

Mr. DASH. Was that still in 1972, after the election?

Mr. REBOZO. I was asked that question before and I've tried to figure if I can pinpoint it, but I really can't tell if it was after the election or the inauguration or just when it was.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Would that have been the next person?

Mr. REBOZO. Could have been.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Was the President the next person to have known?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been, I said. I don't recall.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Other than the President, who else did you tell? Who else did you tell in that early period?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me again. What do you mean, the early period?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I mean the period around the time the President learned. I gather no one knew until after 1972. Mr. Rebozo can't recall the first person he told about it. It might have been the President. I was wondering who was his next most likely choice.

Mr. REBOZO. As I've said, I've discussed it with the two lawyers, with a PR man, a friend of mine down South, with Wakefield, and I don't know who else I discussed it with. It was a matter of trying to determine what to do with it.

The IRS questioned me on some of these aspects, and I think that was in April I discussed it with them.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You mentioned a PR man who was a friend of yours from the South?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Who would that be, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. You know, I am almost afraid to ever inject a new name in these. My experience has been that they get hounded and questioned and get involved. But he's just an innocent friend. His name is Hank Meyer, M-e-y-e-r, who is one of the top guys down there and a good friend of mine. It was just a very passing suggestion, so please don't have him up here next.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, when did you first notify Mr. Wakefield that he should go to the safety deposit box in case of your death?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was the day before we opened it. What was your question?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The question was when you indicated to Mr. Wakefield that if you should die, there was something in the box and he should go to it—

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, immediately.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Immediately at one point?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, immediately when I put the money in.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In other words, prior to your having put the money in, he was under no instruction to go to the box and look for it?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he had a duplicate key to the box all the time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When did he first receive the duplicate key to the box?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, we had always had a joint box. I don't know when he got it—maybe 1967, 1968.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But at the time the box was opened, is that——

Mr. REBOZO. The time the box was opened was this year, and you have a copy of that signature card with the four signatures and the date.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Excuse me, the four signatures—we're referring to box 224.

Mr. REBOZO. Right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When the box was opened initially, when you and Mr. Wakefield decided to have a box together, for whatever purpose, was Mr. Wakefield under any instruction, from that time to the time you received the first contribution, to go into the box in case of your death?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, no, no; probably just in conversation. He drew my will. He handles real estate closings. You know, he does a lot of things for me, and if I'm traveling and I think there's anything that might happen that would require his attention, he can go into the joint box.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But was he under any instructions to go in there in case of your death?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I don't know that he was under any specific instructions. I'm sure that that's the first thing he would do, being a lawyer.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But at the time you received the first contribution, you did so instruct him explicitly that he should go in?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And I take it that he had the keys to 224 from the time it was opened until the time the money was returned?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, what was the original purpose of that safe deposit box—maintaining it with Mr. Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, we had a box all along for the purposes that I've previously testified to. Being out of town as much as I am, if some matter comes up that requires his attention or his signature on something, he can go in and get it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, it's your testimony that the money from the contribution was never stored in any other place than box 224, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. From January 1, 1969, to the present, can you tell us what safety deposit boxes you had access to in the Key Biscayne Bank & Trust Co.

Mr. REBOZO. Numbers?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. REBOZO. 222 is the director's box and 633 is my personal box.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. OK, that's a box which you hold jointly with Caroline Rebozo; is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. She probably is on that. She's my sister and she probably is on that. What are you asking me these questions for? You know the answers.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, I'm sorry, I didn't know who Caroline Rebozo was.

Have you ever had any other box during that period of time, or does that comprise the full extent?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I had a joint box. I was administrator for a minor's estate and I had a box there with his uncle and just had some of—his parents—his father was a director of the bank and they were killed in that BOAC crash in Tokyo. This was the only boy and I was his godfather and became his coexecutor, so we had some of the papers in there. I don't recall the number of the box.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you say that box is still open?

Mr. REBOZO. I just noticed it came up for renewal, and I had contacted the boy and he asked me to go in there and just take out the contents and send it to him. It was just nothing. I think there was a cheap ring that belonged to his mother and some little personal mementoes that the parents had kept, like a note from the kid when he was going to run away from home at age 5, and things like that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is there any other box that you have access to in the bank other than the four you have just mentioned? Again, that's from January 1, 1969, to the present.

Mr. REBOZO. No, no; I don't believe so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you or do you have any safe deposit boxes in any other banks or locations in the same period?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I patronize home industry.

Mr. DASH. That's a good banker's statement.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you indicate for us what other items would have been stored in that safe deposit box when the money was there?

Mr. FRATES. Again, Senator, I just want to point out that here is another repetitious question. I think Mr. Armstrong's—half of them have been repetitious. I do not want to interrupt; I just want to get it over with.

Senator WEICKER. I agree, Scott. We have been over this ground many times, and unless there's something specific you're driving toward, I would like you to tighten it up a bit.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you ever place any money inside the box?

Mr. REBOZO. I've said that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is there any possibility that this money was commingled with any other money that was present, that the moneys were mixed?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Has anyone else ever had access to that box, other than Mr. Wakefield?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We would like to put three exhibits in the record, if we could.

Mr. LENZNER. I'll have them marked as exhibits 3, 4, and 5.

[Whereupon, the documents referred to were marked Rebozo exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 5, for identification.*]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you identify those documents for the record?

*See pp. 10157-59.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir, they're copies of our safe deposit box leases.

Mr. LENZNER. And I believe two of them, exhibits 3 and 4, reflect some entries into boxes 224 and 222. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, the entry record for box 222, which shows, next to your name, the word, "sample," is that just a sample signature, but the original—

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know why it says, "sample," but that is the card. I guess I've just never signed it. As I've said, the little girl we used to have would occasionally shove a card before me, and apparently she just didn't use that one. She shoved one of these other cards. I did sign the others on several occasions.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But that is the original visitation record for the box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. You see, box 222, I have to go in that twice a year when the examiners are there. That's where the directors' financial statements are, and I obviously haven't signed in there since January 1972, though I've been there several times since then.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Are there any other records relating to these three safe deposit boxes that are kept by the bank?

Mr. REBOZO. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the bank keep rental records of the payment of rentals on the boxes?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you indicate to us why we did not receive those in response to our subpoena?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. I just turned the subpoenas over to them to supply what was requested, but I don't know why the rental records would be pertinent.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. May we receive those?

Mr. REBOZO. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you arrange for us to receive those?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. DASH. What do the records show?

Mr. REBOZO. I think what he's talking about is whether we paid the box rent or not. I don't know what bearing that has on this hearing.

Mr. DASH. That's what it ought to show.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, if you'll look at exhibit 3 in front of you, when you're saying, "additional documents," the document above the access cards, do you have documents reflecting the rental or use of 224 in addition to the documents reflected on that sheet?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe this is all that we've done—

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think the subpoena called for the records.

Mr. GREER. I think it calls for the access records.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It calls for any and all records.

Mr. FRATES. What you have asked him is, is there a record of payment of the rental.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Right.

Mr. GREER. Those documents are the only records that reflect any access to the boxes. There may be some document in the bank that was not provided earlier that would reflect the payment of a rental.

on the box; I don't know. But it would not in anyway show any access or any activity related to the box.

Mr. LENZNER. And that would be the entire extent of any records relating to this safe-deposit box?

Mr. REBOZO. As far as I know, it is a mechanics of operation that I don't know about.

Senator WEICKER. Before we waste a lot of time——

Mr. FRATES. We'll make them available.

Senator WEICKER. I gather that. Before you keep on bouncing back and forth here, I gather that they'll make them available.

Mr. FRATES. Surely.

Mr. GREER. It's certainly no big point.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, was there any time when you lost your keys to the safe-deposit box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, at one time, I lost all my keys to the boxes and to my house, and everything else.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you would have lost the keys to all the safe-deposit boxes, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, one of them.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You only had one safe-deposit box key that you kept with you?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you did not lose the safe-deposit box key for 633 or 222?

Mr. REBOZO. No. You see, every safe-deposit box has two keys. I lost them all and then had the locks changed later.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. OK. What I'm asking you is, did you lose even one of the keys for box 633 and 222?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you lost one of each of the keys for all three?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. How did you replace the keys for each of those boxes?

Mr. REBOZO. What we do is the locks on the boxes are interchangeable and the keys don't have a box number. We initiated this some years ago so that if somebody loses a key, he's less likely to know what box to go into. It happens to serve an additional useful purpose in that we just put a tag on it showing what the number is and they can take the tag off.

Now, when anybody closes out a box or loses a key, we change the lock from that box to some other box—we have 800-some boxes—that's open and have new keys made, and they are blank and it's no problem.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And that was done for all three boxes, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, who changes the lock?

Mr. REBOZO. Now, I think that the auditor does it. We used to call the Mosler Safe people, but we devised this other plan and, even though somebody may have lost his keys, our feeling was that somebody could have had a duplicate made and just turn in two keys anyway. So any time a box is vacated, we automatically change the lock so no one knows what their key fits.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Who is the auditor who would have——

Mr. REBOZO. Jack Brown.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is he an employee of the bank, or is he an independent auditor.

Mr. REBOZO. He's an officer of the bank.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Brown would physically change the locks, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. There may have been others who would have done it, but I do know he has done it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did he do it in this case, replacing these three?

Mr. REBOZO. I think he did.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is this process what is known as drilling the box?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is there any difference?

Mr. REBOZO. When we had numbered keys, as some banks still do, the only thing you can do when a customer loses the key is to drill the box and put a new lock on it. Then, when Mosler charges you \$20 to do it and you bill the customer, they go through the ceiling. So this other plan is working out much better.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. How do you get access to the box to remove the lock?

Mr. REBOZO. With the key.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you would have had to use the other key to get into the box

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So did you then request from Mr. Wakefield his key so you could get into the box?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you tell us when that was?

Mr. REBOZO. Just before—I don't know when I lost the keys, actually, but I think that it went back well before we opened the box up to get these funds out.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. By "well before," can you give us an estimate?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, it could have been a year before. I don't know.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So you believe it would have been 1972, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Mr. LENZNER. Was the cash in the box at the time when you went in there after you lost the keys? Was the money in the box?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, sure; sure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, at the time when you replaced the lock, did you then give Mr. Wakefield another key, a replacement key for the new——

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure I did.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And did you give Mr. Wakefield any other key for any other boxes at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think he still has the directors' box key, No. 222. I hope he has. I think he has vault keys for a lot of clients' boxes. He handles a lot of estates and this and that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. My question was, I guess, did you replace the directors' box key that he had with another one when you changed that lock?

Mr. REBOZO. That's a good question. I hope we did. I don't—

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You have no recollection of giving him two keys?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You definitely recall giving him the one for 224, however, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I believe that—I believe we did. I don't recall the details. These things are so automatic that it doesn't impress me. We have certain security measures that we do just automatically, like we have two keys to the front door. Every officer has both keys. Every time there's an officer or anyone who had the key, janitor or anyone else, who leaves our employ, we change both of the locks.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Rebozo, for the record, is this something you would personally do, changing the key and changing the lock?

Mr. REBOZO. I said I don't do it.

Mr. DASH. There is somebody, some service person, I would think, who does this?

Mr. REBOZO. We formerly used Mosler, but—

Mr. DASH. Now the auditor does it.

Mr. REBOZO. He does it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When you say "Mosler," are you referring to the Diebold Co.

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it's Mosler. Maybe it's Diebold. Whoever has our vault. We have equipment from both of them.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it a policy in the bank that records are kept of each visit into the vault?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Would that, is that pretty much an ironbound rule?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, yes. I'm apparently the only one who doesn't follow it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And when you don't follow it, how do you get the second key you need to open the door?

Mr. REBOZO. I just go to the receptionist's desk and almost invariably she has been sitting there, or if the bank has been busy, I just open the drawer and take it out and go in and replace the key.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But you always use her key as opposed to some other key?

Mr. REBOZO. There are only two keys out there, I think, hers and one of the vice president's.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Wood's key?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I might use his occasionally. The keys are on a big ring.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Separate keys for—

Mr. REBOZO. Whoever is up at that front desk.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever instructed your receptionist not to record your entries into the box?

Mr. REBOZO. Never.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever been aware of the fact that she would record your entries even if you went in and let yourself in?

Mr. REBOZO. They wouldn't know which box I was going into.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it not the custom to ask you which box you had been into to make sure it's as recorded?

Mr. REBOZO. They never have.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. They have never made any inquiry of you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, as I said, one receptionist on Wednesday, a cute little girl, now and then she would say, here, you should sign this and she would pull out a card and I would sign it. That is why you see some of the cards with signatures there.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could you tell us which receptionist that would be? Why don't we look at the record for 224? I notice there are three.

Mr. REBOZO. There was a girl who is no longer with us. Her name was Regina Moreira.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Who would "SB" be? There is an indication of the initials "SB".

Mr. REBOZO. "SB" would be probably—What year is that?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That's 1970. Would that be Susan Bagdones?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And "SL"?

Mr. REBOZO. "SL," that's Sharon Leber, L-e-b-e-r. She also was a receptionist for a while.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, referring to the records for box 224, if you still have them—Can you take a look at that?

First of all, can you recall the purpose of entering the box on the day after Christmas 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I wouldn't know the purpose on entering on any one of these days, except the last one, and that was to take the money out.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I note three entries in April of 1970.

Do you recall why you might have entered it three times in 1 month?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I wouldn't know.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And June 5, 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. I know one time in there I wrote a letter for my attorney. I wanted to make some changes to my will and I just put it in there and later told him about it, and he said, that ain't the way you do it. I might have put it in on one of those occasions, but I don't know.

Do you happen to know what—I notice that it was April 3 and April 10, exactly a week apart. I am just wondering what day of the week that was.

Well, it wouldn't make much difference, I guess.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I'm sorry, I don't have that.

Mr. REBOZO. But I don't believe I could recall that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If it's any assistance, I also notice on box 222, you entered on April 16, 1970.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, generally what I go in there for is to either put in the directors' newest financial statement or take something out for the examiners.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But that doesn't help you recall the purpose of entering box 224?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, Mr. Rebozo, can you perhaps help me understand how, during the period 1969 through 1970—well, actually,

from December 26, 1969 through June 5, 1970, a period of 6 months, a little bit more, the records record five entries and then you described to us another five entries which you place after July 3, 1970, when you would have gone into that box to either place the money there or to remove it, to take the wrappers off or to take instructions out?

Can you indicate to us why they wouldn't have noticed any of those entries or been able to record any of those?

Mr. REBOZO. Reggie was the only one who would shove a card at me, generally. Maybe I went up there one time and Susan was there and not busy and I signed the card. But the thing about it is I don't believe I ever even, on these occasions, specified what box I was going into. When they wanted me to sign a card, they would just pull out one of the cards and have me sign it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could we have a brief consultation for just a second, off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, can you explain to us why it would be that Mr. Wakefield maintains that at no time did you come and ask him for his key or give him a replacement key for that safe deposit box or any other?

Mr. REBOZO. Why he maintains that?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, is there any explanation for why he would?

Mr. REBOZO. [Shakes head in the negative.]

Mr. GREER. Let me object at that point. I was present at least during one of Mr. Wakefield's interviews and it seems to me I recall he specifically stated that the key was obtained by Mr. Rebozo at one time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At the time the money was returned is what he stated.

Mr. GREER. It seems to me I recall—I don't have his notes present—that he said it was obtained at one time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, at any rate——

Mr. FRATES. I don't think it is "at any rate" at all.

Mr. DASIL. I think here is a case where you have posed a question involving a named person.

Do we have a record of Mr. Wakefield's statement to the contrary?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, we have the notes of a staff person and myself, who were present.

Mr. GREER. And my recollection is different from that. Again, that's the problem with not having verbatim testimony in these interviews, which we have requested several times.

Senator WEICKER. I don't think we're going to resolve it in this room, I can tell you right now. Counsel has indicated his recollection is different from the staff members', and quite frankly, if anybody wants to make an issue out of it they're obviously going to have to get Mr. Wakefield to make his statement and swear to it.

Let's get on to the next one.

Mr. DASIL. Would there be any reason why Mr. Wakefield would indicate that he did not receive any keys from you—is that the question?

Maybe in fact he does not——

Senator WEICKER. That's not my recollection of the question.

Mr. FRATES. I've got to needle you on that one.

Senator WEICKER. If you want to answer, fine. But otherwise, as I said, on this matter it seems it's easily enough resolved without everybody going off to everybody else in the room.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, are there any other safe deposit boxes in the bank on which you pay the rental, other than the four we have discussed?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I think I paid the fee on my godson's and it's just due now, and that's why I recall that we just haven't gone into it in all that time. But I don't have any other—I paid no other fees on any other boxes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And that would have been just recently, not on any prior occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In the case of your godson's box—that was a recent payment you made?

Mr. REBOZO. No, having paid the payment, it just came due and it was called to my attention and I had forgotten that he had emptied the box. He's now 21, you see, and he should take it over, but he has moved upstate. So he just asked that we empty it and send it up to him. That is, vacate the box.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you have a box 225 in the bank, safe deposit box number 225?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I formerly had. I think 225 is a box I formerly had.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did you not have that during the period January 1, 1969, to the present?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall who the other signatures were on that box?

Mr. REBOZO. No, but you probably have copies of it if you know that. Maybe I have a box that I don't know I've got.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The answer is you don't recall——

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. He asked a question, and I think——

Mr. REBOZO. 225 is familiar, and at one time I——

Mr. DASII. There is a record from Mr. Rebozo's bank.

Do you have who the signatories are?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, we don't.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me make it clear, we don't have any records of the actual access or leasing of this box. What we do have is a reference to it in the financial records, but not the records relating to the safe deposit box itself.

Mr. FRATES. What reference to it?

Mr. LENZNER. I'll read it to you.

Mr. REBOZO. I think I know what that may be. I'm going to conjecture.

Mr. FRATES. Why don't you have him read them?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that probably was a box I had before I switched to 633. I believe maybe 225 was poorly located or a smaller box, or something like that. The number is familiar to me and I probably at one time did have that box. If the date is on the back. I

think you might find, if that is the case, that that box was probably closed out on the same day the other one was opened.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you indicate to us why you switched boxes?

Mr. REBOZO. It probably was either a wider box—I had this narrow one. When you go to put stock certificates or legal documents in, it's better to have the wider box.

The same thing, I believe, was true of the Wakefield and my box. I think we had a different box and then switched. We have a huge demand for boxes over there, and there are never enough of the larger ones.

I would have either switched to get a more conveniently located box so I don't have to climb the ladder to get it, or to get a bigger box.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Would it help if we pointed out that the first box, box 225, was a more expensive box than the second box, assuming it is a larger box?

Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. REBOZO. A more expensive box than which box?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Than box 633.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I'm sorry. I thought the payment was \$20.50.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me read it to you. It says: "Release No. 225", and it refers to a record in the amount of \$20.50 from your bank account on October 12, 1971.

Mr. REBOZO. "Release 225"?

Mr. LENZNER. I'm just reading what the record reads.

Mr. BELLINO. "Release 225, obtain 633", just as you said. This was on October 12, 1971.

Mr. REBOZO. That's the answer.

Mr. BELLINO. The amount was \$20.50 and when it came up the following year in November, there was a \$1.50 charge, but it was crossed out. So whether you paid it—

Mr. REBOZO. Maybe they gave me a break.

Mr. BELLINO. Maybe it was a courtesy.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Would there have been any reason for moving from one box to another, other than moving to a larger box?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You do not recall the signature on the box?

Would that also have been yourself and Caroline Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably. I don't know. I had forgotten Caroline was on this one. She has never been in it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever had a box on which Miss Woods was a signator?

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, at this time we have a series of other questions, but I thought it might be appropriate to at least begin to get into the documents question and hopefully, have us mark some exhibits before we break this afternoon, if you think that is appropriate.

Senator WEICKER. Let me put it this way. First of all, let me ask you, insofar as questions of the committee, do you estimate that it will be necessary to convene tomorrow, get together with Mr. Rebozo tomorrow?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Do you think it will be possible to accomplish the questioning in a morning session, or do you envision an entire day?

Mr. LENZNER. I think we'll do the bulk of it in the morning. There may be some slopover after lunch; I can't tell. It also depends upon if we can get the documents tonight, whether we want to base any questions on those.

Senator WEICKER. Now, let me ask—and just a minute, counsel—let me ask counsel if I may, of the committee, exactly what is the status now of the subpoena relative to these documents?

Mr. DASH. It is covered in a letter by Senator Ervin.

Mr. FRATES. Well, might I——

Mr. DASH. Well, may I respond to the member of my committee?

Mr. FRATES. Well, I'm just mumbling.

Mr. DASH. There are a number of outstanding subpoenas. There are some objections, I know, that you and Mr. Frates made, and all of these issues were brought to a head in a letter from Senator Ervin, chairman of the committee, dated March 12, 1974, in anticipation of this meeting, and it makes according to the various paragraphs, it refers to the particular matters. No. 1 refers to original correspondence between C. G. Rebozo and Richard Danner or Mahen and other agents. No. 2 goes into certain telephone records and No. 3 certain credit card records. No. 4, other documents—it's all very clear. Actually No. 4 goes into documents involving the \$4,562.38 that were in the Wakefield trust account.

But the chairman—by the way—let's see, and the ones of the telephone calls from other matters. There was a response by mail we did receive and in those cases, telephone calls, the response was that they did not have such records. The information the staff has that there should have been some records in order to assist counsel and Mr. Rebozo, the telephone numbers were provided in this letter. Also, there was some indication that some bills, travel records, should have been included other than the ones that were included along with the letter in response, and therefore I think it's easier to go down the line of the March 12 letter paragraph by paragraph because I think the chairman has ruled on that for the committee, but they should be supplied to the committee.

Mr. GREER. All right, that's not exactly correct. The chairman has already ruled in paragraph 4 in terms of the \$4,562.38 in today's hearing that Mr. Rebozo testified he spent the money for personal purposes, and therefore there is no further need to go into that subject. So that takes care of that paragraph.

Mr. DASH. I'm not sure it does.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me try to do this in orderly fashion so I understand what's going on here. Rather than just jump into the middle of the letter, can I understand what your position in this matter is?

Mr. FRATES. Well, go ahead. Mr. Greer, who's handled this, Senator, will—I think again, though, it is important to bear in mind that the subpoena—and I show that to the Senator—that's the one that we're here under. We contend that there are no outstanding subpoenas. There are questions and disputes about some of the previous subpoenas, but

so that technically the record is correct, that's the subpoena we're here under today. We did—just a minute, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. I'm waiting.

Mr. FRATES. Now, what we're trying to do is to take this letter and comply with it as much as we can so that we would not get into a donnybrook about it.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me talk to Mr. Frates for a minute.

I do not understand myself how we can possibly resolve the letter with what you purport to be complete compliance unless we can see what it is you have complied with. In other words, what I'm suggesting to you is there is some objection—we're not obviously—I am not sitting here, you know, deciding a motion to quash a subpoena. We're talking about the letter and that's what you're trying to do.

Would it be appropriate this evening to find out, in other words, enter the documents you brought into evidence, to find out whether there is anything that we are arguing about at all?

Mr. DASH. It may be the one thing, apparently, Mr. Greer, that you're saying is resolved, and I think that can be an issue that we can still talk about.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, Senator, let's find out.

Mr. LENZNER. Let's go ahead.

Mr. FRATES. Well, let me ask this.

I think again when we're talking about the documents we can run down this letter and take it paragraph by paragraph.

Senator, I think that many of those documents they already have in their possession, so this idea of let us see your documents—

Mr. DASH. If we had them, we wouldn't ask for them.

Mr. FRATES. You've had them, Sam, hours and hours and hours.

Mr. DASH. Well, Senator—

Senator WEICKER. Well, let him finish.

Mr. FRATES. Well, why don't we run down the letter. I think, Senator, the quickest way is to run down the letter, tell you what we have and what we've objected to, and then we can debate whether you think we should make them available this evening.

Senator WEICKER. Go ahead.

Mr. GREER. Senator, to present the procedural aspect, we are here under a subpoena which calls only for Mr. Rebozo to appear on what was March 18, and then by telegram was modified to March 20, today. There was no duces tecum attached to that subpoena.

Wait, Sam.

Prior to that time, there were a series of duces tecum subpoenas. We have objected to a portion of those and we have complied with other portions. Now, we received late last week a letter from Senator Ervin dated March 12, addressed to Mr. Harper of our office, setting forth a series of things which the Senator and the staff contended have not been complied with. Certain of those things we are prepared to comply with at this time. Others we are not.

Now, I can tell you what those things are at this time and what our objections are to the others.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

Mr. DASH. That's an orderly procedure. That's all I'm asking for.

Mr. GREER. Now, paragraph 1, the correspondence with Mr. Danner and the other Hughes representatives, we have those letters

present and they have already been looked at by the committee, but we are happy to show them to them again.

Paragraph 2——

Senator WEICKER. Now, as he goes over the letter, I don't have a copy, this is a matter between you two.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, may I just make a comment, Mr. Greer one simple question.

Do you have any objection to us making copies from the original documents you've brought with you?

Mr. GREER. If we have the originals.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, if you have copies, can we make copies from the copies?

Mr. GREER. You may make copies from the copies.

Mr. LENZNER. All right. That's fine.

Mr. GREER. Now, as to the remaining items, paragraph 2 calls for all original phone records or phone messages which reflect telephone calls from C. G. Rebozo to——

Senator WEICKER. Now, excuse me. I'm trying to listen to Mr. Greer. Let's knock it off.

Mr. GREER [continuing]. To any of the following individuals: And there was a whole host of over 100 names. We perused the phone records——

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Excuse me. How many?

Mr. GREER. Over 100 I believe.

And we perused Mr. Rebozo's phone records and there were no records which reflected such contacts.

We informed the committee of this. They replied that they thought there should be, and they gave us a list of 170 phone numbers for 11 different phones. Now, we got this the end of last week.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

Mr. GREER. We have had no way to begin to look at the records to determine if over a 5-year period there were any phone calls to or from those phone numbers.

Now, personally, I think that is an entirely objectionable request to have to go in and do this, and we may want to object to it on that ground. We have not decided that as of yet, but right now we just physically have not had a chance to begin to look at the records to see if these 170 phone numbers for 11 different phones over a 5-year period can be complied with.

Senator WEICKER. Does anybody have an objection on that? Obviously it doesn't——

Mr. DASH. Well, I think counsel, at this point, if he is raising the question of reasonable time to comply, is raising an appropriate issue, and if he needs more time to reply, I think he can do that, of course.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It's actually a very simple process to go through those records. It would take no longer than an hour.

Mr. GREER. I do not agree with you at all.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If you show me the records——

Mr. GREER. To do it properly, you would have to take—the first number as area code 202–293–2900. You have to take each record for each of 11 phones for 5 years and go down each of those records, looking for that number.

Mr. ARMSTRONG If you take a few key numbers——

Senator WEICKER. You can't do that. You made a specific request.

Mr. GREER. You made a request for 170 numbers.

Senator WEICKER. All I am saying is, if you are given a reasonable time, can you comply?

Mr. REBOZO. My gal said it would take her a month to do this.

Mr. GREER. Frankly, I don't know what records are available. I haven't had a chance to go out to the bank and look. That is why I want to hold it in abeyance and we'll come back to the committee with a specific response.

Mr. FRATES. We'll tell the Senator that we will certainly make an effort to do it.

Mr. GREER. I frankly don't know. I have not been able to look at whether the phone records are there. That's why I can't tell you.

Mr. REBOZO. I've glanced at these numbers, and I usually remember phone numbers, and I would say most of them I've never heard of, and some of the area codes they fall in I've never heard of. If they would just pinpoint certain numbers that I've had certain conversations with——

Mr. GREER. If there's any way we can get it narrowed down.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I see no reason why in this matter— Counsel has indicated he will try. Now, Sam, this is something—now, obviously there is a physical problem.

Mr. DASIL. I agree with that, and I talked to Mr. Greer about that and admitted it earlier.

Senator WEICKER. All right. We'll try to resolve the thing. Go on.

Mr. GREER. All right, paragraph 3 calls for any and all credit card and other charges reflecting contact with certain named individuals. We have provided the few items that reflect actual contact in instances where it has any possible relationship to Senate Resolution 60. There may be others that represent private contact between Mr. Rebozo and say the President, but it has nothing to do with campaigns. So everything that does have to do with campaigns we have provided.

Now, they've come back and said, we don't think that we have. Our position is that all of it has been provided that reflects a contact.

Senator WEICKER. Does somebody care to respond to that?

Mr. LENZNER. Well, one way we may have to develop that, if you are representing that the only records related to that request are the ones you already have is by going into extensive questioning with Mr. Rebozo on all of the meetings with Mr. Danner and all of the people, and whether he has in his possession credit card vouchers, records, or expense items that reflect when those meetings took place.

Let me just give you one example. Say there was a conversation or meeting in Las Vegas that we think is pertinent with Mr. Rebozo and Mr. Danner. We would obviously want to see the travel records to pin that date down and how long he stayed out there and who he may have met with.

Mr. REBOZO. That's easy.

Mr. FRATES. We have no—we have no objection.

Mr. REBOZO. But to give me 5 pages of phone numbers——

Mr. DASIL. We're not talking about phone numbers. We're talking about travel records with particular persons.

Mr. REBOZO. But they've asked for all travel records, including every time I visited the President. Well, that's been in the paper every time, you know, and I get it every time I go into Washington, I assume, but it seems like the request is a little extreme and unreasonable.

Senator, the problem that I've got, I've got a small office. I've got people about out of their minds. We've got over 2,000 man-hours invested in pulling out documents and stuff for this committee. Back in September we gave things we felt were not really required by the mandate but we said, we'll get it behind us. Let's go ahead and cooperate. We'll get it to them. Now, much of the same stuff is being requested over again, and my people are just up tight, and it is just an unfair added burden to impose on them at a time like this when our small staff is busy during the winter season.

Mr. GREER. And the problem is, these records don't reflect contact. You'd have to take the records, determine dates, determine exactly where the trip was to, and then determine if there was any later contact from that record. We provided everything that shows on it a contact, and that is what the subpoena called for, that reflected a contact.

Mr. LENZNER. Pertaining to—

Mr. GREER. Specifically named individuals, and where the records have a reference on them to those individuals or to a meeting, we have provided that.

Mr. DASH. In other words, to clarify that, assuming Mr. Rebozo made some trips to Las Vegas, the travel record wouldn't necessarily show that he met with Mr. Danner.

Mr. GREER. And the same thing is, if he went to Washington or New York or anywhere else, that we would have to have some indication without having to force Mr. Rebozo to sit down and take each record and reconstruct what he did on each and every trip, and if during the course of that trip he may have seen or talked to somebody on the phone. It is physically almost impossible to do.

Mr. DASH. Is there any way that the staff can guide, I mean make much more specific the meetings that we would like to address ourselves to?

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think another thing, we have sent a memorandum of law on this matter, but if I may, the Supreme Court of the United States in several decisions has said—if I can just briefly—because I think this gets very close to what we're talking about, of course, a legislative investigation. This is according to the Supreme Court, is any investigation must proceed step by step, but step by step or totality, an adequate foundation for an inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially tread upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected activities, or seriously interfere with similarly protected associations rights.

Mr. GREER. The case says you can't go on a fishing expedition.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I understand that, and I think what we're trying to work out here is—

Mr. FRATES. We want to comply, and we will comply with anything that we feel—when I say we feel—that is related or covered by this. And if we don't we will specifically say we think that is not.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I think we're making good progress here and I think Sam asked Terry if there is any way that he can give additional guidance in this matter.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, my original suggestion I think was simply to include in our questioning—we've already been over some contacts—whether Mr. Rebozo is aware of whether he has specific records relating to the particular meeting or transaction.

Mr. GREER. If you can give us a list of meetings, and if we already know the general timeframe, we'll go back in and search the records.

Mr. LENZNER. For example, I don't understand. We don't have a—you have not produced a copy or a record of the trip—I think you showed us an airline ticket one time but we never did get a copy of that—to San Clemente for the July 3, 1970, meeting.

Mr. FRATES. You've got the information. We'll produce that. We'll give it to you.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, something to support it firmly. That's all we want.

Mr. FRATES. Well, all Mr. Bellino wants is in complete violation of every Supreme Court record I've ever read.

Mr. BELLINO. Senator, I object to him. I have said nothing to him at all.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Bellino's idea of an investigation is to make everybody produce all of their records, and that is what they've done in every bank in this country, and every record, and he's bird-dogged it and he's persisted on every private record that he's had, all in complete violation of the Supreme Court records, and we say, if you relate something specific, we'll produce it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, that's exactly, Bill—

Mr. FRATES. We've tried, Senator, from the inception, to cooperate to make records available without subpoenas, hour on hour after. So we have over and over again tried to cooperate, not secret information, and we are still willing to do that.

Mr. LENZNER. I think Mr. Bellino was simply pointing out to my attention, Mr. Frates, there are specific items that we can indicate to you are items we think are pertinent to our inquiry.

Mr. GREER. If you can give us a list, itemized—

Mr. FRATES. We've asked for this over and over again.

Mr. REBOZO. Pick out the phone numbers, too.

Senator WEICKER. Well, you're going to cooperate on the phone numbers, and he's going to give you as much as he can to assist you in the others.

Mr. GREER. Paragraph 4 goes into the 1968 campaign and the \$4,562 which was discussed earlier this morning. Senator Ervin ruled that Mr. Rebozo's testimony that he spent the \$4,500, that was his money and he spent it on personal items, was sufficient, and it ended that line of inquiry. I don't think we need to go into it any further.

Mr. FRATES. Well, the record will show that.

Mr. DASH. Well, Senator Weicker, he ruled on a question. The question wasn't backed up by any documentation, and therefore, the questioner had a problem. We have not been provided with the records.

Now, wait a minute. Let me finish. I agree that if the records were to show that this particular item had nothing to do with the campaign in 1972, and did not relate to funds that were used in the campaign of 1972, that we under our resolution, have no right to pursue it. But, in an inquiry to find that out, and whether we ever use it in our report or whether we ever conclude on that, we cannot make that decision until—if we have probable cause to believe that the money may have been used—until we see the records.

For instance, we do know that a portion of these funds were sent to Kalmbach, and Kalmbach used it for Ulasewicz.

Mr. FRATES. And you can interpret into it anything you want, but what he did, he sent it. the document is in evidence, there's no question about that.

Mr. DASH. Unfortunately we're asking a question from the blind, and I think Senator Ervin had to rule on the basis of the question asked in the blind which we could not at this point—in fact, Senator Ervin was the one who said that this has to be complied with.

Senator WEICKER. What is the request?

Mr. GREER. Here is the request. Specifically refers to the 1968 campaign, No. 4.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, let me show you these two——

Mr. DASH. And the purpose of Senator Ervin's request——

Mr. FRATES. Wait a minute.

Senator WEICKER. Well, it seems to me—I'd be glad to listen to counsel, but it seems to me that Senator Ervin, having signed this letter specifically requesting documentation, relevant to this amount, would control insofar as the subpoena and insofar as the document is concerned. I don't in any way intend to overrule the chairman's ruling this morning which related to a question, but as far as documents are concerned, I would have to be guided by the chairman's letter.

Mr. FRATES. Well, Senator, I don't know if you were here when we were talking about these two.

Senator WEICKER. I was here.

Mr. FRATES. And I think the record will clearly show that the chairman will rule that those were not proper questions, and he established the ground rule.

Senator WEICKER. Counsel, I don't disagree with you insofar as the question is concerned. Here we are talking about documents subpoenaed, and quite frankly, if the chairman has signed the letter——

Mr. DASH. Senator, he said in his ruling if Terry could show where it related to 1972, he would allow it in. And he couldn't show it because we didn't have the documents because they hadn't been produced. We are looking for the documents.

Now, documents may show that they don't relate, but in all investigations, you don't know until you see, but if they do relate, we believe that they do relate.

Mr. GREER. We're back to a fishing expedition.

Mr. DASH. No, this is not a fishing expedition because we do know the money was used in part for the 1972 campaign. We don't know what. We believe that the rest might be able to show this.

Mr. GREER. Senator, let me say this on this one particular thing. This has been posed to the full committee where we came up here and objected to these various things. As far as we know the full committee has not ruled on this. You were here, we were satisfied that the chairman's ruling would substantiate that under the Supreme Court decisions that we do not have to produce anything other than what has already been produced on that.

And I will say to you, Senator, that we are not going to produce them. I mean, I don't want to play games with you because we feel, for whatever motivation we might have, we are not going to produce them and if the chairman rules that we have to——

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me put it this way. As far as that item is concerned, just mark down they're not going to produce them. We're going to be getting together again tomorrow morning. The chairman will have a chance to be here. You might want to review it again there. I understand—well, let me put it this way. I received your objection. I don't intend to do anything about it. It is just received, it's noted, and as far as that item is concerned, we'll take it up again tomorrow.

Mr. DASH. I think it should be noted for the record that the chairman's letter, which is the chairman of the committee, says that there was no compliance, and the letter calls for this compliance.

Mr. FRATES. The letter is not a subpoena, and again, we're debating.

Mr. GREER. Well, let's not argue anymore. Everybody has everybody's position.

Senator WEICKER. I understand the objection of counsel. I have noted and I have so interpreted the chairman's letter to mean what it says.

Mr. DASH. Which directs compliance with the subpoenas.

Senator WEICKER. Which directs compliance.

Now, as far as anything else is concerned, I suggest we wait on that item until tomorrow.

Mr. GREER. Finally, it asks for——

Senator WEICKER. And we can sit here and talk until we're blue in the face and we won't solve anything.

Mr. GREER. Terry, I don't think we need to discuss anything anymore.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I just want to add one thing, Senator. At one point I think we ought to have in the record—and whether you want to do it now or tomorrow, your advice—just an explanation of the pertinency, our statement as to the pertinency that those documents have to our mandate, so that it's clear on the record for both Mr. Frates and us.

Mr. DASH. Well, why doesn't it go in right now?

Senator WEICKER. Why doesn't it go in right now? We've heard their statement; now let's hear your statement.

Mr. LENZNER. Again, Senator, we also want to include in the record the subsections of the resolution that we feel are the foundation for the subpoena duces tecum for these specific documents.

Do you want us to do that now, too?

Mr. FRATES. We are not standing on that.

Mr. GREER. I would like to know, Bill, because it's going to come up.

Mr. DASH. Well, we're laying the groundwork.

Senator WEICKER. Well, why don't you—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, why don't I cite them and have the reporter add them for the record. They're quite lengthy.

The first, we are talking about Senate Resolution 60, including the language authorizing an investigation of "illegal, improper, unethical activities in the Presidential election of 1972," which appears on page 21.

Mr. GREER. Can you give us the section citation?

Mr. LENZNER. I will in a second.

Which my quote indicated, this is in section 1(a) at page 22 of the rules,¹ "indicate the necessity or desirability of the enactment of new congressional legislation to safeguard the electoral process by which the President of the United States is chosen."

We also would include in that section 2 of Senate Resolution 60, subsections (11), (12), and (13) and (16)².

Mr. GREER. I don't think you have to quote them. We all have copies.

Mr. LENZNER. I will not quote them now.

In addition to the question of the funds going to Mr. Kalmbach, Senator, which we have already documented, we also have an interest in determining what manner formerly campaign funds were utilized as late as 1972, campaign funds going back to 1968, apparently were converted to Mr. Rebozo's use in 1972. We want to determine what actual use was made of them, No. 1, because it may relate directly or indirectly to the campaign of 1972. It may relate directly or indirectly to a whole variety of other things that the committee has been investigating, Ulasewicz and the setting up of funds to pay for the Watergate defendants, but indeed, it is in itself evidence of a conversion of campaign funds, albeit from a prior campaign, and that to me also refers and is pertinent to our inquiry and what happened, and what use, if any, was made of the \$100,000.

Now, if you are having an inquiry, a prior similar act related to the incident that you are looking at is entirely pertinent to determining whether the incident you are looking at could have happened, whether the person you are looking at could have had the propensity to do exactly the same thing.

Mr. GREER. Prior similar acts are never admissible.

Mr. LENZNER. That's absolutely incorrect.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let him lay his groundwork.

Mr. GREER. Keep on.

Mr. LENZNER. The prior similar act is pertinent because if in fact campaign funds were converted to Mr. Rebozo's personal use in 1972, we are suggesting that that is a precedent at least for the possibility that he may have converted some or all of the \$100,000 campaign funds in 1972.

Mr. FRATES. We object to your statement of the campaign funds because the record is clear and there's absolutely no evidence that these were not campaign funds, that it was in the Thomas Wakefield special account which he had gone over in considerable detail.

¹ See Book 1, p. 427.

² See Book 1, p. 430.

Mr. LENZNER. Can I finish, Bill?

Mr. FRATES. Well, I put his statement in there, but I'd like the Senator to know that we are going to—we think we are on valid grounds here. We're not going to produce them. If we're going into citation, we will, and we'll go to the Supreme Court. I don't say that in a sense of arrogance, and I hope you understand that, but we are trying to save time because we feel if there ever was an instance where the investigative committee has gone completely out of bounds, this is it, and we feel this is——

Senator WEICKER. Well, my position in the matter is, as I have stated to you, which is nobody's ruling on anything tonight, that we'll have a chance to discuss it again tomorrow. Very frankly, even if it were not resolved tomorrow, it's a matter that the full committee would get together, so that in no way are you being forced to do anything at this stage of the game. I think it is just good to get the positions out on the table and we can go from there.

So, why don't you continue with laying out your statement?

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Senator, if it's OK with Mr. Frates, without going on and laying out everything, if I could submit a copy to the record and I will submit a copy.

Mr. DASH. That's fine.

Mr. FRATES. That's fine.

Senator WEICKER. Now, let's continue on.

Mr. GREER. There's one remaining item in the letter, Senator, which calls for the production of all of Mr. Rebozo's original bank statements and checks from 1969 through 1973, and if ever there was a fishing expedition, that is it. These records have been provided to Mr. Bellino——

Mr. DASH. What records are those?

Mr. GREER. It's on page 2 the next to the last paragraph. These records have been shown to Mr. Bellino. He has been through them.

Mr. BELLINO. What's that?

Mr. GREER. Repeatedly, and if there are specific relevant items which apply to this investigation and those relevant items will be provided to us by list, we will provide them. But to just come in and dump all of Mr. Rebozo's bank records and checks into the committee's lap and say here you are without any showing of relevance——

Mr. DASH. I'm still trying to find that.

Mr. LENZNER. It's page 3, second to the last paragraph.

Mr. DASH. You are also requested——

Mr. GREER. By telephone, copies of the originals of Mr. Rebozo's bank statements and checks from 1969 through 1973, a period of 5 years.

Senator WEICKER. You say Mr. Bellino has already seen these?

Mr. Greer. We set him down in front of them, and he's gone through them.

Mr. BELLINO. No, sir, I've not seen anything subsequent to December 31, 1972, and furthermore, the disbursements that I saw were selected items which they were rushing me to get through.

Mr. FRATES. Rushed you for 3 days.

Mr. BELLINO. All I'm asking for is to get copies of the bank statements. I don't care whether they give us the checks right now or not.

The bank statements, because I found other items that I want to check against those bank statements.

Mr. GREER. It says bank statements and checks, and we still say that is an entirely improper request. If you can present us with the specific items you want to see, we will be happy to comply, but just to bring in a man's entire financial records and say here, we think that is totally and entirely objectionable under all Supreme Court citations.

Mr. DASH. Do you have a statement of pertinency as to this?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, if we could follow the same procedure to save time. I'll furnish you a copy of the statement of pertinency for you and for the record and for the Senators.

Mr. FRATES. is that agreeable?

Mr. FRATES. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Is that acceptable?

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me ask a question here.

I don't understand counsel's position on this matter. Are you saying that you do object to this one as you did object to the one before? Are you saying that you suggest some method whereby it can be worked out?

Mr. GREER. We're saying we suggest a method whereby it can be worked out, if we can be provided with specific items from Mr. Rebozo's records in which the committee has legitimate interest, they will be provided, but to require anyone to come in and provide all of his financial records, we feel is objectionable, and we will not comply with that.

Mr. REBOZO. May I say a word, Senator?

One of the reasons for this—and I know counsel doesn't like the client——

Senator WEICKER. I was about to ask counsel if he is going to let his client talk.

Mr. FRATES. Well, I'm waiting to hear what he says.

Mr. DASH. Do you want to go off the record?

Mr. FRATES. No, no.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I'll put it on the record.

One of the reasons for this is that after he got through going through all of my bank statements, canceled checks, when Bellino finished all of that, there was one check in there that I had written about 3 years before to a lawyer for \$700 and they called on that lawyer to see what it was for, and it involved a case involving a nephew of mine that had no bearing whatsoever on this case, but it shows you the extent to which they go. And I just don't feel that that is fair.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I've got to say, too, Mr. Rebozo, and also to counsel, that we all do the job that is given to us, and your counsel does a very vigorous and very excellent job, and very frankly, I think Mr. Bellino does the same thing, and I think the record should so state.

So I'm sure that you obviously do not embrace Mr. Bellino to your bosom anymore than, as I said, that in doing their job, are your counsel. But the fact is, they're all doing their job, and I think the record should show that each is doing a proper job, and I don't want any personal comments in the matter.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I don't want any personal comments on that, but he seriously affected my credit rating by going to a bank that loaned me money and questioning the wisdom of the loan and the President of the loan told me this.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I suggest that if there is anything specific, I think you should refer it to counsel.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, there are several things, and I—we'll go into it. This is the only reason. Otherwise we'll go right back to what we did in the beginning. We'll give them everything.

Mr. LENZNER. On that point, Mr. Rebozo, can we agree that at the beginning Mr. Bellino was given access to certain documents from 1969 through 1972, but we were not given copies nor were we allowed to make copies of any of those documents?

Can we agree on that?

Mr. GREER. No, we cannot.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, for your information, Mr. Bellino on one of the first days of many, many days in our office, made a list and he just said he didn't have the bank statements, and here we have it, I guess this is your own writing, isn't it, Mr. Bellino? You have a very good hand. Statements from December 31, 1968 to December 3, 1969.

Mr. BELLINO. That's right.

Mr. FRATES. And this, I understood, you had them right on through 1962.

Mr. REBOZO. 1972.

Mr. FRATES. 1972.

Mr. BELLINO. Read further, read further. You'll see the rest of them.

Mr. FRATES. But you just said you didn't have them.

Mr. BELLINO. I just said I looked at everything up to 1972, but I didn't see anything for 1973.

Mr. FRATES. Well, then, you've looked at everything from 1969 to 1972.

Mr. BELLINO. That's right. You made them available to me.

Mr. FRATES. And you examined them for 3 or 4 days in our office, at least 3 or 4 days.

Mr. BELLINO. That's right.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, the only point, Senator, is that at this point, we——

Mr. GREER. Well, I think, Senator, at this point——

Mr. LENZNER. Alan, can I just finish?

We have in every instance that a subpoena has been served, on every other witness, always required that the documents be produced in their original form so that we can make copies of them at our own expense. And that's——

Mr. DASH. By the way, I want to say, as chief counsel, this is exactly what we've done. In Mr. Rebozo's case, we did the convenient thing of having our staff go down there and work with them so that they would not be inconvenienced. Everybody else has had to come in here or produce the originals here in Washington.

Mr. GREER. That does not make it right, Mr. Dash.

Mr. DASH. I agree, but we've been working, as Senator Weicker well knows, under tremendous pressure of having to put on hearings

and an investigation in the time of a 1-year resolution in a broad area, and I think, as Senator Weicker said, that the investigative staff has had a tremendous burden to produce facts, and we've had our job, and we've tried to do it in the best way we can, and an investigation means getting facts and asking things that some people don't want.

Senator WEICKER. Well, if everybody would sit down, please, and let me try to weed this thing out as to where we now stand.

Now, in this letter there is agreement on the first item requested. And let me just start from the beginning now and go through.

Mr. LENZNER. We have one other item, Senator, that we haven't finished.

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me start at the beginning. We'll end up at the last.

The first portion of the letter is what?

Mr. DASH. That's the correspondence, and I think they said we can make copies of it.

Senator WEICKER. That is being provided, is that correct?

Mr. GREER. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Point No. 2 is what?

Mr. GREER. Point No. 2 is telephone records.

Mr. LENZNER. I just wanted to ask him a question.

After we finish going through the letter, Senator, I would just like to have that correspondence marked tonight as exhibits so we can have access to that prior to tomorrow.

Senator WEICKER. I gather that was agreed to.

Mr. DASH. They agreed we can make copies.

Senator WEICKER. As far as item No. 1 is concerned.

Now, item No. 2.

Mr. GREER. Is the telephone records, as we have said.

Senator WEICKER. I gather that they're going to try to be of assistance, along with you, try to narrow this thing down in order that there not be a logistical problem.

Mr. DASH. And you're going to see what kind of a problem it's going to be.

Mr. GREER. Right.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

Item No. 3.

Mr. GREER. Item No. 3 is——

Mr. DASH. Do you want to make a statement on that?

Mr. LENZNER. I just want to find out if you have the records here, the telephone records you're going to be using?

Mr. GREER. No, we do not.

Senator WEICKER. Item No. 3.

Mr. GREER. Item No. 3 is the travel records, documents and vouchers that reflect contacts, and we've agreed that you're going to give us the specific list of dates and places so we can search the records.

Item No. 4——

Senator WEICKER. You object?

Mr. GREER. We've objected to, and that is on the record.

Senator WEICKER. And you're going to deliver your statement of pertinency, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. GREER. Item No. 5 is all of Mr. Rebozo's bank statements and checks. We didn't feel that since Mr. Bellino has been through at least 1968 to 1972——

Mr. DASIL. 1969.

Mr. GREER. He told us that he wanted 1968, all of 1969 through 1972. As to those records, you ought to be able to tell us what specific items are of import and if there is no objection to them we will provide them.

Mr. BELLINO. The only thing I ask on that, Senator, is copies of the deposit statements. They could hold onto the checks. We'll ask for specific checks after we get the item, because in some cases I could identify the amount and I won't need the check.

Mr. FRATES. Well, you've had the statements, you looked at the statements. You had the statements.

Mr. BELLINO. I had the statements, but I didn't copy every item down.

Mr. FRATES. Please don't yell at me.

Mr. BELLINO. I am not yelling. I just want to hear you.

Mr. FRATES. I'm having no trouble hearing you.

Senator WEICKER. But he doesn't hear you.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, can I suggest, Senator, here the simple point, as I understand it Mr. Bellino's request seems limited and reasonable. All we have to find out is whether you agree to comply and furnish those.

Senator WEICKER. May I suggest on this item, let me think about this one, and you think that, and I gather it is a little bit narrower than what is contemplated in the letter.

Mr. GREER. That is correct. Let us discuss that.

Senator WEICKER. We can talk about it, because we're going to be back on it tomorrow morning, and there's no reason everybody has to get their heels in cement on it.

Now, what's the last item?

Mr. GREER. As far as I know that's the last.

Senator WEICKER. Isn't there one more?

Mr. LENZNER. In the last paragraph, it has also been brought to my attention that the committee has not yet received the majority of materials previously subpoenaed and specified at Mr. Frates request in Marc Lackritz' letter of November 2, 1973, and the chairman goes on, please forward those materials, identified in Mr. Lackritz' letter, which have not been previously provided to the committee.

Now Senator, the background of that is, at a meeting in the fall at Mr. Frates' request, Mr. Frates had a meeting with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker. And one of the understandings that we had coming out of that meeting was that we would specify specific areas that we wanted documents from, and we would contact them, as we did, telephonically and later in writing from Mr. Lackritz. Mr. Lackritz' letter is tab 7 of the documents.

Mr. DASIL. If you could give Senator Weicker a copy of that.

Mr. GREER. Do you have a copy of that letter?

I don't seem to have it.

Mr. LENZNER. And that request was previously included in Senator Ervin and Senator Baker's letter of——

Mr. FRATES. Well, we considered that letter to be completely a fishing expedition, Senator, and we did not feel that it represented the feeling of Senator Baker and Senator Ervin, who were there, and we thought we were going to be asked for specific documents. And if we felt they were relevant or within the resolution, then they were going to be produced.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, if you will turn to tab 8 you will see a letter to Mr. Frates of January 10, 1974, which referred to the meeting and the information that Mr. Frates brought to Senator Ervin and Senator Baker's attention. In the last two paragraphs signed by both the chairman and cochairman, you'll note it says:

In this context we are advised that while certain documents have been furnished to the Committee staff for inspection pursuant to the Committee subpoenas, Mr. Rebozo has refused to furnish the committee with copies of some documents and has refused to furnish, even for examination, all the documents properly subpoenaable pursuant to S. Res. 60. As you are aware, the subpoenaed documents were examined in Florida to assist Mr. Rebozo's convenience and not only to furnish them in Washington. However, the committee now requests that Mr. Rebozo furnish the copies of the specific documents sought, including those documents which Mr. Rebozo has up to now refused to furnish the committee.

It is our intention to maintain these documents in a secure fashion with limited access to a specified number of staff employees.

Now, those documents——

Mr. DASH. Now, that is signed by both the chairman and the vice chairman.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, those documents are the documents that were referred to in a meeting between Mr. Frates, Senator Ervin, and Senator Baker.

Mr. FRATES. I disagree with you on that, Terry, but again——

Senator WEICKER. Is that the letter of November 2, then?

Mr. LENZNER. We received no response to Senator Baker and Senator Ervin's letter that I just read as far as I know.

Mr. FRATES. Well, we received no further requests.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me finish answering Senator Weicker's question, if I may. As a result, in Senator Ervin's letter to Mr. Frates with regard to this meeting of March 12, he again reiterated that there was a need to comply with the previously issued subpoena, and referred specifically to the Lackritz letter of November 1974—of 1973, I'm sorry.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, again, getting down to not the semantics of the word game—we are here and going to cooperate and try to produce every record that we can that we possibly feel is relevant and material. We could debate what was said on the telephone and argue all of these things. If they will tell us what specific records they want, we will certainly try to have them available. We have many of these records here with us and we will try to make them available, so that we can conclude this matter. That is why we are here.

Mr. GREER. But things such as November 2, where you ask for all records, all personal records containing cash receipts, cash disbursements—generally, you are saying, turn over Mr. Rebozo's entire records, everything he ever had or ever will have. We think that is totally objectionable and outside the case law.

These records have been provided. They have been looked at. They have been through the accountant's records. If you could give us specific instances——

Senator WEICKER. Well, let me ask you a question.

For instance, have you brought with you to Washington—I'll just pick out four items because they're obviously quite specific—the records re Key Biscayne Bank building, records re B&C Investment, records re Monroe Land Title, records re Adams Key?

Have you brought those with you?

Mr. GREER. No, sir We have not.

Senator WEICKER. Well, that's a little bit different. You see, the difficulty I find is, I might, on the one hand, I agree with your argument that all personal records containing, you know, cash disbursements is one hell of a request. On the other hand, when I see that you haven't brought the documents relative to something like records re Adams Key, I figure you're not complying at all.

Mr. FRATES. That has absolutely no relationship to this.

Mr. GREER. Senator, the problem is, you cannot look at this request in isolation. When you look at items 1 through 14 and you look at the history of Mr. Rebozo's life, those requests make up a total request for the entire file of Mr. Rebozo. It asks for everything, every business transaction he has ever had with no showing or no indication of any pertinency or relevancy.

Now, Mr. ARMSTRONG has made a statement to me——

Senator WEICKER. Of course, isn't there a remedy available to you which seems to me——

Mr. FRATES. Without producing——

Senator WEICKER. Well, listen to me.

You could have moved to quash the subpoena, couldn't you?

Mr. GREER. The committee has taken the position that the only way we could get into court—as a matter of fact, we tried to quash the subpoena. Your Honor—oh, excuse me, Senator—and this committee went into court and took the position that the court had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of those subpoenas, and that is the position of the committee. And we did try to quash the subpoenas.

Mr. LENZNER. Did we win that one?

Mr. FRATES. No, they threw your subpoena out.

Mr. DASH. The subpoena was a court subpoena. It was signed by the district court. Actually, under the law, as I understand it, you can move to quash a committee subpoena if your basis is that it is out of the resolution of the committee. That is the only reason.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I think the real question here is on the items related to the November 2, 1973, letter, as I understand.

Mr. DASH. They're different, aren't they?

Mr. LENZNER. Relating to the November 2, 1973, letter that Senator Ervin referred to in his letter of March 12, 1974. I take it the position you are taking is that none of these documents—you're not going to furnish these documents?

Mr. FRATES. Senator, we have made these documents available. They have examined them. It's true, we have not permitted them at this time to make copies—Mr. Bellino, Mr. Dale, Mr. Armstrong.

Senator WEICKER. Obviously you've got to follow the same behavior in the instance of Mr. Rebozo that we have of all of the other witnesses.

Mr. GREER. I don't know if that is correct.

Senator WEICKER. Well, the only thing I'm trying to find out now is, we run through the list—where do we stand on this last item?

As I say, we're not going to resolve everything tonight.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, why I said that, they are now in a position to tell us specifically what they want, instead of gunshotting it, and we'll attempt to produce that even if we don't have some of the records. We'll try to get them up here. This is the only reason I say, they have seen them, so they should know if there is any relevancy or materiality in the documents they have examined. And if they will tell us that we will attempt to produce them.

Senator WEICKER. Is there any reason, is there any reason, just out of curiosity, why counsel from the staff and counsel for Mr. Rebozo should not be able to sit down tonight and do some talking on this subject of these documents if they brought documents with them?

Oh, why are we all——

Mr. DASH. What documents have been brought?

That's what we don't have.

Mr. FRATES. We brought a lot of documents.

Mr. DASH. Well, the finance records?

Mr. FRATES. We've got two suitcases full of them, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. Well, instead of all this bouncing, rather than hold up Mr. Rebozo and a lot of others, it seems to me there ought to be some dialog going on here as between counsel.

Mr. FRATES. Well, I think to some extent, we have had a fair dialog between Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner when we got down to specifics and weren't hollering at each other, and we seem to have worked these problems out. I think, again, as they insisted, frankly again, where we have a problem was when we try to do business with Mr. Bellino and Mr. Armstrong. And I'm not saying that——

Mr. DASH. Well, Mr. Bellino and Mr. Armstrong followed through on assignments given to them.

Mr. FRATES. I'm not asking you to defend them or not. I am stating a fact. I would hope that we could work out some specific statement of why, what documents you want to ask tomorrow about, instead of—and we are not going to, again, we are not going to turn all of Mr. Rebozo's records over here, and we think have them revealed to the world.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying now that you will not allow us to make copies?

Mr. FRATES. I'm not saying that at all. I am saying, I would hope that we will make every effort to produce the records that you feel are material and relevant for the interrogation.

Mr. LENZNER. For copy?

Mr. FRATES. For copy.

Mr. GREER. If you can give us specifics, without saying all documents on a certain subject.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I want to say, Senator, the problem here has been, frankly, following the meeting. This same request was made back in November when Mr. Frates came up here to meet with Senator Ervin and Senator Baker. The letter, Mr. Lackritz also telephonically communicating after the meeting, it was an effort

to reduce what Mr. Frates was objecting to on a broad subpoena to specific transactions and items that Mr. Bellino and others and myself and Mr. Dash felt were appropriate and relevant to our inquiry.

Now, the answer to that letter has been, as I understand it, nothing, you're not going to get it. We have never been told that we can get any of those documents since we have sent that letter. And in addition, there were a number of documents referred to in that letter that we have never seen. Now, I understand that Mr. Armstrong did make an effort to talk to Mr. Frates about this request some time ago, and was told that Mr. Frates would not discuss it.

Mr. FRATES. Now, that's not entirely true, Terry. You see, the trouble is, after these communications Mr. Armstrong has been down in our office several times and we've asked him for specific letters and specific designations. But I don't want to get in a hassle. We're trying to resolve what we can do tomorrow.

Senator WEICKER. I think—look, we're not going to resolve it here tonight. I think we've made great progress on this item here plus this last item. I still would like to see my suggestion pursued whereby there would be some dialog this evening—in other words, as between counsel—especially when all these documents are here, as to what can be done on the matter.

In my job, I am obviously—let me put it this way. It's very easy to rule on the chairman's request, which in fact is a subpoena. Boom, that's it. I am not ready to rule anything at this stage of the game, in hopes that these matters can be worked out. And I think some of them already have.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, we can certainly sit down and try.

Senator WEICKER. I wish you would. I find it—you know, I understand you've got a job to do and I understand your job has not been made easy over the months. But on the other hand, I've got to confess to you that just out of common sense—you know, when I see a subpoena for somebody's paid telephone bills—I don't know how old this guy is over here, but Christ, if it were me, 42 years of telephone bills, whatever it is, are supposed to go ahead and be produced.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Senator, it's common, frankly, for investigative committees, not to mention grand juries, to ask for what we were asking for here, which is the telephone bills for a specific period of time, 1969 to the present. It's done every day.

Senator WEICKER. Where is that?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It's in the letter. It's in the subpoena.

Mr. REBOZO. Eleven phones.

Mr. GREER. The letter shows "all".

Senator WEICKER. The letter says "all".

Mr. LENZNER. We have never asked for anything beyond 1968, Senator.

Senator WEICKER. Well, if the letter is the frame of reference, there is nothing here.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, the subpoena, which is tabs 13 and 14—

Senator WEICKER. Where's the subpoena?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Tabs 13 and 14.

Senator WEICKER. You are the ones that said that "all" referred to the letter. The letter says "all", period.

Mr. DASH. Terry, what I suggest is that in following up on Mr. Frates offer that you and, I think if you need the assistance of Mr. Bellino, meet with Mr. Frates and find out how much you can narrow this down and what they would be willing to agree.

Senator WEICKER. I agree.

Mr. BELLINO. Senator, how can you narrow this down?

Here is Monroe Land Title, which is one of Mr. Rebozo's companies. In the period we are interested in, he received from that company over \$222,000. We don't know whether any part of this \$100,000 ever went in there. We are interested in the whole of those records.

Senator WEICKER. But let me explain this to you. That could very well be entirely proper part of the request. I'm not saying it is or isn't. That could be. Unfortunately, there are a whole series of requests in here and some of them, as I said, seem to go very far afield. Now, all I'm saying is, nobody's ruling a damn thing here.

Mr. LENZNER. I understand.

Senator WEICKER. What we've got is an agreement of a good portion as to the course of action that's going to be taken. I want counsel to get together this evening to see what further can be accomplished along the lines of the last item, which is those things requested in Marc's letter.

Mr. LENZNER. We'll proceed with that.

Now, Senator, can we get a ruling on the correspondence marked as exhibits, and then we can close up shop?

Mr. FRATES. What correspondence?

Mr. DASH. The No. 1, which we had no problem with.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I'd be glad to meet at any time. I'm just wondering: I'm here and I have nothing else to do. So I am at their convenience. As I sometimes find at the end of the day, everybody gets a little uptight, everybody but me. I am available from now on. I'm available early in the morning, 7:30 on til 10 a.m., to meet anywhere to discuss this.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

May I make the suggestion that we reconvene at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning the hearing and that, why doesn't counsel get together at 8 o'clock tomorrow morning on this matter?

Mr. FRATES. That's fine, that's fine.

Senator WEICKER. If you worked for me you'd be up at 6 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. DASH. 7:30 a.m., you're talking to the one man on my staff that's impossible to get up in the morning.

Senator WEICKER. All right. I'd suggest 8 o'clock in the morning, 8 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. LENZNER. All right.

Mr. FRATES. That's fine.

Senator WEICKER. And then we reconvene at 10 o'clock, and in the meantime, yes, let's make that which has been agreed to, let's mark it for inclusion in the record.

Mr. DASH. To be copied and returned.

Senator WEICKER. Right.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you want to start tonight?

Mr. FRATES. No, Terry. I'm afraid even I won't be able to get along with you tonight.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I've stood you this long—

Mr. DASH. I think 2 hours ought to be enough to at least arrive at what—

Senator WEICKER. After 2 hours you're going to disagree, he's going to go his way and that's that. And obviously we've got to take our steps within the committee.

Mr. LENZNER. All right, we'll be here at 8 o'clock.

Mr. FRATES. Are we going to meet in this room, Senator?

Mr. DASH. We can meet in my office.

Mr. FRATES. The formal proceedings.

Mr. DASH. As soon as I get out of here, I'm trying to arrange for S-143, for the formal proceedings.

Mr. LENZNER. Can we get the correspondence marked now so we can peruse it for tomorrow?

Mr. DASH. I thought we were going to do that.

Mr. FRATES. Sure, sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you want to go ahead and have the whole thing marked or have each exhibit marked?

Mr. FRATES. All right, we can do that. We don't have to have the Senator here.

Mr. GREER. All right, for the record I have a letter from Richard Danner to Mr. Bebe Rebozo dated February 24, 1971, which would be exhibit No. 6.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 6 for identification.¹]

Mr. GREER. The exhibit No. 7 will be a letter from—a copy of a letter from Danner—excuse me, from Rebozo to Danner, dated March 1, 1971.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 7 for identification.²]

Mr. GREER. Then 8 would be a letter from Danner to Rebozo, March 3, 1970.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 8 for identification.³]

Mr. GREER. Next would be—9 would be a letter from Danner to Rebozo dated March 17, 1970, with an attached memorandum entitled "To Whom It May Concern," consisting of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 pages.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 9 for identification.⁴]

Mr. GREER. The next is a carbon copy of a letter from Danner to the editor of Life magazine, the carbon copy to Bebe Rebozo, dated July 30, 1970.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 10 for identification.⁵]

¹ See p. 10160.

² See p. 10161.

³ See p. 10162.

⁴ See p. 10163.

⁵ See p. 10171.

Mr. GREER. Exhibit No. 11 will be a telegram to Rebozo from Danner dated October 7, 1970.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 11 for identification.¹]

Mr. GREER. Exhibit No. 12 is a carbon of a letter from Rebozo to Robert J. Bird, re Dick Danner, with a copy attached of the letter from Bird to Rebozo dated April 12, 1971.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 12 for identification.²]

Mr. GREER. Exhibit No. 13 will be a letter, Danner to Rebozo, May 14, 1971.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 13, for identification.³]

Mr. GREER. And finally, a letter from Rebozo to Danner dated May 19, 1971.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 14 for identification.⁴]

Senator WEICKER. Is that it?

Mr. GREER. That is it.

Senator WEICKER. The meeting is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. LACKRITZ. This is in answer to the subpoena. This is all the correspondence between Mr. Rebozo and Mr. Danner?

Mr. GREER. That is all the correspondence that we have been able to locate in Mr. Rebozo's possession. This does not mean that there are not possibly additional letters.

Mr. FRATES. And I say in his record, we got something. But anything that he had——

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter recessed].

¹ See p. 10172.

² See p. 10173.

³ See p. 10175.

⁴ See p. 10176.

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-143, U.S. Capitol.

Present: Senators Inouye, Montoya, and Weicker.

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director; Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel; Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsel; Carmine S. Bellino, chief investigator; Marc Lackritz, James C. Moore, and Ronald D. Rotunda, assistant majority counsels; Richard L. Schultz and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; Scott Armstrong and Lee Sheehy, investigators; Richard Rust, office of Senator Inouye; Emily Sheketoff, research assistant.

Senator WEICKER. Everyone is here and the witness has been sworn, so we'll resume.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, after Mr. Danner joined the Hughes Tool Co. in 1969, did he have discussions with you after that with regard to issues relating to Hughes Tool Co. or Mr. Hughes?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES G. REBOZO—Resumed

Mr. REBOZO. Issues—you mean—are you talking about a possible quid pro quo?

Mr. LENZNER. No, just any problems. If he discussed with you a quid pro quo, I would like to hear about it, but any problems that he brought to your attention.

Mr. REBOZO. I think the only—there were no problems seriously discussed, in my judgment, at any time. I guess as I said before, that at one time, they expressed concern over the nuclear tests underground in Nevada, and another time they expressed concern about the nerve gas that was being transported. Beyond that, I can't recall any discussion on any subject that Hughes was concerned with.

Mr. LENZNER. When you say "they", can you identify who "they" is?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, "they" is Danner and Maheu.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall when you discussed the atomic bomb testing in Nevada with them? Was that before or after you received the funds from Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether it was before or after. It was—I'm reasonably sure it was after, but in each instance, it was shortly before the actual tests were to be conducted.

Mr. LENZNER. And are you saying that you don't have a recollection now as to whether those discussions began before the time—do you remember—

Mr. REBOZO. It could be determined. I don't know when the tests were conducted, but it was like days before. But I did not transmit to anyone their consternation, and I told them that I was not going to.

Mr. LENZNER. I think you have indicated that on prior occasions, you recall receiving the funds after Mr. Danner called you two or three times with regard to the atomic bomb testing.

Mr. REBOZO. What was the question?

Mr. LENZNER. One second, please. The question was—I think you said before, that it was your recollection that after you got the contributions, not before—in other words, there was no discussion when you were discussing the contribution, there was no discussion about the Agency, but after you got the contribution, then Mr. Danner started to call you with regard to the Agency test?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I just said that I thought it was after, but I wasn't sure.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, you furnished us yesterday, pursuant to subpoena, a letter from Mr. Danner dated March 17, 1970, marked exhibit 9.* Would you look at that and tell me if you had discussions with Mr. Danner on the Agency test after you received that document?

Mr. REBOZO. I probably did. I doubt that I have ever read the full letter. I don't read long letters.

Mr. LENZNER. You're referring now to the letter and the memorandum attached, is that right, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall where you had your discussions with Mr. Danner and Mr. Mahen after you received that letter?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably in Miami. I don't recall where.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever see Mr. Mahen in Las Vegas?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Approximately when was that?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, again, I think I testified before about one time having gone out on the way to California and meeting him there, but I find it difficult to pinpoint the time. The fact remains that nothing was ever done, to my knowledge, for them. They asked me about the underground thing just shortly before the test was to be conducted, and I told them at the time that it seemed to me that that was sort of an 11th hour approach, that the plans for any such operation must have been going on for months and months, and for me, an outsider, to step in and suggest, even that they should call them off would have been most presumptuous, to say the least, and I didn't feel that I could properly convey that message. And I didn't, and they know that I didn't.

Mr. LENZNER. But did you ever send a memo on to anybody for analysis?

Mr. REBOZO. Say that again?

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever send the memorandum on to anybody?

*See p. 10163.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I don't think so. Because had I done so, the chances are, up here where it says "Danner, file" I would probably also have said, "Copy to."

Mr. LENZNER. Do you do that as a matter of course when you're sending copies on to somebody else?

Mr. REBOZO. Generally. I may not always.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of ever discussing the subject of the Agency testing with anybody in the administration, including the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't. I may have just, in passing, in some of the conversations referred to the thing, but no, I again—contrary to what some people I'm sure assume—try my best to stay out of anything to do with Government. It has been my practice for many, many years, even before I knew the President, even though I've been close to a number of Senators and Congressmen over those years.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, Mr. Danner and Mr. Mahen did request of you, though, did they not, that you pass the information and request on to other people in the administration?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that they were interested in getting the information passed on, but I don't believe that I even discussed it. I could have discussed it with someone. I certainly didn't discuss it with the President, nor did I urge that anything be done about it with anyone. If it was discussed at all—I say if it was discussed at all—it would have just been in casual conversation.

Mr. LENZNER. With Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been with anyone up there. I saw them, you know, all on different occasions.

Mr. LENZNER. Miss Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. But there was no concentrated effort to try to accomplish this thing, and they knew that I wasn't going to make it and they knew that I didn't make it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you get back to them and indicate to them that the tests were going to go forward and you couldn't do anything about it?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I told them at the time that I couldn't have avoided the tests. If the tests went forward or didn't go forward, they would probably know it before I.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever respond in writing to Mr. Danner's letter of March 17, that is exhibit 9?

Mr. REBOZO. If I did, a copy of it is in that file.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I can't find any response, so would that suggest that you did not answer the letter in writing?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. By the way, you say you saw Mr. Mahen on occasion in Florida. Was he ever present, to your knowledge, in Florida at the time Mr. Danner delivered the \$5,000 in cash that you previously testified to?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I've answered that question about 15 times and the answer is still the same it was on all the previous occasions. Danner—there was no one else present.

Mr. LENZNER. My question was, to your knowledge, did Mr. Danner or anybody else indicate that Mr. Mahen was in Florida at the time?

Mr. REBOZO. He may have. I know that Maheu was there on at least one occasion.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember when that was?

Mr. REBOZO. No sir; I don't.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you meet with Mr. Maheu on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. What was discussed on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that might have been one of the occasions where either the nerve gas or the underground testing was discussed.

Mr. LENZNER. You don't recall which, though?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, the records of Mr. Danner's phone calls to you totaling \$3 and some cents—\$3.60. Do you recall whether he was calling with reference to an appointment he was seeking at the Department of Justice?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm positive he wasn't. Was not.

Mr. LENZNER. And why are you so certain about that, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. Because he wouldn't call me for that. He knew John Mitchell and I never made any appointments for him with anyone up there, nor did he ever request that I do.

Mr. LENZNER. How did you know that he knew Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he worked some in the campaign and he practiced law in Washington, and he had to know him.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, were you ever present when Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Danner met together or talked together?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. So you're making an assumption then that he knew him, but you had no knowledge—

Mr. REBOZO. Well, from conversations. I know that you know Mr. Dash. You're both in the same room and have some association. Some things you know without someone specifically spelling it out.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, Mr. Danner had indicated to you at some point that he knew Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think he knew him. He worked in the campaign right in the headquarters up there, the Committee To Re-Elect, in 1968. Mitchell was campaign manager. How he could help from knowing him, I wouldn't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have discussions—my question is—with Mr. Danner regarding Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. My answer is the same as before, no.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Danner ever discuss with you the Hughes problems with regard to the acquisition of any hotels?

Mr. REBOZO. Never.

Mr. LENZNER. Would the March 16 phone calls that show up in Mr. Danner's records, to your knowledge, be related to the letter he sent to you on March 17, which is before you as exhibit 9?

Mr. REBOZO. I wouldn't know.

Mr. LENZNER. On March 18, I believe it is, Mr. Danner met with Mr. Mitchell at the Department of Justice. On March 19 he went to Key Biscayne and has indicated that he had some discussions with you. That would have been the day after he met with Mr. Mitchell in the Department of Justice. Am I correct in that?

Let me give you the specific dates. He met with Mr. Mitchell, according to Mr. Mitchell's logs, at 12:15 on March 19, and on March 19 he departed for Biscayne, where he indicates that he met with you. He has also indicated that Mr. Mitchell told him that the Department of Justice would not object to the Hughes acquisition of the Dunes Hotel.

Now, the day after he received that word, he apparently saw you, according to his records and recollection. Do you have any memory now of him telling you that he had seen the Attorney General the day before and that they had discussed the Dunes Hotel?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he may have mentioned having seen Mitchell. I don't even recall that. But I'm positive that he didn't talk about the Dunes Hotel. Now, that date was right after this date here of this letter. This is March 17. You're saying he went there on March 19?

Mr. LENZNER. He went to the Department on March 19, and he went to see you on March 20 of 1970.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he probably came down, just as when he was in the East, he came down to see his mother and called on me, too. Most of his visits were purely social.

Mr. LENZNER. Except for the times he discussed the Agency and the nerve gas?

Mr. REBOZO. They were probably social then.

Mr. LENZNER. On March 21, Mr. Mitchell's records show that he went to Key Biscayne, March 21 of 1970. Do you have any recollection of seeing Mr. Mitchell about that time, either alone or with Mr. Danner or somebody else?

Mr. REBOZO. I generally saw Mr. Mitchell on probably every visit he ever made to Key Biscayne.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you every see him with Mr. Danner together in Key Biscayne?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you discuss with Mr. Mitchell at any time any problems related to Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever receive a memorandum from Mr. Danner on the subject of the ABM, antiballistic missile?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you ever tell Mr. Danner that the memorandum had, in fact, been distributed to people in Washington and that they were impressed with Mr. Hughes' comments?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't remember that.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever tell Mr. Danner that both Dr. Kissinger and the President had read the ABM memo that he had sent to you?

Mr. REBOZO. I couldn't have told him that. I wouldn't have known it.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry, sir; I didn't get your answer.

Mr. REBOZO. I couldn't have told him that, because I wouldn't have known whether they did or didn't, if there were such a memo forwarded to them.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying now that that is because you never had discussions with the President or with Dr. Kissinger with regard to the Hughes position on the ABM?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't know anything about that sphere of governmental operation any more than I know about others. I just draw a total blank when you start talking about ABM, and Kissinger, and the President and all.

Mr. LENZNER. So your answer is you never sent on to anybody information or a memorandum from Mr. Danner on the ABM?

Mr. REBOZO. You know what I do occasionally? I'll get, as you can appreciate, many, many requests from all kinds of people for certain things. Most of the people are people I don't even know and I have a standard procedure. Many of them are nuts, but there is always a possibility of some of them having some validity, and with the thought in my mind that everybody perhaps is entitled to some sort of response, I have taken material, put it in a blank envelope, and sent it up there so they don't even know it's coming from me; therefore, it doesn't get any special attention or I don't get credit or discredit for whatever may be in there. But at the same time, the sender gets some sort of a routine acknowledgement.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, you send it in a blank envelope with no cover letter or anything indicating that you're involved in it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, that's correct. On occasion. But I don't recall having sent anything to do with ABM like that, but I do send quite a bit of stuff that comes through just that way.

Mr. LENZNER. Who do you send it to, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. If it's a letter that someone said, "When you and the President are relaxing on the beach, will you hand him this and have him review it?" Something like that. If my name is not on it, I just put it in a blank envelope and send it to the President, the White House, that's all. It gets the routine treatment.

Mr. LENZNER. But the envelope does not indicate that it is from the Key Biscayne Bank & Trust or Mr. Charles G. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. I have blank envelopes for use for that.

Mr. LENZNER. Would you have somebody type those for you, or do you just write it on yourself?

Mr. REBOZO. Usually, I write it myself. In fact, I think always.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you mail it yourself, or do you have somebody mail it for you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I have had on occasion just told the secretary, "Put this in a blank envelope and mail it on."

Mr. LENZNER. Which secretary is that?

Mr. REBOZO. Whoever it happens to be. I don't have a secretary as such. Whoever happens to be sitting—occupying the desk nearest my office—is the one I usually use.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you ever sent anything on to the President from somebody that you knew, from a friend of yours? Or an acquaintance?

Mr. REBOZO. I really don't believe I have ever sent anything on to the President, and this might sound ridiculous, but in the 5 years he has been in office, I have phoned him one time on my own—that has been nearly 5 years ago. I have returned his calls when he has called me, but I have initiated a phone call one time since he was first elected President.

Mr. LENZNER. And when was that?

Mr. REBOZO. Way back; I think it was something spectacular that had happened, and I just felt like I had to tell him how great it was, and that is the only time that I have ever initiated a call to him.

Mr. LENZNER. That would be back in 1969 or something, way before this——

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think so.

Mr. LENZNER. In reviewing your records, have you been able to locate the date of that phone call?

Mr. REBOZO. That phone call?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. REBOZO. No. You see, a phone call would only show to the White House, and I call different ones there frequently.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember what the subject of the thing was that stimulated you to call the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't.

Mr. LENZNER. I take it, though, what you're saying is that you had known Mr. Danner for some time—in fact, as I understand it, Mr. Danner introduced you to the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Actually, he did, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And as a result, if Mr. Danner had wanted to, he could have sent these materials on himself, directly to the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Surely.

Mr. LENZNER. And you have no recollection—do you have any recollection of telling Mr. Danner that Dr. Kissinger or somebody else from the administration would be willing to brief Mr. Hughes with regard to the ABM?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Yes, now I do recall. I do recall that on one occasion, they wanted—I think what happened was that they wanted—I don't know whether he wanted to talk to the President or what it was, but I do recall now that on one occasion I did talk to them and Kissinger was willing to do it, and Hughes did—that's right.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember when that was, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, it was a long time ago. I don't recall when.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall whether it was before or after you received the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, the contributions were, what, 4 years ago? I would purely guess that it was before, but I would just venture a guess that it was before. But I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you recall what the subject matter was that the briefing was going to refer to?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I wouldn't know if you told me, but it was just a case of wanting to be briefed, presumably. No, I think he declined. I think Hughes didn't want to meet with anybody.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall how the matter that you discussed with the President got started?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't. It just didn't seem—I don't know, it didn't seem significant to me at the time. It was just a routine sort of action. I believe probably Danner or Maheu or both of them suggested that maybe it would help if he were briefed, and I suppose I may have talked about it with Kissinger. But it has been a long time ago.

Mr. LENZNER. You're saying you talked about it with Dr. Kissinger. Do you have any recollection of discussing it with the President also?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have mentioned it. I may have mentioned it to the President. I really—that phase, I had totally forgotten until right now.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, wouldn't the President have referred you to Dr. Kissinger?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Mr. LENZNER. And you don't recall whether that related to the ABM matter or not?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether it was ABM or whether it was an underground nuclear testing, or just what it was. I really don't know. But I do know that the offer was made to have Kissinger brief him on it.

Mr. LENZNER. And I take it Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu had indicated that Mr. Hughes was concerned about this issue and that is how the briefing with Mr. Hughes came up. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Say it again?

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, I take it Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu or both represented that Mr. Hughes was very concerned about this particular issue.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, because I think everyone knew how concerned he was. It had been in the press enough.

Mr. LENZNER. With regard to——

Mr. REBOZO. His concern about underground testing, et cetera.

Mr. LENZNER. So you think the briefing then, was with regard to underground testing?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. I don't recall what it was about. I think it would have been ABM, it could have been underground testing. But I do recall that there was an offer made that, on one of the trips when Kissinger was in California, to brief Hughes if he wanted to be briefed. And I believe that he declined—Hughes declined.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have any correspondence with the President or Dr. Kissinger with regard to Mr. Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you think of any other matters that Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu brought to your attention, aside from the underground testing and the nuclear—the underground testing and the dumping of nerve gas?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. I have read in the papers, of course, about the possibility of getting favors with respect to the Dunes and with respect to Air West, but I can tell you that there was never any discussion with me about either of those matters. That might save a dozen questions later.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, let me ask you this: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu the lawsuit involving TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. Only cursorily. It naturally was in the press, so of course, when a fellow's got a judgment against him for \$147 million or so, you would make mention of it, perhaps, in your casual discussion with a close friend. So I'm sure that it was discussed—not in

the context, let me emphasize, that he was asking me to help him do anything about it or anything like that.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you ever have discussions with Mr. Danner with regard to the possibility of settlement of TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of telling Mr. Danner that you, in fact, knew the principals of TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't see how I could have told him, because I don't know them.

Mr. LENZNER. You don't know any of the principals in TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you know any in 1970 or about that time?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I have never known any. I may on some occasion have met one at a function or something like that, but I can't say that I would know them.

Mr. LENZNER. Then you never indicated to Mr. Danner that you could be of some assistance to him in regard to a negotiated settlement with TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. Never.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever tell him that you had talked to people in the administration with regard to the TWA problems?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have told him that we discussed it, again like I'm referring to, but I don't recall ever having done so.

Mr. LENZNER. Talked to the President about it?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I don't recall ever having talked to anyone in the White House about the settlement.

Mr. LENZNER. It's obvious that this is based on some testimony that we've had, so let me ask you this: Did you ever tell Mr. Danner that, in fact, you had talked to people in the administration and that they were concerned about what was going to happen to TWA, because it appeared to be in economic trouble?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have. It may be that in these discussions that we're talking about, someone may have expressed concern about a major airline like that getting in trouble, and I may have said that, or I may have said it on my own, because that's the way I feel. I think it would be disastrous to a major airline to go under.

Mr. LENZNER. But you never represented to Mr. Danner that you had talked to specific figures in the administration and they were concerned about TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection—

Mr. REBOZO. Everything that I am testifying to now, of course, has got to be to the best of my recollection. I don't—if I knew anything about it, I would tell you. I just don't. If there are any of these questions that you have a basis for asking me about that you could be a little more specific, maybe I could recall a little bit better. But in general, the way you're asking the questions, I have to answer them just as I believe them.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, are you saying, though, that it's possible that you had a specific discussion with the President or somebody else in the administration with regard to TWA, related that discussion to Mr. Danner, and would not remember that?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure I didn't have a specific discussion with the President about TWA and their problems as such.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, how about other people in the administration?

Mr. REBOZO. As I just got through saying, it may have been just in normal discussion. TWA may have come up, and I may have expressed the sentiment that I just finished expressing, because I've always been interested in the airlines and I know what they did during the Second World War, and I just think it would be terrible for a major airline to go under. But that's my personal sentiment. I'm sure that Danner knew that I don't go to the President with these problems, so he really wouldn't have expected me to.

Mr. LENZNER. Except that you did go with him to the President on the one issue that you say later there could have been a briefing on.

Mr. REBOZO. What did I say?

Mr. LENZNER. You did say that you discussed with the President the one issue where you, where there was a possibility of a briefing by Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think that I mentioned that, but that wasn't a case of going to the President with something. It's something that evolved out of a discussion.

What I'm sure you're getting at is, do I go up there on a specific cause, I want to see the President and I want to see him about this and that. When I see the President, it's purely social as it has been for all these years. Naturally, during conversations, things come up and I may have expressed on one of those occasions a concern on the part of Hughes. He may have been the one to suggest, "Why don't you have Kissinger brief him and he'll feel better about it." I think it was shortly before a trip to California. But it was nothing more than I believe the President would have said with respect to any other important businessman in the country that was concerned about something, and felt that he was entitled to know a little bit more about it from the horse's mouth.

Mr. LENZNER. In that instance, you communicated that back to Mr. Danner and the word came back that Mr. Hughes did not want the briefing, is that accurate?

Mr. REBOZO. In essence, I suppose that is correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, you asked me to give you some specifics. Let me ask you this and see if we can pin this down. Do you recall on occasion flying on the Hughes company plane, the de Havilland?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall on how many occasions you did that?

Mr. REBOZO. I think just once.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember when that was and where you flew to and from?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was an occasion where I was in California and the plane was there, and they took me to Las Vegas.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you at the Palomar Airport in Carlsbad at that time? Is that where you flew from?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I flew from the Orange County Airport, but I can't be sure. I believe that's where it was.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection, though, of requesting the Hughes plane to pick you up at the Palomar in Carlsbad, Calif.?

Mr. REBOZO. I never requested the Hughes plane to pick me up, or anyone else's plane, in my life, to pick me up.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, do you have a recollection of flying from Palomar Airport to Las Vegas?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether—I've been under the impression that it was Orange County. Where is Palomar?

Mr. LENZNER. In Carlsbad.

Mr. REBOZO. Where is Carlsbad.

Mr. LENZNER. It's in southern California.

Mr. REBOZO. I was in San Clemente, and if they said they had a flight that was there at the time, if it was at Carlsbad, why, that's probably where they directed me to go to get it. But normally, when I would fly out of there, I would fly out of Orange County. It's closer.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember what purpose you were going to Las Vegas for?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was to see Jimmy Durante, if I'm not mistaken.

Mr. LENZNER. How did you learn that there was a Hughes plane at the airport?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think that I learned that there was one sitting there. I think that perhaps—and again, you know, we're going back a few years. It's sort of a routine thing. I think, perhaps, Danner invited me and said, "We've got a plane out there, you can come back on it."

Mr. LENZNER. So Mr. Danner arranged it?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure he must have.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you see Mr. Danner and/or Mr. Maheu in Las Vegas on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably did.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall having any discussions with Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu with regard to the contribution on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I really don't recall discussing contributions with him on any occasion in Las Vegas, but I could have. I've been to Las Vegas, I don't know, maybe four or five times in my lifetime, and Danner being manager—at that time I think he was manager of the Frontier Hotel—why, as an old friend, he made arrangements to meet me. I don't believe that I have ever stayed in Las Vegas more than 1 night. I've flown in, had dinner, seen the show, and left the very first thing in the morning.

Mr. LENZNER. You stay at the Frontier Hotel?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you always register there under the name, Charles G. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. Danner registered me. I didn't register at all.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you ever use the name, Charles Gregory?

Mr. REBOZO. All the time. I use it all the time.

Mr. LENZNER. For what purpose?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I use it for a variety of purposes. I started using it many years ago. When I first got a marine phone on the boat and, conversations on the boat are all monitored by every other boat, of course, and having the odd name that I have, I had

somebody kid me one time before I started using it that they heard the conversation, so I just started using Charles Gregory, which is my first and middle name, on the marine phone and I could carry on conversations and people didn't know who was talking.

Subsequently, after I started getting a little notoriety, it developed that if I would ask somebody to tune the piano, he would say that he was the President's piano tuner and so on. So it became increasingly more difficult to enjoy the anonymity that once was a precious possession, so I used the name Charles Gregory on magazine subscriptions, when I buy something out of a catalog. When I draw a personal check—you've seen all of those checks. You've seen many of them that I got cashier's checks for, and then ordered—usually, in the name of Charles Gregory, sometimes Nicki Moncourt would order it.

Mr. LENZNER. Why would you have to do that for business transactions, Mr. Rebozo? I don't quite understand.

Mr. REBOZO. That's not exactly a business transaction, but you buy something, and people are funny. But with the name having gotten so much publicity, and it is an odd name, of course, they start saying that I'm a customer of theirs or that I endorse this or that or the other thing, so it's just my desire for privacy perhaps, principally.

There's nothing wrong with it. Everybody in the bank knows it. When they get a phone call from Mr. Gregory, they know who it is, who it's for. There's no big secret about it. Any mail that comes—by ordering these things in the name of Gregory, I've gotten on a lot of mailing lists. I get quite a bit of mail for Gregory.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, would you say that it even goes to the extent of having people calling you and leaving messages for you under the name of Gregory at the bank and other places?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I've had calls like that. If, for example, someone is calling on a marine phone, we'll say, we do it that way.

Mr. LENZNER. What about just a line telephone—a telephone-to-telephone?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think that's any problem, except where perhaps someone is soliciting from a mailing list that they acquired as a result of this. But there is no mystery about using the name Gregory. In fact, it's so well known now, I am going to have to find another name to start using.

Mr. LENZNER. Just don't use mine, because then I'll be interviewed.

Mr. FRATES. That you don't need to worry about.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, what you're saying, is when you have a secure line phone, you don't instruct people to call you by the name Gregory?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no; people that I know, you know, it's no problem. I get many, many phone calls and stacks of mail. Normally, the Gregory mail doesn't even get opened. I just throw it in the trash because I know it comes from these mailing lists.

Mr. LENZNER. I understand that, but just on a secure line phone, you never instruct people to call for Mr. Gregory?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, on the question of your trips to Las Vegas, sir, do you have records, do you know, that would reflect—would help us pin down the dates of those occasions?

Mr. REBOZO. I could probably find something, you know. I can't know about it through a credit card—I don't use credit cards much any more, either, because they reveal my name. I only use it where I'm already known. It just saves time and conversation.

Mr. LENZNER. You mean you have credit cards in the name Gregory?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I don't think I could get away with that.

Mr. LENZNER. But you think you do have some records that would help us pin down when you may have been——

Mr. REBOZO. I think I could find some.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, do you recall a trip that you made, I believe also on the de Havilland company plane—the Hughes plane—from Las Vegas to Miami, Fla., on about February 2, 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't.

Mr. LENZNER. I believe—do you have any recollection that Mr. Danner and Mr. Maheu accompanied you on that flight? And I believe also there may have been an astronaut on board that flight. I'm trying to see if this will help your memory. It might have been Gene Cernan, and he was dropped off in Melbourne, Fla.

Mr. REBOZO. I think I would have remembered that, because I later got to know Gene Cernan. He's a wonderful fellow. I got to know him about a year ago and have corresponded back and forth with him. So I don't recall that. If I were out there at the time and they were coming here, I would see nothing wrong with riding in their plane with them. They had, I recall, on one occasion offered to send a plane for me or to take me somewhere, and I declined.

Mr. LENZNER. On the occasion of this trip, apparently, Mr. Rebozo, we're told that after arriving in Miami, you all then went over to Nassau, Grand Bahamas, with, I think, you and Mr. Danner, perhaps Mr. Maheu. Does that help you refresh your recollection on that?

Mr. REBOZO. What year? When was that?

Mr. LENZNER. This would be February of 1970.

Mr. REBOZO. Maheu, I don't believe, ever went to Grand Bahamas. Danner has been over there with me once or twice.

Now, the one occasion I can pinpoint the date on was somewhere in 1967, because it was the night of the Bahamian election that Pindling got elected, and I remember that we went over to the little villages to celebrate, and that is the only way I remember that date. But Danner was probably over another time, but I'm pretty sure that Maheu was never there.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, let me say this, the airline air transportation division records reflect a flight that you and Mr. Danner took with Mr. Maheu, first from Las Vegas to Miami, and then Mr. Danner and you went on from Miami to Nassau, Grand Bahamas, and I think stayed in the Britannia Beach Hotel.

Mr. REBOZO. You're talking about two things. Nassau is not Grand Bahamas. Grand Bahamas is Abplanalp's place, the northern part of the Bahamas, and the Britannia Beach Hotel is in Nassau, New Providence Island.

Mr. LENZNER. I believe the pilot told us that he went to—I believe the pilot testified before us that he landed at Paradise Island and that you all stayed overnight at Paradise Island. Does that help refresh your recollection?

Mr. REBOZO. He couldn't land there. He couldn't land at Paradise Island.

Mr. LENZNER. He landed, I guess, at Nassau and you went over—is that possible? I've never been down there to tell.

Mr. DASH. Some of our staff have been more fortunate in having been able to go down.

Mr. LENZNER. Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. REBOZO. We could have gone over there. There have a great restaurant that I highly recommend to everybody. It's worth just making a trip for one meal, the Cafe Martinique in Paradise Island. I think we could have gone over there for dinner.

You have to remember, Danner is a friend of, you know, 30 years' standing, and every time we got together we weren't talking about nefarious goings on. He's a great kidder, and I do my share. We enjoy each other's company, and I think, perhaps, we just went over there, as I have done many times, just for dinner and come back the next morning—take a 4:30 or 7 flight, have dinner, and come back the next morning.

Let me hasten to say that since all this publicity about laundered funds and all, I've quit going over there, so I haven't been to Nassau. I go to Grand Bahama with my friends.

Mr. LENZNER. I know you're great kidders just from the correspondence you turned over last night, but do you have any recollection that you discussed, during this trip with Mr. Danner, the TWA lawsuit? That's what I wanted to know.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. I don't think there was anything specific to that. I really think that, you know, I can swear, I think, that you're spending a lot of time on something that is a dry hole, as far as I'm concerned. I don't know anything about that operation, and if it was discussed, it could have been discussed any number of times, because that kind of money is a lot of money. To have that judgment hanging over your head, would make anyone want to leave the country. But there's nothing involved there that I think would concern this committee remotely, insofar as I'm concerned.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you ever discuss doing anything on behalf of Mr. Danner or the Hughes people with regard to getting some aspect of the lawsuit with TWA?

Mr. REBOZO. I think this is the third or fourth time that I've said no.

Senator WEICKER. Yes, I believe in fairness to the witness, he has answered that he has not about three or four different ways. Now, let's get on with this, Terry. I don't know how else he can respond that he didn't. Now, if you're going to believe him or not, that's your privilege, but he has answered, and I think he has answered very clearly.

Mr. LENZNER. In this context, Senator, let me ask this different question. Do you have a recollection that Mr. Danner discussed with you, in addition to the TWA problem, the problem of the Hughes

acquisition of Air West and the amount of money that that was going to tie up in Air West?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I anticipated that question earlier and answered it in order, I thought, to save us, as I said, 10 minutes or so, that I never discussed or had anything to do with either the acquisition of Air West or the Dunes, and about all I know about it is what I have read in the papers. And that I'm saying under oath. That's that.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, after the trip to Nassau, the plane records reflect that you and Mr. Danner and Mr. Maheu went from Miami back to Washington. Do you recall that? In February of 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. We may have. The question would imply that I went up there with them to show them around and introduce them to somebody, and if I went up there, it was only because they were going, and I was going, and our ways parted after that. I don't remember going up there with them. But if the plane records show that the three of us went, we went.

Mr. LENZNER. But you did not show them around or introduce them to anybody in Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. You say the plane records show that the three of us went?

Mr. LENZNER. And the pilot has also testified to that.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, perhaps I hitched a ride to Washington.

Mr. LENZNER. But once you got to Washington, my point is, you didn't take them around and introduce them to anybody?

Mr. REBOZO. There is one other thought that comes to mind, and I don't want to falsely accuse anybody because this, too, is pure conjecture. I don't know whether the plane records were read by Howard Hughes and whether there was some attempt made to appear that I was being consulted or carried along or whatnot.

I could have gone with them. But I'm just injecting the thought that it's possible that the plane records could have been prepared in order to make it appear that I was assisting in these matters. I repeat again, I never assisted in them, I knew nothing about them. If I rode up in the plane it's because I was going anyway, and there was no action taken on my part for that period.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, when you got to Washington, there was no effort made by you to take Mr. Danner or Mr. Maheu around and introduce them to any of the administration officials?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, again, on May 6, approximately, of 1969, Mr. Danner's records reflect that after dinner, he took you and other individuals out for entertainment. Do you recall that? I believe one of the friends was an individual by the name of Jack Davis.

Mr. REBOZO. Where was that?

Mr. LENZNER. In Washington.

Mr. REBOZO. Jack Davis, I know. He's the president of that operation over there at Paradise Island. He could have taken us to dinner. I don't remember that.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember if there were any discussions on that occasion with regard to the \$100,000 contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure there wasn't.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Davis political contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall anybody else who may have been present with you and Mr. Davis and Mr. Danner on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't even remember the occasion, so I couldn't recall anybody else.

Mr. LENZNER. And I think Mr. Danner has also indicated that you were in Las Vegas between June 14 and June 16 of 1969. Do you recall that occasion, what the purpose of your visit to Las Vegas was?

Mr. REBOZO. I can tell you the occasions that I was there. I can't tell you the dates, but it would be easy to determine them. Once was to see Jimmy Durante do this great show. Another time was Danny Kaye; another time was Sammy Davis. Now, it could be that I saw two of those shows on the same visit—the early show, one place and late, another. But they were just great entertainers that I thoroughly enjoyed seeing, and that is the principal purpose, really, of making the trip.

Now, I don't believe that—in fact, I know I never made a trip from Miami to Las Vegas and back to Miami, specifically for any purpose. The trips that I made were when, once, as I indicated previously, when I was on my way to California for some charity affair. I overnighted there at the Frontier. The other time was when I came from California to Vegas and back to California. Or maybe I took that plane trip on one occasion back home, got a ride.

Senator WEICKER. If I could just interject for a minute, for a 10-minute recess. I have one question before we recess. You mentioned yesterday, it seems to me, in the testimony, the fact that Danner mentioned to you the fact that Mr. O'Brien was on the Hughes payroll. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Did it cause you any concern, either before, during, or after the receipt of the \$100,000, or any portion of it, that Mr. O'Brien was involved with this operation, which operation was making a contribution to the President's campaign?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Or vice versa, of the concept that everybody was feeding at the same trough here? Was this a matter of concern?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, Senator. That was a contributing cost for the apprehension that I had about accepting the money. There were the other causes which I mentioned, but that was certainly a contributing cause, and it was contributing to the degree that I had expressed it to Danner on several occasions. I could not understand all this.

And finally, it was on that trip that Danner and Mahen made to Key Biscayne. I recall, that apparently Danner had told Mahen about my feelings, and Mahen said that Larry O'Brien had done them so many favors that they had to do this.

Senator WEICKER. You say this was a trip with Danner and Mahen to Key Biscayne?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. When was that?

Mr. REBOZO. I think they have the date that he was there.

Senator WEICKER. Do you have the date?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was in 1970, did you say?

Mr. LENZNER. Are you talking about when you took the plane trip with Mahen and Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. When Danner and Mahen were at Key Biscayne.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think this is the testimony of yesterday and previous testimony, not under oath, that on one of the occasions, the visit to Key Biscayne, Mahen was with Danner. I think that's what you're referring to.

Mr. LENZNER. There are several dates we have—September of 1969 and February of 1970.

Mr. FRATES. Of Mahen?

Mr. LENZNER. Of Mahen and Danner.

Mr. FRATES. I think he testified that it was once, and it could have been more times. I think this is what you're referring to.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. This visit and this subject matter—I'm sorry, because I don't have a list of dates in front of me. Was this prior to or after receipt of the moneys?

Mr. REBOZO. The information on O'Brien came to me when the money was first offered in 1968.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

Mr. REBOZO. And it didn't make sense to me. I understand better now that sometimes people will contribute to both parties. But I had apparently expressed such concern about it to Danner that he told Mahen, and Mahen sort of went out of his way to explain to me that O'Brien had done them so many favors that they had to compensate him.

Senator WEICKER. That's what I'm trying to find out. In other words, that visit—and as I've said, this is entirely my fault because I don't have the list of dates in front of me. Was that visit prior to or after receipt of the moneys?

Mr. REBOZO. It would have to be prior, if his dates are correct. He said 1969 and early 1970. So it would have to be prior to receipt of the money.

Senator WEICKER. And I assume, then, from the facts, that whatever reservations you had were allayed as a result of that visit.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I'm sure that the purpose of telling you that was to help allay those reservations.

Senator WEICKER. We'll recess for 10 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator WEICKER. Let's come to order, please.

Mr. LENZNER. You did raise an interesting issue and I want to pursue it. As I understand, Mr. Rebozo, in 1968, you and Danner had a discussion with regard to why the Hughes people had hired Mr. O'Brien. Later, Mr. Mahen came down to explain that.

Mr. REBOZO. No, we didn't have discussions about why he had hired him. He simply told me that he was on their payroll. That's all. He said—you know, it was kind of—well, I'm not sure that I said it at first. I was sort of nonplussed, because I thought that it was a genuine effort to help the President in his campaign. Then,

when I learned that, coupled with the other things which I've related, they all contributed to my apprehension about accepting the contribution.

Mr. LENZNER. In 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. In 1968, yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. And did they ever specify what favors Mr. O'Brien had done for them?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, was there indication that the reason that the discussions of the contribution with you were premised on feeling that since the Democrats were out of office, they needed to show favorable position toward the new administration?

Mr. REBOZO. No, the only thing that I've seen with respect to that was reported in the press, where there was supposedly some memo that Hughes had sent Mahen about contributing to this man because he very easily could be President. The wording of it, I don't recall, but I remember seeing something like that in the paper.

Mr. LENZNER. But you're saying there was no indication at any time that one of the reasons for the contribution was an effort to have a favorable reaction to any Hughes problems?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. Never, not even remotely.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you ever had occasion to discuss the facts of Mr. O'Brien's favors and employment with the President? His employment with the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Only in the—only to the extent that I've stated that I understood that he had done them a lot of favors and that they were paying him six figures.

Mr. LENZNER. What was the President's reaction to that, do you recall?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, you say did I ever discuss it with the President?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I don't know whether I did or not. I didn't understand your question. I don't remember whether I ever discussed it with him or not. Possibly.

Mr. LENZNER. You would recall, specifically, if you discussed something like that with the President of the United States, wouldn't you?

Mr. REBOZO. Not necessarily, but I probably did mention it.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall any reaction he had when you did mention it?

Mr. REBOZO. No, the President doesn't react on matters like that, I don't think, outwardly. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ask you to get any more information for him?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever become aware of the fact that there was an IRS audit being conducted on Mr. O'Brien with relation to his employment with the Hughes Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I may have read something about it.

Mr. LENZNER. Aside from the news media, did you learn from some individual?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, no; no, no, no.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall when you read about that in the news media, that Mr. O'Brien was being audited?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I just saw one time some little something. I just assumed it was a routine audit.

Mr. LENZNER. That was some time ago, though; that wasn't recently?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was a while back, yes.

Mr. LENZNER. 1969 or 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. Whenever it was.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of discussing the O'Brien tax audit with anybody else at the White House, Mr. Halde-
man or Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you have any recollection of traveling to Las Vegas, Nev., shortly before Mr. Danner delivered the \$50,000 to you in San Clemente, about a day or two before that?

Mr. REBOZO. No. You'll recall, I provided a copy of my plane ticket and it was from Miami to Los Angeles direct, where I went to San Clemente.

Mr. LENZNER. As part of the documents furnished us last night, there's one exhibit I wanted to inquire about, exhibit 8* of March 3, 1970. Do you have that?

Mr. FRATES. What is it?

Mr. LENZNER. It's a letter to Mr. Rebozo from Mr. Danner.

Mr. FRATES. Did you give the originals back to us?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes.

Mr. FRATES. It doesn't look like all our files are here.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I recall this letter.

Mr. LENZNER. The question is, did you pass on the letter from Mr. Morgan to anybody else, as requested by Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have mailed it up to whatever department that was—HEW or whatever—but I don't know that I did.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall ever getting any response to it?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you know Mr. Morgan, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I've testified, you know, that I met him. He's the one who first offered the money.

Mr. LENZNER. Had you had any conversations with him, or communications with him, between that time and the time you got this letter on March 3, 1970?

Mr. REBOZO. No. In fact, I don't think I've had any communication with him since 1968, when that offer was made.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever learn that Mr. Morgan was seeking out information with regard to the \$100,000 contribution that you had received? Did you ever hear that?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I would have assumed that he knew about it, because he was the first emissary to deliver it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever learn whether he had a conversation with Mr. Ehrlichman or others with regard to that subject?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not to my knowledge. I don't even know if Morgan knows Ehrlichman.

*See p. 10162.

Mr. LENZNER. Does anybody have any questions in that area?

Senator WEICKER. Let me, not necessarily in this area, but I can at least get an answer to an area that is of interest to me before we break for the morning.

Mr. Rebozo, tell me about trying to return the money to Mr. Danner—as specifically, the first time you discussed it and any subsequent times, and what the gist of the conversation was, insofar as you're concerned?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, Danner is a funny guy about phone calls. He just takes forever returning a phone call, even from his closest friends. I think his closest friend is probably Smathers, and he has told me this, that he has a hard time getting an answer to calls. So I did talk with him and told him what I wanted to do, and he said he would have to talk to his superiors.

Senator WEICKER. When did you——

Mr. REBOZO. This was in the spring of 1973.

Senator WEICKER. The spring of 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. You contacted Danner by phone, or was this in person?

Mr. REBOZO. I think by phone—I think.

Senator WEICKER. What did you say to Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I told him that I wanted to return this money, that I had been advised to, and so on. He said, well, he didn't know how to handle it, or words to that effect.

Senator WEICKER. Did you tell him, at that time, that you had been advised by the President?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether I did or not.

Senator WEICKER. Had you been advised by the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, by the time you got on the phone, talked to Mr. Danner, and requested the return of the moneys, you had discussed the matter with the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. But you don't know whether or not you said that to Mr. Danner, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I don't know. I was more concerned with getting the message to him that I wanted him to take the money. He said, well, he would have to talk to his superiors. I didn't hear from him and I kept calling and calling. I called any number of times and left word. He never would return my calls.

I knew that Chester Davis was the—one of the superiors, and I arranged somehow, I think I arranged for the lawyer to get hold of him.

Senator WEICKER. What lawyer?

Mr. REBOZO. Gemmill, who was handling my tax matters.

Senator WEICKER. You arranged for Gemmill to get hold of him?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that's the sequence. I believe I arranged for Gemmill to get hold of him because I couldn't get hold of Danner.

I took the money to Gemmill's office in Philadelphia and he had made some arrangements with Davis. At that point, I thought that either Davis would be in Philadelphia or in his office in New York.

I thought Davis stayed in New York all the time. But when I got there, I learned that Davis was out West and wouldn't be in New York for a few days.

I was going on to New York anyway, so then, that's when I drew Bill Griffin into it, to just hold the money. He had a bank, he's a lawyer, I have great confidence in him. He had been one that I had consulted about how to handle this earlier, so I just asked him if he would hold it and we would have Gemmill and Davis contact him when they could get together. That was Griffin's entire part in this whole thing. As a matter of fact, Griffin is principally Bob Abplanalp's attorney and he didn't even tell Abplanalp about it. Abplanalp first learned about it when he read it in the paper that morning. But Griffin just kept the money in the vault until he got a call, and then delivered it to them.

Senator WEICKER. Now, you never, then, heard again from Mr. Danner after the initial request that he accept the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I went to—while I was in Philadelphia, from Mr. Gemmill's office—I told Mr. Gemmill that I had just exhausted every effort to get Danner to take it, that he now wouldn't even return my calls. So he said, "Well, why don't you try one more time from here." So, I called him right from there and I told him where I was, and I said, "I'm going to leave the money here and I want you to know it." That's about the length of the conversation.

Senator WEICKER. And what did he say?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know what he said, other than perhaps, he would look into it or something. But by then, I believe Gemmill had already made arrangements with Davis, or maybe he made arrangements—was in the process of making arrangements.

Senator WEICKER. What was the lapse of time between the first phone conversation with Mr. Danner, where you asked him to take back the money, and when you called him again from Gemmill's office in Philadelphia?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, you mean from the first time I asked him to take the money, or the last call I had made to him? I had made numerous calls.

Senator WEICKER. I gather you made numerous calls which he would not accept or never returned. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I don't know. It could have been 2 or 3 weeks, or something like that, maybe longer.

Senator WEICKER. Did you actually only talk to Mr. Danner, then, two times? In other words, the first time when you requested that he take the money back—

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Senator WEICKER [continuing]. And the second time from Gemmill's office?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Senator WEICKER. And in between, you had attempted to get hold of him, but were unable to do so?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you tell us who referred you to Mr. Gemmill, in light of Senator Weicker's questions?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that somebody in the White House—I think it was Len Hall, I'm not sure—I had heard of him before and I

had been told when all this business started that I would probably need Washington counsel. So I got hold of him.

Senator WEICKER. Excuse me, Terry. Just one last question which I forgot to ask. After you deposited the money with Mr. Griffin, did you have occasion to tell the President that the money had been given back?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; I'm sure I did.

Senator WEICKER. Can you tell me when that was?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it would have been shortly after that. The next time I saw the President, probably.

Senator WEICKER. The next time after you had met Mr. Griffin?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. And did you tell the President to whom you had given the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. And what was the President's response?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think he said something to the effect, well, you did the right thing.

Senator WEICKER. I'm sorry, Terry. Go ahead.

Mr. LENZNER. Where was that meeting held, Mr. Rebozo, with the President, that you just described?

Mr. REBOZO. There wasn't—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, the conversation.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Probably at the White House. I don't know if on that occasion, I came back through Washington or whether I went back to Miami and saw him on the next visit down there. I've always made it a practice to—I know all the things he has on his mind all these years, and I generally just wait to tell him anything. That, perhaps, I wouldn't have waited as long to tell him, because I thought that it was the thing that he would feel better about. I don't know just where it was, but it was shortly thereafter.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, was it in the President's office in the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know where it was.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying you have no recollection now at all of where you had that discussion?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it wasn't a discussion. It was just to let him know that I had returned the money.

Senator WEICKER. But it was in person? It was in a conversation?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. It was in Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably, but I really don't know, because I'm in Washington more often than he's in Florida. So I would presume, because of that, that it would have been there.

Mr. LENZNER. When you said "Len Hall" before, did you mean Len Garment?

Mr. REBOZO. Did I say Len Hall? I'm sorry, I meant Len Garment.

Mr. DASH. Just to fix the time, do you have any recollection of how soon after you returned the money that you told the President about it?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was as very shortly afterwards. I would like for the record to reflect that the Len Hall was just a slip of the tongue, because if this becomes public information, then I'll have Len Hall on my back.

Mr. DASH. I think the record will reflect that.

Senator WEICKER. Is there a member of the staff here who can tell me when the money was turned over?

Mr. LENZNER. June 22, 1973.

Senator WEICKER. June 22, 1973.

Mr. REBOZO. They have a copy, Senator, of the receipt and the serial numbers of the bills.

Mr. DASH. And therefore, you said it's your recollection that it was very shortly after that, that you told the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRATES. Terry, show that to the Senator.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm showing the Senator a letter from Mr. Rebozo to Mr. Chester Davis, dated June 22.

Mr. FRATES. I think he actually got it on the 27th, though.

Mr. LENZNER. On the 27th, yes.

Mr. DASH. It could have been in the same month, actually. I'm still trying to follow it up.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure it was immediately after.

Mr. DASH. Immediately after, sometime after June 22, 1973, that you told the President and that might have been the place where it may have occurred?

Senator WEICKER. Do you keep any record of your appointments?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. I've tried that time and again. Up until a couple of years ago, I had one of these tear-off appointment books, or sheets. Then subsequently, I have had the other kind. But I don't have anybody keep it for me, and if I'm there and think of something, I put it down. I use that for scratch pads and for everything else.

Senator WEICKER. I think it would be most helpful to the committee and, as I said, it's impossible for any of us, just in the sense that we're human beings, to remember all details and facts, but I would appreciate it if you, in consultation with your counsel—and maybe it might develop in questions here, but if it does not, to try to pinpoint the date on which you met with the President to tell him that you had it—that you had returned it.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think to clarify that situation a little bit, the relationship between the President and Mr. Rebozo is a friendly, informal one and not one of appointments. As someone expressed to him the other day, which I thought sums it up pretty good, he's like an electric light. When the President pulls a switch, turns him on, he'll talk about something now. But it's an informal thing. It might seem strange to someone that you don't go and have an appointment and tell him that. They are in constant and close relationship.

Senator WEICKER. I understand that. That's why I'm saying—it's quite frankly why I don't pursue the matter of an appointment book, because I do understand the relationship. It's an in and out type of situation. But I do think it is important, in certain instances, that an effort be made to try to pinpoint the time. This is one of them.

Mr. REBOZO. I'll try to see if there's anything I can associate with it. I don't have high hopes of finding something because of—when we're together, I don't sit down and write what we're talking about.

Mr. FRATES. I think you can check the next time you were together, either up here or down there, and I think that would tie it in.

Mr. DASH. For instance, I take it, if it was up here, I take it even with the informal relationship, you're logged in with the President on any meetings, and anybody else is, on meetings with the President.

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Senator WEICKER. And it is, to the best of your recollection here today, within several days after you turned the money over?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir. I wouldn't be logged in, though, Mr. Dash, if I went there and just had dinner, something like that.

Senator WEICKER. Oh, I think you would be, I think you would be. In the White House, I think you would be. If you're not—I think anybody ought to be.

Mr. LENZNER. I think the logs that are kept are of his public visits as well as of his quarters.

Senator WEICKER. As I say, even his guests are logged in. This is the President of the United States.

Mr. DASH. I think even if he went to eat dinner, you are.

Mr. LENZNER. When you discussed the situation with Mr. Garment, Mr. Rebozo, did you describe to him the nature of the problem, why you needed an attorney?

Mr. REBOZO. I think perhaps I got into that, but I was more concerned with who should I get to represent me in Washington. You know, I just felt that my problems would be here, and I thought I would obtain a Washington attorney to handle them. He was recommended.

Mr. LENZNER. And you say Mr. Garment described him as a Washington attorney. I think Mr. Gemmill's offices are in Philadelphia.

Mr. REBOZO. He practices a lot here. His office is in Philadelphia, but he takes that—

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Garment indicate that Mr. Gemmill was representing the President at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I'm not sure he was. He may have been; I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. But you were not told that at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I was just told that he was the former—you see, the problem at the time centered largely around the IRS and I was told that he was former Chief counsel for the IRS and that he would best be able to handle it. So that's why I employed him.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying also that you employed Mr. Griffin as an attorney representing you in this case, also?

Mr. REBOZO. With Mr. Griffin, from time to time—I have great confidence in his judgment on many matters, and he did some research on it advised me to turn it back.

Mr. LENZNER. And those are the two people representing you as attorneys, except for Mr. Frates, when he later came in?

Mr. REBOZO. I discussed it at sometime along with Wakefield, who has handled a lot of my work over the years.

Mr. LENZNER. That was after you decided to turn it back?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. And incidentally, I was thinking last night—I may have yesterday, when I injected Hank Meyers' name into this—I recall that I did not discuss it with him until after we had decided to send the money back. I want to clarify that.

Mr. LENZNER. He's not an attorney, though?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he's just a pretty good guy.

Mr. FRATES. You mean that can't be consistent?

Mr. REBOZO. Strike that. I was simply intending that he's a good guy in spite of the fact that he's not an attorney.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, when you were trying to contact Mr. Danner—this is in the period in the spring of 1973. Would that have been from when to when? Approximately when did you start trying to contact him?

Mr. REBOZO. My guess is it probably started around March or April. I don't know. I'll tell you, it probably wasn't as long as it seems to have been in my mind, because I was anxious, as they say down South, to get shed of it. But I just couldn't get him to return my calls or do anything about it. But he is a sort of procrastinator. He's a bright fellow and decent person, he just procrastinates, and probably that was the reason he didn't return the calls.

Mr. LENZNER. And you left messages for him, under the name "Rebozo," I take it, to have him call you back?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. I think I always used "Gregory" there. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. You used "Gregory" with Mr. Danner? Why?

Mr. REBOZO. When I would leave a message with a switchboard, with a person who knows I use "Gregory", I just use "Gregory" so they don't tune in or create another aura of suspicion of any kind.

Mr. LENZNER. Is there anybody else you use "Gregory" with besides Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. As I've said, I've used it with him in his switchboard. I use it quite a bit. It's done for the reason that I mentioned and it's always, sometimes it saves a lot of small talk. If somebody said, "Oh, Mr. Rebozo, such and such and such and such." So it's just easier to do it that way.

Mr. LENZNER. What—would you call from your home and your office to Mr. Danner during that period of time?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Any other phones you might use besides those?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I never went out to a phone booth and used a phone or anything like that.

Mr. LENZNER. The reason I ask it, is our records don't reflect any phone calls from you to Mr. Danner between—during the month of May at all. Is there any reason why you didn't try to contact him during the month of May of 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. I remember calling him from New York two or three times, and calling him from—I may have called him from Washington, probably did. There should be a record of my calling him in that time frame from Miami.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, would you charge those calls, long distance, to your home numbers or your office numbers?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Generally, I would charge them to my home numbers.

Senator WEICKER. Terry, I'm sorry to interrupt, but it's to save asking questions later. During June of 1973, did you have any occasion to talk with, personally or by telephone, either Mr. Dean or Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. I had very little contact throughout all the years with Dean.

Senator WEICKER. I'm specifically saying June of 1973.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe—I don't believe so. I could have talked with anyone or all three of them about something, but I don't believe so. In June of 1973—no. In June of 1973, by them, they had left the White House, hadn't they? So I don't believe I had any conversation with any of them.

Senator WEICKER. All right, let me backtrack. That's correct. Let me backtrack. From the first of the year 1973, from the first of January 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have, Senator, but I don't recall. I had very few conversations with Dean, either on the phone or personally, over the years, just seeing him. I had probably—I could have talked with Erlichman or Haldeman.

Senator WEICKER. Did you talk with any of these three individuals, either in 1972 or 1973, about the \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. No, sir, they knew nothing about it, to my knowledge. You have to remember that by then——

Senator WEICKER. I'm sorry. I see why it slipped by my mind. My original question, which I think you have answered anyway, in this answer, was June of 1972. But I gathered, in other words, you covered that in the answer you've just given me, which is you did not talk to any of these three men at any time about this \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever call Mr. Danner from the White House phone, to your recollection, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Mr. LENZNER. Where would that phone have been located? Did you ever use the phone in the President's office to call Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I don't think so. In the White House, you just pick up any phone and the operator gets the number for you.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, during a certain period of time, there was some uniqueness about some of those phones, and I just wondered if the phones in the President's office—if you ever used the phones in the President's office, or in the sitting room of the residence.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think I've ever used the phone in the President's office. In the sitting room of the residence, there's one phone right by the chair where the President always sits, and the phone is right at his left hand. I can only recall using that phone once or twice when he wasn't around, or something I wanted——

Mr. LENZNER. To call Mr. Danner or somebody?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I wouldn't have called Mr. Danner from there. I might have wanted to call Julie or something like that.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if the President ever telephoned Mr. Danner during this period of time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so. I doubt that he has ever had a phone conversation——

Senator WEICKER. Terry, could you clarify, for my sake, and also just in case, so you don't confuse Mr. Rebozo, what time are we talking about here?

Mr. FRATES. Any time. Is that right?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, any time.

Senator WEICKER. Any time?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. You're not relating it specifically to the time the money was returned, that period?

Mr. LENZNER. I assume that "any time" would include that period of time.

Senator WEICKER. I didn't know how broad your range was.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo's answer was that to his knowledge, President Nixon never called Mr. Danner at any time.

Senator WEICKER. All right.

Mr. LENZNER. Would the answers be the same for the President's Executive Office—the Executive Office Building—as to the Oval Office?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, when did you first learn that your name had come up with regard to the IRS investigation of the Hughes contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. It came up during an investigation that IRS was making of Howard—of Maheu, I think, and Hughes and Danner and—about a year before in early 1972. The agent called me from Las Vegas and wanted to come and see me, and we set up an appointment. Two of them came over. So they started asking me questions about it then.

I don't want to go into a dissertation. I've answered your question.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, was that the first time that you learned that your name had come up, when the IRS people called you for an interview?

Mr. FRATES. Came up. I ask you to clarify. Came up where?

He testified about the Anderson column in 1971.

Mr. LENZNER. I mean came up in connection with the IRS investigation.

In other words, that there had been testimony to the effect, to the IRS, that the money had gone to you.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. The first time you were aware that there had been such testimony was when you were asked for an interview?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that's right.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall when they called you? How soon after?

Mr. REBOZO. You mean when they came over?

Mr. LENZNER. When they called and asked you for an interview.

Mr. REBOZO. It was March or April of 1973, I guess.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, I believe that Mr. Danner was interviewed originally in May of 1972, and Mr. Frates, we both have copies of that original interview.

Are you saying that Mr. Danner did not notify you after May of 1972, that he had disclosed to the IRS that he had given you the \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, he didn't tell me.

Mr. LENZNER. And you're also testifying that nobody else advised you of that fact?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Danner had told me on one visit that the IRS was making what he described as a routine examination of their taxes out there. He said that they would take everybody over a certain salary, income, in Vegas, and check them out.

Mr. LENZNER. But he didn't mention at that time that he had told them about the \$100,000 that they were investigating and wanted to talk to you about that?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And nobody in the administration contacted you before the IRS contacted you and told you that your name had arisen in the IRS investigation as the recipient of the \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think the first that I knew of it was when they called me.

Mr. LENZNER. The agents, you mean?

Mr. REBOZO. The agents called me.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember what their names were?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I remember very well, because one of them was Skelton and Red Skelton is a friend of mine and he comes from the same town in Indiana that Skelton came from, and no relation.

Mr. LENZNER. Does he look like him—I withdraw that.

Mr. FRATES. He's not a comedian.

Mr. REBOZO. He sure isn't.

And the other one was—I can't think of his name now.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Keeney?

Mr. REBOZO. Keeney, yes.

Senator WEICKER. Terry, as I said, I'm going to recess at 10 past. I have just one more question—I have two more questions. You have plenty of time. You're going to be getting together at 1:30.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me ask this one question. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman, prior to your contact with the Internal Revenue Service, the fact that your name had come up with regard to the \$100,000 contribution and the IRS investigation of it?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have. I had very few discussions with Haldeman. He didn't discuss much with a lot of folks. But occasionally I would see Ehrlichman more. I may have mentioned it to Ehrlichman.

Mr. LENZNER. You may have mentioned it to Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have mentioned it to him.

Mr. LENZNER. That would have been after the IRS contact?

Mr. REBOZO. Pardon me?

Mr. LENZNER. That would have been after Mr. Skelton called you and asked for an interview with you?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think so.

Mr. LENZNER. What I'm asking you is, Mr. Ehrlichman never called you and said, "By the way, Mr. Rebozo," or however he addresses you, "we've learned at the White House that you're going to be interviewed by the Internal Revenue Service"?

Mr. REBOZO. Not that I can recall.

Senator WEICKER. When was this that you believe you talked to Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know, Senator. It was all right in that same period.

Mr. LENZNER. Which was when?

Mr. REBOZO. Which was March, April, or May of 1973.

Mr. LENZNER. But you would have been on notice, I take it, if Mr. Ehrlichman had called you before then, and that would have been a pretty significant conversation if he had told you, "By the way, the IRS is going to want to talk to you"?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think that one time in conversation, I think I told Ehrlichman about the call I had from Las Vegas.

Mr. LENZNER. That was from the IRS agents, you mean?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, that was about the extent of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you requesting Mr. Ehrlichman to do anything with regard to that call?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. What was the purpose of telling Mr. Ehrlichman about that call?

Mr. REBOZO. I suppose it was just conversation, and naturally it would be something that I would be concerned about. But I'm not even sure that Ehrlichman knew about the money then. I'm not even sure that I had discussed that with him at that point.

Mr. LENZNER. You're not sure that was discussed—why the IRS wanted to talk to you then?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I told him what they had told me, that they—they called twice. They called once and they wanted to set up an appointment.

Mr. FRATES. The agents?

Mr. REBOZO. The agents. Then, when the agents called again, or I returned their call, maybe, I asked them what they wanted to talk about, so that I could be prepared. They said, well, it's nothing to do with you, we're investigating—running a tax investigation on—I think they said Hughes and Mahen. I think that's what he said, and maybe others.

So when they came over, they, as a matter of fact, reemphasized during the couple of hours, maybe, that we were sitting there, 11½ hours, several times they reemphasized that they were not after me at all, they were just trying to get what information they could get.

Senator WEICKER. Let me just clarify this in my own mind, and then also make a comment.

First of all, the question. That is, did you have this discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman before your discussion with the President or after?

As I understand it, you discussed, or you told the President around the same period of time—it has not been pinpointed—

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Senator WEICKER [continuing]. That you had this money.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I had told the President, I'm sure, before this that I had the money.

Senator WEICKER. So you think the conversation with Ehrlichman came after the conversation with the President?

Mr. REBOZO. I think, yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Let me make just one observation, counsel. I think it is awfully important. I'm trying to be of assistance to you and your client.

You made a very proper observation at the beginning of these hearings, let's get to the point of this questioning, and I tried to

assist you about our going around the bush a thousand different times. I asked a question awhile back that related to these three men, the contact between your client and these three individuals. I can, as I say, cite a thousand different instances and stay here and go around it, but I thought that would be the most direct way to handle it. I would only suggest that you ask your client to think a little bit harder before he responds, because clearly, this is a meeting which very definitely relates to that which I asked about. It only comes to pass by virtue of one of the questions.

Nobody wants to rush you at all. Neither do I want to see you harassed by a whole series of questions. I would rather get right to the point, which is what your own counsel asked for.

Mr. REBOZO. I appreciate that.

Senator WEICKER. I think we do have to recess now, because I have to get to my office. We'll reconvene at 1:30.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator INOUE [presiding]. I understand the witness has been sworn and will continue his testimony.

Mr. DASH. That's right, Senator.

Senator INOUE. Very well, proceed.

Mr. DASH. Mr. Bellino will initiate some questioning.

Mr. FRATES, this is in line with our discussion this morning. Mr. Bellino will be asking some questions in the areas of the questioned materials so as to identify certain things.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Dash, can I ask you to help me keep on the line that we delineated this morning?

Mr. DASH. Oh, yes.

Mr. FRATES. I would appreciate it.

Mr. BELLINO. I have other questions, also.

Mr. DASH. You're not limited on the questions—

Mr. FRATES. We were here at 1:30, ready to go.

Mr. DASH. So, let him proceed. I think I ought to say this, too, that there may be some misunderstanding at times in places where Carmine may not be able to hear the answer.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, this morning, we had a 2-hour session where, at the suggestion of Senator Weicker, we got together and resolved some of the problems we had about exhibits, scope, clearance, things of that nature, and I think Mr. Dash and I have a very workable arrangement on it.

Mr. DASH. We're proceeding on that basis. It has to do with a number of things, questions that Mr. Frates has raised. We're trying to work it out. Let's leave it that way.

Senator INOUE. With that preliminary discussion, the hearing will please come to order. By prior arrangement, Mr. Bellino will please proceed with his questioning.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, I understand the Key Biscayne Bank pays your salary in cash, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. We pay all salaries in cash.

Mr. BELLINO. Does any other firm or company you're connected with pay you in cash?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. Have you won any substantial amount of cash in any games or anything?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. Who prepares your annual financial statements, usually as of September 1?

Mr. REBOZO. A bookkeeper and I prepare it.

Mr. BELLINO. What's the source of the information that you use?

Mr. REBOZO. The files that we have.

Mr. BELLINO. You have files—financial files?

Mr. REBOZO. You see, a financial statement has to record what your balance is, so we have to check that. It records what mortgages you have. We have files to show who we owe what to.

Mr. BELLINO. Did you ever advise whoever was making up your statement, your 1969 financial statement, that you had a sum of cash, currency, on hand?

Mr. FRATES. I don't understand the question.

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. In other words, the cash you would report——

Mr. REBOZO. The cash is in the account.

Mr. BELLINO [continuing]. You would report on your financial statement would be mainly what was in the bank?

Mr. REBOZO. Exactly.

Mr. BELLINO. Did you ever have a sum of \$50,000 in cash which you considered your own?

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. Senator, "Did you ever have \$50,000 cash that you considered your own." May I ask some date? Because we're going way far away from what our agreement was.

Mr. DASH. Yes, can you limit that question?

Mr. BELLINO. Since January 1, 1969, of course. I understand all our questions relate to prior to—subsequent to January of 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I never had that much cash, not deposited.

Mr. BELLINO. Would you say you might have had \$20,000 or \$25,000?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know what amount of cash I've had at any one time. As I indicated, I'm paid in cash and I use funds from my pay and I keep the rest.

Mr. BELLINO. Your September 1, 1969, financial statement which you distributed to various institutions reflects a cash on hand and in bank of \$23,741.36. Your bank statement shows the balance in the account as \$3,741.36.

Mr. REBOZO. Which bank statement?

Mr. BELLINO. Your bank statement at Key Biscayne Bank. You can check it from your own——

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't need to check that. I've had cash in other banks, deposited.

Mr. BELLINO. Could you specify what other bank accounts you have?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I have a couple of small savings and loan accounts.

Mr. BELLINO. Whereabouts?

Mr. REBOZO. One in Key West First Federal, and one in the Greater Miami Federal. I've had occasion to keep cash in banks where I borrow money.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, what banks are those?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, you have the list of all the banks I've borrowed from, and several of them have requested some semblance of compensating balance. That figure that appears in that statement is not my figure. The bookkeeper got it from the records, you can be sure.

Mr. BELLINO. Your principal account is that 134 in the Key Biscayne Bank?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. BELLINO. Do you have any other savings or checking accounts in the Key Biscayne Bank?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. No other, any accounts in which you're the signator, where you have the right to withdraw funds?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. Have you ever used another name in connection with any accounts?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not in connection with any bank accounts.

Mr. BELLINO. In what way have you used—

Mr. DASH. I think you have asked him that, for the record.

Mr. FRATES. We spent a half hour on that, Senator, where he explained he uses the name Gregory.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. He uses the name, Charles Gregory, in order to remain anonymous in small transactions.

Mr. DASH. We covered that this morning.

Mr. REBOZO. I've been using that name since I was a Democrat, even. No, Senator, for your information, what I'm getting at is I started using that name about 20 years ago for marine phone calls so that everybody couldn't hear. You know, a name like yours or mine, if you mention it once, everybody is going to know who is talking. So I just used the Gregory just to keep anybody from knowing who was talking. That's all.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, Mr. Bellino was not here this morning.

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't mean that derogatorily, I'm sure you know.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, you said you had some other accounts in the Key Biscayne Bank. Would that account for the difference of \$20,000?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't say I had some other accounts in the Key Biscayne.

Mr. BELLINO. I meant the Key West.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I had some other small amounts there, maybe \$3,000 or \$4,000, and the Greater Miami Federal has a small amount. But from time to time, I have had compensating balances in accounts. I have had in Manufacturers Hanover when I borrowed from them. I have had balances in, I think, the Hialeah-Miami Springs. I've got another balance right now, \$10,000, I think, in the First National Bank.

When I borrow money, they want you to have an account with them. But I could supply you—I'm sure my bookkeeper could supply you to the penny, where that was at that time.

Mr. BELLINO. Could you explain where the \$20,000 cash might have come from?

Mr. REBOZO. I just tried to.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, that's around \$3,000 you mentioned.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I mentioned the other banks. You see, it depends on whom I was borrowing from at the time.

Mr. BELLINO. You didn't have an account in Manufacturers over that distance of September 1, 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm mistaken.

Mr. BELLINO. That \$5,000 compensating balance you had, you didn't have it in September 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. I've had accounts with them, I've borrowed money with them since before then. I don't know when I started a compensating balance with them, but those figures, we can account for them readily.

Mr. BELLINO. Could this \$20,000 in cash be part of the money that Dick Danner brought over to you?

Mr. REBOZO. Mr. Bellino, you brought that question up numerous times, and last evening, you suggested that I had drawn \$200,000 out of Monroe Land, and that you were curious as to whether \$100,000 of that was the Hughes money. I have testified under oath that the Hughes money was entirely returned to them in the identical form that I received it, and there's no way that that could have been a part of anything.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, would you just answer the question?

Mr. REBOZO. I'll be happy to.

Mr. DASH. I think the question has been answered. I think he has answered the question.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, but he hasn't. He hasn't directly answered it. I asked specifically whether any part of this is—\$20,000, is part of the \$50,000 Dick Danner gave you. You can answer yes or no.

Mr. REBOZO. The answer is no.

Mr. FRATES. I think, Senator, we have been somewhat at odds with Mr. Bellino and his tactics for some time. We don't want to get into personalities at this time. I think we resolved it, and I appreciate Mr. Dash's attitude in the whole matter.

Mr. BELLINO. With respect to your returning of the money. I understand you were questioned this morning. Did you meet at any time with Mr. Rose or Mr. Gemmill?

Mr. REBOZO. I met with Mr. Gemmill several times, and I think I met with Mr. Rose once.

Mr. DASH. Would you identify for the record who Mr. Rose is? Mr. Gemmill was identified earlier, but not Mr. Rose.

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that the only time I met Mr. Rose—

Mr. DASH. Who is Mr. Rose?

Mr. BELLINO. H. Chapman Rose, I believe, an attorney in Cleveland, who is associated with Mr. Gemmill. I think he also has an office here in Washington.

Mr. DASH. I'm sorry, Mr. Bellino.

Mr. REBOZO. I believe the only time that I met with Mr. Rose was when he and Mr. Gemmill came to Key Biscayne, working on the President's statement, for Cooper's Lybrand or whoever it was. I think that was the only time I met with him.

Mr. BELLINO. When would you say that was?

Mr. REBOZO. —Well, whenever they did this audit. You'll recall earlier this year, was it, that he engaged the Cooper's Lybrand to do an audit to prove that he had not used campaign funds for the purchase of these properties.

Mr. BELLINO. Did you discuss with them the matter of the \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. I never discussed it with Rose. I previously testified I have discussed it with Gemmill.

Mr. BELLINO. Did he advise you—

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. Senator, again, Mr. Dash, we went into this at some length this morning. I don't object to the repetition as long as we just don't spend all afternoon going into what we went into this morning.

Mr. DASH. I don't think this is repetitious. Senator Weicker, since he wasn't going to be back, went ahead and asked some questions concerning the return of the money. There were some specific questions that we had. I don't think this is repetitious.

Mr. FRATES. Well, the conversations between Mr. Gemmill and he were. I'm not talking about specifics, I'm talking about the context, just so Mr. Bellino will know that.

Mr. BELLINO. I understand that we'll be coming back to those questions, so the Senator will ask them later on.

In 1969, you did have in your bank, at least one Presidential campaign account on which you were a signator, and on which you personally controlled the funds. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. REBOZO. Correct.

Mr. BELLINO. Did you have any others besides that one which was called the Florida Nixon for President Committee?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. As a banker, you know the value of having funds in your bank which your correspondent bank will invest in Federal funds. For each day, the excess is in their control, which also means that interest ranging from 3 percent to as much as 11 percent is paid to your bank even when the funds are held over a weekend. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir, except that the Federal funds went up last year to 14.5 percent.

Mr. BELLINO. Yes. In fact, even when you borrowed money, you have requested that the funds be credited immediately to your bank so that they could get the benefit of the Federal funds. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. We do that with every large deposit.

Mr. BELLINO. Sir?

Mr. REBOZO. We do that with every large deposit. We try to get immediate credit. We're a small bank and if we, particularly if it is over a weekend, we're earning interest on that money over the weekend.

Mr. BELLINO. Besides the \$6,000 which you withdrew from the Florida Nixon for President account and deposited in the Thomas H. Wakefield trustee account on April 15, 1969, did you withdraw any other funds from that account?

Mr. REBOZO. I drew quite a few funds during the time that that account was open to pay campaign bills, rent for headquarters, secretaries' salaries, stationery, rental of the desks and chairs, and lights and water.

Mr. BELLINO. After January 1, 1969, we're talking about not before.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, again, we have gone into this at considerable length. Senator Ervin made a ruling on it which I have asked the reporter to transcribe, that it was—I don't want to summarize the testimony up. I thought we had put this thing to rest and, again, Mr. Bellino is now back into this field.

Mr. DASH. Senator, this dealt with an amount which Mr. Rebozo has indicated, a fund that had originally been a campaign fund for the President, that he said that he had put his own money into the campaign and reimbursed it himself from this account, and it became his own personal money.

Mr. FRATES. It went to another account, Mr. Dash. I think you can show the Senator two exhibits. It went to the Thomas Wakefield account and there, after that—that was in 1969.

Mr. DASH. Did that empty out that account?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. Well, I guess that covers it.

Mr. FRATES. And Senator Ervin has ruled that that precluded any further discussions on that, that that was his money and that it wasn't relevant under the mandate of the committee. I have asked the reporter to type that up. Sam, did he give you that ruling?

Mr. DASH. I think that the ruling of Senator Ervin had to do with any question with regard to the funds of the 1968 campaign that could not be ruled out in the 1972 campaign.

Mr. FRATES. He ruled that there be no further questions on that amount specifically. I have asked the reporter to type it up.

Mr. DASH. He meant the questions on the amount to Mr. Kalmbach.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The question is not on the same account.

Mr. FRATES. The question is exactly on the same account. I have asked in addition to that, Senator—

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can I clarify the question?

Mr. FRATES. Let me finish, because I want the Senator to know the background.

We have presented on this identical thing a motion to the full committee to preclude and prohibit any production of these documents, which the full committee had not taken any action on. It was not until yesterday at the start of these hearings, when Senator Ervin clearly ruled this out.

Mr. DASH. Senator, there is a letter from Senator Ervin to Mr. Frates—actually, some attorney in Mr. Frates' office—as of March 12, in anticipation of the meeting actually saying that the records dealing with this particular account are still required under the subpoena. What Senator Ervin did rule on, is questions on this matter which are not linked to the 1972 campaign should not be asked.

Now, I think Mr. Armstrong says, and perhaps Carmine did not phrase his question correctly, we're not talking about this account and the matter Senator Ervin ruled on. If we can get a clarification

as to what we're talking about, maybe we don't have to get into this.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Bellino's question, I believe—and correct me, Carmine, if I'm wrong—was based on whether or not there were any other payments made out of the Florida Nixon for President Committee account. The account Chairman Ervin ruled on was the Thomas H. Wakefield account. The chairman did not rule on the Florida Nixon for President Committee account. We're talking about a different—

Mr. FRATES. The evidence is that it was closed out.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We're talking about those transactions which took place after the election of 1968 and took place in 1969, and those are the directions of Mr. Bellino's questions.

What we're attempting to find out is whether or not those moneys were used for campaign purposes in 1972.

Senator INOUE. I think it is relevant if it is for that purpose.

Mr. BELLINO. The question is whether he had withdrawn any other funds from that account since January 1969.

Senator INOUE. In 1969 or thereafter.

Mr. FRATES. The Florida Nixon for President account is what you're talking about, not the Wakefield account?

Mr. DASH. Right.

Mr. FRATES. I have no objection.

Mr. BELLINO. If you had any other funds from the Florida Nixon for President account in 1969, besides what you paid to Kalmbach and what you gave to Wakefield, in the Wakefield Trust?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I only drew that back myself.

Mr. BELLINO. You say you have not withdrawn any, but you used it for yourself?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. BELLINO. In other words, you have withdrawn money.

Mr. FRATES. Just a minute, Bellino.

Excuse me, sir. We're getting right back into the situation where it was transferred to the Wakefield account. You're talking about the Florida for Nixon account.

Mr. BELLINO. Yes, the transactions.

Mr. FRATES. That's right, Mr. Bellino, you're talking about what Senator Ervin ruled you had no right to ask about.

Mr. DASH. Maybe Mr. Rebozo's answer will clarify that.

Mr. FRATES. I recall Senator Ervin said that was his money and that is the end of it.

Mr. DASH. I understand the question is excluding the amount that we have discussed that was transferred to the Wakefield account, was any of the money left in the Florida Nixon for President account?

Mr. FRATES. That's not Mr. Bellino's question.

Mr. DASH. I'll ask it.

Mr. REBOZO. No. That closed the account.

Mr. DASH. So that closed the account?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. BELLINO. You say the Florida for Nixon account was closed?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. BELLINO. When was that closed?

Mr. REBOZO. You have the records there.

Mr. BELLINO. No, we don't have the Florida for Nixon account.

Mr. REBOZO. You had them for about a week.

Mr. BELLINO. We had the Thomas Wakefield account.

Mr. DASH. I'll still put the question. At the time you withdrew the \$6,000 from the Florida for Nixon account and transferred it to the Wakefield account, did that close out the Florida for Nixon account?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Just to clarify this, between the period January 1, 1969, and the time you closed out the Florida Nixon for President account with the \$6,000 check to the Thomas H. Wakefield special account, between that time, were there any other checks written on that account?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, the two that were mentioned yesterday, but I did not withdraw anything to myself. There was the \$4,500 or whatever—

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir, I'm not referring to the Thomas H. Wakefield account. I'm referring to the Florida Nixon for President account. Were there any checks between January 1, 1969, and, I guess it's April 15, 1969, when the check was written to Thomas H. Wakefield special account. Between those two dates, were any checks written on the Florida Nixon for President Committee account? I'm sorry we don't have the records here.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so, but I produced all those records for you, and you can't remember them so I'm sure I can't.

Mr. FRATES. I think the records show they were not, other than those testified to yesterday.

Mr. DASH. Was the payment to Mr. Kalmbach by check?

Mr. FRATES. \$1,000, yes, in 1969.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That refers to the Thomas H. Wakefield special account. We're not asking any questions about that account. We're asking questions about the Florida Nixon for President Committee account.

Mr. FRATES. He has answered that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The reason I believe there is confusion—when you're talking about the \$1,000 check for Mr. Kalmbach, that was not written on the Florida Nixon for President Committee account; that was written on the Thomas H. Wakefield account. We're asking about the Florida Nixon for President Committee account.

Mr. DASH. Have we gotten any record of the Florida Nixon for President account?

Mr. BELLINO. No, we have not.

Mr. FRATES. You certainly have.

Mr. BELLINO. I'm saying we have not received the Florida Nixon for President account—

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, I'm—we try to cooperate, Senator, and when Mr. Bellino gets in, everything bogs down. I don't want to be personal, but I thought we had a working arrangement.

Mr. DASH. You do, as we're trying to identify.

Mr. FRATES. Are you saying you showed the records to the staff?

Mr. FRATES. They have seen them.

Mr. DASH. Do you have any objection, since we have seen them and our understanding this morning was that they would be able to have access to them?

Mr. FRATES. Absolutely.

Mr. REBOZO. Surely.

Senator INOUE. Where are the records now?

Mr. REBOZO. I think they're probably back in Miami.

Mr. FRATES. I do not have those with me, I don't think. But I'm sure that they have a copy, and we made a copy for them, and it was provided to the committee.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Just to clarify the record, I believe again, sir, I say respectfully, there is a confusion. The records you provided us were for the Thomas H. Wakefield special account and we did not receive any records from the Florida Nixon for President account.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Armstrong, I disagree with you. If we have not, they will be available. I think I have a clear recollection of your having them, but we'll make them available.

Mr. REBOZO. You received them, because otherwise, how did you know about two checks that—

Mr. FRATES. That was on the Wakefield account.

Mr. DASH. Could you proceed, Carmine?

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, you have on occasion paid miscellaneous bills for 500 Bay Lane, which is President Nixon's property, have you not?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. BELLINO. Are you reimbursed for those expenditures?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I say "usually." I am not going to nitpick with the President. If there's something I think he should have, I might just go ahead and do it without even him knowing about it. He just doesn't concern himself at all with financial problems ever; never has.

Mr. BELLINO. Were you reimbursed from the Florida Nixon for President account?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. BELLINO. On September 9, 1969, a certificate of deposit was issued to President Nixon or Patricia Nixon for \$100,000 at 6¼ percent. Can you tell us how payment was made for this \$100,000 CD?

Mr. REBOZO. I am sure that our records would show it. We have provided you with copies of all his CD's. Again, it gets to the point where you pick out a date and an amount. I am sorry that Hughes didn't give me the \$115,000 or \$87,000, or some other amount, because every time a \$100,000 figure shows up, it's immediately identified with that.

In 1969, you'll recall—the press has been full of it and your documents reflect that he had sold his interest in Fisher's Island, and he received something like \$380,000 or \$390,000 for that. He had sold his New York apartment and he received something like \$340,000 for that. So there is no question about his ability to have purchased a CD. He's so little concerned about his financial affairs that the moneys were just sent in and placed in a checking account. I'm the one who has transferred them to CD's so he would be earning some

interest on them. And he receives the same interest that any other customer coming into the bank would receive.

Mr. BELLINO. Now, I might mention when you said we have the CD's available, I haven't seen anything on CD's from your bank.

Mr. FRATES. Well, they've been furnished. We have them and they clearly show all the various deposits. This is a matter that has been discussed fully in the newspapers and if you don't have them, we certainly will give you them. They show the deposits. They show where the money has come from. This has been in the New York Times and the Washington Post.

Mr. BELLINO. I was referring to all the CD's.

Mr. REBOZO. As a matter of fact, that same CD that you're referring to has been renewed regularly on maturity and it is still down there.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If I can just clarify for the record, I believe there was an occasion on which members of the minority staff were present and certificates were shown them, but members of the majority staff have never seen them. We're not informed by the minority staff if they've been available.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Armstrong, to me, the committee is a committee—period. I don't break it up in majority and minority. But we went over each deposit, each certificate, and I thought everyone was completely satisfied that there was no way that that money could be related to the Hughes money.

Mr. DASIL. You would have no objection to our seeing them?

Mr. FRATES. Absolutely not. I'll be glad to show you each one of them.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, have you on occasion purchased a cashier's check with currency?

Mr. REBOZO. Never—no, wait a minute.

No, I don't believe so. I was going to say my cashier's checks are generally small amounts, \$10, \$15, \$25—something that I'm purchasing that I don't want to purchase in my name, so I use the "Gregory." But no—

Mr. BELLINO. Have you purchased any cashier's checks under some other name?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. BELLINO. You have never used another name in purchasing a cashier's check?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator INOUE. He has just testified that he used the name "Gregory."

Mr. BELLINO. Would you use the name "Gregory"?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I use that all the time. I thought that was assumed.

Mr. BELLINO. On April 15, 1971, you deposited a cashier's check amounting to \$50,000. The deposit ticket didn't show where it came from or what it was for. Could you explain that transaction?

Mr. REBOZO. It wasn't cash.

Mr. BELLINO. Sir?

Mr. REBOZO. It wasn't cash.

Mr. BELLINO. It was a cashier's check.

Mr. REBOZO. I deposited a cashier's check?

Mr. BELLINO. \$50,000 on April 15, 1971.

Mr. FRATES. Do you have those work records?

Mr. BELLINO. Yes, April 15—

Mr. FRATES. Can you show him the work records from the account so maybe he can refresh his recollection?

Mr. BELLINO. I don't have his account, I have my notation, which is the same thing.

Mr. FRATES. You have the work records from the accounts, Mr. Bellino.

Mr. BELLINO. This is not from the account, this is from his own records.

Mr. DASH. I think what our understanding was, was that if a question was put by Mr. Bellino concerning a specific amount, back to a date—1971—in which he was going to have to refer to his records, if he couldn't recall, you would make a note of this and go back and look at your records—

Mr. REBOZO. What was the date of that cashier's check?

Mr. BELLINO. April 15, 1971.

Mr. REBOZO. It sounds like income tax, doesn't it?

Mr. BELLINO. This is my notation from his records.

Mr. FRATES. Uh, what bank is that, Key Biscayne?

Mr. BELLINO. That's his bank, 134—his Key Biscayne bank. I'm just asking if he can explain it. There's no other notation on your other records?

Mr. REBOZO. Mr. Bellino, you have gone through something like 12 corporate and partnership and individual ownership accounts of mine and all the checks and all the deposits and all the bank statements and everything else. You know how many transactions go through my personal account. I have been meticulously careful since I was examined by IRS about 10 years ago to have a separate account for every entity, and if I borrow money, for example, from one of my companies, I don't use that money for whatever purpose it was, I run it through my personal account. Then, when I pay it back, I draw a check on that account and pay it back. Even the IRS, when they finished their examination, complimented us on the book-keeping that we have—that we maintained.

Mr. BELLINO. Well, you've had many transactions—I was just asking to see if you might recall.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I have had many of them; \$50,000 was something deposited in my account?

Mr. BELLINO. If you can't recall now—

Mr. DASH. I don't want Mr. Rebozo to guess on a question of this nature. I think, Senator, that if a question is put to him and he doesn't have the record with him here, I think Mr. Frates indicated this morning that we could put that aside and he could give us the answer, and at another time it could be made part of the record.

Mr. FRATES. Right.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, have you, since January 1, 1969, had any transactions with brokerage firms other than Walston Co. and Bache & Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably. They were my principal ones. I am not that big a stock dealer. But they both, the managers of each one of those firms, have accounts at the bank and on occasion, there would be someone else.

Mr. BELLINO. Who would those banks be?

Mr. REBOZO. In the bank dealings, we deal with quite a few. We buy Government bonds, and agencies and industrials and such. So I do have dealings with a number of brokerage firms.

Mr. BELLINO. I'm talking about your own personal——

Mr. REBOZO. Me personally, I can't recall one instance where I personally have purchased any stocks or bonds through anyone other than Bache & Walston.

Mr. BELLINO. It is possible that you might have but you can't recall, maybe——

Mr. REBOZO. Anything is possible, but I seriously doubt it. If you have something you particularly want to ask me about, ask me and I'll tell you if I know.

Mr. BELLINO. Do you recall Becker & Co.—any transactions with them?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, we did have dealings with Becker & Co. Was that me personally, or was that the bank?

Mr. BELLINO. That was your purchase, to my recollection.

Mr. FRATES. Do you have a record?

Mr. BELLINO. I don't have it. I have that in the office.

Mr. REBOZO. These brokerage firms are constantly calling us for business and we must deal with a half dozen of them. But generally, if I want to buy something, I'll just tell one of the men to order such and such.

But I don't believe I have ever personally.

Mr. BELLINO. Becker & Co. might be the bank, but how about Val Stover and Company?

Mr. REBOZO. Who?

Mr. BELLINO. Val Stover.

Mr. REBOZO. To my recollection, I've never heard of it.

Mr. BELLINO. V-a-l S-t-o-v-e-r.

Mr. REBOZO. I've never heard of them before.

Mr. BELLINO. Do you have any brokerage accounts in someone else's name?

Mr. REBOZO. All of my stock, as I've testified repeatedly, is purchased in my sister's name, Anita Reynolds. I think for the benefit of the Senator. I probably ought to explain that, too.

Some few years ago, I bought 400 shares of Pan Am stock at \$26. Then it went down to \$22 and I bought 400 more. Then, through the grapevine, I got word that there was some word out that I knew something about Pan Am. Well, what has happened since then, everybody knows, but it finally got down to \$15 and I sold it.

But the only thing that I could determine was that perhaps some girl in the office typing up an order or a certificate or something thought, being a friend of the President, why, he has told them they're about to get a new line or something that never even occurred to me when I ordered it.

So ever since that date, I buy stocks and bonds in the name of my sister, Anita, and we have a bona fide legal document filed with the appropriate authorities. I pay the taxes on the income from it or the sale and so on, and she doesn't have to declare it at all. But that is done for the very same reason.

Mr. BELLINO. Do you always make payment by personal check?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. BELLINO. On September 1, 1970, you list as an asset on your financial statement Maison Neuve Investments, \$59,914.33.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes?

Mr. BELLINO. Could you tell us what that is?

Mr. REBOZO. Surely. That's a Canadian investment firm that specializes in shopping centers and when I started getting so much heat about the Cuban shopping center that we built and the SBA guaranteeing the loans and so on, I just decided to get out of it and sold them. I have a partner in that and that figure represents half of the mortgage that they owe us.

Mr. BELLINO. What shopping center was this?

Mr. REBOZO. That's the Central Commercial Cubano.

Mr. BELLINO. From January 1969 to December 31, 1972, you were paid—you received various payments from Fisher Island, or I should say you paid a total of \$274,000 to Fisher Island, Inc. Were these payments all for the purchase of stock on your behalf and on behalf of others?

Mr. REBOZO. They were all on behalf of me. That's the annual preemptive rights issue. I am sure you must have seen documentation on that, because you saw the Fisher Island books. The way that's operated, every year we have to make up a budget. There are 3 million-some-odd shares, and all the shares have always sold for \$1 a share. That's our means of meeting the budget—the interest on the mortgage, \$90,000 a year or so in taxes, the legal expenses, and other expenses that would normally go with that type of investment.

Mr. BELLINO. Have you received any funds from Fisher's Island, over \$5,000, since January 1, 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. Not before—not since, nor before.

Mr. BELLINO. What was the reason for the payment of \$10,000 given to you in May 1971?

Mr. REBOZO. From Fisher's Island?

Mr. BELLINO. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know. At one time, the auditors found that there had been a mistake, that they had misfigured my preemptive rights and I had picked up more stock than I was entitled to. That may be the case, so I returned the stock and they reimbursed me. That could be it.

Mr. BELLINO. Is the Central Commercial Cubano the same as CCC Laundry?

Mr. REBOZO. No, CCC Laundry is in that complex.

Mr. BELLINO. Two separate entities?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. BELLINO. Now, in 1970, you received from CCC—would that be the laundry?—a total of \$74,500.

Mr. REBOZO. I think that probably was some of the proceeds of the sale, or the property across the street, which we owned and sold. We were going to build an apartment building there, had the plans drawn. Then, when everything started, you know, I just decided to get out of a lot of these things and we sold that property, too; so it would be from one or the other of those.

Mr. BELLINO. Is this the property on which your tax returns, the gross, had come to \$7,352, and had a loss of \$22,178? Is that the same property?

Mr. REBOZO. What year was this? When was this?

Mr. BELLINO. 1970.

Mr. REBOZO. 1970, and it's identified—we filed separate returns on CCC. That would clarify what that was for if it's for that. But it could very easily be—and again, that's the sort of thing that the President is plagued with a little bit right now. There are—you know, there's nothing wrong with avoiding taxes so long as you don't evade them, and I'm certainly not going to do that. But probably, that was depreciation on the building as opposed to income from rents. It offset it. I couldn't tell you, but you have seen all those records and you probably could put it together better yourself.

Mr. BELLINO. We haven't seen the records of the company. We've seen just your records. This is the only information we could get out of your records.

Now, \$74,500 that you received from CCC, did you say that was from the sale of the land or something? I didn't quite get it.

Mr. REBOZO. No, if it was that large amount, it had to be from the sale of the shopping center.

Mr. BELLINO. That is what that would be?

Mr. REBOZO. I can provide you with that date and the closing statement and all other materials necessary to satisfy you.

Mr. BELLINO. Now, your records reflect that you exchanged checks with George Smathers on two occasions during the period from January 1, 1969, to December 31, 1972. It was \$20,500 on one occasion—you have it going in and out of your accounts—and you have a \$36,725.63 on another occasion, where you received it on August 28 and paid back September 11. Have you had any other financial transactions with Mr. Smathers?

Mr. REBOZO. I have had a number of them. I have known him since the fourth grade.

Mr. BELLINO. I'm talking about 1969 on.

Mr. REBOZO. He lives on Key Biscayne. He was associated with us originally in Fisher Island and got out. Then he was with me on the Adams Key sale, which I'm sure you've got recorded there. I don't know if we've had any other joint dealing or not, but the fact that you have got those records, in and out, those checks in and out, is further evidence of what I just said, that we run everything through that account so the records are complete and clear.

Mr. BELLINO. Did you borrow any money from him?

Mr. REBOZO. From Smathers? Yes.

Mr. BELLINO. How much did you borrow during this period of time that we're talking about?

Mr. REBOZO. January 1, 1969? No, I don't think I ever borrowed from him in that period of time.

Mr. BELLINO. Your tax return shows you paid him \$13,875 in interest in 1970.

Mr. REBOZO. What that could very easily be was the result of borrowings much earlier. I had borrowed \$25,000 from him back about 1959 or so to invest in a company and paid him back about this time. So that's probably what that is.

Mr. BELLINO. How did you pay him back?

Mr. REBOZO. I paid him—what I did in this instance, I believe this is the only instance where I borrowed that kind of money from him. I transferred some real estate I owned to him.

Mr. BELLINO. And how much was involved? Did you say that? How much did you borrow?

Mr. REBOZO. As I recall, it was valued at something like \$32,000. How much interest did I show paying?

Mr. BELLINO. \$13,875.

Mr. REBOZO. \$13,000. Well, I could have—and it was in and out, you say?

Mr. BELLINO. No, not the interest; no. This is on your tax return.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, you wouldn't know whether it was in and out or not, if it was just on a tax return?

Mr. BELLINO. No, this was not in and out. I don't see it at all on your books.

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that that's what it had to be. I believe it had to be the transfer of this property, and it was computed on value at the time.

Again, it's not necessary to conjecture on this. I can provide you with the documents, because the files are complete on this. I'm sure we might save a little time by it. But give me those dates and that amount again.

Mr. BELLINO. That was the 1970 tax return—\$13,875.

In the purchase of any stock you've purchased from Key Biscayne Bank or Fisher Island, have you made payment by any other way, other than through your checking account—the 134 checking account?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir, you've seen all of those checks, I'm sure. You'll find canceled checks for that.

Mr. BELLINO. You haven't purchased any other stock other than what's shown through your record?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, you've seen those checks, and you'll find that they correspond right with the preemptive stock issue dates.

Mr. BELLINO. On your financial statements, you include always an item, notes payable to others, unsecured. From 1969 on, they range from \$108,350 to \$171,215. What's the source of that information? Do you have some records?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I have complete records on that. I was formerly in the finance business where you borrow money from banks, going back to 1949 and 1950. Numbers of my friends would ask if they could invest. I was advised that the best way to do it was to just issue notes with generous interest and not get involved with the possibility that an investment may turn sour and I could be accused of causing

problems. So I did that and got in certain sums of money from a variety of people, and every 6 months, they get their interest check.

Now, when I sold the business, I contacted them all. I wanted to pay it off, and every one of them asked me if I could invest it in something else for them. I said: "Well, I'm investing all the time; if you want to continue the same procedure, we'll do it, and I don't commingle funds of any kinds."

So for all these years I have paid them, most of them have all their money back and still getting interest. Occasionally, I will get a letter from one of them asking if I can take more deposits. But I have the copies of all those notes and names of all of them, and it goes way, way back.

Mr. BELLINO. Your financial statement——

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, Mr. Bellino. Senator, I think you probably know that the IRS has conducted an initial investigation, 14 weeks with four agents, and have gone over every one of these records in some detail—in complete detail. I understand now that you have those records available.

Mr. DASH. Not those from the IRS.

Mr. FRATES. We have been told by the IRS——

Mr. DASH. The IRS has taken it. There was a resolution passed by the Senate at the request of our committee authorizing us, but I think the IRS at this point are awaiting a meeting between the chairman and the vice chairman before——

Mr. FRATES. We have been informed directly by the agent in charge that they have found no improprieties, nothing illegal in it. The IRS has now come back. There was an exchange and there have been no further investigations. I just wanted the Senator to know that.

Senator INOUE. But we have not received those records yet?

Mr. DASH. No, we have not yet. They have asked for a meeting of the chairman and the vice chairman to determine whether or not certain regulations that they have permit them to show the records.

Mr. REBOZO. I might say additionally that we have had swarms of so-called investigative reporters that have gone through anything I ever did. Newsday had six men there for 6 months, spent a quarter of a million dollars. They went through everything in the courthouse. They talked—in their report, in their story they said they talked to over 400 people.

The New York Times about 3 or 4 weeks ago, said they had conducted their investigation and they had a crew down for 30 days. They inspected everything and found no wrongdoing. The story was back on page 43, so everybody didn't read it. But the attacks previously were on page 1.

I just can't begin to tell you how anxious I am to bring this thing to a close, because there is no way you would believe the harm that's done me and my business in my community where I have lived 55 years.

Mr. DASH. I think the Senator can appreciate this. That was the purpose of trying to make these arrangements, so we can get an agreement between what staff wants to do, whether there was any harm or harassment. Of course, you and Mr. Frates know that any investigation has an impact, and this is an unfortunate thing.

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure, Mr. Dash, that you feel that way, and I know from what I know about the Senators on the committee, that they share that viewpoint. I wish I could say as much for some of your investigators.

Mr. DASH. The investigators—I think the record should show that our investigators have the responsibility of trying to do as aggressive, but legal a job as possible and get as many facts as they can. We cannot criticize investigators for being aggressive. We certainly can keep our investigators within the bounds of law and ask them not to harass.

Mr. REBOZO. I think they can temper aggressiveness with reasonableness. I haven't found any semblance of that. Even the First National Bank, which is the largest bank in the State, told us the subpoena served was so broad it would take them months to comply. City National said they weren't going to the expense of that. If you wanted it done, you would have to pay for it.

It has been like this in all these banks. I do a lot of business with banks, and it has been impairing—I'm afraid it's going to impair my banking relationship with people that I have enjoyed a good relationship with before. Nobody wants to be in partnership or doing business with somebody if every few weeks they're going to have to answer subpoenas that ask them to sweep out the cellar.

Now, the Newsday people, in their investigation, went back so far that someone in the courthouse told me that the records were so old that they had to go back to the warehouse and dig out records for them.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Rebozo, Mr. Dash, Senator. I think the Senator in his military career recalls that with a statement like that, you send him to the chaplain. I suggest that while this is interesting to the Senator, we get on with the interrogation on the facts.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, in your financial statement of September 1, 1970, there is a loan liability of \$100,000 owed to the Key Biscayne Bank. I don't find that in your receipts. The proceeds have been taken by cashier's check and put somewhere else. Do you recall that?

Mr. REBOZO. That would be news to me if that's the case, because the bookkeeper generally puts everything in my personal account and then pays it out of there. I believe if you examine it carefully, you'll probably find that that was done, and if it wasn't it's a very simple matter to provide that information.

Mr. DASH. For these purposes, we're noting things that we're going to get additional records to show.

Mr. REBOZO. What was that date?

Mr. DASH. There was a thing Mr. Frates indicated he wanted to do to clear this up once and for all. If there was a questionable amount, write it down and get it for the record.

Mr. REBOZO. What was that date?

Mr. BELLINO. That was the 1970 financial statement.

Mr. REBOZO. And it said what?

Mr. BELLINO. It shows a liability of \$100,000, but I don't find the receipt of it anywhere before the date of that statement, but you did pay it back. So you must have done it—if it didn't go into your 134 account, what account did it go into?

Mr. REBOZO. I probably haven't paid it back.

Mr. BELLINO. No, this has been paid back.

Mr. FRATES. He said it has been paid back.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it was probably something borrowed in 1969, and that's why it appeared——

Mr. BELLINO. It could have been borrowed in 1969 and paid later on, but I don't find it even in 1969 or 1970, unless it was 1968. But I don't think so.

Mr. REBOZO. I have always borrowed from our bank.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. For the record, Mr. Rebozo, it didn't show in the 1969 financial statement. That's why Mr. Bellino raised it.

Mr. REBOZO. I see. Then it has to be on the 1970, I'm sure.

Mr. BELLINO. In 1969, you had a balance of \$64,000. In 1970, it's \$100,000. The balance would show.

Mr. REBOZO. You see, the balances I show in my accounts are the balances as of September 1 of each year. I, sometime back, adopted the procedure of picking one day to make out all my financial statements for the various banks so as not to have to fool with it too often.

Mr. BELLINO. Mr. Rebozo, have you invested any funds in Water Pollution Control, Inc.?

Mr. REBOZO. In the Water Pollution Control Act?

Mr. BELLINO. Water Pollution Control, Inc.

Mr. REBOZO. Not to my knowledge. I don't even know what it is.

Mr. BELLINO. Your friend, I believe Jake Jernigan——

Mr. REBOZO. No, I'm not in that. I know Jake. He's a fine fellow.

Mr. BELLINO. Has he ever fronted for you with any financial transaction?

Mr. REBOZO. Mr. Bellino, the word "front" annoys me, very obviously, because I saw once before, the term you used was "straw man"—something like that. He has not fronted for me or been a straw man for me. I have known him for about 20 years. He's a nice fellow. He tries hard. He chases rainbows a lot, and I have never invested in that company, though I would see nothing wrong with it if I did.

Mr. BELLINO. Have you had any other financial transactions with W. A. Baraket besides the \$100,000 that you borrowed from him?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. BELLINO. I would like to get on the record the transaction you had with Dick Danner. Will you tell us about that \$1,000 transaction with him and how it arose?

Mr. REBOZO. Mr. Bellino, I explained that to you before as best I could recall. It seems to me, and I don't know whether—I think that I borrowed \$1,000 from him and then sent him a check for it, and you ran across that canceled check when you had my books pulled. I have yet to even look at any of those checks. My bookkeeper got them together when I gave them to you before. I haven't looked at them yet because I know there is nothing there.

Mr. BELLINO. You say you borrowed \$1,000 from him?

Mr. REBOZO. I am inclined to think that that is what I did when I was in Las Vegas. He may have borrowed \$1,000 from me. I really don't even remember which it was. Was there a check of mine written to him for \$1,000?

Mr. BELLINO. That's right.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, then, that's what it was.

Mr. BELLINO. Did he pay you back immediately?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I was paying him back.

Mr. BELLINO. Or did you pay him back?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. BELLINO. That is—I don't quite understand it. The record shows you gave him a check on May 19 for \$1,000.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Rebozo has responded that he had borrowed from Dick Danner. This was repayment of the loan.

Mr. BELLINO. And the next day, on May 20, you deposited the \$1,000 and I've been trying to find out whether that was cash, because it doesn't show.

Mr. REBOZO. As you'll recall, the question was brought up before and the deposit slip said, "exchange."

Mr. BELLINO. No, it didn't say anything.

Mr. REBOZO. Something said "exchange." I recall us discussing it. So when you have an exchange, you have an in and out, whatever it was. What year was that?

Mr. BELLINO. That's the same, 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't remember what it was. But I can tell you that it was not a payoff or anything. It was a straight, honest transaction between two old friends.

Senator INOUE. Do you want to take a short break?

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir. Before that, Mr. Bellino has indicated, along with our agreement, several documents, and if we can have him write those down, or Mr. Armstrong, so we can check them so there'll be no misunderstanding—

Mr. SCHULTZ. Senator, before we break, may I speak to an issue that was raised before?

Senator INOUE. Go right ahead.

Mr. SCHULTZ. On January 17, Mr. Thompson and I interviewed Mr. Rebozo in Miami. At that time, Mr. Frates displayed to us copies of certificates of deposit which, according to my writeup, originated on September 9, 1969. This memo was provided to Marc Lackritz, so he does have the date.

We did not make any notes nor did we bring any copies of those certificates. My reason was I saw no significance to the 1972 Presidential campaign. So the record is correct, he did display them to us. I made no notes.

Mr. THOMPSON. I suppose they're still available.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, they are, CD's of the President and Mrs. Nixon.

Mr. DASH. If the staff feels it's important to look at it, he raises no objection to producing them.

Mr. SCHULTZ. If Marc does not have copies of the memo, I have it here and he's welcome to it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I verify the fact that you provided me with a copy of the memo of your interview. I believe the point was only raised that we had no copies of the certificates of deposit and were provided no copies. I think we clarified that for the record.

Mr. DASH. You're right, when you see any member of the staff of our committee, you have the right to expect you're talking to the whole committee. I don't think it's an issue—

Mr. FRATES. I don't want to create an issue.

Mr. DASH. It's not an issue. Sometimes one staff may see some significance that another doesn't and it falls in the crack, that's all.

Senator INOUE. Do any of the staff wish to speak before we take a recess?

Mr. FRATES. One other thing, since this is your first time in these hearings. From the inception of the Watergate investigation, we have tried completely to cooperate. We have had some disagreements and I think we resolved that this morning between the investigative staff and ourselves. They felt they were entitled to examine all personal records of all corporations from 1969 right on through. I think we have resolved that situation now.

I also assured these people that from my examination, we are not trying to conceal any document, withhold any document that is relevant to the investigation of this committee. This is the approach that we have tried to adopt in these examinations.

Mr. DASH. We did agree as of this morning that—I think you said you do have them here, the bank statements?

Mr. FRATES. I have this whole thing of the checks and the bank statements. I don't think they're through 1973. Again, Senator, this is Mr. Rebozo's personal checks, which Mr. Bellino has seen, from December 1969. He spent several days in our office examining them. I just want you to know.

Mr. DASH. They're here. I think he said he didn't have to follow the checks with checks, but he was interested in bank statements.

Mr. FRATES. I told that to my client and he doesn't think they have the right, but he has agreed. I think this is one of the matters.

Mr. DASH. And you have copies through 1973?

Mr. FRATES. June of 1973.

Mr. REBOZO. I have no objection to showing appropriate persons representatives of this committee anything and everything that I have of record. I do strongly object to their photographing anything for very, very important reasons. There have been just entirely too many leaks. I don't want to see a copy of my check up here in some magazine or newspaper with a distorted story saying what it was for. It was embarrassing to me when they singled out some people I've made checks to and then went and called on them as though I were a criminal.

Mr. DASH. Carmine, so we can save time, would you be in a position to go through those statements if we don't have copies of them, while they're here?

Mr. BELLINO. I would like to have them, because from time to time——

Mr. DASH. This can be off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator INOUE. We'll take a brief recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. LACKRITZ. Mr. Rebozo, we would like to get to the questions of the circumstances surrounding your decision to return the money in the spring of 1973. As I recall your testimony, you testified that you were contacted by the IRS on the matter in March or April of 1973. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I believe you told us also earlier in your testimony that you first talked to the President about the money in March or April of 1973. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I had first talked to him earlier about having the money, but about returning it then.

Mr. LACKRITZ. When did you first talk to him about having the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I was asked that question before and couldn't recall. I did it on some occasion. I believe it was at Key Biscayne.

Again, you know, he has had so many bombshells for so long, I usually wait if I have anything to tell him to seek a time when it's a relaxed atmosphere, and so forth.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you tell the President that you had the money prior to the time that you were contacted by the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. At the time you told the President that you had the money, did you tell the President who had delivered the money to you?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So you told him, in fact, that Mr. Danner had delivered it to you?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. At that time, he offered you no advice about whether or not to return the money, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. No—yes, that's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, you say you subsequently had another discussion with the President about the money, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. As I have indicated, yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, was that second discussion with the President about the money prior to the time you were contacted by the IRS, or subsequent to the time you were contacted by the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it was about the same time, and I think that perhaps I ought to correct a misunderstanding I may have made to Senator Weicker earlier, because I was asked about Ehrlichman and I do recall that Ehrlichman did mention about the IRS to me. I didn't recall any specific conversation, but now I do remember that he had said something about the IRS was going to check this out. It was about that same time frame.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall Mr. Ehrlichman getting in touch with you in March or April?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, and I don't know whether he told me that after I had received the call from the Nevada IRS or before. That part I can't pin down, but I do remember him saying that it was going to be investigated, or that I was going to be investigated. So it must have been—well, no, it couldn't have been after, because again Ehrlichman left there in April and that's about the time all this was happening.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, had you talked to the President about whether or not you should return the money prior to the time that Mr. Ehrlichman advised you that you were going to be talked to by the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. I would say about the same time, probably.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, which came first?

Mr. REBOZO. As I say, I don't know, and it's not like you make appointments to go see something about something. When I go to the White House, I generally—I don't bother the President, I go around and visit the different people I know and say hello. During these visits, discussions on all topics of moment at the time naturally come up, particularly if they involve me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, was the fact that the IRS contacted you a factor in your deciding to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I think so. I think that had something to do with it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So in other words, you had not made the decision to return the money prior to the time that the IRS contacted you?

Mr. REBOZO. No; as I indicated previously, I had hoped that maybe this whole situation would clear up—that is, the situation between—

Mr. LACKRITZ. I understand that, Mr. Rebozo.

Mr. REBOZO [continuing]. Between Hughes and Maheu, but that hope diminished with time, and I sought counsel with several people, as I've indicated, and the sort of unanimous conclusion was, return it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I understand that, but as I also understand your testimony, the fact that you were contacted by the IRS played some part in your decision to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure it had some effect on it; yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So you did not decide—

Mr. REBOZO. Even though the IRS told me that they weren't checking me at all.

Let me say this about that particular meeting, because it may be relevant. They came over to see me at Key Biscayne, these two agents whose names are Keeney and Skelton—came to see me and they told me that they were checking the tax returns of whomever it was—whether it was Danner, Maheu, Hughes, or what—and they would like to ask me some questions. So they went on with a few questions.

Then they asked me if Danner gave me any money or did he give me \$100,000. I said "yes." They said, "What did you do with it?" Well, when I said, "I've still got it," they did a doubletake, because that was not expected.

So he said, "What we're here for is to try to locate \$1 million." They said, "We've searched all over; there's a million that we feel, perhaps, taxes have not been paid on and this is the first amount that we've been able to locate."

Then two or three times during the discussion, they told me that they wanted to make it very clear that I'm not under investigation and so on. At one point, they asked me: "Who do you think the money belongs to?" I said, "At this stage, I don't have any idea. I know it doesn't belong to me."

Then I proceeded to get Danner to take it back or get his people to take it back.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. So in other words, your efforts to contact Danner to have him take it back were not until after you met with the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So then it would have had to be after your first interview with the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe that's correct.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. So as I understand it, you met with the IRS shortly after the time you were first contacted by them, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir. They came to see me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I take it at this time, you were not represented by counsel when you talked to the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Following your meeting with the IRS, what was the next thing you did with respect to trying to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that's when I spoke to the various people that I indicated to get their judgment on it, because by then, I was fairly well convinced that the money could not be used for any campaign purposes.

I thought of all kinds of things. I thought of giving half of it to the Democratic Party and half to the Republican. I thought of all kinds of things just to see what I could do to dispose of it. When I talked to the few lawyers that I mentioned, why, it was pretty unanimous that I should return it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. After you talked to the IRS, who was the first lawyer? That was Mr. Griffin, I take it, that you spoke to about it?

Mr. REBOZO. I think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what did Mr. Griffin advise you to do with the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Turn it back.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ask Mr. Griffin if he would take the money back for you?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not then. That just happened later, because I was working with Mr. Gemmill, and he was——

Mr. LACKRITZ. I understand, but at that time——

Mr. FRATES. Let him finish, please.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Excuse me.

Mr. REBOZO. No, it never occurred to me to involve Griffin and I'm very sorry I did, now, because he had nothing to do with this, just that one act for a friend, and didn't even let his principal client, who is Abplanalp, know he was doing it. He had to read it in the paper and it was rather embarrassing for him. But Griffin researched some law on it and said that that was the best thing to do.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And this was very shortly after your meeting with the IRS, as I understand it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. As I also understand your testimony, you at that time did not ask Mr. Griffin himself to take the money back to Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. No; that came about as the result of taking the money to Philadelphia, thinking that we would meet with Chester Davis there and give it to him, and then finding out that Davis wasn't even there or in New York, and wouldn't be for a couple of days.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK.

Mr. REBOZO. So that's when I asked Griffin if he would hold the money, since he lived in New York, since he's director of a bank, and then put it in the vault, and since he knew the details of it. So he took the money and then they made their arrangements after that to turn it over.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Then going back to this meeting shortly after the IRS interview, did Mr. Griffin give you any advice that you should have an independent third party arrange to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now following the meeting with Griffin, did you contact any other attorneys in May?

Mr. REBOZO. I said that I had talked with several friends. I talked with my own attorney; I talked with my accountant.

Mr. FRATES. Wakefield.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Your attorneys?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; I'm sorry, my house attorney.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Are you referring to Mr. Davis when you say your accountant?

Mr. REBOZO. That's Warren Davis.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did Mr. Gemmill advise you to arrange to return the money through an independent third party?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he knew that I was trying to return it to Danner, but Danner, for some reason, either didn't want to accept it or didn't know what to do, or just didn't bother. I don't know what. So then, I think, I had Gemmill get hold of Chester Davis, because I knew that he was their top counselor, and arrange to give it to him.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now, at your first meeting with Mr. Gemmill, did you—

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me, Senator. Again, I don't want to object, but we went through this thing this morning in some detail.

Mr. DASH. I know we did. I think Senator Weicker started to ask questions in this area. I wasn't sure he would come back. But it was my understanding that we shouldn't repeat questions—

Mr. FRATES. It seems to me we're repeating a majority. I'm not objecting, but—

Mr. DASH. I think my understanding was that you were willing to explore the record further, but not repeat questions.

Mr. LACKRITZ. We're just trying to lay a foundation for a subsequent meeting that I didn't think we had gotten into prior to this time.

Senator WEICKER. In any event, I agree with him. So far, everything I have heard we've gone over. Let's get it going.

Mr. DASH. One way to expedite it—you wouldn't object to some leading questions?

Mr. FRATES. Of course not. I would prefer them.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. For the record, I think it's worthy of note that one of the reasons why some of the questions have been repeated is it gives Mr. Rebozo an additional opportunity to reflect. As I pointed out when he returned to the room, during the lunch period, he collected a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman.

Senator WEICKER. At any rate, let's get going.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You testified previously that you contacted Mr. Danner on numerous occasions after your contact with the IRS. Did you ever contact Mr. Danner and ask him to come to Washington in May of 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. I met him in there, and I know the date because I read about it, and that story was totally distorted also. I don't know

if I asked him to come or if he was in Washington on other business, but I did see him there.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You don't recall asking Mr. Danner to come to Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Where did you meet Mr. Danner in Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe we both stayed at the Madison.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You both stayed at the Madison?

Mr. REBOZO. I think there was some function going on. There was some reason for being there at that time, but I don't recall what it was.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Was this on or about May 18 or 19, 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. It was in May, the date that was indicated in the paper—I thought it was the 5th—of this year, but I don't—whatever the date was, was, I believe, accurate.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you have any discussions with Mr. Danner at the Madison Hotel about returning the money on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. I must have.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you have any recollection of those discussions?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I've just—you know—I'm sure that the decision had been made and I have to presume that we did discuss it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But you have no recollection of discussing it?

Mr. REBOZO. Not specifically. Again, Danner and I have been friends, you know, for so many years. We talk about everything under the sun. We used to talk about girls; we don't do that any more.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I understand that, but as I understand your earlier testimony, you had testified that you had been trying to call Mr. Danner on numerous occasions after your first IRS interview?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And this meeting in Washington would have been sometime after that time period, so you did discuss with Mr. Danner the return of the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you see Mr. Danner on more than one date during that period, or was that just a 1-day meeting?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I saw him that one day. Then the next morning or that night, I went to Camp David and Danner spent a lot of time telling me about the pulse of the people that he meets out there. In Vegas, he meets people from all over the country. It was his feeling that the Watergate didn't get the play out there that it's getting in the East and that he didn't feel that the President was in serious trouble. Danner is a very convincing, deliberate speaker.

So at Camp David, I related to the President what Danner had told me, but I didn't get the feeling that he was buying it. I just had the feeling that maybe he thought this was more his friend trying to make him feel better.

Then the thought occurred to me that if I could just get him to talk to Danner, he would be getting it right from the horse's mouth and it might relieve the tension some.

So I called and Danner was still down there. I checked with the aide and he said they have courier cars coming up. So I arranged for one of them to bring him up.

I was staying in one of the cottages there and they brought him right to the cottage I was in. We talked about everything, I guess. Then I eased over and talked to or else I called—I guess I called Manuel—that's the way I usually do it—the President's butler. But in any event, I got the President to come over for a few minutes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. That is, come over to your cottage?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I guess he was there 5 to 10 minutes, something like that, and I cited the purpose. I said I would just like, you know, I think I said, "I have the feeling that you don't believe me, but I wanted you to get it from the horse's mouth." And I just told Danner, "I just want you to relate to the President what you related to me." And Danner did. He told him the same stories that he had told me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. When did you first talk to the President? Did you talk to the President about your conversations with Danner on the night that you went out to Camp David, the night before?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether I went that night or the next day to Camp David, but I talked to him at some point while we were there. Sometimes we take walks, and these are things that I generally choose to talk to him about when we're alone, rather than when all the family is around or whatever. So I always make it a practice to just wait for a convenient time.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. Now, during that time, did you discuss with the President anything concerning your efforts to have Mr. Danner take the money back that he had given you?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No; again, I'm sure I didn't.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did the President ask you any questions about whether you had been able to return the money to Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Are you sure?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. You don't think so, are you sure—I don't think the record is clear.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I'm sorry. Are you certain that the President did not ask you any questions about whether you had been successful in having Danner take the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I'm not certain.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So, in other words, the President could have raised some questions with you on that occasion?

Mr. REBOZO. Could have. What was that date again?

Mr. LACKRITZ. I believe it was May 20, 1973, for the record. How long was your discussion with the President that evening, or that next morning?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, the President was probably there 5 or 10 minutes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. No. I mean with you alone, not with Mr. Danner.

Mr. REBOZO. No longer than it took me to tell you this. As I say, it was part of a general discussion that I mentioned this to him.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see.

Mr. REBOZO. I mean, I don't go in for an appointment with the President and they say, you have 30 minutes, or 20 minutes, or an

hour, or whatever. Generally, I go over when he calls me, and he's usually working, and he'll work for hours on end sometimes. If he has a free moment, he'll call to see what you're doing, see if you want to go swimming or take a walk. Very often, on the walks, the walks seem to present a good opportunity to bring up something like this.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Now, you say the President, after hearing your version of what Mr. Danner had to say, asked you to have Mr. Danner brought out to Camp David?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it was my idea.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You suggested that to the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir. I thought that—I didn't know at first that Danner was still there, but I just wanted him to talk to him direct, because I provide him with reports. I get voluminous mail from all over the country supporting the President, and I get phone calls, and people sometimes come in the bank with tears in their eyes wanting to send him a message or something. I have relayed some of these things to him, but I think that—I'm not sure that he believes it always. He might think that I'm making it up to make him feel better.

But Danner, as I said, had told me this without any coaxing and without the President being there, and Danner is rather articulate. I know the President likes him and I thought he would believe somebody else saying some of these things rather than me.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right, but I take it at this point, Mr. Danner had not yet agreed to take the money back. Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. He never did agree.

Mr. LACKRITZ. That's right. So by that time, he had not agreed to take the money back?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right. He was always going to let me know.

Mr. LACKRITZ. As I understand it, you talked to the President about the advisability of returning the money at about the same time that you were contacted by the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Which was a short time earlier.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think it's all right in that timeframe.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yet, your testimony is that you had no discussions with the President about the return of the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I said earlier—

Mr. FRATES. At that time. At that meeting you're talking about.

Mr. LACKRITZ. At that meeting.

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, at that meeting. No, I don't believe it came up.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, you then called to get a courier car for Mr. Danner to have him brought from the Madison Hotel out to Camp David?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you ask Mr. Danner to stay over for the purpose of coming up to Camp David the following day?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I called and he was still there. I said, "What are you doing?" He said, "I thought I would probably do a little sightseeing." I said, "When are you going back?" And I think he

said some time that night. Then I asked him if he could come up there if I could make some arrangements.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could I ask two clarifying questions? The President was not aware that Mr. Danner was coming out to Camp David, is that right?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether he was or not. I may have told him. I'm inclined to think I would have.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did he know the reason why Mr. Danner would be coming out?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I had related to him what Danner had just told me the day before, so——

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did he think it was for the purpose of relating that as opposed to a social visit?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, not just relating that. I think it was more intended to get a feel of the pulse of the crossroads of the Nation, where he's always talking to people and seeing people.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Whom did you contact to arrange the car to have it brought out?

Mr. REBOZO. One of the aides.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Military aides, such as Mr. Golden or somebody?

Mr. REBOZO. I just asked them if they had any cars coming up. He said, "Yes, we have courier cars coming all the time, we have courier cars coming, changing shifts for the Secret Service and so on."

Mr. LACKRITZ. What time of day did Mr. Danner arrive at Camp David?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think we had lunch there. I don't remember. I am inclined to think it was morning.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What part of the morning?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I'm inclined to think it was late morning.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Late morning?

Mr. REBOZO. That's my guess.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And he came directly to your cabin?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. They had instructions where to bring him.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And how soon after he came to your cabin did President Nixon come to your cabin?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it probably was a half hour or so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So you and Mr. Danner had an opportunity to discuss matters for half an hour before the President came?

Mr. REBOZO. Sure.

Mr. LACKRITZ. At that time, did you discuss with Mr. Danner the need to return the money and ask him if he could take it back?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe so. But, again, I'm trying hard to be completely accurate, and I don't want to say anything that I'm not positive of.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right, but you say you're fairly certain that you discussed that in the time that you were alone in that cabin?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm inclined to think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. Now, I take it Mr. Danner still did not agree to take the money back. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. REBOZO. He was going to check with his superiors.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, did you call the President to come over to the cabin, or did the President just wander over on his own?

Mr. REBOZO. I think what I did was to call the butler and tell him that we were there and if he had a couple of minutes, I would like for him to drop by.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. So the President then came over and it would have been around noontime when the President came over. Was it prior to lunch?

Mr. REBOZO. I said I think it was. I don't know.

Mr. LACKRITZ. What did the President say to Mr. Danner when he came in?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, of course, he hadn't seen him in a long time and greeted him as anyone would greet someone else, and asked him how he was doing out there—just general small talk.

Senator WEICKER. Is this the Camp David meeting, by the way, that we're talking about again?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So Mr. Danner said he was fine, and then did the President ask him specifically about what the mood was?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I think I initiated that. I think I said to the President that Danner had related some things to me the day before that I would like him to repeat if he didn't mind. So Danner got into this discussion, which he does very well, and that was it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And what did he tell the President specifically?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, he told him in essence what I previously said, that all the people that he sees out there don't show the concern about this matter that he reads in the Eastern press, that most people that he has seen are behind him, appreciate the great job he has done, and along those lines, just in general.

I think he cited maybe one or two people that had said certain things.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Right. Now, was anything else discussed other than small talk and the general mood of the country in that discussion with the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No. The President may have talked a little bit about football or something like that, but—no, that was May. I don't know. It was small talk.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And how long would you estimate this meeting with Mr. Danner and the President was?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe the President was there more than 10 minutes, if that long.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And at the conclusion of the meeting, what did the President do?

Mr. REBOZO. He went back to his quarters. Danner and I visited a while, and then he went back.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, did you take a walk—did you and Mr. Danner take a walk with the President around the Camp David grounds?

Mr. REBOZO. The President and I walk around there all the time. It's possible that we may have, but I don't—

Mr. LACKRITZ. Would you recall that if you and Mr. Danner and the President——

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, I wouldn't. I've walked around there so many times with the President and the First Lady or someone else.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall what kind of day that was, that day that Mr. Danner came out to see the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Was it rainy?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And you don't recall whether or not you and Mr. Danner and the President took a walk around the grounds following the meeting?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't recall.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Is it possible that that happened?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, it could be possible.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And if, in fact, you walked around the grounds, would that have been a long walk, a short walk?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe we walked around, but you said is it possible, and I say, sure, it's possible.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But you have no recollection of walking around?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. How long after your meeting with President Nixon was it before Mr. Danner left Camp David?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I presume a half hour or so.

Danner and I have a lot of mutual friends, and we no doubt indulged in some conversation about them.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you know, after the meeting with the President, did you have any further discussion with Mr. Danner about requesting him to take the money back?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall that. I thanked him for the presentation, which I thought was effective and useful, and apologized for inconveniencing him by bringing him up. But outside of that, I think it was just talk about some of our mutual friends.

You mentioned Jernigan a while ago. We probably talked about him and his different ventures, and probably about Smathers.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. How did Mr. Danner get back? Did you call a car for him?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. To take him back to Washington?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Who did you ask to call a car? The similar military aide?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Usually the aide does those things.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall the aide, incidentally, that was there that day?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't. I generally just call for the duty aide and whoever it is does it. But I don't recall the aide.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall if there was any time that the President and Mr. Danner just were together out of your presence, outside of your presence?

Mr. REBOZO. No, they weren't out of my presence at any time.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. What cabin were you staying in?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether—I stay at different cabins, and sometimes—I think it was Maple.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it possible that the discussion took place in the President's, in Aspen Cabin rather than Maple?

Mr. REBOZO. No, it didn't take place, wasn't discussed there at all.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The previous evening, when you discussed with the President Mr. Danner's general reflections on the situation, his view from the West, where did that discussion take place, do you recall that?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know if it was the previous evening or that morning, but it would probably have taken place in Aspen.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall where it would be in Aspen? I mean where in the cabin it was?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In his study?

Mr. REBOZO. It could have been. I don't know.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Do you recall that same weekend, Mr. Rebozo, did you see Mr. Abplanalp?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm piecing together some things that almost seem—it seems to me that we went up there on a Saturday rather than a Friday because it seems to me that the President was—I was staying at the Madison. I would normally stay at the White House. So, I think that what happened—there was something going on. Abplanalp was here, too. And I believe that—Abplanalp has his own plane. I believe the day before we flew up to Abplanalp's place and had lunch at his Eldred preserve——

Mr. LACKRITZ. You mean the trout preserve?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And who was on that trip?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether Griffin was with him or not, but I think it was just the three of us.

Mr. LACKRITZ. You, Mr. Abplanalp and Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And to the best of your recollection, that was the previous day, which would have been a Friday?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think that—you know, when you make so many trips to a city, it's awful hard to keep from confusing what happened on one trip with what might have happened on another. But I connect Danner's visit there with the trip to Eldred because I remember us all going up there, and there's no other occasion that I can recall when we did.

Senator MONTANA. We'll have a recess because there's a vote. I only have 3 minutes to make a vote.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator WEICKER. Back on the record.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Before the break, we were talking briefly about your trip to upstate New York with Mr. Abplanalp and Mr. Danner previous to the date you went up to Camp David. Mr. Rebozo, do you recall on that trip to upstate New York, did you discuss with Mr. Danner the possible return of the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

You see, Abplanalp knew nothing about it all this time until he read it in the paper. We were together all the time. We were all staying at the same hotel here.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, was there a specific reason why you didn't inform Mr. Abplanalp about the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I guess only that it's just my nature to not, you know, it was a private affair, and not that I would distrust him; I just didn't do it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see.

Mr. REBOZO. Then, too, I had involved his lawyer, and I didn't know whether his lawyer had told him or hadn't, and he hadn't mentioned it, so I just thought I'd better not, to put his lawyer on the spot.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So, in other words, your trip to New York was subsequent to the time that you had contacted Mr. Griffin?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yet you decided you were still not going to tell Mr. Abplanalp about the money at all.

Mr. REBOZO. That's right. If Griffin had told him, he would have brought it up himself.

It was just a spur of the moment thing to go up there.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, as I understand it, prior to the time that you went out to Camp David to see the President, the previous time that you had discussed the money with the President had been—

Mr. FRATES. When you say "see the President," he was staying out there.

Mr. LACKRITZ. To see the President at Camp David. When Mr. Rebozo went out to see—well, when you went out to stay at Camp David.

As I understand it, Mr. Rebozo, prior to that time, you had discussed the advisability of returning the money with the President in March or April, in there?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Now, the President said to you that it was advisable for you to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did he advise you to talk to anybody about the return of the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Are you saying that he did not advise you to talk to anyone else?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm saying I don't think he did.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Well, would you recall specifically if the President did advise you to talk to anyone about it?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall that he did.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you, at the request of the President, talk to anyone else about the money?

Mr. REBOZO. No. That's the same question, but I talked with—I think I told the President who I'd talked with about it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. This is when the President was discussing with you his advice to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think Bill Griffin was the first one I spoke to about it. I could be wrong, but I believe he was.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And Griffin had advised you to return the money prior to the time he talked to the President about it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, and his advice was not just off the cuff, as I said. He said, "Let me do something on it," and—he was in Miami. As a matter of fact, he had gone to Walker's Cay, and, as I recall, he flew back to Lauderdale and went to a law library or something and did a couple of hours research on it and advised me to return it.

Mr. LACKRITZ. All right. Did you tell the President that you had discussed this matter with anyone else prior to your seeking Mr. Nixon's advice about whether to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. I think so.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Griffin.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Other than Mr. Griffin.

Mr. REBOZO. The chronology of something like this is very difficult to try to piece together. It was all part of one package, and what went in first, I find it difficult to recall to the point that I can be that specific. The fact remains that once all this came about, I, with as much haste as possible, talked to those in whom I had confidence that I felt would give me good counsel.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I see. And once you informed the President of the individuals with whom you had already consulted, did the President suggest any additional individuals that you might consult?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. I take it, Mr. Rebozo, if I may just drop this in quickly, you didn't talk about Mr. Gemmill with the President, or did you?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I talked about it with Mr. Gemmill but not with the President and Mr. Gemmill.

Mr. LENZNER. No. I mean, did you tell the President that you were retaining Mr. Gemmill as an attorney?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And which occasion was that, sir?

I understand from the questioning that there were two occasions. Do you recall which one?

Mr. REBOZO. It would have been early in—

Mr. LENZNER. The first one?

Mr. REBOZO. Possibly.

Mr. LENZNER. If you've gotten into this, stop me, but how many total conversations did you have with President Nixon with regard to these funds?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, Terry, I've had so many visits—not meetings but visits—

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I said conversations.

Mr. REBOZO [continuing]. With the President on so many occasions that it would be impossible to suggest how much on those occasions this was even mentioned. Once a decision was made to

return it. I think the President probably dismissed it from his mind, and that was the end of it there. He goes on to other things.

Mr. LENZNER. So, can you approximate the number of times that you talked about this with the President? I take it it was more than two.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I can't approximate.

Senator MONTROYA. I would like to ask one question there.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. At what time did the President reach a determination that the money should be returned to Mr. Danner? What was the time?

Mr. REBOZO. You mean the date?

Senator MONTROYA. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. We've been trying to establish that, but I believe that it was again in early 1973 when all this—I think all this happened in, you know, a very close time span. He didn't reach a decision and tell me. I consulted with him about it.

Senator MONTROYA. Did he take it under advisement after you first broached it to him?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. He made the determination immediately?

Mr. REBOZO. He felt that I was—I told him that I had been advised to return it, and he thought that was the right thing to do.

Senator MONTROYA. And when did he know about this Danner contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. He didn't know about it until after the 1972 election. Senator, I explained that to them, not perhaps as clearly as I wish I could, but I recall it was on a visit to Key Biscayne after the election that I told him. It was one of those occasions, again, where I would choose a time when his mind isn't involved in other things.

Senator MONTROYA. And when did you advise Rose Mary Woods of the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I advised her immediately after receipt of it.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you tell her it was a contribution or did you just tell her that you had the money from Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. I told her it was a contribution from Howard Hughes, or from Danner, however.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, let me ask you this: Did you ever discuss—after your initial interview with us—did you ever discuss the fact that the Watergate committee, Senator Ervin's committee had been to see you or seeking to see you about these funds with the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, I'm sure I mentioned it.

Mr. LENZNER. And in addition, at some point did you learn that Mr. Cox's office, the Special Prosecutor's office, was also beginning work on this investigation?

Mr. REBOZO. The only place I learned anything about that was in the newspapers, and I find it difficult to believe that he was working on it.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, did you discuss that with the President also?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. You did learn at some point, did you not, that Mr. Cox's office had obtained a disclosure agreement with the Internal Revenue Service? Weren't you advised of that at some point?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. In other words, that they had the right to obtain information from the Internal Revenue Service? You never learned of that?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. I would like to get back, if we could, to the Camp David meetings briefly.

As I understand it, when you said that the President advised you to return the money, that was at the same time you were contacted by the IRS, about the same time?

Mr. REBOZO. All of this happened within a relatively short period of time.

Mr. LACKRITZ. As I understand it, you were interviewed by the IRS in early May of 1973, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Somewhere in there, whenever it was. I thought it was March or April, but it could have been May. I don't know.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So in other words, it would have been only a few weeks prior to the May 21 date that you would have been discussing this matter with the President, is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. What's the May 21 date?

Mr. LACKRITZ. The date that you were at Camp David with Mr. Danner and the President, or the May 20 date—I'm not sure which is accurate. I just want to understand that at no time during that meeting with Mr. Danner or during your meeting with the President was the subject of your difficulty in returning the money to Mr. Danner brought up in any way by anybody?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Senator, do you have any other questions about the Camp David meeting?

Senator WEICKER. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Terry?

Mr. LENZNER. I assume you've covered how the President learned why Mr. Danner was in Washington?

Mr. FRATES. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. I have one question—again stop me if this has been covered. I don't want to repeat anything.

After the IRS called you for an interview, did you advise anybody besides Mr. Ehrlichman of that? In the White House staff?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know that I advised him of that, and I don't know the chronology of his telling me that, that that was going to happen. But I may have.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell Miss Woods that you were going to be interviewed by the IRS?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably. We talk all the time about all kinds of things. Very few of these things, however, do I discuss with the President. We have always felt—and Miss Woods, although she has been with him so long, is of the same opinion—that if there's any matter that can be resolved without bothering him or involving him, those close to him try to do it.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if Miss Woods ever discussed the Hughes contribution with the President? Your involvement in the Hughes contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm positive she didn't.

Senator MONTORA. You say you're positive that she did?

Mr. REBOZO. Did not. I've got to quit dropping my voice.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me go back to one thing. As I understand it, while I was out, Mr. Rebozo, you testified about a conversation you did have with Mr. Ehrlichman with regard to your name coming up in the IRS investigation?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Ehrlichman advise you as to how he learned of that?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I just would assume that he would have friends over there, or contacts over there. It never, you know, really concerned me anymore than all of this investigation has concerned me, except for the horrendous consumption of time that I've devoted to it and the humiliation as a result of the bad media stories. The facts, though, no problem; I'm delighted to give them.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware that Mr. Ehrlichman was receiving sensitive case reports from the IRS which reflected your name when it came up?

Mr. REBOZO. If he was receiving them, this was the first I've heard of it.

Mr. LENZNER. You were not aware of that?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he give you any advice or ask you any questions with regard to when he called you to tell you that they wanted an interview?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, as I recall, it was a very brief thing and Ehrlichman is the kind of fellow who didn't linger, waste a lot of time.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ask you if there was any problem involved in the——

Mr. REBOZO. He may have.

Senator WEICKER. In the summer of 1972, June and July of 1972, did you have any occasion to speak with either Mr. Mardian or Mr. LaRue?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know Mr. Mardian and if Mr. LaRue was at Key Biscayne, I could have spoken to him. I knew him from 19—from previous campaigns.

Senator WEICKER. Did he ever have occasion to discuss Watergate with you? Mr. LaRue?

Mr. REBOZO. I think only in the context that we're all, of course, interested in, most of which is in the press.

Senator WEICKER. Did you know of the Cubans that were involved in this matter——

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator WEICKER [continuing]. Prior to seeing them appear in the media?

Mr. REBOZO. No, Senator, I didn't know them before nor since. There's a lot of conjecture on that in the press.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I think there's nothing wrong with conjecture. After all, you know, you're looked up to by members of that community in Miami. I wouldn't get too distressed about conjecture. I'll put it that way.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, what I was going to allude to was more than just conjecture. A day or two after the break-in, Jack Anderson announced that I was, implied that I was financing the Cubans, and since then, several stories came out that I was in real estate deals with them and other kinds of investments—these stories get picked up by fringe periodicals that will print anything and amplify it—that they had us in as partners and all.

On the contrary, Sturgis is supposed to be a close friend of Anderson's. But I got a lot of bad press on account of that. But I don't know.

Senator WEICKER. My comments were not made in the way of—I didn't even know there was such a story. But rather to try to tie the loose ends together insofar as any knowledge of the individuals is concerned or any relationship with them after the break-in, or in the course of their various trials and relations.

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir. To my knowledge, I've never seen or met any of those men to this date.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have a discussion at some point also with former Senator Smathers with regard to the \$100,000 contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Smathers——

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. May I ask at what time? Before or after or at any time?

Mr. LENZNER. I would like to start with at any time. I think we can narrow it down.

Mr. FRATES. All right.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, no. Smathers, of course, first learned about it from the press. We've had virtually no discussion about it other than perhaps the dominant results.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying that after it came out in the press, former Senator Smathers called you and said he had read it in the press and wanted to chat with you about it?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, I didn't say that. I'm simply saying Smathers lives on Key Biscayne. He's a lifelong friend. He would naturally have read the stories and be concerned to a degree, and any discussion we had was just about what happened. Danner, coincidentally, was Smathers' campaign manager in his first race for the Congress in 1946 and again in 1948, and then for the Senate race in 1950, and they had been very, very close. So he had a dual reason for being interested in it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he tell you that he had talked with Mr. Danner about this matter?

Mr. REBOZO. He could have, but I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ever ask you whether in fact you had received the \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think that would have been a moot question. I never denied that and there was never any indication that I had.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ever ask you what the reason or the purpose of the money was?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he ever tell you that, or did you ever tell him that you were very upset with Danner for telling the IRS about the contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think I may have expressed the sentiment that the least Danner could have done was let me know.

Mr. LENZNER. That's understandable.

Mr. REBOZO. Maybe I would have returned the money a year sooner.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever tell Senator Smathers that your recollection of the delivery dates and the purpose of the money was different from Mr. Danner's?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know when I talked with him about it, but Danner and I have not collaborated on any of this in any fashion. As I understood it, when IRS first questioned me, as I said, I was so confused about the dates, I didn't know what year it was, even. But I did know that the first payment was made in San Clemente.

Danner, I was told, had told that the first payment was made in Key Biscayne. It was subsequent to that that Danner, in checking his records and his expense vouchers and all, found that he had only made one trip to San Clemente in all these years and it was on July 3 and he recalled that being the first payment.

Mr. LENZNER. And you say you recall now describing all that to Senator Smathers?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I think that what I'm saying is, that what you injected into your question would indicate that maybe Smathers and I had had a conversation with respect to the money at a time after Danner realized. But if we had such a conversation, it would have been very early, before that time, and since then, Danner has substantiated what I had said. There has been no collaboration of any kind and no discussion, no phone calls, nothing between Danner and me since then.

Mr. LENZNER. Also, I'm sure you've testified that you consulted with Mr. Gemmill. Did you tell Mr. Gemmill that the reason you held the money was because Danner had never given you instructions as to how the money was to be used?

Mr. REBOZO. That's not exactly correct. I don't think I told Mr. Gemmill that. I think that that just ensued from conversations that we've had, such as we're having now. There was never any question in my mind what the money was for and there has been plenty of conjecture about it.

Mr. LENZNER. So your answer is that you don't recall telling—you didn't say that to Mr. Gemmill?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know how Mr. Gemmill obtained the letter that he obtained from Miss Woods with regard to her knowledge of this matter? Did you know he was doing that, by the way?

Mr. REBOZO. I understood that IRS had requested a letter from her.

Mr. LENZNER. And it was Mr. Gemmill who then contacted somebody to get it?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know who contacted her. I thought that the IRS had contacted her.

Mr. LENZNER. You were not aware, then, that Mr. Gemmill had contacted the White House to get the letter?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, it was my understanding that the IRS had contacted her and asked her for a letter. I believe that was correct.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry, Mr. Rebozo. Go ahead. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

Mr. REBOZO. You know, she may have given Mr. Gemmill a copy of it or whatever.

Mr. LENZNER. Did she consult with you before she prepared that letter?

Mr. REBOZO. Not with respect to the preparation of the letter. We've consulted, if you want to use that word, many, many times on numerous matters.

Mr. LENZNER. And I take it including the details of the \$100,000, the fact that you still had it and all that business?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, I would say so.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever consult with Mr. Buzhardt or with Mr. Haig with regard to this matter?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I've only seen Mr. Buzhardt once in my life, very, very briefly. I think he was at Key Biscayne, getting off or on the plane.

Mr. Haig, I've talked with him about any number of things and I consult with him because I feel that he should know what's going on.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, when did you first talk to General Haig about this, if you can recall?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably about that same period, you know, the early part of 1973.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you call him on it or did you see him in person?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably saw him in person.

Mr. LENZNER. It was at your request, I take it, or did he ask to see you about it?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I went in to see him. Usually when I go to see him, I know he's busy, too, and I have two or three things I want to pass on for what they're worth.

Mr. LENZNER. And was anybody else present?

Mr. REBOZO. Wasn't this the period that the President was sick or not? I'm trying to think when he went to the hospital. Was that in May of 1973?

Mr. DASH. That was in the summer. That was July.

Mr. REBOZO. No, that wasn't it, then.

Mr. DASH. Are you speaking about talking to General Haig at the time when he had taken over as chief of staff after Haldeman left, or before that? I don't know if that's clear.

Mr. REBOZO. No, it would have been after.

Mr. DASH. After he had taken over when Mr. Haldeman left?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. DASIL. Well, that didn't take place until after April 30.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. So you placed this sometime after April 30. Do you remember what month it was?

Mr. REBOZO. It would have had to be probably in May.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall if anybody else was present during that discussion?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't believe so. I believe that the very brief and periodic and few discussions that General Haig and I have are generally alone. I'll sometimes stick my head in and ask the secretary if he has anybody with him. If he has, I go on.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you tell him basically what you told us today with regard to your recollection of the money and its purpose?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know if I went into that much detail.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ask him for any advice or counsel?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. What was the purpose of that? Just telling him about it?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I think that any high official's right-hand man should know a lot about what's going on so that they can field the balls that may be thrown out of bounds or whatever. I think that's probably it. I don't bother him with a lot of minutia. If I think there's any area wherein he might be drawn in or might want to understand or might want the answer to in advance, I try to brief him on it. I know how busy he is and I very seldom bother him.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you have more than one conversation with General Haig about this?

Mr. REBOZO. I doubt it.

Mr. LENZNER. Did General Haig know about this incident beforehand and supply you with any information about it?

Mr. REBOZO. You mean about my having the money?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. REBOZO. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he advise you to return it?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think that I counseled with him on that.

Mr. LENZNER. You discussed it with Miss Woods, the President, Mr. Ehrlichman, General Haig, and Mr. Garment. Was there anybody else at the White House that you discussed this with that you can think of?

Mr. REBOZO. There were probably some, because once a determination was made to return it, I had no compunction about discussing it with anybody in whom I had confidence. It might even shed some light on some aspect of it that may not have occurred to me. But I don't recall who else.

Mr. LENZNER. You say you had talked to these people after you had made the decision, after the President——

Mr. REBOZO. Some of them. Some of them I got their counsel on. But as I say, there was no longer any reason to keep it a secret.

Mr. LENZNER. Because you had decided to return it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, it was known that I had the money and it was known that I was returning it.

Senator MONTROYA. I have just one question.

Mr. LENZNER. Yes, sir, surely.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you at any time discuss the returning of the money with anyone at the Committee To Re-Elect the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No, Senator.

Senator MONTROYA. At no time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I think, as I told them before, I think I mentioned it to Kalmbach one time. I just ran into him there at the White House during that same period. If there was anyone else, I don't recall.

Senator MONTROYA. Do you recall discussing it with Mr. John Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you visit Mr. John Mitchell at Key Biscayne when he was down there for the political strategy session?

Mr. REBOZO. Not during the strategy session.

Senator MONTROYA. Did you during that time?

Mr. REBOZO. Every time that the Mitchells were at Key Biscayne, at one time or another, I visited them. They were staying at a house that belongs to the bank.

Senator MONTROYA. But you didn't discuss the Hughes contribution with him?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir, I don't believe I ever discussed Hughes with Mitchell.

Senator MONTROYA. Do you know whether anyone else discussed it with Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Thank you.

Mr. LENZNER. How about Mr. Ziegler? Did you talk with him about this?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. He was one of the few left out, I guess.

Let me ask you this: Does that pretty much conclude whom you talked with with regard to the money? Can you think of anybody else?

Mr. REBOZO. No. As I said, I talked with Abplanalp's lawyer but didn't talk to Abplanalp, as close a friend as he is. But I can't think of anybody else I discussed it with.

Mr. LENZNER. What about Mr. Rose, Chapman Rose? Did you discuss it with him?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know whether it was discussed on the one occasion that he was with Mr. Gemmill down there. I'm sure that he was aware of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you been over this?

I'm sorry. Let me go on to something else, then.

Did you discuss it with any employees or directors of the Key Biscayne Bank and Trust?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. FRATES. I think that might be misleading. When you talk about—in what time context?

Mr. LENZNER. Prior to the time that he returned it in June of 1973.

Mr. FRATES. As long as the record is clear on that.

Mr. REBOZO. Only with Mr. Wakefield, who is a director——

Mr. LENZNER. No others?

Mr. REBOZO [continuing]. Who participated in getting it back, but no one else.

Mr. LENZNER. After June, you did discuss it with members of the bank or the board of directors?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't—I think that I didn't discuss it at any board of directors' meeting, but I think the board was all well aware of what was going on, and with the daily assaults on the TV and radio, they were getting a little flak from their wives for being on the board, in the beauty parlors and every place else. So I explained the thing to them, I think just individually, so that they would know that nothing wrong had been done so that at least, they could put their wives at ease. Because they were getting ribbed a lot and they were beginning to get a little supersensitive about the publicity that the bank was getting with respect to all these goings on.

Mr. LENZNER. This would have been after the news disclosures. I think in October of 1973.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, no, it started when your committee people came to the bank with television cameras to photograph their arrival and appeared and put it on ABC. That was very early in the matter.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have occasion to discuss this with James Golden, the \$100,000 contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No; I did not.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, did you tell us last time and today again, you mentioned that you ran into Mr. Kalmbach. Can you tell us where you ran into him and what the discussion was?

Mr. FRATES. I have no objection, but we've been over that in detail.

Mr. DASH. Yes. Ran into him where, when?

Mr. LENZNER. Today?

Mr. FRATES. Not today, no, but we were here yesterday. I think in the 2 days, we've spent 1 day and 1 day asking the questions again. We're not objecting, but I just——

Mr. LENZNER. We have not, I'm sure, except for Mr. Rebozo's statement, we haven't. I have my notes and I know we haven't——

Mr. FRATES. I'm telling you we did discuss it yesterday. But go ahead.

Mr. DASH. There was a discussion yesterday of giving Kalmbach money——

Mr. FRATES. No, no, the discussion was—but let's go, we're wasting more time with my talking.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you tell us where and when that was?

Mr. REBOZO. Kalmbach was one of those whose judgment I sought, I think, about returning the money.

Mr. LENZNER. Where and when did you see him?

Mr. REBOZO. In the White House. I was over in the West Wing and ran into him over there.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry, Mr. Rebozo. I take it that when you say "you consulted him," you didn't seek him out for that, but since you ran into him, you asked for his judgment?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. On whether you should or should not return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Kalmbach and I—that wasn't the only reason I wanted to talk with him. We had the other interests in California that he was handling, property that Abplanalp and I owned. There might have been some other things, but I also asked for his judgment on this.

Mr. LENZNER. I think you told us that before, too. I believe you told us also that you met him, you ran into him on the morning of April 30, 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. We recalled, I think, that it was the day that the President was at Camp David and Haldeman and Ehrlichman left that day. That's how we can pinpoint that.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you explain to him again that you had received the funds and that you had kept them and why you kept them?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I passed over that.

Mr. LENZNER. And I take it you did tell him you kept it because you were asking for his judgment on whether you should return them or not?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ask him to do anything other than giving you his judgment at that time?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever discuss with him again the \$100,000 contribution from Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I've seen very little of him. That may be the last time I saw him.

Mr. DASH. Did you tell us what recommendation he did make?

Mr. REBOZO. He thought I should give it back.

Mr. LENZNER. I think you told us also that you had had a prior conversation with Mr. Kalmbach with regard to—that he had come to you at some point—it's not clear from the notes of the prior interview—that he had come to you and asked you at some other prior time whether Mr. Hughes, the Hughes people had given a contribution in the past. Do you recall that?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I think he did ask the question and I think I simply told him yes, they had.

Mr. LENZNER. And had you told him—so he knew before this meeting that you had received the money in the past?

Mr. REBOZO. He didn't ask and I didn't offer that the money hadn't been turned in. His question was simply, "Did Howard Hughes contribute?" and I said "yes."

Mr. DASH. When was this time?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, this was way back.

Mr. DASH. 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. One of the California visits where I saw him.

Mr. FRATES. Excuse me. I think for clarification, you're talking about, did they contribute in 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. We're talking about the contribution.

Mr. FRATES. In 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. FRATES. Before.

Mr. REBOZO. He asked me if he contributed.

Mr. DASIL. That isn't clear. That he contributed in 1968?

Mr. FRATES. That's what he asked him, and that's what he said, but I think from the question you did not understand that answer.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Senator MONTROYA. During what year was the discussion?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was when Kalmbach was—I don't think he was making collections, he was lining up commitments. So it was probably 1969 or 1970.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, why would you interpret his question as referring to a time prior to 1968?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't say prior. I think his question was did he contribute in 1968.

Mr. FRATES. The 1968 campaign.

Senator MONTROYA. Specifically?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. FRATES. He was looking for prospects, Senator.

Senator MONTROYA. All right.

Mr. LENZNER. You talked, I think, to Mr. Kalmbach sometime in October or November of 1973. Did he ever advise you of those discussions?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so. I don't know. I don't think I've seen Kalmbach—yes, I did see him once in California since that meeting we just referred to. That simply had to do with the grounds, the Presidential grounds out there, certain repairs that needed to be made and so on.

Mr. LENZNER. There was no discussion on that occasion about the Hughes contribution of \$100,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm sorry, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. You told him, then, on April 30 that, basically that you had retained the same funds that had been given to you previously. Did you tell him when you had received those funds—Mr. Kalmbach, on April 30?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Actually, at that time, I wasn't even sure when I had received them. That was established later.

Mr. LENZNER. And you did tell him that they were the same funds and you wanted to know what to do about it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Again, stop me if I'm asking this again. Have you gone over the return of the money to Mr. Griffin, when you actually gave him the funds?

Mr. FRATES. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. That has been covered?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. There was one specific question that I don't think was covered. I'll just ask it briefly. Did Mr. Gemmill ask you to bring this money up to his office after you met with him the first time? Is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. After I met with Mr. Gemmill?

Mr. LACKRITZ. Yes. He asked you to bring the actual money——

Mr. REBOZO. He didn't precisely ask me to bring it. It was a question of trying to determine how it would be returned.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But at some point, Mr. Gemmill did request you to bring the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. So then you went to your box and I think we did go through the other individuals who were there during the counting?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And I think at that time, you took out the same identical bills that had been given to you by Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And you took them up to Philadelphia to Mr. Gemmill's office?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. At that time, did you attempt to give them to Mr. Gemmill?

Mr. REBOZO. I testified earlier today that I was under the impression that Mr. Davis would be there to accept it. That's why my cover letter with the inventory of the bills was addressed to Mr. Davis. But I didn't know until I had arrived at his office that Davis had been delayed in California and couldn't get back for several days. So Mr. Gemmill had made the arrangements to deliver the money to him in New York, and somehow or other the conversation evolved around—I don't think he wanted to have it around his place. But somehow or other—maybe I suggested it or whatever—since I was going to New York anyway, we would let Bill Griffin, who already knew about it, hold it until Davis came a couple of days later and turned it over to him.

Mr. LACKRITZ. But did you try to give the money to Mr. Gemmill and Mr. Gemmill told you to take it up to New York?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know how that came about. I may have suggested, look, I'm going to leave it here, and he may have suggested, take it to New York. Then we came about the thought of letting some trusted person, who already knew about it, since he lived in New York, handle it, and since he's a director and general counsel for a bank.

Mr. LACKRITZ. OK. Now, where specifically, in terms of location, did you turn over the actual funds to Mr. Griffin?

Mr. REBOZO. I turned them over to him at his bank.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Inside his bank or outside?

Mr. REBOZO. I believe it was inside the bank.

Mr. LACKRITZ. And that was the last time you saw the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you call anybody after you turned the money over to Mr. Griffin to tell them that you had, in fact, gotten rid of the money? For example, did you call President Nixon?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you call Mr. Danner?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LACKRITZ. Did you call Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No. No, I'm sure that it was just on another visit that I related that.

Mr. FRATES. To the President, you're talking about?

Mr. REBOZO. To anyone.

Mr. FRATES. That's the context of his previous testimony.

Mr. DASIL. There is a question in my mind about the return to Mr. Griffin. Did you clear that area now?

Mr. LACKRITZ. I have.

Mr. DASIL. I think you have indicated, Mr. Rebozo, that you sought Mr. Griffin's advice on whether to return the money. I understand the record shows that you said Mr. Griffin actually did some research?

Mr. REBOZO. Uh-huh.

Mr. DASIL. And that he advised you to return the money?

Mr. REBOZO. Uh-huh.

Mr. DASIL. What was the issue, as you understood it, that he was researching, and what did he base his advice on?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, of course, I'm not a lawyer.

Mr. DASIL. I don't want you to give me a legal answer, but just your assumption on the question.

Mr. REBOZO. I think what he was trying to do was protect me, and I think what he was trying to ascertain was whether or not I would have any IRS liability on it, and how best to divest myself of any such potential liability were there some.

Mr. DASIL. But then the advice you were getting from Mr. Griffin had tax implications, rather than anything to do with whether or not it was wise to hold onto the money because it was from Hughes, or that if there was a flare-up in Hughes, that the matter might become known, that this was a Hughes contribution to the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I'm sure that Mr. Griffin was interested in my best interests in the overall picture. We're good friends, he's a brilliant attorney, and he's a fine, honorable person. I'm assuming that the research he did had to do with taxes, but I don't know. The reason that I assume that, is that he didn't give me an off-the-cuff opinion; he indicated what he thought his opinion would be, but he said he wanted to research a little bit, and he did, and told me that definitely, I should return it.

Mr. DASIL. Did you raise the question with him, whether or not there had been any problem of your turning this money over to the finance committee? Is that an issue that you raised with him or had you already made up your mind that you were not going to do that?

Mr. REBOZO. No. By then the finance committee was in trouble, weren't they?

Mr. DASIL. Well, actually, it appeared that the first time you began to consider these issues of return was when you were also being notified by the Internal Revenue Service that there were questions being raised and they were going to talk to you.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. DASIL. And the tax issues were being raised. Not yours personally, but—

Mr. REBOZO. Let me emphasize that my consternation wasn't motivated by tax implications involving me. Again, I still was concerned about embarrassment to the administration principally, that here was a possibility that we get another Drew Pearson-type series about Hughes money and it goes on and on. It would break him forever. It never even occurred to me that I had any tax problems. I was custodian of some funds. They hadn't been touched. They were sitting there. I hadn't spent them. I hadn't done anything with them.

Mr. DASIL. So the only question Mr. Griffin was researching for you was how to best turn it over so as not to raise any tax implications?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think it was whether I should turn them over and how it should be done in order to avoid embarrassment.

Mr. LENZNER. Following Mr. Dash's questions, did these individuals that you consulted with—Mr. Haig, Mr. Garment, Mr. Ehrlichman, Griffin, Kalmbach, and so forth—did you discuss with them the issue of whether the funds had been used or not?

Mr. REBOZO. That was no issue. They had not been used. I still had the funds.

Mr. LENZNER. So the answer is no, you never discussed that with any of those individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. One question that I guess wasn't asked. When you were with the President and Mr. Danner at Camp David, was Mr. Sanchez or any other individual present during any of those discussions?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think Sanchez brought in coffee and he never—

Mr. LENZNER. He didn't overhear any of the conversation?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, they come and go.

Mr. LENZNER. I was going to get into another area.

Mr. FRATES. What area is that, Terry?

Mr. LENZNER. One thing I wanted to ask you about was—there was a newspaper article recently, and since we didn't know about this, it couldn't have come from us, regarding a conversation with A. D. Davis, I think it was.

Mr. REBOZO. Uh-huh.

Mr. LENZNER. I don't know whether that newspaper article is accurate or not. I just wanted to ask you, did you receive a cash contribution from A. D. Davis?

Mr. REBOZO. What does the article say?

Mr. LENZNER. I don't have it with me. I saw the article in Mr. Anderson's column, so I thought I would ask.

Mr. FRATES. When was this?

Mr. LENZNER. The article?

Mr. FRATES. No.

Mr. LENZNER. It was supposed to be for the 1972 campaign.

Mr. FRATES. What was it made on?

Mr. LENZNER. I don't know. Do you recall a contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall when you got it?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, Davis made a contribution before the deadline, the April 7 deadline.

Mr. LENZNER. In cash?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. How much was it? When was that?

Mr. REBOZO. It was purported to be \$50,000. I never saw the inside of it. I just turned it in.

Mr. LENZNER. You received it on April 6?

Mr. REBOZO. I guess it was the 4th or 5th. I think it was 2 or 3 days before the deadline.

Mr. LENZNER. And it was cash?

Mr. REBOZO. Supposed to be.

Mr. FRATES. He said he didn't see it.

Mr. DASH. Was it in an envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. A big envelope.

Mr. LENZNER. What did you do with it after you received it?

Mr. REBOZO. I called the finance office and turned it in.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you mail it up to them or——

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, they sent someone down to get it.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you remember who came down to pick it up?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Yes, Fred LaRue came down and picked it up.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you give him anything else besides that envelope?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. And you did not open the envelope yourself?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. You contacted Mr. Davis and asked him for a contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No, the way it came about was that Davis had made a contribution in 1968 through me, and the way it came up was the State chairman, the State finance chairman for the 1972 campaign, lives in Jacksonville where Davis' headquarters are. He had approached Davis for a contribution. Davis had said they wanted to give it through me. So that's what he did.

Mr. LENZNER. It's A. D. Davis of the Winn-Dixie Co., is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. The Davises have always—they have about 900 supermarkets in a lot of cities. I recall some years ago they made contributions to a Governor's race and got a lot of bad publicity about it, so ever since then, my understanding is that they just pay themselves big enough salaries every year to make their contributions in cash. It's very apparent why, because if they're identified as being a big contributor, they're going to be besieged with every officeholder in every city they operate in and every councilman, everyone else. He is, incidentally, a Democrat, and I think he gave money to the other side, too. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. He was covering all his bets.

Mr. REBOZO. They have to do it, I guess.

Mr. LENZNER. Was this money from Mr. Davis personally, or from his conglomerate of people?

Mr. REBOZO. No, from what I understand, he and his brothers each year do this. They pay themselves salaries—ever since they had the problem some—it must have been 20 years ago, about contributions, they've handled their political activities in this fashion, from what I understand. They—I think there are 4 brothers, and they went in business in Miami originally with 1 little store and they now own the Winn-Dixie and Kwik-Chik chain of about 900 stores.

They are very, very highly respected people, highly regarded. I want to dispel the idea that seems to be prevalent among those who aren't involved in politics; when you talk about cash, right away, people think there is something nefarious. But there are many reasons for people to give cash. They may give to both sides and they don't want the other side to know it. At this time, it was perfectly legitimate and legal, according to the—before April 7 to make a contribution.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you receive any other cash contributions?

Mr. REBOZO. No, just minor ones. I think like \$10 or \$20. I recall getting one check from a poor old lady for \$10. It was all wrinkled up and she said she was so anxious to help this President that she took this out of her tithing money. So I sent that up so that it would get special attention, maybe get a letter for her or something like that.

Mr. LENZNER. If I can sum up in two questions, now, just about everything we've been focusing on—

Mr. FRATES. For 2 days in two questions?

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Frates, if you can just wait a second. In sum, you're testifying that at no time was the money that Mr. Danner delivered to you ever used on behalf of any other individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. And at no time did you ever make that statement or say that you used it on behalf of any other individuals?

Mr. REBOZO. That's to the best of my understanding and knowledge.

Mr. LENZNER. And obviously, if you hadn't used it, you wouldn't have told people that you had used it?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. I would like to get on now to some other areas.

Mr. DASH. These are not lengthy, Mr. Frates.

Mr. FRATES. I'm not rushing him, just so we don't repeat.

Mr. DASH. I'm also interested in finishing it.

Mr. LENZNER. If I start repeating, stop me. Do you recall having discussions with Mr. Danner with regard to the employment of a Johnny Meier, M-e-i-e-r, by the Hughes Tool Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, we went over that pretty thoroughly during our previous—

Mr. FRATES. He has the right to ask that. This is under oath.

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't want to go into that, that thoroughly. I just wanted to point that out so those who weren't present at the time can check your records on it. Johnny Meier—I think I've met him one time, and I had heard through Danner and Maheu that he was

suspected of fraudulent mine claims or something to that effect. They felt that he was buying abandoned mine claims and selling them to Hughes for a much higher price. And there were other factors involved. He was, as I said before, very patronizing to Don Nixon and, as I've said before, I don't think Don Nixon is dishonest; I think he's very naive. And I was concerned, again, about the possibility of some more embarrassment, such as he had showered on the President in 1960 and 1962, because of the Hughes loan then, and from the things that they were telling me, why, I just didn't think that additionally, that Don Nixon should be consorting socially and otherwise with a representative of Hughes Tool Co.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you so advise Mr. Danner and ask him to——

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER [continuing]. Ask him to make sure that that relationship didn't continue?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you later learn after that conversation with Mr. Danner of a meeting between Mr. Meier and Mr. Donald Nixon?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. You know what I'm referring to?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, you're talking about the airport——

Mr. LENZNER. Exactly.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Yes, I understood that they were seen and photographed there at the airport together after they were not supposed to be consorting with each other.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall hearing from an individual at the White House that—advising you that the meeting in fact was going on right at that time and asking you to find out if, in fact, it was?

Mr. REBOZO. No. Someone called me, but I don't really remember who it was.

Mr. LENZNER. From the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. I think so.

Mr. LENZNER. Telling you that in fact, the meeting between Mr. Meier and Mr. Donald Nixon——

Mr. REBOZO. At the airport right then. Someone took their picture. I don't know how that was engineered.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall if that phone call was from Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. Could have been. I don't recall, you know, for sure.

Mr. LENZNER. And do you recall whether the information of the meeting was obtained from physical surveillance by the Secret Service?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know how it was obtained.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you call Danner and ask him to check it out?

Mr. REBOZO. I sure did.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he get back to you on that?

Mr. REBOZO. I think later, he told me that it was true, that they were photographed.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you forward that information on to anybody, to Mr. Ehrlichman at the White House or others?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, if Ehrlichman was the one who told me, I wouldn't have any occasion to tell him. I don't think so. Certainly

not the President. These are the kinds of things that we all kept from the President, because there was nothing he could do about it and we were hoping that the matter could be handled properly otherwise.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you discuss that subject with Rose Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Mr. LENZNER. Did she have—did Miss Woods have any responsibility for Donald Nixon and his activities?

Mr. REBOZO. Rose?

Mr. LENZNER. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so. She shared the sentiment of those of us close to the family. Many families have relatives they would like to keep in the closet for awhile now and then, but I'm not saying—I don't mean to say this derogatorily about Don, because I want to repeat, I really just feel that he's overly endowed with naivete.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you ever had any financial transactions with him, by the way, Mr. Rebozo?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Never furnished him any money or—

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you, after that incident at the Orange County Airport, ask that Mr. Meier be terminated?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that was the whole objective. I think that they were trying to terminate him all the time because of these apprehensions they had about mining claims, of which I know nothing. But as I understand it, Hughes doesn't terminate a lot of people.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have written communications with Mr. Danner with regard to Mr. Meier?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have, but I don't—I don't know. If I had, it would probably have been in that file.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever ask him to send you any information on Mr. Meier?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. I think we had a very clear understanding about my feeling about Mr. Meier, and I believe the feeling was mutual.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware of the fact that the IRS was doing a tax audit on Mr. Meier, also?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever learn whether the White House had requested investigative files on Mr. Meier from agencies?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me show you what has previously been marked as Danner exhibit 15* in an executive session of December 19, 1973.

Mr. DASH. Letter to whom?

Mr. LENZNER. It's a letter from Mr. Danner, I believe, to Mr. Rebozo, dated November 11, 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. They could have sent some news releases. I wouldn't have any occasion to file them. So I don't know anything about it. I don't even remember—was that after Meier's separation?

Mr. LENZNER. You don't recall receiving that letter, though, Mr. Rebozo?

*See Book 20, p. 9675.

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't remember the letter. What it may have been—I recall one incident when they were trying to apparently figure out a way to get rid of Meier, and he kept cropping up with Don Hughes in different places——

Mr. FRATES. Don Nixon.

Mr. REBOZO. Don Nixon, I'm sorry. I recall that at one time, he was supposed to have gone to the opening of—I think it was Caesar's Palace, and they had adjoining tables, so they weren't together. That may have been what the news article that he sent me was about.

Mr. LENZNER. The letter refers also to a memorandum on the same subject, "which I discussed with you." Do you recall what that memorandum was?

Mr. REBOZO. It must have had to do with his zeal for publicity. He had told—Danner had told me that this fellow loved publicity and he was actually a geologist, I think. And he has travelled with Nixon, as I understand it, one time to Europe and one time to the Dominican Republic.

Mr. FRATES. This is Donald?

Mr. REBOZO. Don Nixon, and it may have been some clipping like that, and if it were, I could have very easily folded the memo and the pictures up and sent them to Ehrlichman. I don't know. I could have. I don't know. Meier, you know—there's really nothing I can tell you about Meier that would assist in this investigation, I don't believe, because I hardly know him and I've told you everything that I know.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, were you aware that Don Nixon was under electronic surveillance at any time before it came out in the news media?

Mr. REBOZO. No, not until I read it in the paper.

Mr. LENZNER. Did the presence of Donald Nixon and Johnny Meier in New York, have anything to do with your refusing the Hughes contribution initially?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I read that also. I'm sure it didn't. It would have added to my rationale. So I have no reason to say I don't think it does, unless it did. But I had—I think at that time, I knew nothing about Johnny Meier and I had no reason to. At that time, Danner wasn't even with Hughes, so I couldn't have even learned about Meier and his relationship. The name, "Johnny Meier," I think at first rang a bell because several administrations back, there was a wheeler-dealer John Myer. This fellow's name is spelled differently, a different person.

Senator MONTROYA. He was also a Hughes boy.

Mr. REBOZO. Was he?

Senator MONTROYA. Yes.

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't know that.

Mr. LENZNER. I've given Mr. Frates a copy of exhibit 12* that you furnished us, Mr. Rebozo.

Mr. FRATES. This came out of our file, so the Senator understands.

Mr. LENZNER. Can you tell us who Mr. Bird is and what that refers to?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. I hadn't seen Bird in years. I wouldn't know him if he walked in this room now. But I remember years ago, he was—

*See p. 10173.

I think he worked in Senator Smathers' office. I think he was a young, bright fellow there. I remember this letter, and he was suggesting that we get Danner into the campaign and Danner was doing too well to make any move. I don't think I even spoke to him about it, but I would have known that.

Mr. LENZNER. Turning to another subject very briefly—

Mr. FRATES. You'd better get these back.

Mr. LENZNER. I take it at some point, you learned that this Newsday magazine in 1971 was conducting an investigation and—I don't know if you describe it as an investigation, but they were planning on writing a series of articles on you. Do you recall that, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir, I recall that vividly, because I first heard of it in February, that they were going to do a story for the October issue, and I wondered why in the world are they down here now? They had six men down there, spent 6 months, and the first tipoff I had about them was from somebody in the courthouse, whom, I don't even know to this day. But they contacted someone who they knew was a friend of mine and told me these people were down there and they had a surly way about them and they were asking a lot of questions, and they were digging up every record that I had. This went on for weeks and weeks and weeks and they were concerned, because they even had many—many of the records were stored in the warehouse some distance away. They even went back there.

They got the records of my divorce in 1949 and they went through every land purchase and every transaction I had ever had, and they, by their own admission, conducted over 400 interviews with everyone even remotely connected with me. And they came up with this bunch of tripe that I would say was about 2 percent accurate.

Mr. LENZNER. I can understand your concern about that matter. Did you discuss this investigation and pending article with anyone in the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. Probably.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall who you might have discussed that with—the President?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so. That's the kind of thing we never bothered him with. And he doesn't read the papers, anyway.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I don't think so. I know what you're getting at, that possibly, somehow or other, I had triggered an investigation on one of their reporters. But that's not the case. I made no request of any kind, nor would I. And after what I've been going through with IRS, I would never do it to my worst enemy, regardless.

Mr. LENZNER. You were not aware, then, that an audit had been ordered on some of the reporters on Newsday?

Mr. REBOZO. I read in the paper that one of the reporters had—

Mr. LENZNER. But weren't aware of that?

Mr. REBOZO. I read in the papers that one of the reporters had them investigate a previous year's tax return, a routine audit.

Contrarywise, they didn't have IRS men, they had intelligence, fraud men on me, and still are. They have four of them there, five of them sometimes. They conducted 3 years, every corporation and partnership that I've been involved in for 3 years. They've seen

every check I've ever written, and any one of these companies, they've seen every statement, every deposit slip, they've tracked everything down. They came back in September and said, "There's no wrongdoing, we've found no wrongdoing."

So we asked them, "File your report," and they said they would file it by the 1st of October. Then they didn't, so we asked them again and they said, "Well, we're going to wait for Watergate to end." So you have an idea why I've tried to be as cooperative as I could be by handing you my whole soul and my life to review and try to get this miserable nightmare behind me.

There are many, many other considerations and I know it doesn't bother you people, but it bothers me in a community that I've spent my entire life in. I'm the youngest of nine children and my 97-year-old mother sees my picture on television or sees something in the paper that's bad; they all worry. I just hope that when this is over, assuming that you give me a clean bill of health, that I'll get some sort of a strong statement to that effect. Because it has affected our deposits by about \$7 million. It affected our profit at the bank last year by approximately \$270,000. We had 900-some accounts closed in the last 6 months of last year, most of which can be attributed to this. It's the first year in the 10-year history of the bank that we didn't increase 30 to 35 percent. Our deposits were actually below the previous year. I don't want to bore you all with my personal problems, but I just want to emphasize the anxiety that I have to bring this thing to a conclusion and hopefully, this will do it. Even though in the middle of October, we met there with Terry and he said if we turned these checks over to Bellino and let him go through them and all, and doesn't find anything, we'll end this thing. So a week later, we met again and Terry said, "We've found no evidence to indicate that we need to call you to Washington, and everything looks good." But I'm still here and I hope that I'm not just turning the stretch. I hope that we're winding it up.

Mr. DASH. We're winding it up. We're winding it up, one, because Senator Montoya knows we're also winding up ourselves. We're closing the investigation. I hope we'll be able to make whatever findings we can from the evidence. It's in our interest and that of the committee, and I speak for the committee as well as the staff, that we make findings of, not of culpability, but of nonculpability. We enjoy that more.

Mr. REBOZO. I think so.

Mr. DASH. But no time in any of this investigation has anybody on the staff or the committee been out to get anybody.

Mr. FRATES. I disagree with that, Mr. Dash, since you've said it, because we have evidence that the staff has made the statement, "We're going to get the whole damned crowd."

Mr. DASH. I saw that quote, but I—

Mr. FRATES. No, sir, that Bellino and Armstrong have indicated a paranoid investigation technique, and I submit to you that they have been out to get—

Senator MONTAYA. I would like to know who they said that to.

Mr. FRATES. All right, sir, it's published in the paper, and we'll furnish you affidavits for that.

Mr. DASH. I've seen that quote, but I don't know who it is attributed to.

Mr. FRATES. In the early stages of it.

Senator MONTROYA. Let me get the record straight.

We of the committee have met with the staff. Every policy decision which has been made has passed the committee unanimously, except one, when the vote drew political lines. Now, we have not badgered any witnesses. I hope you will go out of here convinced that we have been as courteous as anybody could be with a witness or with his attorney.

Mr. FRATES. Couldn't ask for more.

Senator MONTROYA. We're more concerned with doing justice and getting at the truth than with trying to find anybody guilty of anything. That's all we want.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I have no reservations. I think that the Watergate, the total picture, has been very helpful to this country. I supported it, Mr. Rebozo has supported it. I think he has personal things. I do feel, and I wasn't going to say anything about it until Mr. Dash did, I feel and Mr. Rebozo and everybody in his office has indicated, I think every one of these Senators, we couldn't have asked for better treatment. I think the whole proceedings, as I've watched it on TV. But I did feel maybe sometimes overzealous investigators—I'm an active Democrat, Senator, so this is no partisan thing with me. It doesn't make any difference. We're out for justice, too. But I do believe that we have done irreparable harm to Mr. Rebozo. I hope he's going to be able to recoup it. That might be tough, because he has been involved in it.

With that, I'll stop. But there has never been any question in our mind.

I will say that Mr. Dash has been extremely cooperative with us. Any time that my partner, Alan Greer, and I have gone to him, we have seemed to work out the problems.

Primarily, Terry Lenzner and our staff have attempted to work out the problems. But I say to you, sir, that Armstrong and Bellino bring no credit to the Senate of the United States, in my opinion.

Mr. BELLINO. I resent that.

Senator MONTROYA. I would like to know if they have overstepped the bounds of propriety in investigative work. I would like to know the details of it, because that has not been the policy of the committee.

Mr. FRATES. I know, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. We don't want any of the employees to do that. In fact, in the spirit of fairness, I was going to ask at the conclusion that Mr. Rebozo make his own statement and say anything into the record, because this might be spread publicly. He has that privilege under our rules, as you know.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTROYA. Certainly, we don't want you to go out with the feeling that we're badgering Mr. Rebozo or even that those who are investigating the factual situation have any authority in the committee to do that. We want to know.

Mr. FRATES. Senator, one of the incidents that happened here, to show, Mr. Rebozo had a nephew who got into some minor criminal

activity 3 or 4 years ago, paid a lawyer some \$700, the president of our Dade County Bar. They investigated—I don't know which one, it slips me now. After seeing all checks, goes over there, calls him about it, asks him about it when they were trying to check out \$100,000. It was just constant repetition of things of this nature.

Mr. REBOZO. Mr. Bellino called the president of one of the banks that I had borrowed money from and questioned the wisdom of the loan.

Mr. BELLINO. That's absolutely not true.

Senator MONTAYA. Go ahead.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. DASH. Back on the record.

Again, I don't need to make a defense or a charge. I think we have made a statement. I think one thing I have asked of our staff is to have—and I would ask for—an aggressive investigation. We have had this responsibility. I understand that at times, an aggressive investigation can be understood to go beyond that by one who is the subject of it. Nobody likes to be under investigation. We who have had the responsibility of conducting this investigation do not find it pleasant to bring into or probe into private matters. But we have a responsibility and we're going through it.

I know that, for instance, Mr. Bellino, who has had a long record of public service and an excellent record for the Senate, is a very thorough investigator who seeks—and Mr. Frates, I would agree with you that at times, under the law, he might seek more than he would be entitled to under the law, but he does it in accordance with what he considers to be his responsibility.

I have known and worked with Mr. Armstrong throughout this investigation. I've known him to be a man of integrity but a very tough investigator.

We felt during this period of a year, that in order for us to get the facts, we had to have people go out and pry and probe and get information. Investigation at all times—I'm sure Mr. Frates knows as a good trial lawyer and experienced lawyer, we all know that investigation isn't necessarily the most pleasant thing to do.

Mr. FRATES. Mr. Dash, we appreciate, we could argue this thing. It just so happened that Senator Ervin was down making an address at the University of Miami Law School. He said the leaks in the Senate committee staff are like a sieve.

Mr. DASH. He probably didn't say leaks of the staff, he said leaks out of the committee.

Mr. FRATES. But really, I'm sure Mr. Rebozo appreciates what the Senators have done and we didn't expect anything else but from a Senator.

Senator. when you walk in this room, you or any one of the other Senators, I stand up and Mr. Rebozo stands up. That is the way we feel about a U.S. Senator. That is the way we feel about the Presidency, the office of the thing. We want to cooperate and conclude it.

Mr. DASH. Can we now, as quickly as we can, proceed to the closing questions?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I have no other questions.

Mr. LENZNER. Going back to the Newsday problem, I didn't get quite—did you know whether an IRS audit had been requested by the White House on one of the Newsday's reporters?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't know it; no. I've read it in the newspapers.

Mr. LENZNER. But nobody advised you of that except what you read in the newspapers?

Mr. REBOZO. No; and I've wondered who ordered my audit. The White House may have ordered it. Mine is more than an audit. It's a criminal investigation of 3 years.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you seek to obtain from anybody at the White House, or have them obtain, any information with regard to Newsday or Newsday articles?

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware that, in fact, an attempt was made to obtain information with regard to those news articles?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm not aware of it now.

Mr. LENZNER. May I have this marked as an exhibit today?

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 15, for identification.¹]

Mr. LENZNER. It's a memorandum from Mr. Caulfield to Mr. Dean dated September 10, 1971, and it's subject is "Newsday Article."

I'm particularly interested in item C, for example. It says:

A trusted member of the newspaper's staff has stated that heavy outside pressure is being exerted to uncover the details of the story before publication. This pressure is independent of the efforts being programed from my office.

Mr. REBOZO. I know nothing about it, Terry, but I tell you, one thing I'm really graced with is a lot of friends. I'm very proud that one of them would have made that effort to try to find something out.

Mr. DASH. I don't think the record shows what that memo is. You identified the memo and who it's from.

Mr. LENZNER. It will be part of the record.

Mr. FRATES. It's from Jack Caulfield to Mr. Dean. I don't see why it's relevant.

Mr. LENZNER. I was trying to refresh Mr. Rebozo's recollection.

Mr. REBOZO. No, sir; but as I said, I wouldn't wish this on anyone. The kind of investigation I'm getting, as I said, is not a routine investigation like this fellow Green got, or O'Brien or anybody else. My accountants are Horwith & Horwith, one of the large firms. Every partner there says they have never seen an investigation in depth as much as this one is.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, did you ever suggest to anybody at the White House that the Newsday articles were being financed actually by the Kennedy Foundation?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Let me have this marked as an exhibit.

Mr. FRATES. I have a hard time seeing where this is relevant or material.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 16, for identification.²]

¹ See p. 10177.

² See p. 10178.

Mr. FRATES. We're talking about an article written against Mr. Rebozo after some investigation. I don't see what that has anything to do with the resolution of the question.

Mr. DASH. We have already had in the record in the first phase the use of certain agencies of the Government—

Senator MONTROYA. I remember that.

Mr. DASH. That created an atmosphere which the committee has already ruled on in our resolution, as to the use of IRS, and the committee has been investigating, not just from Mr. Rebozo but the question of enemies lists as well as other types of abuse of agency powers of this nature. Therefore, the committee has a ruling on this.

Mr. REBOZO. Let me answer that question in this way, Mr. Dash.

I have been privileged over all these years to have been acquainted with a number of wonderful, wonderful people in the Senate and House. Today, Stuart Symington is a dear friend of mine; Russell Long is one of my dear friends, both of them over some 20 years. Spessard Holland was one of my friends. Smathers I went to school with from the fourth grade. Dick Russell was a good friend of mine. I could go on and on with people like that, high caliber, wonderful people, fine people that I have the greatest respect for. Our local Congressman, Fascell, I've known him 30 years. He has been up here 25 or so.

Not one of these men will ever tell you that I ever asked a favor of any of them at any time. Why would I suddenly start doing it now?

Mr. FRATES. Of course, I don't think, Terry, that the letter indicates the question you asked, but I don't want to get into semantics.

Mr. LENZNER. This says:

"As you know, it"—being the Newsday article—"is based upon Bebe's observation that Greene and Guthman are Kennedy loyalists and that Moyers is now with the Kennedy Foundation."

My question really is: Did you relay that information to anybody at the White House and ask them to determine whether the Kennedy Foundation was financing the Newsday article?

Mr. REBOZO. I think I may know how that happened. Someone told me, and we're going back into an area that I don't think is even relevant, but for what it's worth—

Senator MONTROYA. It's not relevant as far as you're concerned or your testimony, but it's relevant with respect to something else that we uncovered earlier in the hearings.

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. Someone told me, Senator, that one of the hotel bills down there was paid for by Ted—what's-his-name's lawyer for Kennedy? There could have been a lawyer, a story, somebody with the same name. You know who I mean, a nice looking young guy—Sorensen. Someone told me that one of the hotel bills was picked up by Ted Sorensen. I may have relayed that to somebody and they pieced it together like this.

But I knew—President Johnson was a friend of mine since before he was majority leader and never have I asked—I have never mixed.

Senator MONTROYA. I don't think it's important anyway.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think so.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, as I understand it, at some point, you indicated a desire to file a libel suit against Newsday for this. Do you recall discussing that with Fred Fielding?

Mr. REBOZO. With who?

Mr. LENZNER. Fred Fielding, of the White House.

Mr. REBOZO. Who is Fred Fielding?

Mr. LENZNER. I think he was one of Mr. Dean's assistants.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall anything like that, no; unless he brought it up and the thought went through my mind. I've considered filing libel suits against quite a few and have been told that we have some pretty good grounds. Unfortunately, all of this notoriety has made me what they consider a public person, and I have to prove malice was intended, and it's not quite that easy. But we have filed one against the Post, as you know.

Mr. LENZNER. But you don't recall Mr. Fielding coming down at the request of Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss financial transactions with regard to this libel suit?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall that, no. I talked over the years, you know, to a lot of those people around the White House, and many of them I don't even know their names. But I'll say that I certainly seriously considered bringing action against them. I considered ABC, of all places.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall discussing that with Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have, but——

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall Mr. Ehrlichman indicating to you that the President did not want you to file such a lawsuit if possible?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever receive a written request from Mr. Ehrlichman requesting more information——

Mr. REBOZO. About what?

Mr. LENZNER. About the financial transactions that were being investigated by Newsday?

Mr. REBOZO. It was in all the papers. It was a bomb. A lot of them didn't buy it. They had a big investment——

Mr. LENZNER. You have no recollection of discussing with Fielding all the financial transactions save the B & C Investment Co. when he came down to see you?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall Fielding at all. I don't recall him coming to see me. And that doesn't mean that he didn't do it. A lot of these people, when they come down, they'll come down for a vacation for a week or so, and they'll drop in to see me and it may have been mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall Mr. Lewis, Hobart Lewis, coming down and talking to you or talking to you at some other time?

Mr. REBOZO. I talked to Hobart Lewis about it.

Mr. LENZNER. What did you seek from him?

Mr. REBOZO. I wanted to get his opinion. Hobart's got both feet, well, solidly planted. He's a journalist, and he's a friend and a great person.

Mr. LENZNER. You wanted to get his opinion on whether you should file a lawsuit?

Mr. REBOZO. I wanted to get his opinion about the whole thing.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you request Mr. Lewis to conduct an investigation and obtain information for you with regard to the Newsday article?

Mr. REBOZO. I didn't request it, but he volunteered it, and he did have one of his men do a check on his own. The fellow was the most objective investigator reporter I have ever seen, because he didn't want any list of people from me to go to see. He just took the article and worked from scratch on his own.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he try to obtain information from Newsday itself as to what they were going to print?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know—no, I think this was after the story was printed.

Mr. LENZNER. After the story was printed?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, do you recall, again, Mr. Dean or another individual discussing with you in 1971, the relationship between Larry O'Brien and the Hughes Tool Co. and Robert Maheu?

Mr. REBOZO. I've had very few discussions with Dean, and obviously not few enough. But I don't recall any such conversation with him about that.

I would discuss things with Ehrlichman and I would venture to say in the 5 years he was there, I probably had maybe five discussions with him. I would see him, sure, talk to him here and there. But I mean about anything substantive.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall telling Mr. Dean that you had received information from Mr. Maheu with regard to O'Brien, and that you felt that Maheu had possibly retained O'Brien for his services without any direct knowledge by Hughes himself?

Mr. REBOZO. The last sentence I couldn't have, I would have been purely conjecturing, and it's not like me without qualifying it. I could have at sometime, if he asked me or brought it up, and it's possible that I had mentioned it to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman told Dean and Dean asked me about it. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall telling Dean or Ehrlichman that you were under the impression that Maheu had a good bit of freedom, refuses money, and that you could acquire some documentation of that fact?

Mr. REBOZO. What in the world would have been the object in my offering that kind of—

Mr. FRATES. I think the question was, did you make the statement. Mr. Rebozo, if you would answer the question, and then if you want to explain, I'm sure the chairman will let you.

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall such statement.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you also recall telling Dean or Ehrlichman that you requested, if any action be taken with regard to Hughes, you be notified because of your delicacy of relationship and dealings with the Hughes people?

Mr. REBOZO. I may have done that.

Mr. LENZNER. You may have told that to Dean or Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, you say Dean or Ehrlichman. Which one?

Mr. LENZNER. Well, which one do you recall telling that to?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall telling it to either one, but if I told it to anyone, it would probably have been Ehrlichman. I don't recall it, but I could have. That would be logical for me to do if a man has made the kind of contribution he has.

Mr. LENZNER. Were you aware of any effort to obtain derogatory information on Larry O'Brien by the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. No, and I don't know that they did make any effort. No, and I can't conceive of it even now—what use it would be.

Mr. LENZNER. Any possible discussions with the President with regard to the tax audit, of the use of information from the tax audit to document O'Brien's retainer from the Hughes Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I didn't even know they were conducting a tax audit on O'Brien.

Mr. LENZNER. I think that's about it for me.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, did anyone ever tell you or did you ever learn that Mr. Hank Greenspun had a large number of memos in Mr. Howard Hughes' handwriting?

Mr. REBOZO. I think that came up during one of our previous interviews. But no, I, firsthand, had no knowledge and I don't believe I've ever met Greenspun.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You don't recall Mr. Danner ever discussing that with you?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't recall it. He could have said it and it wouldn't mean anything to me.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Do you recall if Mr. Kalmbach ever mentioned it or Mr. Ehrlichman?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And do you recall any discussions that Mr. Greenspun had made inquiries to Mr. Kalmbach and others in the administration, regarding the receipt of the \$100,000 contribution to Mr. Hughes?

Mr. REBOZO. The only thing I recall about that is what I've read in the press.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You have no independent knowledge of that other than the press?

Mr. REBOZO. No; no knowledge of it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And similarly, about the use of the contribution in San Clemente that Mr. Greenspun—

Mr. REBOZO. Which contribution?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That Mr. Greenspun had inquired about the use of the \$100,000 contribution in San Clemente?

Mr. REBOZO. That's the first I've heard that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, have you ever had any financial or business transactions with the President, and would you describe them for us, please, since January 1, 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, we've had the Fisher Island matter, which is well known, and the lots on Key Biscayne.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That's the Cape Florida development?

Mr. REBOZO. Cape Florida. And the purchase of the San Clemente property.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That's the B & C Investment Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; and I assisted in the acquisition of the two houses at Key Biscayne.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In what capacity did you assist in the acquisition of those houses?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, the first capacity was a very interesting one. It sort of depicts the President's attitude pretty well about money. I can cite many more, but when it was understood that he was going to buy—move down there and buy a couple of houses, the president of the chamber of commerce came to me and said they had voted to buy the houses for the President, renovate them, do anything he wanted and let him live there free for the term that he was in office. He immediately declined it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, were you involved in the financing of the houses?

Mr. REBOZO. Only to the extent of calling a mortgage company and working that out, not personally.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Are there any other financial transactions you can recall?

Mr. REBOZO. The Fisher Island matter, which we've gone over numerous times.

Another tribute to his lack of interest in money, because as I've stated before, when he became President, he decided to divest himself of his interest in Fisher Island. He had something like 189,000 shares. He paid \$1 a share for it, as we all did and still do. I tried to urge him not to sell it because we had a contract to sell it that we expected to close in 6 months. He said, "No," he wanted to get out of it, he would just get his money back. And I told him, "No," that it was worth over \$3 a share and it wouldn't be right to just take his money back, he had to take a profit.

Then he said, "Well, I don't want much profit, just \$1.25 a share." And I said, "No, sir; it's worth over \$3 a share and we have this sale all ready to go. In 6 months' time, you'll get this money."

So I went before the board and told them of my conversation with him and his insistence on not making a lot of money on it, and I said, "Well, I think the least we can do is give him \$2 a share." And everybody on the board unanimously approved the sale, and the interest in it was such that the board members wanted to pick it up themselves, because we already had the property sold. The President, by waiting 6 months, would have gotten, according to the contract, \$175,000 more for it, but he declined to do that because he was going in office. So we went ahead and arranged the sale.

We kicked it around a bit and realized that we might be criticized for the board having inside information, and maybe buying this stock up for themselves, so we called a shareholders' meeting and told them the details of it, and we bought the stock in the treasury, put it back in the treasury. So every stockholder participated in a pro rata share of what they had. We paid for it out of the \$330,000 that the buyers had deposited with us.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever borrowed money from the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, I borrowed \$10,000 from him, and that was the first time back—I don't know when it was, late last year, that I paid him back.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When you say late last year, you mean 1973, or do you mean late 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it could have been—it was probably December of 1973 or January of 1974. No, I guess it was in the latter part of last year.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. December of 1973?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't know when it was. I borrowed \$10,000 from him last year.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Was it over a year ago, or was it just a few months ago?

Mr. REBOZO. I can tell you when it was; when I bought that Maryland house, however long ago that was. It was longer than that.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So it was at the end of 1972?

Mr. REBOZO. That's right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And it was for the purpose of purchasing that house?

Mr. REBOZO. What happened was that I'd looked around and found this house and decided to buy it. There was a possibility of Julie and David moving there. David was in the Navy and I thought I would buy it for an investment or rent it in the meantime, or use it, or whatever, but principally in the event that they wanted a place. But I had looked at, I guess, 200 houses on paper, and I made the rounds for 2 full days of the pick of the houses that I found, because I felt that if Julie and David did go there, the house had to be one that would provide maximum security for his visits, rather than have a whole street full of people every time the President came and went. It was about 18 minutes from the White House.

When I talked to the President about it, he said, "Well, why don't I buy it for them?" And I said, "OK, if you want to buy it, OK."

So what happened was I charged his account \$10,000 for the initial deposit to buy the house. Then I got thinking about it and I thought, well, I don't know what they're going to make of it. He already has houses in California and Key Biscayne, plus the fact that if he does it, then what's he buying for the other daughter? And I talked him out of it.

So I said, "No, let me buy it." Then I went ahead and bought it and returned the \$10,000.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So at what point did you repay the loan?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, it was several months later. Actually, I had forgotten I had charged his account for it until the audit was made, which reminded me, and I paid it back.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I'm sorry, sir, it wasn't paid back until when?

Mr. REBOZO. It wasn't paid back until that Coopers Lybrand audit. I had forgotten about it. When the audit was made, they said, "What's this \$10,000?" and I said, "I owe it." But it was a very innocent, logical thing.

I think that we made the right decision and it has been perfect for them when they want to go out, because nobody bothers them. They

have an acre of ground, they have a big, high hedge. It's just perfect seclusion, and it's near enough.

Senator MONTYA. We're going to have to be in recess. I have to go up and vote. I'll make sure Senator Weicker is coming. If he's coming, I won't come back.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator WEICKER. We'll reconvene now.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I believe, if I'm correct, you had just finished telling us about the instance in which you had borrowed money from the President.

Mr. FRATES. Since Senator Weicker has just come in, when you say "borrowed money," I think that's a misnomer. If you're going to ask any questions on that, I would like Mr. Rebozo to repeat for the Senator what this is, because it's for the purchase of Julie and David Eisenhower's house. It's not a cash transaction.

Mr. DASH. We have no further questions on it. Do you, Scott?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No.

Mr. DASH. If that's all right with you——

Mr. FRATES. I thought he was going to start asking some questions. It wasn't any borrowing, but it was a charging back.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Rebozo, have you ever loaned any money to the President since January 1, 1969?

Mr. REBOZO. I haven't. The bank has. Wait a minute, not since January of 1969, though.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And have you ever given any gifts of cash or stock or any other negotiable commodity of value in excess of \$1,000 to the President?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And with the exception of the B & C Investment Co., have you ever purchased any real property from the President?

Mr. FRATES. From him?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. From the President, yes; again since January 1, 1969.

Mr. REBOZO. Only what the corporation purchased in Fisher Island, which I've explained.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But only as a corporation member of that organization?

Mr. REBOZO. Right.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever sold any real property to the President from January 1, 1969, to the present?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever cashed any checks in excess of \$10,000 in the President's behalf for cash?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever had any financial or business transactions with any relatives of the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Only the matter involving Tricia's participation in the lots. You know, that has been explained.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In the Cape Florida situation?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. And Julie and David's renting a house.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is in the relationship of landlord and tenant, technically speaking?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, technically and actually.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Right. Have you ever had any financial or business transactions with Edward Nixon, the President's brother?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever borrowed money from Mr. Edward Nixon?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever loaned him any money?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever given him gifts in excess of \$1,000?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever purchased any real property—

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever sold any real—it should have been real or personal property?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever sold any real or personal property to him?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever cashed any checks in excess of \$10,000 for Mr. Edward Nixon?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever had any financial or business transactions with Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. Only the, again the Fisher Island, her small portion in Fisher Island, which was a corporate transaction. But, no; I have had none.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you describe that transaction briefly?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, you recall she had part of the—the President sold her part of the stock that he had. I think it was 10,000 shares or 5,000 shares, at \$1 a share. I think when we sold it, she got her money.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At the same rate that the President redeemed his share?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And at the same time?

Mr. REBOZO. As far as I recall.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Now, have you ever borrowed money from Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Since January 1, 1969, have you ever loaned money to Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever given money in excess of \$1,000 to Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever purchased real or personal property from Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever sold real or personal property to Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you ever cashed any checks in excess of \$10,000 for Rose Mary Woods?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you describe the financial or business transactions you've had with Robert Abplanalp—just briefly list them?

Mr. DASH. That just helps us. This goes to the question we had this morning of identifying. This will substitute for the records.

Mr. REBOZO. The B & C operation. You've gone through all those records. And more recently, we've purchased jointly some property on Key Biscayne.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you tell us—could you just describe that property?

Mr. REBOZO. On Key Biscayne?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is that one parcel?

Mr. REBOZO. I have 150 feet next to the bank and 650 feet separated a parcel that Abplanalp had previously bought of 450 feet. I had an option on the 650 and he participated in the purchase of that with me. That was just this year.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is that property properly described as Matheson property?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you tell us when that purchase was made?

Mr. REBOZO. It was recently. I'm sure you have the record, because it's a very recent one or you would know about it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I don't believe we have the record, because I believe it was in 1973 and we don't have any 1973 records.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it would have been December of—yes, I know when it was done. It was December of 1973.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Could you tell us, please tell us the purchase price of that property?

Mr. REBOZO. It was \$6 a square foot.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So the total transaction—

Mr. FRATES. Again, I don't see where this—Senator, where we have an agreement, how can this possibly come—December of 1973—this is just inquiring into business transactions way beyond 1972 without showing any relationship at all.

Senator WEICKER. Let me ask, Scott, do you intend to pursue this line of questioning?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I was only going to pursue it with two more questions and then get back to a question to tie in its relevance. If you would prefer—

Senator WEICKER. Why not invert the order so counsel can understand?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. At what point, sir, did you terminate your share of the partnership in the B & C Investment Corp. with Mr. Abplanalp?

Mr. REBOZO. Some time in 1973, maybe the middle or a little after the middle of 1973. I don't know the exact date, but it's a matter of record.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And can you tell us what happened to your share of the property?

Mr. REBOZO. It was purchased by Abplanalp's children's trust.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And can you tell us the purchase price?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes; he paid me my cost plus 10 percent.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. And how much would that be, sir?

Mr. REBOZO. I think it came to something like \$290,000—somewhere along in there.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Total? I mean, in other words, that would include your cost plus the 10 percent?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can you indicate to us why you sold your share of the B & C Investment Co.?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, this is why I'm selling just about everything else. There's just too much publicity attendant on anything that I do, and I would like to get back to my private existence.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did it have anything to do with your financial affairs at that time, with your liquidity?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, you've seen all my bank statements and all of my borrowings. Up until recently, you're well aware that I've had no trouble borrowing. I don't know how much trouble I'm going to have after all of this inquiry of all these bank presidents about me, but that remains to be seen.

Senator WEICKER. Let me say this right now. I think we have just about reached the limit, and I'm going to inject myself into this and inquire as to its relevance to the campaign of 1972. As I understand it, counsel have agreed upon bank statements being made available to the committee as a part of the subpoena.

Mr. FRATES. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. Certainly, that would give as good an indication as any other as to the financial condition of Mr. Rebozo, et cetera. If we're going to continue on this for any length of time, I'm going to rule it, quite frankly, as not proper.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. May I speak to you out of the hearing of the witnesses for one second? I don't have many more questions, perhaps one more.

Senator WEICKER. Ask one more question.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I just want to be sure the answer to the question is as to whether or not it had anything to do with your liquidity or ability to borrow as part of the portion of the B & C Investment Co. The answer is "No," is that correct?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I think any time you sell something, it has something to do with your liquidity position or if you want to get hold of cash for something or other or to retire some debts, so I don't know whether the question is a fair one, really.

Senator WEICKER. I think you've answered the question.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Excuse me just a second.

That's all.

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Rebozo, the President's diary for April 15, 1973, indicates that he met with Attorney General Kleindienst, and later with Attorney General Kleindienst and Henry Petersen, and in the interim with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman. That was the day, of course, that the information started to come to the President with regard to the investigation of Watergate.

The diary also shows that at 5:25, you and the President departed for the Navy Yard. You boated for several hours. My question is,

did you discuss with the President at that time the information that he had received that day with regard to Watergate?

Mr. REBOZO. That's one date I can pinpoint very well, because April 15 is income tax day and it happened to fall on Sunday, so I had a 1-day reprieve. I happened to be at the Executive Office Building when Petersen and Kleindienst came in. I was not in his office; I was outside. I did not know Petersen at the time. I was wondering who this fellow was coming dressed like he was—he was dressed like a mechanic. It later developed that he had been working on his boat and Kleindienst had told him to come right on over.

But I waited, and later, the President asked me to go out on a boat ride with him. That's the same day that there had been a lot of activity around the White House, far more than usual. So the 6-hour tape ran out at 3 that afternoon in the middle of the discussion with Kleindienst.

Senator WEICKER. How did you learn that?

Mr. REBOZO. The President told me.

Senator WEICKER. When did he tell you that?

Mr. REBOZO. I suppose as soon as he found it out.

Senator WEICKER. Which was that day?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no; he wouldn't find it out until later.

My understanding is that although they have equipment that automatically activates another reel when the tape runs out, apparently either they didn't put another one on or it was malfunctioning.

Senator WEICKER. When did you learn that from the President?

Mr. REBOZO. Some time later.

Senator WEICKER. When did you first have the knowledge that there was any taping facility in the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. I think when everybody else did, not before. I didn't know it.

Senator WEICKER. Well, I don't think anybody else knew about it, as I recall, at least——

Mr. REBOZO. No, I mean I think the first I knew of it was with Butterfield's testimony. In fact, I know that's the first I knew of it.

Senator WEICKER. I still don't understand the answer to the question relative to the President telling you about the fact that the tape ran out. I would like to know when he told you that.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, it was some time later. It was sometime after it had been disclosed that they had tapes, because I didn't know about it until Butterfield's testimony that they even recorded them, I think.

But I might have digressed for a minute from my story. But April 15 stands in my mind because of the combination of circumstances.

We went out on the boat for dinner and the President, for the first time, to me, showed distress, concern. It was apparently something that they had told him. Beyond that, I don't know what it was, because we didn't go into that.

He asked me if I thought that these people who are being identified with Watergate should be released, and I said:

Mr. President, if I were in the White House and my name were even mentioned remotely about this, you would have my resignation immediately pending full investigation.

That was my answer. I didn't recommend one way or the other, as I don't. But he had asked me that question.

So we were out and had dinner and then came back in. The next day, I returned to Miami.

Mr. LENZNER. Are you saying now that the President did not disclose to you the information that he had received during the day?

Mr. REBOZO. No, no, he was—he had obviously received some information that was distressing, but he didn't disclose it. The closest he came to disclosing it was, see, the question that I had just mentioned.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he tell you that an item had come out with regard to the Ellsberg trial that was distressing to him?

Mr. REBOZO. No; it wasn't mentioned.

Senator WEICKER. As I understand it, your answer is, then, he merely asked you what you would do with those persons that had been mentioned relative to Watergate that were in the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. On the staff, and you indicated that you, if you were in their shoes, you would resign?

Mr. REBOZO. Exactly.

Senator WEICKER. Pending a full investigation.

Mr. REBOZO. A complete investigation; yes, sir.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, the trip was several hours. Do you recall any other subjects that were discussed during that time?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't remember how long the trip was, maybe a couple of hours or so. But you don't go far on the Potomac in a boat like that in 2 hours.

Mr. LENZNER. The trip actually departed the White House at 5:25 and returned to the White House at 7:34.

Mr. REBOZO. Well, that's less than 2 hours, so we were on the boat 2 hours and 9 minutes, portal to portal.

Mr. LENZNER. And did you discuss any other subject, to your recollection, during that period of time besides the brief discussion you've described?

Mr. REBOZO. I don't think, you know—I'm reasonably sure we didn't discuss anything to do with the affairs of the moment. I recognized that he was not feeling well and I certainly didn't—I don't ask questions.

Mr. LENZNER. Following up Senator Weicker's question, what was the context in which the fact that certain portions of the tape for that day had not been recorded—certain portions of the conversation had not been recorded—how did that arise when you discussed that with the President?

Mr. REBOZO. I'm sure that was sometime later, when I suppose they had analyzed the tapes or when they found that the tape had ended. As I understand it, it ended right in the middle of a conversation with Kleindienst, and he, of course, had no way of knowing when the tape was running or if it was running, I'm sure.

Mr. LENZNER. But what I was asking was how did that arise? How did it come about that the President decided to discuss that with you?

Mr. REBOZO. Oh, just, you know, just in discussion, a normal discussion.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you heard any tapes yourself or seen any transcripts of any of the tapes?

Mr. REBOZO. No, I didn't want to.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you had any discussions with regard to whether your conversations with the President concerning the \$100,000 may have been recorded?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, as I repeatedly stated, I didn't have any conversations with him about the \$100,000 until Key Biscayne, after the campaign. I don't believe that it was ever discussed any more.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, I thought you said before, sir, that there were several conversations, one of which you thought might have taken place at the White House?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, the White House—most of our conversations at the White House are in the west hall, in their own private quarters on the second floor.

Mr. LENZNER. I see. You don't usually meet with the President in the Oval Office?

Mr. REBOZO. Very, very rare; very rare. I think in 5 years, I've probably met with him in there two or three times. Maybe he just called me in to ask me something.

Mr. LENZNER. So the answer to the question, then, is you had no discussion with regard to whether any conversations you had with the President with regard to the \$100,000 are on tape?

Mr. REBOZO. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you had any discussions with Miss Woods with regard to the missing portions of the tapes that she was transcribing?

Mr. REBOZO. Yes. She had related to me about it because she was so distressed when she first went in to the President, and she related this to me before it appeared in the press, but you've all read it. She was very concerned that she had erased part of the tape and she went to tell the President that, and he said, it doesn't matter, that's not the part they've subpoenaed anyway, so don't worry about it.

Senator WEICKER. Let me make an inquiry here. I don't intend in any way, aside from the fact that we joked about 14 minutes or 15 minutes, I want it as part of the record that if there is substantial questioning left, I want to be informed about it and I'll make arrangements, unfortunate as it is, if counsel are so inclined, to continue into tomorrow. But I want to know now.

Mr. LENZNER. I have one question after this.

Senator WEICKER. I also want to make it clear that Mr. Rebozo should be in the position of saying he answered fully all questions posed to him.

Mr. FRATES. That's right.

Senator WEICKER. Also, I don't want any complaints coming from anybody on the committee that they have not had ample opportunity to ask questions. I do want to know what it is we're going to do now.

Mr. LENZNER. I have one question and one question after that—two questions.

Mr. DASH. I do appreciate it that you have spent such time, despite your other Senatorial duties.

Senator WEICKER. The main thing is we're doing a job. We're here; everybody wants it done completely. We have gone this far.

Mr. LENZNER. My last question is did the President ever discuss with you the offer or the discussion he had with Mr. Dean with regard to raising money for the Watergate defendants of approximately a million dollars?

Mr. REBOZO. He told me about it once, shortly after the question arose, and it was exactly as it was subsequently described.

You see, anyone who knows the President, you know, even when he makes speeches, he frequently becomes a devil's advocate. He makes a statement and then he answers it.

We also know, those of us who use tapes, that while we're sitting around here talking about something, it sounds one way, and you hear it on tape and it sometimes doesn't have the emphasis where it was intended, or where it appeared to be. But he did tell me one time about that conversation, very, very early after all this came about. He told me exactly what was later reported that he said when Dean said it would take a million dollars. He said, "Well, raising the money is no problem, but it would be wrong."

This is exactly what he told me a long, long time ago.

Mr. LENZNER. If I could just ask one followup question, that would have been about, in terms of time, that would have been about the time Mr. Dean had testified to that conversation?

Mr. REBOZO. I think probably yes.

Mr. LENZNER. That's all. Thank you.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is the Committee To Re-Elect the President, are they or have they ever, or has anyone else ever been involved in paying your legal fees with regard to this investigation or the IRS investigation?

Mr. REBOZO. Say that again?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Has the Committee To Re-Elect the President or any other individual been involved in paying your legal fees in regard to this investigation of the \$100,000 contribution?

Mr. REBOZO. No. I sure wish they were.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Have you been involved in paying the legal fees of any other individuals in this investigation?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. FRATES. I think, Senator, if I may clarify the record, Mr. Rebozo, how about answering the question, when they ask about the legal fees, yes or no? You say you sure wish they were.

Mr. REBOZO. The answer is no.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No to both questions?

Mr. REBOZO. Right.

Senator WEICKER. Let me repeat, in light of the answer given by Mr. Rebozo to the last two questions, are there any additional questions counsel wishes to ask? You're not restricted to one further question.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, if you'll give me a minute, I had to step out and I want to check.

Mr. DASH. While they're checking, I can save some time on this.

I think as we close this, I would like, if we could have an understanding of what we did agree to on the record, and I think most of this has been taken care of—I'm referring back again to the letter of March 12. Paragraph No. 1 that dealt with the Danner correspondence has been complied with, turned over yesterday.

The paragraph numbered 2 dealt with the telephone communications, and we were going to work out with you a method——

Mr. FRATES. We were going to try to work out expediting something within reason.

Mr. DASH. Right. No. 3 deals with travel records, and the staff had worked with you to try to identify it more clearly.

Mr. FRATES. Again—well, I won't qualify. Go ahead.

Mr. DASH. Then I think we have taken care of the questions involving Mr. Lackritz's study in terms of financial records through questions that Mr. Bellino has put, some particular items will be identified through the transcript. We'll be back in touch with you and you promised to give us back-up records on that. They can be identified in the transcript.

Mr. FRATES. Right.

Mr. DASH. And we'll identify them in copies of the transcript to show what they are.

Mr. FRATES. Right.

Mr. DASH. The only issue, I think, that is still in dispute, and I think cannot be resolved at this meeting, Senator Weicker, is the request in the subpoena calling for the records involving the Wakefield account, which deals with the balance of the \$6,000 amount that was put in the Wakefield account, which is the \$4,562.38.

I realize Senator Ervin ruled that questions regarding that——

Mr. FRATES. Whatever he ruled is on the record, Sam.

Mr. DASH. But the documents, we're not able to follow up on the questions to comply with his ruling because we don't have the documents to establish whether or not we can relate it, and therefore, since he did ask in his letter of March 12 for compliance, I would like a direction, Senator Weicker, that they be complied with. And of course, Mr. Frates can refuse to do that and then it becomes a matter that the committee has to rule on.

Mr. FRATES. I want the record to show that we contend Senator Ervin ruled on that and disposed of that matter. He may disagree. The record will show that he disagreed.

Mr. DASH. Whatever the record will show, it will show.

Mr. FRATES. That's right.

Too, we have pending before the full committee an objection which has not been ruled on on this particular issue.

In other words, Senator, we don't want to get into contempt of the Senate for something that we're not in contempt for. But first, and as I said the other day, at this time—and we might modify it—at this time, we feel so strongly about that on the basis of principle, and maybe we could change that, too, I guess, that we're not going to produce those records under any circumstances.

Mr. DASH. Some help can be given if that—I know Mr. Rebozo has indicated that these are personal files.

Mr. FRATES. I say it's all going to be clarified as soon as you read what Senator Ervin has said.

Mr. DASH. What we haven't asked is anything to support Mr. Rebozo's statement that he made certain disbursements.

Mr. FRATES. The Senator has ruled on this. You and I disagree on it.

Senator WEICKER. I'm going to rule that the question in the sense of the documents alone was not ruled on by the chairman, and I would direct Mr. Rebozo and counsel to produce said documents to the committee.

Mr. FRATES. So there will be no misunderstanding, Senator, what documents are you referring to, Mr. Dash?

Mr. DASH. Terry, you can cover that.

Mr. LENZNER. While you're looking at it, can I ask one last question?

Senator WEICKER. It's included in the letter, the \$4,652 or some such figure.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Reference is made to it in two subpoenas. The first reference is made to it in the subpoena dated January 24.

Mr. FRATES. Returnable what day?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. January 28, item 2 and item 3. The other one is the subpoena returnable—subpoena on Mr. Rebozo, returnable February 14, signed January 24 by Senator Ervin. In that subpoena, it's item 4.

Mr. FRATES. All right, Senator, can we, for our own information—we asked the reporter to type up the questions and answers and what we contend was the disposition of this by Senator Ervin at the start of yesterday. I forget, sir, whether you were in the room or not. It hasn't been done. I know they're extremely busy, and I guess we run into some problems on rulings of the committee. We would like to ask permission to have that typed up and be available so that we can help resolve this.

Mr. DASH. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. I would say this: I would say this to you, counsel, that my direction to you and your objection, both of these are being made in order that the record will be complete. I do not understand either my direction or your objection to indicate that this is a total impasse, and it shall not be so conveyed to the full committee.

Mr. FRATES. All right, sir.

Senator WEICKER. In order that all rights have been preserved, those of the committee and those of your client, the reporter will go ahead and turn over the transcript to counsel and also the committee in order that we can resolve this question.

Mr. FRATES. Thank you, sir. That takes care of that.

Mr. LENZNER. For the record, Senator, we had better have this marked. This is the pertinency materials I mentioned to you yesterday. I would like to have this marked as an exhibit and we'll furnish Mr. Frates with a copy of that, explaining the pertinence of the materials as we see it.

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked Rebozo exhibit No. 17 for identification.*]

Senator WEICKER. Are there further technical matters?

Mr. LENZNER. I have one question.

Senator WEICKER. Go ahead.

Mr. LENZNER. I'm told we didn't get an answer to this.

*See p. 10179.

In the time interval between receiving and returning the money, did any other person have access to the money during that period?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, thank you very much.

Mr. FRATES. Again, since the last question was ambiguous, I think the record is clear that it was in a box, and who had the other key?

Mr. REBOZO. Well, Wakefield did.

Mr. FRATES. I think that's clear, but again I don't want——

Mr. LENZNER. Had access or used or had in their possession the money, OK, Mr. Rebozo? The answer to that is no, I take it. No other person had access, possession, or——

Senator WEICKER. Counsel, I'm sure counsel would say that Mr. Rebozo has answered that somebody else did have access.

Mr. LENZNER. In the time interval between receiving and returning the money, did any other person have possession or control or use of the money?

Mr. REBOZO. The only other person that could have obtained entry to the box was Wakefield, and I've testified he's the only other one who had a key to it, and the money was in there all the time.

Mr. LENZNER. All I want to do is get a yes or no answer whether, in the time between receiving the money and returning it, did any other person have control or use the money or have it in their possession?

Mr. REBOZO. No.

Mr. LENZNER. That's all.

Mr. DASH. Did Mr. Rebozo want to make any statement?

Mr. FRATES. Senator, I think it might be well to put this on the record. We're going to make and give to Mr. Dash the bank statements which we have agreed to, and he is going to accept those in his possession.

Mr. DASH. What I have committed to Mr. Frates is that I'll keep them in my safe and they'll be looked at only in my presence.

Mr. FRATES. Certainly. That's very fair.

Senator WEICKER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. FRATES. Thank you, sir, for your many courtesies. We have appreciated that.

Senator WEICKER. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:25 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was adjourned.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator for the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say:

1. In view of the continued unjustified personal attacks on me and the staff of this Select Committee by Mr. William Snow Frates, attorney for Charles G. Rebozo, I feel compelled to set forth the true facts concerning his allegations.

2. The Senate Select Committee on October 10, 1973, expressly authorized its staff to conduct an investigation into the \$100,000 cash contribution from Howard Hughes to the President through Charles G. Rebozo. It was in pursuit of this mandate from the Committee that I, working at the direction of Terry Lenzner, had occasion to deal with Mr. William Snow Frates.

3. In the first week of October 1973, Assistant Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Terry Lenzner, requested me to accompany him and Scott Armstrong to the office of Mr. Frates in Miami, Florida, for the purpose of conducting an interview of Charles G. Rebozo. That was my initial contact with Mr. Frates. As I listened to Mr. Rebozo's testimony, I wondered why he had finally accepted two \$50,000 cash contributions from Howard Hughes in 1969 and 1970 after he had refused similar contributions before. Similarly, I wondered why a banker like Rebozo would place all of this currency in a safe deposit box for three or four years and not use the money for any purpose. When I sought some clarification from Mr. Rebozo, for no reason whatsoever, Frates loudly criticized me in a most humiliating manner.

4. I next saw Frates on October 17, 1973, when again I participated in an interview of Mr. Rebozo in Frates' office. After the interview, I remained in Miami to review Mr. Rebozo's records to determine if they corroborated his testimony.

5. I stayed in Miami from October 17 until October 23 in an attempt to review all of the relevant records. However, my efforts were constantly frustrated by Mr. Frates' and his associates' repeated delays in producing relevant materials as well as his refusal to let us photocopy subpoenaed documents.

6. For example, Frates asked me for copies of all my workpapers and notes from my review of Mr. Rebozo's records as well as my inventory of the records I reviewed. I agreed to provide Frates with an inventory of records, but I did not think it appropriate to turn over to him my work product without further authorization from the Committee. After my efforts to cooperate with Mr. Frates

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and his associates, late in the afternoon on October 18, 1973, I was handed a letter from William Bruce Harper (attached as Exhibit A) which accused me of bad faith in conducting the investigation and seeking to embarrass Mr. Rebozo in his business and commercial relations. The letter further requested that I was "not to remove from this [Frates] office any of Mr. Rebozo's records or any of the notes, worksheets or summaries you [I] have made until we [Frates and Harper] are provided copies of these documents at our [Frates and Harper] expense."

7. After reading the letter, I told Mr. Harper that I would not furnish them with a copy of my workpapers.

8. On Friday morning, October 19, I was accused by Frates and Harper of leaking a story with a Washington dateline in the Miami Herald that morning which stated that I was in Florida investigating Rebozo's financial records. (See story at Attachment B) I denied that I had disseminated any information about my investigation to the press and expressed my surprise and anger that the information appeared in the newspapers. I categorically deny again that I have ever disseminated any information to the press about my investigation into the financial affairs of Mr. Rebozo.

9. In the late afternoon of October 19, 1973, I was handed yet another letter signed by William Frates (attached as Exhibit C). I made no comment in response to his letter.

10. I completed reviewing the records provided by Frates on Saturday, October 20.

11. On Monday, October 22, Mr. Frates renewed his completely unjustified attacks on me in a conversation with my colleague John Dale. In light of Mr. Frates' behavior, I returned to Washington on Tuesday, October 23, to discuss the matter with Assistant Chief Counsel Terry Lenzner.

12. Frates' attacks continued in my absence against my colleagues John Dale and Ken Jernigan. On Tuesday, October 23, John Dale returned to Frates' office to review additional documents. Dale was forced to copy the documents by hand since Frates refused to let him make any copies.

13. I returned to Miami on Thursday night, October 25, and decided to begin serving subpoenas on other banking institutions for Rebozo's records since Frates had refused to furnish us with actual copies of records requested.

14. On Monday morning, October 29, I served a subpoena on the Key Biscayne Bank and Trust Company for records of Mr. Rebozo. Despite my objections, Mr. Lenzner made arrangements to inspect these documents in Mr. Frates' office on Tuesday, at 10:00 a.m.

15. Because of the pressing matters, we were not able to show up at Frates' offices at the scheduled time on Tuesday. On Tuesday night, we watched the news on station WCKT and were surprised to learn that Rebozo had been in Frates' office all morning and that television cameramen were waiting outside. I believe that we were "set up" so that TV cameramen would be waiting when we were to appear at Frates' offices as scheduled, and we would be blamed for alerting the media.

16. Neither Ken Jernigan nor I were in touch with any news media personnel to discuss our scheduled meeting with Frates on Tuesday or any other aspect of our investigation.

17. I had no contact with Mr. Frates from November 1, 1973, when he appeared before Senators Ervin and Baker until March 20, 1974, when Mr. Rebozo testified in Executive Session and Mr. Frates reiterated once again his unfounded charges against me.

18. While I am reluctant to dignify Mr. Frates' allegations about me by even responding to them, I feel an obligation to set the public record straight in this matter.

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19. I am confident that the final report of the Select Committee on this investigation will further refute the groundless charges of Mr. Frates.

I have read the foregoing statement and it is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to me this

21 day of June, 1974. *in the District of Columbia*

Peter H. Huber
Notary Public

Carmino S. Bellino
Carmino S. Bellino

My commission expires

14 May 78

LAW OFFICES

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AREA CODE 305
 TELEPHONE 377-0241

October 18, 1973

Mr. Carmine Bellino
 Miami, Florida

Dear Mr. Bellino:

Yesterday, October 17, 1973, Mr. Rebozo was again available for interrogation and voluntarily produced all of his personal bank records for inspection by the Select Committee's investigators, Mr. Terry Lenzner, Mr. Scott Armstrong, Mary d'Oreo and yourself.

Mr. Lenzner stated that he wanted to examine Mr. Rebozo's personal bank records to verify Mr. Rebozo's statement that the \$100,000.00 was returned to Mr. Hughes' representative. This request was beyond the scope of the Committee's investigative mandate and it is obvious from the examination of the records that Mr. Rebozo's statements are correct. However, with the hope that the Committee and its investigators might be finally and absolutely satisfied of this fact, we agreed to provide you an office to examine such records.


Mr. Rebozo had a right to have a representative present but you refused to agree to permit Mr. Rebozo's representative to be present. This is not common practice for government investigations and inconsistent with established rules of law and it now appears that you are making an itemized list of his personal records which any businessman would not want to become public property. You have assured us that they will be kept confidential, however, the experience Mr. Rebozo has had with the Committee is that repeated leaks and distortions have been fed to the newspapers after each of our previous meetings.

Mr. Carmine Bellino
Page Two
October 18, 1973

We are of the opinion that you are on a witch hunt and are not in good faith making an investigation but are attempting to embarrass Mr. Rebozo in his business and commercial relations.

We are, therefore, asking you not to remove from this office any of Mr. Rebozo's records or any of the notes, worksheets or summaries you have made until we are provided copies of these documents at our expense. You may use our photocopying equipment.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Wm. Bruce Harper, Jr." The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Wm. Bruce Harper, Jr.

WBH/mg
Hand delivered

USA ★ ★ ★ ★ ROUNDUP Rebozo-Hughes link investigated

WASHINGTON — The Senate Watergate committee's chief investigator is studying the bank records of President Nixon's close friend, Bebe Rebozo in connection with a contribution from billionaire Howard Hughes.

Sources said the investigator, Carmine Bellino, was in Florida yesterday working on the Hughes-Rebozo connection and attempting to reconstruct Rebozo's complex financial holdings in the state.

Rebozo's bank records, it was said, were obtained by subpoena from the Key Biscayne bank of which Rebozo is president and board chairman.

It also was learned yesterday that Rebozo's handling of the Hughes cash is being investigated by Special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox and the Internal Revenue Service.

Headless bodies found in park

NEWARK, N.J. — The headless bodies of two young black men were found in a park here yesterday, and police said they were investigating the possibility the men were victims of a Black Muslim vengeance ritual.

The bodies of Warren Albert Marcello, also known as Warren Marcel, 30, of Newark and Michael Allen Huff, 19, of Orange, were found in Weequahic Park in the city's South Ward. Their heads were found in a gutter in the Central Ward.

A police spokesman said there were indications the victims were connected with the Black Muslims, but he would not elaborate.

Gunman kills 2 pedestrians

NEW YORK — A young man armed with a pistol killed two men and wounded two others yesterday in a wild outbreak of gunfire amid sidewalk crowds in huc-


tims were among a group of bystanders who pursued him in full cry after he killed a passerby in a brief altercation.

Weather

MIAMI FORECAST

Gilda remains a threat to southeast Florida.

All interests should keep in touch with latest advices and be ready for quick action if warnings become necessary today. Winds with frequent showers and occasional squalls. Temperatures mostly in the 70s. North-easterly winds 20 to 30 m.p.h. occasionally higher in squalls and probably increasing today. Small craft should remain in port.



NATIONAL TEMPERATURES AND RECORDS

GREATER MIAMI

	H	L	Prec.
Coral Gables	83	72	1.57
Miami Airport	84	77	.14
Bayfront Park	84	73	.10
Miami Beach	81	74	.10
N Miami Beach	83	74	.93
South Miami	83	72	.93

	Rise	Set
Sun	7:21 a.m.	6:50 p.m.
Moon	—	2:34 p.m.

FLORIDA

Apoplachicola	77	55	
Clewiston	85	71	
Daytona Beach	81	72	
Fort Lauderdale	82	74	
Fort Myers	87	71	
Gainesville	60	52	
Homestead	64	70	21
Jacksonville	77	50	
Key West	85	77	.10
Lakeland	79	68	1r
Leesville	70	67	
Orlando	83	59	
Orlando	78	67	.18
Pensacola	81	54	
Sarasota-Bradenton	84	48	
St. Petersburg	84	70	
Tallahassee	79	47	
Tampa	83	46	1r
Vero Beach	87	72	1r
W Palm Beach	84	77	

CANADA

	Skies	H	L	Prec.
Ottawa	cloudy	47	36	
Toronto	cloudy	51	39	.67
Winnipeg	clear	55	77	
Vancouver	cloudy	57	44	.11

	H	L	Prec.
Albany	46	35	
Asheville	72	53	
Atlanta	74	42	
Baltimore	46	24	
Boston	53	45	
Buffalo	49	39	
Charleston SC	71	55	
Charleston WV	49	35	
Charlotte NC	49	31	
Cheyenne	74	44	
Chicago	52	50	
Cincinnati	67	44	
Cleveland	55	45	
Columbia SC	74	35	
Columbus OH	67	48	
Dallas-Ft Worth	76	49	
Dayton	63	45	
Denver	63	42	
Des Moines	55	44	
Detroit	47	32	
Houston	78	54	
Indianapolis	67	46	
Jackson MS	74	47	
Kansas City	75	44	
Las Vegas	92	57	
Los Angeles	91	45	
Louisville	73	42	

HIGH

	TODAY	High	L
Miami Harbor	3:30	84	
Miami Beach	2:50	84	
City Yacht Basin	4:50	84	
77th St. Causeway	6:00	84	

Exhibit C

LAW OFFICES

FRATES FLOYD PEARSON STEWART PROENZA & RICHMAN

WM SNOW FRATES
 ROBERT L FLOYD
 RAY H. PEARSON
 LARRY S. STEWART
 MORRIS C. PROENZA
 GERALD F. RICHMAN
 JAMES O. LITTLE
 ALAN G. GREER
 BERTHA CLAIRE LEE
 ANDREW C. HALL
 KENNETH J. WEIL
 JOHN M. BRUNBAUGH
 IRA H. LEESFIELD
 STEPHEN N. ZACK
 SHERRYLL WARTENS DUNAJ
 WM. BRUCE HARPER, JR.
 CHRISTIAN O. SEARCY
 TULLY SCOTT

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
 TWELFTH FLOOR CONCORD BUILDING
 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

AREA CODE 305
 TELEPHONE 377-0241

October 19, 1973


Mr. Carmine Bellino
 Miami, Florida

Dear Mr. Bellino:

As you are still in our office examining Mr. Rebozo's records, we are hand delivering this letter to you. I am attaching a copy of article in the Miami News which is self-explanatory. I was shocked after reading the article because obviously its source had to be one of the individuals who participated in the conference of October 17, 1973.

We again request that you give us a copy of any notes, worksheets or summaries that you make while you are examining the records and that since the records that you are examining are Mr. Rebozo's personal records which have no relation to the mandate of the Select Committee, that if any of the information contained therein is leaked to the press or any other source, that we intend to hold you, other members of the Committee's staff and the members of the Committee itself liable.

Sincerely yours,



Wm. S. Frates

WSF:mg
 Enc.
 Hand delivered

	High	Low
Miami Harbor	2:35a	9:25p
Miami Beach	2:35p	9:25p
Cory Yacht Basin	4:40p	7:10p
77th St. Causeway	6:25p	9:25p

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 1

FLORIDA NIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE		NO	1151
100 WEST WASHINGTON STREET REV BIRMINGHAM, ALA 35203		DATE	APR 13 1971
THOMAS H. REBOZO - SPECIAL ACCOUNT		2-1691	\$ 5,000.00
THE 5,000.00			
Wm. R. Rebozo Bank			
-40631-01181		1-0655	
			REBOZO

Wm. R. Rebozo

ACCOUNT NO. 2-1691

SPECIAL ACCOUNT

THOMAS H. REBOZO -

FOR DEPOSIT ONLY

FOR DEPOSIT ONLY TO THE
ACCOUNT OF
RECENT ALBANY, N.Y.
FOR CLOSURE
Acct. No. 002-691

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 3

Date: July 9, 1968

Safe Deposit Box Lease:

The undersigned leases Safe Deposit Box No. 224 at an annual rental of \$ 12.50 Dollars, subject to Rules and Regulations and acknowledges receipt of two keys

Special Stipulations:

Thomas H. Wakefield
LESSEE-DEPUTY

C. G. Rebozo
LESSEE

REBOZO, C. G. or Thomas H. Wakefield

BOX NO. 224

SIGNATURE	ATTENDANT	BOOTH NO.	DATE	HOURL
<i>C. G. Rebozo</i>			<i>12/25/69</i>	<i>3 50</i>
<i>C. G. Rebozo</i>	<i>RW</i>		<i>4/3/70</i>	<i>11 30</i>
<i>C. G. Rebozo</i>	<i>RW</i>		<i>4/10/70</i>	<i>1:00</i>
<i>C. G. Rebozo</i>	<i>SB</i>		<i>4/30/70</i>	<i>11:45</i>
<i>C. G. Rebozo</i>	<i>RW</i>		<i>6/5/70</i>	<i>1:05</i>
<i>Thomas H. Wakefield</i>	<i>J. K.</i>		<i>6/18/73</i>	<i>10:15</i>
<i>V. W. Pittman</i>				
<i>B. L. Rebozo</i>				
<i>Margaret Benson</i>				

VISITATION RECORD

DEMOLD CARDINER FORM 74845 (4-513)

DIEBOLD CARGINEER FORM 35844 142541

Date 10/14/66

Sit Box Lease:

we undersigned have rented Safe Deposit Box # 222
vault of Key Biscayne Bank, Key Biscayne, Florida.

Copy 20 hereafter called lessor, at \$ NC year, received TWO keys to said safe, and
the Rules and Regulations of the said lessor in force at this date, as recited on a receipt issued to us
out of rent, and to such Rules and Regulations as may be hereafter adopted by said lessor.

that each of us may appoint attorneys or deputies to have access to or surrender said safe and may
such appointment made by either of us, and that until the receipt by said lessor at its office or
ere said safe is located of written notice of revocation of any power of attorney or deputy appoint-
conclusive notice of the death or legal incapacity of either of us, any action of said lessor in reliance
power of attorney or deputy appointment or in permitting the other of us to have access to said safe
spose shall be fully binding upon both of us and our respective heirs, executors, administrators, per-
representatives, committee and assigns, and to that extent such power of attorney, deputy appointment
in authorization to each of us shall not be deemed to have been revoked by the death or legal inca-
pacity of us, and we jointly and severally agree to indemnify said lessor against any unauthorized act
of us or of such attorney or deputy.

B. G. B. B. LESSEE DEPUTY

B. G. B. B. LESSEE

Date: 10/12/71

Safe Deposit Box Lease:

The undersigned leases Safe Deposit Box No. 633 at an annual rental of
\$ 17.50 Dollars, subject to Rules and Regulations and acknowledges receipt of
two keys 3.00

Special Stipulations:

Carlynn R. Rizzo So. C. Rizzo
LESSOR LESSOR

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 6

FRONTIER HOTEL

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89114

(AREA CODE 702) 734-0110

RICHARD G. DANNER
MANAGING DIRECTOR

February 24, 1971

Mr. Charles G. Rebozo
Key Biscayne Bank
Key Biscayne, Florida

Dear Bebe:

I am attaching hereto an advertisement of the Royal Biscayne Hotel, which ad I have now seen in various publications over the last several months. Frankly, it has aroused many speculations in my mind, basically, how could an attractive person like this, with the obvious charms, have been able to come over to Key Biscayne repeatedly and invade the domain of the man-eating tiger (pardon the expression), and still be able to at least keep her bikini.

It occurs to me that either there is something going on behind your back, or that old Father Time has finally got you in his clutches. Or, (and I hate to think this) those certain psychological changes I detected in you a couple of years ago, such as constant invitations for me to stay at your house, have finally changed the direction of your interests. Of course, there is a final thought, namely, that you have fallen far behind in your homework.

If I do not see this ad any further, then I can only assume that you have asserted your rights on Key Biscayne and are back to normal. Please let me hear from you and don't be embarrassed to tell your old friend and confidant the truth!

Sincerely,

Rich
Richard G. Danner
Managing Director

RGD:ah
Enclosure

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 7

March 1, 1971

Mr. Richard Danner
Managing Director
Frontier Hotel
Las Vegas, Nevada 89114

Dear Richard:

Received your epistle of February 24. Only a third degree depraved mind could have given birth to thoughts such as those expressed therein.

Maybe on the other hand, it is the frustration bit you experienced by "mis-reading" the invitation to stay at my house, which I have on occasion inadvisedly extended you. Frankly you are not my type. But have no fear or concern about this happening again. Now that I am acquainted with your warped thinking, I'll make arrangements upon your next visit to stay at the Y.M.C.A.

You ask that I should not be embarrassed to tell an "old" friend the truth. I hope you can take it.

Sincerely,

C. G. Rebozo

CGR:jl

REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 8

FRONTIER HOTEL

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89114

(AREA CODE 702) 734-0110

RICHARD G. DANNER
MANAGING DIRECTOR

March 3, 1970

Mr. C.G. Rebozo
Bank of Key Biscayne
Key Biscayne, Fla.

Dear Bebe:

I am attaching hereto a letter from Ed Morgan, together with some newspaper articles all on the subject of school busing. Ed and I were discussing this subject when he proposed the constitutional theory as set out in his letter and I asked that he develop it further and give me the benefit of his thinking. It occurred to me that some of your friends up the line might be interested in his comments.

In my opinion Morgan is one of the best trial and appeal attorneys in the country. An examination of his record will reflect that he rarely loses a case on appeal, because of his intimate knowledge of the law and the Constitution.

I whole heartedly agree with his observations that this issue is going to become of paramount importance in the days ahead. The great rank and file of the people who have accepted integration, civil rights, etc., in good spirit will simply blow up when it comes to the question of busing, and will vigorously oppose such efforts.

Let me have your reaction.

Sincere personal regards,



Richard G. Danner
Managing Director

RGD/ms

Att:

REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 9

FRONTIER HOTEL

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89114

(AREA CODE 702) 734-0110

RICHARD G. DANNER
MANAGING DIRECTOR

March 17, 1970

Mr. C. G. Rebozo
Bank of Key Biscayne
Key Biscayne, Fla.

Dear Bebe:


I am attaching hereto a five page memorandum addressed to "Whom it may Concern" and a two page digest of the former as per our conversation.

It occurs to me that the A.E.C., by continuing to conduct underground tests, is moving into the realm of the unknown, with the resultant danger that, should the A.E.C. have miscalculated, catastrophic effects could ensue. For example, should an earthquake be generated, which along with the natural devastating effects of an earthquake, would also break open the sealed underground chambers causing the latter to release the stored up radioactive materials into the underground water system, as well as into the atmosphere, the damage could be incalculable.

I think everyone realizes, by the same token, that there are probably great and over-riding reasons stemming from our national security requirements that may dictate that these tests continue even if there are serious risks that have to be taken.

If it is possible on your part, I would sincerely appreciate having a scientific explanation as to why these fears of earthquakes or contamination are groundless, or a simple explanation that our national existence is dependent upon our ability to further develop and refine our nuclear capabilities.

Sincere personal wishes,



Richard G. Danner
Managing Director

RGD/ms

Enc.

To Whom It May Concern:

The resumption of megaton-plus nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site dictates that authoritative literature be reviewed to determine if possible, the continued need for such events in light of the detrimental effect produced by resultant radioactive materials being dumped into our environment.

The authorities for both the A.E.C. and the President's Committee, who conducted research studies on problems resulting from nuclear blasts, have not developed a common understanding among themselves, or within themselves, as to detrimental results to be expected.

To be sure, as stated by the A.E.C., the larger part of the harmful, radioactive materials seemingly remains sealed within the molten rock-lined blast chamber created at the time of the explosion; however, the earth moving effects resulting from subsequent megaton blasts and from movement along natural faults will undoubtedly shatter the walls of these sealed chambers thereby creating avenues of escape for the nuclear materials. The unknown factor concerning natural fault phenomena is time in that no one has ever been able to predict instants of occurrence. Southern Nevada is one of the highly faulted areas on Earth and the majority of the rock present are competent to the degree that fault zones remain unsealed by gouge material. These fault zones can, and do, furnish ready avenues for the passage of fluids from a source to points of escape at considerable distances from the Test Site. The A.E.C. in S.J.Res. 155 (Committee on Foreign Relations - United States Senate) report that "three out of ten significant leaks at the Nevada Test Site occurred via earthquake faults or fissures". These instances were observed in the few days following an explosion and were, undoubtedly, made possible as a result of earth movements created by the blast. It is most probable that a natural fault occurring in the vicinity of the blast at some future date can cause similar leakage of currently confined radioactive material.

In the NVO-28 (Safety Involving Detonation of Nuclear Devices - May, 1966) it is stated by Frank W. Stead of the U.S.G.S. "Very few of the underground nuclear explosions to date have been detonated in saturated rock below the water table; in even fewer cases has post-explosion exploration been sufficient to obtain meaningful samples".

In a report by Tom Humphrey, Hydrologist for the A.E.C., delivered to a group of hydrologist in Carson City (1969) he stated that auxiliary wells have been drilled around certain blast holes for the purpose of determining the degree of lateral percolation of radioactive-effected waters and, as of that date, movement of these waters had been only tens of feet. In view of the fact that wells are largely bottomed above the existing water table, it seems most probable that any critical movement of water will be downward from the blast chamber rather than laterally and that an increased volume of rain water will be introduced into the contaminated areas because of the catchment basin effect created by surface craters. Access of these waters to fracture and fault systems can result in their moving considerable distances from the contaminated source.

A most important issue which became apparent during the megaton tests is that of creating earth movements of a magnitude comparable to those which occur during natural earthquakes. Certain comments by well known authorities on the subject of seismology are:

1. Dr. Frank Oliver, Professor of Geology at Columbia University, stated that, "The records of the largest earthquakes frequently indicate that the main seismic event began with a small disturbance, and, in a sense, was triggered by it. Thus it appears possible that a large earthquake could be triggered directly by the smaller earthquakes that the explosion might generate, provided the large earthquake was eminent."
2. Dr. James Brune, principal earthquake consultant for A.E.C., states, "In many cases larger earthquakes may be considered successions of triggered events rather than smoothly propagated ruptures."
3. Dr. Frank Press, Professor of Geophysics, M.I.T., states, "Unfortunately a series of tests with progressively increasing yields is a precaution of uncertain value if the instability mechanism which triggers an earthquake has a threshold. In my opinion, the need to test at these large yields must be very compelling to justify the risk".

Each of these men is a scientist who, by force of profession, states that lack of information limits the ability to prophesy time and degree of earthquake occurrences, but they do point out that earth ruptures resulting from the megaton explosions at the Nevada Test Site are of a major magnitude.

A condition which should concern all Las Vegas is the presence of two recognizable faults, having vertical displacements up to thirty feet, which run in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction through the city. Although these faults are apparently not currently active they have been so during Quarternary time, or within the last 250,000 years. Should the effect of nuclear explosive stress be accumulating along these fault alignments they too could be rejuvenated.

In testimony presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on January 28, 1970, Dr. J. W. Gofman and Dr. A. R. Tamplin in their Doc. No. GT-114-70 titled A Proposal For At Least A Ten Fold Reduction in the FRC Guidelines For Radiation Exposure to the Population-At-Large Supportive Evidence. They stated "The most potent enemy of atomic energy development is not truth, but is false optimism and an ostrich-like approach of refusal to examine the possible risks in a reasonable fashion". These men estimate that exposure of the U. S. population to F.R.C. (Federal Radiation Council) guidelines of 0.17 rads per year would lead to 16,000 extra cases of cancer annually in the U.S.A. Today, the only way in which we might change that number is to increase it materially, since abundant evidence we have recently uncovered indicates very strongly that the true situation is even worse.

In Senate Joint Resolution No. 155 on Page 88 under the topic of Containment of Radioactivity, Dr. Larson's testimony....

A very substantial amount of data is in hand on the containment of nuclear explosions over a broad range of yields, leading to a good understanding of the techniques necessary for its accomplishment. Scaling laws have been developed whereby the depth of burial required to contain an underground explosion can be calculated with a high degree of confidence. Test emplacement practices that are used today assure comfortable margins of containment safety; for intermediate and high yield tests there has never been any radioactive leakage.

This principle of scaling can be interpreted to mean the planned test in March in "A" megaton is of a greater yield than previously agreed would be detonated at the Nevada Test Site. To recap from Exhibit A on Page 19 of the same document:

Boxcar	Apr. 26, 1968	Nevada Test Site	3,800'	= 1.2 meg.
Benham	Dec. 19, 1968	Nevada Test Site	4,600'	= 1.1 meg.
Jorum	Sept. 16, 1969	Nevada Test Site	3,800'	= A meg.
Milrow	Oct. 2, 1969	Amchitka	4,000'	= A meg.
-----	Mar., 1970	Nevada Test Site	5,200+'	= ?

Dr. Frank Press' quotation Page 7 Definition of Calibration:

"It is an escalation of test, planned in this case from around one up to 5 megatons. It is a question of sort of pushing your luck, and when something goes wrong at one particular point, then we can stand back and say that this is most unfortunate, that we should not have escalated to that point and degree". The spartan is the long range interceptor in the projected safeguard antiballistic missile system. Its explosive power is believed to be two megatons (equivalent to two million tons of TNT), twice the force of the largest underground blasts yet conducted. It is not known if the 1200'+ depth difference planned for the next detonation is adequate to contain this possible escalation. Dr. Frank Press also has stated, "... and the fact that the large explosion being planned are without precedent, suggests that previous experience may not be pertinent".

It cannot be denied that "testing underground does not lessen the amount of radioactivity which an explosion creates; it simply changes the initial routes which it takes, as it begins its almost endless re-circulation in the air, water, soil and food-chains of this planet".

Dr. Pitzer stated on Page 35: "Thus, in my judgment both the long-range safety of all mankind, as well as the immediate safety of those in central Nevada, in Alaska, and on the coast of the North Pacific, would be better served by postponing megaton nuclear test at this time and by initiating an open, broad-based review of all aspects of this situation".

Dilution, of course, does not eliminate the radiation; a curie is a curie, no matter how fast the radioactive substance is diluted.

Since many radioactive substances last for generations and even thousands of years, every leak (off-site or on-site) adds to the planet's total radioactive pollution.

The Congressional panel chaired by Professor Harvey Brooks quoted in S.J.Res. 155, on Page 40:

"Indeed, the very essence of the Panel's concern about the narrowness of the criteria that currently dominate technological choices is a conviction that the present system fails to give all effective interests effect representation in the crucial process of decision."

This narrowness of criteria does not allow a comprehensive accumulation of data for arms control, medical, environmental and pollution effects to be studied and analytically equated to the pressing need for further megaton test in light of United States existing nuclear overkill capability.

Is the resumption of megaton-plus nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada site necessary? Is it as safe as we are led to believe? We ask these questions because responsible authorities are not in agreement as to the possible detrimental results.

Some authorities point out that scaling laws have been formulated whereby the depth of burial required to contain the underground explosions can be calculated with a high degree of confidence. Other authorities are just as positive that possibilities of increased environment pollution and earth movements comparable to large earthquakes exist to a very high degree.

Who is right is not known, however, if the doubt exists shouldn't the underground nuclear testing be terminated until the doubt is erased.

To be sure the larger part of the radioactive materials seemingly remains in the blast chamber, however, earth movements along natural faults with subsequent blasts could shatter the walls of these sealed chambers, thereby creating avenues of escape for the radioactive materials. Southern Nevada is one of the most highly faulted areas in the world. Thus, it is also probable that a natural earthquake, occurring in the vicinity of the blast chambers, could cause leakage of currently confined radioactive materials.

Water movement through the blast areas is also not fully known. Large amounts of radioactive materials could be released by future detonations and carried via faults and fractures considerable distances from the contaminated source.

Authorities on seismology have noted that large earthquakes frequently began with small disturbances. The instability mechanism which triggers earthquakes is unknown. Las Vegas should know that the city sits on two large faults. With continued underground testing stress could accumulate and the faults might be rejuvenated.

Testing underground does not lessen radioactivity, it simply changes the initial routes as it begins its almost endless recirculation into the air, water, soil and food chains of the planet.

Since many radioactive substances generated by the testing last for thousands of years and there is a reasonable and real doubt as to the validity of current testing criteria in relation to pollution and the generation of large earth movements shouldn't we stop and reevaluate? Can we afford to continue working with unknowns when their effect on our diminishing environment is uncertain?

Source from which some information was gathered are:

NVO-28 (Safety Involving Detonation of Nuclear Devices), May 1966
Frank W. Stead of U.S.G.S.

Dr. Frank Oliver, Professor of Geology at Columbia University

Dr. James Brune, principle earthquake consultant for A.E.C.

Dr. Frank Press, Professor of Geophysics, M.I.T.

Senate Joint Resolution No. 155, Page 88, under the topic
Containment of Radioactivity also Dr. Pitzer, Page 35

S.J. Resolution 155, Page 40.

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 10

July 30, 1970

The Editor
Life Magazine
Rockefeller Center
New York, N.Y. 10020.

Dear Sir:

I was never so shocked and disgusted as when I picked up your July 31, 1970 issue of Life Magazine. The leering countenance on the cover is bad enough, but I recognized the jacket worn by the character as one that I owned which mysteriously disappeared on the occasion of a visit to Key Biscayne.

I tried to read the article, but became so bored with the many inaccuracies (references to good looks, money, generosity, intelligence; etc.), that I threw the whole mess in the wastebasket.

Please consider this as my request that you cancel my subscription to "Life" and I am having all copies of the offensive publication removed from our newsstand!


Disgustedly,

Richard G. Danner
Managing Director

RGD/ms

cc: Bebe Rebozo

REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 11



Telegram

M1034P EDT OCT 7 70 AA853 PRA244

PR LGA447 HF PDB FAX LAS VEGS NEV 7 653P PDT 1970 OCT 7 PM 10 41

C G REBOZO BANK OF KEY BISCAYNE

RPT DLY 45 West Me Intire

KEY BISCAYNE MIAMI FLO 33149

IVE JUST LISTENED TO THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH ON VIETNAM IT WAS
 OUTSTANDING AND PRECELY TO THE POINT. PLEASE EXTEND MY PERSONAL
 BEST WISHES TO HIM ON HIS PROPOSALS SUCCESS

DICK DANNER LAS VEGAS NEV

(715

361-5484 FB
 88-936 mlt

10173

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 12

ROBERT J. BIRD
1140 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036


April 12, 1971

Mr. C. G. Rebozo
Key Biscayne Bank Building
Key Biscayne, Florida 33149

Dear Mr. Rebozo:

When do you think it would be the proper time to get Dick Danner geared up for next year. According to the press, he is having problems out there and since I know we will need him, maybe one of us should talk to him. What do you think?

With kind regards.

Sincerely,


RJB/djr

April 21, 1971

Mr. Robert J. Bird
1140 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding Dick Danner. Presently I think perhaps no action should be taken in that relation, until I have had a chance to discuss several matters with Dick.

Thank you for thinking of it.

Sincerely,

C. G. Rebozo

CGR:jl

A TRUE COPY

REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 13



DESERT INN

Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

(AREA 702) 735-1122
CABLE DESERTINN

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

May 14, 1971

Mr. C. G. Rebozo
Key Biscayne Bank Building
Key Biscayne, Florida 33149

Dear Bebe:

Despite your rude note, "for your information, no acknowledgement necessary," I must reply to the clipping that you sent me from the Miami Herald of Nixon Smiley's column concerning the Cash kidnapping case.

I thought this matter had long ago been straightened out, since it happened some 33 years ago, but as you probably will remember, Sheriff Coleman had nothing to do with the solution of this case other than quite by coincidence. He gave Franklin Pierce McCall a ride up to Miami from Princeton and turned McCall over to me with the statement that McCall wanted to talk to some F. B. I. agent. It was your friend Danner who finally broke McCall down and got his confession. Coleman had nothing to do with it but was smart enough after the case broke to remember that he had given McCall transportation to Miami.

I don't intend to write to the Herald to try to straighten them out, but it does grieve me to see them use a story that was an effort to attempt to malign the Director and which has long since been thoroughly discounted. The Miami Herald really goofed this one, and I suppose that for the next century they will continue to justify their violation of a confidence, which incidentally no other newspaper, wire service nor news media violated.

Jim Golden tells me you have not been feeling well, which I am sorry to hear. I wonder if it could be your cooking, and if it is, if you weren't so penurious, I would be happy to come down as your guest for a few days or a month and fix you some meals that might straighten you out (comped, of course.)

Everything is going fine out here, except that I am working too hard but I am enjoying it. Let me hear from you.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Danner

RGD/ss

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 14

May 19, 1971

Mr. Richard G. Danner
Desert Inn
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

Dear Dick:

The newspaper clipping which I sent you did not conform with what you had previously told me, that is why I thought you would be interested.

Don't ever suffer under any illusion that the Miami Herald "straightens anything out". As you know, it is open season on the Director, and for that matter, law and order in general. The Miami Herald's "goofing" this one certainly does not establish a precedent as we all know they are old hands at this.

Glad to know that everything is working out well with you.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

C. G. Rebozo

CGR:jl

A TRUE COPY

REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III

FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: NEWSDAY ARTICLE

New York sources advise the following scattered pieces of information:

A) A discreet look at the newspaper's publication calendar has been accomplished. There is no indication at this time that the subject series of articles will appear during the month of September. However, this could be subject to change because of the high priority being given to the article.

B) Unusual and highly secretive steps have been taken to prevent the substance of the article from becoming known to other employees.

C) A trusted member of the newspaper's staff has stated that heavy outside pressure is being exerted to uncover the details of the story before publication. This pressure is independent of the efforts being programmed from my office.

D) A firm consensus has been reached that Ed Guthman of the L. A. Times is close to this matter. It is alleged that he was in New York at the time of the planning stages of the inquiry.

E) Robert Greene, leader of the investigative group, has been in both Washington and Florida within the past two weeks.

Will continue to push and follow through on this matter.

REBOZO EXHIBIT No. 16

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN W. DEAN, III


FROM: JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: NEWSDAY ARTICLE ASSERTEDLY FINANCED BY
KENNEDY FOUNDATION

Proving this assertion may not be possible. As you know, it is based upon Bebe's observation that Greene and Guthman are Kennedy loyalists and that Moyers is now with the Kennedy Foundation.

I cannot believe that a matter of this sensitivity would be identifiable through normal investigative technique. It seems to me that we need harder input than now at hand in order to proceed.

I would suggest, however, that consideration be given to an oblique Nofziger media drop vis a vis the Kennedys, Newsday, the L.A. Times et al - a sort of an alert that we are aware.



REBOZO EXHIBIT NO. 17

V.

How this transaction was handled maybe highly relevant to an understanding of Mr. Rebozo's procedures for handling campaign funds. Mr. Rebozo's testimony doesn't explain adequately why he got the money in this manner, and we reiterate he has offered no proof of the campaign expenses for which, he has testified, this was repayment.

Section (3) of the subpoena (as narrowed to the period from November 6, 1968, to the present by section (4) of the subpoena dated January 24, 1974, ^{to Mr. Rebozo personally, verifiable Feb. 14, 1974.}) has also not been complied with. These records tie in directly to the transaction described in Section (2) of this subpoena. On April 15, 1969, Mr. Rebozo signed a check on the account of the Florida Nixon for President Committee to the Thomas Wakefield Special Account. The \$4,562.38 that Mr. Rebozo has testified was for his personal expenses came from this money. If indeed the money was to repay Mr. Rebozo for 1968 campaign expenses, the records of the Florida Nixon for President Committee should reflect that fact.

V. Subpoena dated January 24, 1974, to Charles G. Rebozo personally returnable Jan. 28, 1974.

Section (2) of this subpoena has not been complied with; it reads as follows:

And bring with you pursuant to Senate Resolution 60 of the 93rd

Congress the following:

- (2) Any and all original documents and original records which relate to the transfer of \$4,562.38 on June 28, 1972 from the Thomas H. Wakefield Special Account #2-1691 to the Wakefield, Hewitt and Webster Trust Account #1-0673 and which relate to the deposit, expenditure, disbursement or transfer of said funds from the Wakefield, Hewitt and Webster Trust Account including, but not limited to, books, files, ledgers, books of accounts, correspondence, notes, surveys, receipts, appointment books, diaries, memoranda, checks, check stubs, deposit slips, bank statements, petty cash records, telephone records, credit card vouchers and bills, expense reports, airline and railroad records, savings records, loan records, fund-raising records and records of gifts of cash, securities, and in-kind contributions.

Mr. Rebozo has testified that this transaction was accomplished as it was his way of paying himself for certain campaign expenses he incurred during the 1968 Presidential Campaign. The Select Committee has received no documentation supporting the claim. We do know the following:

a.) the transaction involving the \$4,562.38 occurred shortly after the Watergate break-in and in the midst of the 1972 Presidential Campaign, raising questions about such a late date for reimbursement of 1968 expenses.

b.) the method adopted, which included setting up the Thomas Wakefield Special Account #2-1691 on April 11, 1969, under Mr. Rebozo's control, is not an ordinary method for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses.

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:22 p.m., in room 337 Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., chairman.

Present: Senator Ervin.

Also present: Terry Lenzner, assistant chief counsel.

[The following testimony was given prior to the arrival of Senator Ervin.]

TESTIMONY OF HERBERT W. KALMBACH, ACCOMPANIED BY
EDWARD P. MORGAN, COUNSEL

Mr. LENZNER. This is a continuation in executive session. In public testimony, Mr. Kalmbach has been previously sworn.

Mr. Kalmbach, did you have occasion to discuss with Mr. Rebozo your fundraising activities in 1969 or 1970?

Mr. KALMBACH. It would be my recollection that I did.

Mr. LENZNER. And what was the purpose of you discussing those with him at that time.

In other words, were you asking him for specific names of people?

Mr. KALMBACH. I recall that in one instance, Mr. Rebozo set it up for me to see a prospective contributor, Mr. J. Paul Getty, in Europe.

And, I am certain that he was aware—well aware—of my fundraising activities in 1970.

Mr. LENZNER. So you think you had your discussion with him sometime in 1970?

Mr. KALMBACH. That is my recollection as to Mr. Getty.

Mr. LENZNER. Who asked you to see Mr. Rebozo with regard to Mr. Getty, if you recall?

Mr. KALMBACH. I don't recall that. I don't recall if he talked to me about it and he initiated it, or if someone suggested that I talk to him. I saw him from time to time in connection with the San Clemente property in matters involving the President, and I think probably it came up during one of those discussions, that he suggested that I talk to Mr. Getty, and I remember that he mentioned a Mr. C. Lansing Hays, who is Mr. Getty's attorney in New York.

I think there were other instances such as the Getty solicitation, but at this time I don't remember what they are.

Mr. LENZNER. Did he indicate to you when he initiated your seeing Mr. Getty, that the President had asked him to talk to you about that and asked you to do something about the Getty contribution?

Mr. KALMBACH. I don't recall that.

Mr. LENZNER. Did Mr. Rebozo, or anybody else, indicate that these funds were to be set aside for use other than for political contributions?

Mr. KALMBACH. I do not recall that. It was my understanding, and is my present recollection, that Mr. Getty was to be solicited for the 1970 senatorial campaign program, in which I was the primary solicitor of funds. And as I recall that, Mr. Getty pledged, I think it was \$50,000, and that pledge was realized on by Mr. Gleason dealing with Mr. Hays in New York. But that is my recollection.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you know if the funds went to the campaign or went to some other—

Mr. KALMBACH. I don't know.

Mr. LENZNER. You don't know how they were used?

Mr. KALMBACH. I made the solicitation and received the pledge, and as I say, Mr. Lenzner, I am not sure whether it was \$50,000 or \$100,000, but it is my best memory that it was \$50,000.

Mr. LENZNER. But you are not aware of who asked Mr. Rebozo, if anybody did, to talk to you about seeing Mr. Getty?

Mr. KALMBACH. No, I am not. I had the feeling at the time—and this is just an impression—that he had known Mr. Getty personally from earlier days, and this is something he would set up for me, since I had never met Mr. Getty before that time.

Mr. LENZNER. Would you remember when you went to see Mr. Getty?

Mr. KALMBACH. Yes, I would. I think it was in August of 1970, but I am not absolutely certain of that.

Mr. LENZNER. And your conversation with Mr. Rebozo was sometime prior to the summer of 1970?

Mr. KALMBACH. I think that is true.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall where that conversation took place?

Mr. KALMBACH. No. It could have taken place in San Clemente or in Washington, or it could have been by telephone.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall if anybody else was with you during that discussion?

Mr. KALMBACH. I do not.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you and Mr. Rebozo and President Nixon ever have joint conversations with regard to potential or specific contributors?

Mr. KALMBACH. No, I recall no such joint conversations.

Mr. LENZNER. Did you ever have a conversation with the President with regard to specific contributors and contributions?

Mr. KALMBACH. Excuse me. Would you restate that question, please?

Mr. LENZNER. Did you and President Nixon ever discuss specific contributors or contributions?

Mr. KALMBACH. I don't recall any conversations that were finance oriented. I think there were conversations that I had with the Presi-

dent from time to time where I would talk about a particular contributor, but I don't recall any meetings that I had with the President where the purpose of the meeting was to talk to him about campaign finance. I think it came up during the course of conversation.

Mr. LENZNER. Have you ever on occasion discussed the Hughes' contribution with President Nixon?

Mr. KALMBACH. I have not.

Mr. LENZNER. Do you recall sometime in 1968 or 1969 discussing with Mr. Jack Gleason, Gleason's conversations with Rebozo with regard to the acceptance of a contribution from somebody living abroad?

Mr. KALMBACH. I am not certain of your question.

Mr. LENZNER. Let's go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Back on the record.

• Did Mr. Rebozo suggest to you that you talk to Mr. Crosby, the head of Resorts International, to obtain political contributions?

Mr. KALMBACH. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. LENZNER. On one occasion did Mr. Rebozo suggest to you that you ought to talk to a Mr. Crosby?

Mr. KALMBACH. Yes.

Mr. LENZNER. And he is the head of the Paradise Island Resorts, is that right?

Mr. KALMBACH. He was head of an organization that I knew as Resorts International, and I think that I saw Mr. Crosby on several occasions, and one of the prime reasons that I would see him was to—I had the impression that he had not been given some recognition by the administration, and it was more of an expression that he was considered as a good friend, and please see him, Herb.

And I remember on one occasion, I—and I don't know whether Mr. Rebozo scheduled this for me or whether I took the initiative—in seeing him for the pledge to the 1970 senatorial campaign program, which as I remember, the pledge was initially \$25,000, and eventually, my memory tells me, eventually the amount of the contribution to that program was \$5,000.

Also, at this point I want to make it clear, I think that during the 1969 program, I think your earlier question was whether I was raising funds at that time, and the only funds that I recall that I received in 1969 was the \$100,000 from Milton Semer, and I don't recall whether I advised Mr. Rebozo about that or not. But I am sure that Mr. Rebozo was aware of my trust funds that I had under my control.

Mr. LENZNER. So, you are saying that Mr. Rebozo had noticed that you had a considerable amount of money left over after the 1968 campaigns?

Mr. KALMBACH. And that I was trustee for those funds. And, you know, it would be my memory that he knew of those funds that I was holding as trustee.

Mr. LENZNER. In fact, did he not, in early 1969, and we have the checks on this, send you checks with him as signator, checks for money that were deposited in your trustee accounts?

Mr. KALMBACH. That is correct, but I maintained that as a separate trustee account. And I was saying that he was also aware, in addi-

tion to that that he sent to me, that he was also aware of the funds that I had been asked to act as trustee for by Mr. Stans, on or about January 14, 1969.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, can you describe the circumstances surrounding the fact that he did furnish you with funds in 1969?

Mr. KALMBACH. Well, as I remember it, Mr. Lenzner, in February, or March I think it was, of 1969—it could have been April, or in that time period—Mr. Rebozo indicated to me that he had certain funds left over—as I understood it and as I understand it now—left over, I think, from the 1968 campaign. I think the fact is that they were funds that I understood were Floridians For Nixon or something like that, and again, as I remember it, he asked me to act as trustee for those funds, and he sent me, I think in totality \$400. First there was about \$216 and then there was another \$200, and I think there was only one disbursement out of those funds of some \$360 to Mr. Caulfield. That, as I remember it, I was authorized to so disburse by Mr. Ehrlichman, and it would be my memory that Mr. Ehrlichman was aware of these funds that Mr. Rebozo was holding and had been holding, and that Mr. Ehrlichman authorized me to accept this trusteeship and also that he authorized me to make the disbursement to Mr. Caulfield. Now, that is my best memory.

Now, in addition to this, I have been advised in the past in several different meetings such as this, that a \$1,000 check was drawn in my favor. Now, I don't have any recollection of such a check. It may well be that I did receive it and disbursed it pursuant to some authority. But I have no recollection of such.

Mr. LENZNER. Well, we can show that to you later and see if it refreshes your recollection.

Mr. KALMBACH. All right.

Mr. LENZNER. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. As you recall now, Mr. Kalmbach—and at some point you will want to refresh your recollection from notes that you say are over in the Special Prosecutor's office——

Mr. KALMBACH. That's correct.

Mr. LENZNER. But to the best of your recollection, did Mr. Rebozo know that the funds that he was sending you were going to be disbursed, and disbursed for a nonpolitical campaign?

Mr. KALMBACH. My best recollection is that there was an initial mailing to me of this check, with the admonition by Mr. Rebozo that this be set up where I am trustee for these funds. And I think the initial amount was just a couple of hundred dollars. And, my recollection is, too, that this is what I understood at the time, as funds that had been left over from the committee, Floridians For Nixon.

Now, I don't recall at that initial mailing that it was clear that Mr. Rebozo knew or advised me that these funds would be later disbursed for nonpolitical purposes. But, I think there came a time, within a month or two thereafter, where it was evident that a statement or bill had been received from Mr. Jack Caulfield for activities, as Mr. Caulfield alluded to it, these were activities of a person who "for the time being shall remain nameless," that sort of thing, and

I did not know at that time who he was talking about. And it would be my memory that I needed a couple of hundred dollars more in order to cover this check for \$360 which was to be disbursed out of this trustee account. And that money was sent to me by Mr. Rebozo. I then was able to write a check against the then \$400 total, leaving the present balance, which is still outstanding in the bank, in the Security Pacific Bank in Newport Beach, of some \$34 or \$48, or whatever it is.

But, I think at the time that the disbursement to Jack Caulfield occurred, it would be my impression, which I would like to be refreshed on by going through this file, it would be my impression (a) that Mr. Rebozo knew that these funds were going to be disbursed for this purpose, and also (b) that Mr. Ehrlichman knew and concurred or further authorized such disbursement.

MR. LENZNER. For the record, I want to furnish Mr. Kalmbach with what has been previously obtained—which I will represent reflects a partial transcript of an interview with Mr. Charles G. Rebozo in Miami, Fla., on October 17, 1973, and I want to furnish these materials to Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Morgan, his attorney, for their review with regard to the subject of attorney-client privileges so they may have access to this information.

I will also represent, on the record, that Mr. Rebozo was asked under oath this morning which attorneys represented him with regard to the question of the \$100,000 contribution from Hughes, and he responded that Mr. Gemmill did, Kenneth Gemmill, G-e-m-m-i-l-l, and that Mr. Griffin also did. When asked if he could name some other individuals that he consulted with, he indicated that he consulted with Mr. Meyer, with the President, President Nixon, and with one other individual whose name escapes me now, but who is not Mr. Kalmbach. In other words, he did not specify this morning that he consulted with Mr. Kalmbach.

Now, to save time while we are waiting for Senator Ervin, I would also like to point out specifically for the record and for Mr. Morgan and for Mr. Kalmbach, that in the questions and answers taken from the tape, which tape was done because Mr. Frates requested a recording of the conversation, the following questions and answers were given. And I might say that I have heard this tape and I represent that the transcript which I am going to ask to be made a part of this record is an accurate reflection of what is on the tape as best as I could hear it.

LENZNER. Yes, how about Mr. Kalmbach? Did you ever discuss this with him?

REBOZO. I probably told him about it. He was involved in—I saw him several times at the White House and in California.

LENZNER. And do you remember how it was, were you seeking his advice or counsel?

REBOZO. I don't think so. I think it was just a general discussion. You see, Kalmbach and I had business discussions naturally, on the San Clemente interest. He and I worked on the Yorba Linda house.

LENZNER. He, at that time, he was not aware of the fact that those funds had been supplied to you?

REBOZO. That is correct.

Skipping over some immaterial parts.

LENZNER. Apparently you had met with Mr. Kalmbach in the White House, at 8 a.m. in late April of this year, do you recall that?

REBOZO. Yes, I recall it. It was the day that Haldeman and Ehrlichman resigned, he was there.

And then I heard the word "principally" and the rest was inaudible on the tape.

LENZNER. Do you recall the two \$50,000 contributions came up?

REBOZO. Yeah, I believe I told him about it. That may be. . . .

And the rest of that sounded like "the first time" but was pretty inaudible.

LENZNER. Do you recall specifically what you told him about it and why you told him at that time?

REBOZO. No, other than—I mean, he had been involved in fundraising, and it wasn't going to be any secret. I guess I just told the key people that should know about it.

LENZNER. Did you ask him whether you should send the money back? Did that money question arise?

REBOZO. Well, that was April 30, 1973, and I think the decision was already made. If I did ask, it was just for his opinion.

LENZNER. Since you were already decided, did you communicate and tell him that you had already decided to send the money back?

REBOZO. I don't know. No, because as I recall the part about the Hughes money, it was just an irrelevant part of the conversation, irrelevant.

LENZNER. The purpose of the meeting was not to discuss that?

REBOZO. No.

And then, skipping over another part of that, I later asked: "Did you have any other discussions with him?"

And he answered, Rebozo answered, "I don't think so."

And I am just saying for the record, while we are here, that we feel that this conversation plus Mr. Rebozo's testimony under oath yesterday and this morning before the Select Committee indicates first, that he never sought any legal advice from Mr. Kalmbach according to his own testimony with regard to the \$100,000 contribution. He did not raise the attorney-client privilege when asked about that conversation. And if, indeed, such a privilege existed, which we believe clearly, the record clearly demonstrates does not, he has also clearly waived any privileges he may have had by both discussing it with us on October 17, 1973, and by not raising the attorney-client privilege at that time.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. LENZNER. Mr. Edward P. Morgan is representing Mr. Kalmbach here today.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the anticipated testimony from Mr. Kalmbach, it perhaps should be indicated at this point that Mr. Kalmbach has heretofore had some problem by reason of an impression or thought that perhaps the pertinent conversation was covered by the attorney-client privilege. I think I perhaps should say upon the record that Mr. Lenzner has acquainted me, as Mr. Kalmbach's counsel, with statements under oath by Mr. Rebozo on two or more occasions which suggest that he did not regard it as a conversation covered by the attorney-client privilege, that in fact, he did not regard Mr. Kalmbach as his attorney.

However, in view of the very strict canons in the State of California covering this matter with respect to an attorney, before Mr. Kalmbach testifies upon this matter, I would appreciate the thoughts

of the Chair as to whether it is felt that a bona fide attorney-client privilege is involved here.

Senator ERVIN. Have you put this statement in the record?

On the basis of this statement, I would rule that the statement shows that there was not even, from Mr. Rebozo's standpoint, that it was really not—an attorney-client relationship was not created, and for that reason, that Mr. Kalmbach would be required to testify.

Mr. MORGAN. With that statement of the chairman, Mr. Kalmbach, it is my thought that you should proceed.

Mr. LENZNER. I think just for the record, may I just ask Mr. Kalmbach one or two questions.

As I understand, Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Rebozo did not request you to do any legal research?

Mr. KALMBACH. He did not.

Mr. LENZNER. And did he pay you any retainer or fee for anything?

Mr. KALMBACH. No, he did not.

Mr. LENZNER. And as I understand it, the only concern that you had was based merely on the fact that at the time of April 30, 1972, when he asked to speak to you about—I am sorry, April 30, 1973—that on April 30, 1973, after Rebozo had discussed a number of other matters, he indicated to you that he wanted to go on something called the attorney-client basis. Is that correct?

Mr. KALMBACH. That is correct.

Mr. LENZNER. But he later discussed this matter with you on another occasion in January of 1974 when he did not specify it was an attorney-client basis?

Mr. KALMBACH. He did not at that time.

Mr. LENZNER. And on the basis of that, Mr. Chairman, and also on the transcripts and Mr. Rebozo's sworn testimony, I would suggest Mr. Kalmbach be directed to answer the questions.

Senator ERVIN. I so direct.

Mr. LENZNER. Now, as I understand, Mr. Kalmbach, you prepared a memorandum reflecting your conversations with Mr. Rebozo on this matter on the Hughes' money?

Mr. KALMBACH. I did.

Mr. LENZNER. You had put that in a sealed envelope direct to me and I would like to unseal that now and have that presented and ask you to read that into the record.

Mr. KALMBACH. Yes. This memorandum is dated February 3, 1974, entitled "Memorandum Relative to Conferences with C. G. Rebozo on Monday, April 30, 1973; Tuesday, May 1, 1973; and Tuesday, January 8, 1974." Sometime during the week of April 23, 1973, Bebe Rebozo called me at my office in Newport Beach—I think he was calling from Key Biscayne—and told me he had a matter he wanted to discuss with me, and asked when I would next be in the East.

I told him that I, too, had some items that I wanted to go over with him, and that I was scheduled to be deposed in Washington at 10 a.m., Monday, April 30, and that perhaps we could meet some time during my 1- or 2-day stay in the Capital, if he was going to be there at that time. He said he would be in Washington over the weekend, and suggested that we get together Sunday evening,

April 29. The way we left it was that he would call me early in the evening about the time of my projected arrival at the Madison Hotel.

On Sunday Jim O'Connor and I flew into Washington from Phoenix, Ariz., arriving at Dulles Airport around 7:15 p.m., and at the Madison around 8 p.m. At the time of our check-in, I was handed a telephone slip by the desk clerk which indicated that a Mr. Gregory had called. I remember showing the slip to Jim and identifying Gregory to him as Bebe's alias (I think it is his middle name).

Bebe had told me in his call during the prior week that he would use the name Gregory to identify himself if he missed me when he called the hotel and had to leave a message. I remember that he used that same alias at different other times in earlier years in similar circumstances.

I returned Bebe's call around 8:15 to the White House where he was staying, and we were immediately connected. He asked me if I could come down then or if it would be more convenient for us to meet earlier the next morning. It was finally decided that I would see him at 7:45 or 8 o'clock the next morning, and that we would meet in the lobby of the western wing of the White House.

At about 7:30 on Monday morning, April 30, I took a cab from the Madison to the Pennsylvania Avenue front gate entrance of the White House. I went through the gate using my White House pass, and entered the lobby sometime between 7:45 and 8 o'clock. The person on the desk called Bebe and announced my arrival, and within 5 or 10 minutes he came out and met me.

I recall that while I was waiting Bob Haldeman came into the lobby through the front entrance. He saw me, expressed surprise, and came over and shook my hand. I don't remember that we said anything other than an exchange of hellos, except he did ask me who I was waiting to see. I told him that I was there to see Bebe. He simply nodded, wished me well, and departed the lobby through the side door nearest the receptionist.

My total conversation with Haldeman didn't take more than 1 or 2 minutes. I have not seen or spoken to him since that date.

When Bebe came out and after we had exchanged greetings, he debated with himself as to where we should have our talk. Finally he decided we should use the Fish Room, which is just off the lobby. We went together and sat in the corner nearest the door. After we had sat down and Bebe had sent the steward for some coffee, he asked me how things were going and I replied that although it was a period of strain, that Barbara and I were bearing up, and that all things considered, things were going well.

I recall that I asked Bebe to relay my best wishes to the President and to the family, and to tell them that I wished them well. He then said that after our brief conversation the night before that he had told the family that we had just talked and that they had asked him to say hello for them all.

At this point, we began our discussion of the various matters to be considered, and it was agreed that we would go through my list of items before we talked of the matter that Bebe wanted to discuss.

My items included such matters as to my efforts relative to a re-financing of the San Clemente property; the status of a recent offer that I had received relative to the purchase of the President's Whittier property, the status of the President's tax refund for 1972, which was expected to issue that week, and certain miscellaneous questions relative to the maintenance of the San Clemente property including the status of the golf course facility.

After we had spent 10 or 15 minutes covering these points, Bebe went into the matter that he wanted to discuss. At the very outset, he said words to the effect, "Can I now go on an attorney-client basis with you, Herb, in discussing a personal problem that I have?" I replied that I would so regard a discussion on whatever followed as that between attorney and client, and asked him then to proceed.

He said the President had asked him to speak to me about this problem and not Maurice Stans. He said he had personally received \$100,000 in campaign contributions from Dick Danner representing Howard Hughes. He said that he had received two cash contributions of \$50,000 each in 1969 and 1970 (he didn't particularize as to the time and place of such payments or whether the \$100,000 had been earmarked by Hughes as being intended for a specific campaign or campaigns).

He said that the IRS had scheduled a meeting with him on this very subject, which would be held 2 or 3 weeks hence. He said that he had disbursed part of the funds to Rose Woods, to Don Nixon, to Ed Nixon and to unnamed others during the intervening years, and that he was now asking for my counsel on how to handle the problem.

In response to my questions, he reiterated that the money had been given to him as a contribution by Hughes, and that the expenditures he had made to the several individuals including Rose and the President's two brothers had come from the Hughes' cash.

I then said that my advice was that he should get the best tax lawyer that he could find, and give him not only the entire story but also the balance of the Hughes' cash for return to Hughes and a list of everyone to whom he had given money from these funds to which list should be attached, whatever backup could be obtained to show the use to which such funds had been put by the recipients. I said that he and his attorney should then lay out the facts of the matter exactly to the IRS.

Bebe in reply to my advice expressed grave reservations about so doing for the stated reason that, "This touches the President and the President's family, and I just can't do anything to add to his problems at this time, Herb."

I then said I would like to check the validity of my advice with Stanley Ebner, who I identified as the then general counsel at OMB in the White House, indicating further that Stan had been counsel to Maurice Stans' finance committee during the 1972 campaign, and that he had begun his duties with Stans after the new finance law took effect on April 7, 1972.

Bebe was very queasy about me talking to anyone about this matter, and I assured him I would not mention his name to Stan, and would talk to him only on a hypothetical basis. I added that I

would feel better about the advice I had given him if he would authorize me to check my thinking with Stan.

Finally, Bebe agreed and we said goodbye to each other after agreeing to meet the next morning at 8:30 in the lobby of the west wing of the White House. Immediately after Bebe and I parted, I used the phone in the lobby and called Stan at his office in the Executive Office Building. I found him in, and in response to my request for a few minutes of his time, he suggested that I come right over.

I went over to Stan's office about 9 o'clock, and after a very brief exchange of amenities, I asked him to let me check my judgment against his as to a special situation that had arisen.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, I don't know what your time problems are. Do you want to hear all of this?

Senator ERVIN. That's all right. I will tell them to come if they need me.

Mr. KALMBACH. I then recounted the facts as earlier expressed to me by Bebe. And I told him that in the fact situation: "A" had received \$100,000 in cash contributions and that he had not forwarded such funds to any campaign or campaigns but had instead held such funds over a period of years, and had in fact disbursed part of such \$100,000 to other individuals for miscellaneous purposes. "A" was now confronted with talking to the IRS and had asked me for my advice.

I then told Stan exactly what my advice had been. My recounting to Stan was as close to the facts that Bebe had given me as possible without, in fact, giving away Bebe's identity. I think I also ran quickly over several of my own problems with which Stan was familiar, and asked for his comments on these problems.

Stan agreed completely with what I had advised Bebe, and expressed himself that he could not see any other course for "A" to take in the fact situation presented. I left Stan's office about 9:15 and proceeded to Ed Morgan's office in the Farragut Building where I met Jim and Ed. Jim and I left Ed's office around 9:45 to meet William Dobrovir for my 10 o'clock Nader-Butz deposition.

I again met Bebe the next morning. I arrived by cab from the Madison, and was in the lobby around 8:30. When Bebe came out to see me, I remember that he—that we wandered around the lobby floor looking for a private meeting place. Finally with Rose Woods along, we went into a small room on the ground floor of the west wing. Rose left us, and we sat down behind a closed door.

I began recounting my visit with Stan including his confirmation of my suggested course of conduct for Bebe to follow, and before I had completely finished, Bebe cut short further discussion of the matter with a somewhat baffling comment, that he saw no problem but he thanked me for my thoughts.

I had the feeling at the time that he had made up his mind on what to do before that meeting, and cut me short when he found that I had not come up with a more acceptable alternative to my advice of Monday morning.

Bebe then launched into a bitter denunciation of the press, the Ervin committee, and the critics of the President generally. I recall

that he again urged me to move up on the refinancing of the San Clemente property. Bebe was very warm toward me, and expressed his appreciation for my counsel, and underlined his understanding that we had been in an attorney-client relationship during our discussions of the Hughes' cash. I, too, reaffirmed the attorney-client status of our talks.

Our entire conversation that Tuesday morning did not last longer than 15 or 20 minutes, and I recall that I left the White House around 9 a.m.

A third meeting was held with Bebe on Tuesday morning, January 8, 1974. He and I had talked by telephone once or twice after he arrived in San Clemente to be with the President during his stay in California. Never at any time during these telephone conversations did Bebe mention directly or indirectly our discussions in the White House on April 30, May 1.

And finally he called and asked me to meet with him on Tuesday January 8. I agreed to meet him at 8:30 in the morning at the mess at the western White House. On that date when I arrived at the gate, the guard told me that Mr. Rebozo had left word that I should proceed directly to the guest house in the living compound. This I did and arrived at the guest house—which is directly across a court from the President's quarters—at 8:30.

When I entered the guest house, Bebe told me that the reason he had switched our meeting place was because he had learned that a great number of the press were over at the offices, and we would be afforded greater privacy within the compound. Our meeting lasted for about 1 hour and 15 minutes and ranged across a number of subjects.

When Bebe called the meeting several days before, he indicated that the primary reason was that he wanted to discuss the Richard Nixon Foundation with me. We spent about 30 minutes discussing the Foundation, then moved on to cover other subjects.

At one point somewhat near the end of the meeting, Bebe said words to me to the effect that:

Undoubtedly, Herb, I have not told you that after you and I talked last spring regarding the Hughes money, I found that I had not in fact disbursed any of the Hughes' cash to the several people I named. When I went into the safe deposit box, I found that the wrappers around that cash had not been disturbed, and so it was clear that no part of this money had been used during the several years it was in my box.

I didn't make any comment at all to Bebe when he made this statement other than to acknowledge what he had said. We then went on to other items on the agenda, and I left him around 9:45 and drove up to Los Angeles—about a 2-hour drive—for a luncheon meeting.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, that is the end of it.

Mr. KALMBACH. That's the end of it.

Mr. LENZNER. Senator, because of the sensitive nature of this, only five of us here—because there are only five of us that know about the existence of this, I am asking that the transcript be sealed and delivered to you personally, and I also ask you to direct us, all of the individuals here, that we not disclose to any other person, except in Mr. Kalmbach's case obviously to Mr. Jaworski's group, and in my

case, to investigators if it becomes necessary to follow up on this; but other than that, that we be directed not to disclose or discuss this with anyone.

Senator ERVIN. I direct you to follow those instructions. If everyone will keep silent about this thing, nothing will get out except in those ways.

Mr. LENZNER. That's why we waited for you, Senator.

[Discussion off the record.]

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter recessed.]



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